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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Soviet intervention in Afghanistan
- Moscow on deferral of SALT II
- Hanoi on Chinese threat, Soviet support
- Kampuchean developments
- Kim Il-song on objectives for 1980
- Yugoslav budget debate
- Soviet leadership standings

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4 JANUARY 1980
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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AFGHANISTAN

The strong U.S. response to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has evoked new charges from Moscow that U.S. support for Afghan "counterrevolutionaries" constituted a threat not only to Afghanistan--the original justification--but also to the security of the Soviet Union itself. Moscow has continued to defend its military assistance to Kabul on the basis of provisions in the Soviet-Afghan treaty and the UN Charter and has now acknowledged a "limited" Soviet military presence in the country, to be used "exclusively" in rebuffing outside interference. While Moscow has refrained from any comprehensive assessment of the implications of the Afghanistan crisis for U.S.-Soviet relations, it has reacted to initial U.S. steps in response to Soviet intervention by stepping up criticism of the Carter Administration. Soviet media promptly and caustically reported the President's request for postponement of Senate consideration of SALT II.

World communist reaction has ranged from outspoken support by East Germany and Vietnam to outright condemnation by the Yugoslavs and Albanians. Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have seemed supportive, and Romania implicitly critical. The traditional moderates, Poland and Hungary, have observed the minimum formalities in indicating support but have refrained from commenting on the Soviet role.

Beijing has issued highly authoritative statements expressing grave concern over the Soviet intervention and has denounced Moscow's actions as a direct threat to Chinese security and a dangerous extension of the Brezhnev doctrine to the Third World. Cautiously avoiding any commitment to Chinese initiatives in response, however, Beijing has stressed the global strategic import of Moscow's intervention and has urged strong international steps to check it.

USSR SAYS "IMPERIALISM" POSED THREAT TO SOVIET SECURITY

Essentially defensive in justifying its military role in Afghanistan, Moscow is now seeking to deflect criticism of its actions with increasingly shrill charges against the United States. In effect, Moscow is claiming that the United States, faced with the loss of its positions in Iran on the Soviet periphery, sought to make common cause with the late Afghan president, Hafizollah Amin, to threaten the USSR through Afghanistan. Moscow has accused Washington of seizing on the Afghan situation to convince Muslim coun' 'es that the threat to

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peace in the region emanates from the USSR rather than the United States. Elaborating on themes prominent in commentary on the U.S.-Iranian crisis, Moscow has insisted that it is in fact the U.S. "interventionist" plans against Iran and Washington's naval buildup in the region which threaten the countries of the area.

Wary of Islamic reaction to its move, Moscow has not mentioned Iran as a base for rebel activity, as it occasionally did last year. While the Petrov PRAVDA article asserted that there were camps on Pakistani territory for the training of rebels, it did not specifically charge Islamabad with "connivance" and "complicity" in Afghan rebels' cross-border operations, as Petrov articles had done last April and June. The United States and the PRC remain the chief targets, along with Egypt, of Soviet allegations about foreign support and assistance for the Afghan "counterrevolutionaries."

Moscow has complained that the United States could have helped to "normalize" the situation in the area if it had tried to end the cross-border incursions, weighed in with Pakistan on the policy of granting centers for the rebels, and "informed China" that it was impermissible to interfere in Afghan affairs. But instead, Moscow has said, Washington has announced provision of "major funds" to Pakistan and has encouraged a "broad anti-Soviet campaign" at meetings with its allies in London and Brussels. Citing Afghanistan's "resolute" opposition to a UN discussion of the "nonexistent" Afghan question, Moscow has reported that Afghan Foreign Minister Dost had a "cordial, comradely" meeting with Gromyko on 4 January during a Moscow stopover en route to New York to explain Afghanistan's foreign policy at the United Nations.

JUSTIFICATION OF MILITARY ROLE

The claim that Soviet security interests were threatened by "aggression" against Afghanistan was first broached in Moscow's most authoritative commentary on the situation thus far, a 31 December article in PRAVDA under the byline "A. Petrov." The widely-publicized article also provided Moscow's first acknowledgment of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, maintaining that the "limited Soviet military contingent" would be used "exclusively" for assistance against outside armed interference. Petrov reiterated the earlier Soviet rationale for intervention by quoting Article 4 of the 1978 Soviet-Afghan treaty and citing provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Petrov asserted that the Afghan Government in 1978 and 1979 had "many times" requested military aid from the Soviet Union; he implied that Moscow had turned down these requests since it believed that "imperialist forces" would not "go beyond a certain limit and would show consideration for realities." But it was no secret, he declared, that the USSR would not allow Afghanistan to be "turned

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into a bridgehead for preparation of imperialist aggression" against the Soviet Union.

The following day Mikhaylov expanded on this line in IZVESTIYA, specifically stating that "for a time" the Soviet Union had "refrained from satisfying" Afghan requests, while making clear that it "would not permit" the long Soviet-Afghan border to be turned into a bridgehead for aggression against the USSR. And on 3 January, PRAVDA correspondents Demchenko and Mironov in Kabul asserted that the Pentagon and the CIA, having lost bases in Iran, were counting on "stealing up on our territory" through Afghanistan.

Even more explicitly, TASS Director General Losev, in a commentary carried on Moscow radio's World Service in English on the 3d, dismissed any notion that developments in Afghanistan might affect U.S. security, and maintained that "it was the Soviet Union which was directly threatened as a result of activities instigated by the U.S. special services." He accused National Security adviser Brzezinski of wanting to build a "strategic bulge" around the USSR's southern border and to fan anti-Soviet feeling among Muslim countries.

AFGHAN SECURITY SITUATION Reporting from Kabul by Soviet media "special correspondents" has begun to provide cautious acknowledgment of the tenuous security situation within the country, despite earlier affirmations that the "Afghan army" was in control and Kabul was calm. In line with Petrov's definition of Soviet military support as being confined to countering "outside" interference, there has been no suggestion of Soviet involvement in putting down internal unrest. As for any time limit on the Soviet military presence, Petrov asserted that the Soviet "contingent" would be pulled out of Afghanistan completely "when the reason" for its presence no longer existed. Moscow has, however, reported remarks by Afghan leader Karmal that would justify a lengthy Soviet stay: PRAVDA on the 3d cited him as saying Soviet forces would leave Afghanistan once the question of foreign aggression is removed and "when peace and security in the region are insured." PRAVDA also noted Karmal's statement that if "incitement" to aggression continued, Afghanistan would ask for "greater assistance" from the Soviet Union and "other peace-loving countries"--named by Karmal, according to a Kabul radio account, as Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola, and the Palestinians.

The first hint of difficulties within Afghanistan following the 27 December coup came on 3 January, when PRAVDA correspondents reported from Kabul that "it would be wrong" to think that foreign interference had ended and "counterrevolution had laid down its arms." The dispatch noted that shooting broke out in Kabul "several times" on New Year's eve

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and that a "detachment of raiders" heading for the radio station had been dispersed. Similar reports, it said, "are being received" from other parts of the country. IZVESTIYA correspondents reported on the same day that in visiting the office of a Kabul newspaper, "we were surprised that some of the journalists were armed with submachine guns" against forces of "foreign reaction and imperialism." And an IZVESTIYA report cited by TASS on the 3d noted that telephone and teletype communications with the outside world had been cut "for several days now" as a result of "terrorist" activity. In effect conceding continued problems in the countryside, IZVESTIYA added that "at the moment bands are conducting subversive activities against organs of people's power in the provinces and are disrupting transport."

SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS, DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow has publicized new Afghan leader Babrak Karmal's praise of the USSR's "genuine" friendship and "fraternal" assistance and has played up support of the population and the army for the government. Congratulating the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on its 15th anniversary, the CPSU Central Committee offered "fraternal" greetings to its "dear comrades," as did the Soviet message on the occasion a year ago. Last year's message had mentioned the Soviet-Afghan treaty, signed the previous month, and had referred to the "spirit of comradeship, sincere friendship, and revolutionary solidarity"; this year's message, broadcast by Moscow's domestic service on 31 December, spoke of relations of "friendship, solidarity, and cooperation" between the two countries and parties and did not mention the treaty. Reflecting the current circumstances, the message said the PDPA headed the struggle for "true people's power"--a Karmal phrase--and for defense of the country's independence from "interference of imperialism and its agents." The message pointedly called for rallying Afghan patriotic and progressive forces closely together--the national unity theme Moscow has pressed since at least last summer.

The status of the front is unclear: Karmal himself has been variously reported as saying that a broad front would be formed "at the earliest opportunity" and that the front, under party leadership and with the aid of the army, had "taken power into its own hands." Moscow also cited Karmal as saying, in his first radio address in which he outlined foreign and domestic policies, that "our immediate task in the present conditions is not the introduction of socialism."

Soviet reportage, based largly on Karmal's statements and Soviet correspondents' interviews with Afghan officials, has reflected the disruptions of the coup and the current reorganizations, ranging from a decision to "put in order" the defense and interior ministries to appointments of a new communications minister and a new head of the Afghan news agency, the publication of a new government newspaper, and the "resumption" of Kabul television.

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MOSCOW CALLS ADMINISTRATION SALT II DELAY AN "UNFRIENDLY STEP"

Moscow has yet to reveal in any comprehensive or authoritative fashion its view of the implications of the Afghan intervention for U.S.-Soviet relations. Moscow's sharp reaction to the Carter Administration's steps in connection with the crisis, however, as well as its charges of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan to justify the intervention, suggests that Soviet expectations are gloomy for the foreseeable future. The first report of the President's decision to request a deferral of Senate consideration of SALT II accused the Administration of joining with the foes of U.S.-Soviet detente.

Moscow's response to the President's 3 January request for a deferral of Senate action on SALT suggests that the Afghan crisis may bring a sharp escalation in Moscow's criticism of the Carter Administration's foreign policies. A brief TASS rejoinder on the 3d dismissed as a "pretext" the President's linkage of his decision to the Soviet Afghan intervention. Significantly, the TASS report added the Administration to the usual "reactionary quarters" that it accused of having "long been working" to postpone ratification of the treaty. A 4 January Moscow domestic radio account of the decision went even further. Calling the decision an "unfriendly act" toward the USSR, the radio account accused the "U.S. Government" of joining with those who hope to scuttle detente and step up international tension. Moscow's response to the SALT deferral decision comes in the wake of sharp Soviet criticism of NATO's decision to proceed with modernization of its theater nuclear forces in Europe and of the Administration's recently released five-year defense program.

Moscow has also responded vitriolicly to official U.S. denunciations of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Commentary has expanded on earlier charges of U.S. assistance to Afghan rebels and has escalated its criticism of Administration officials. After replaying attacks on President Carter's public remarks by Afghan leader Babrak Karmal on 2 January, TASS sharply criticized the President on its own authority in a commentary by its foreign news chief Goncharov on the 3d. Without acknowledging the substance of the President's remarks in an ABC interview, Goncharov said that his condemnation of the Soviet action in Afghanistan was "militant and malicious" and that he had distorted the "aims and nature" of Soviet policy. Goncharov called Washington's "propaganda campaign" over Afghanistan a maneuver intended to camouflage the American "military threat over Iran" and its revolution.

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EAST EUROPEANS DIVERGE IN TREATMENT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION

Moscow's orthodox Warsaw Pact allies have differed markedly in their reaction to the Soviet move into Afghanistan. While the hardliners--East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria--seem supportive of the USSR action, the moderate Hungarians and Poles have been notably restrained. Although joining the other allies in congratulating the new regime and reprinting the 31 December PRAVDA article by Petrov, Budapest and Warsaw have shown detachment in commenting on the Afghan events and have refrained from praising the Soviet military role. The maverick Romanians and Yugoslavs have each assailed the Soviet move--Bucharest indirectly, and Belgrade directly. Albania characteristically has denounced the intervention as "fascist" and part of a superpower plot.

While the parallels between the present Soviet action and the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia are far from exact, the arguments used by the Soviet Union to justify its actions in both cases are strikingly similar. In 1968 as in 1979, the Soviet Union claimed that it had acted in response to appeals by local authorities, and in both cases the Soviet Union stressed that local "counterrevolutionaries" were being encouraged and supported by outside hostile forces. Since the East Europeans cannot be unaware of these parallels, it is striking that their individual reactions to the Soviet move in Afghanistan parallel the attitudes they assumed in 1968.

GDR, BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA

East Germany, which had been Moscow's most enthusiastic partner in the intervention in Czechoslovakia, is now its most outspoken supporter on Afghanistan. Even before Moscow itself began commenting on the intervention, ADN on the 28th carried a statement of support, identified the next day as having been issued by the SED Politburo and GDR Council of Ministers--the only such official statement by an East European country thus far. The statement contained strong overtones of what has been termed in the West as the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, which was evolved by Moscow ex post facto to justify the Czechoslovak intervention. The GDR pronouncement stressed that the USSR had fulfilled its "internationalist" obligation in meeting the Afghan regime's request for military help to defeat the counterrevolution and defend the achievements of the Marxist revolution in that country. It also claimed that the Soviet intervention was "temporary," three days prior to Moscow's own assertion on this score in the PRAVDA article by Petrov on the 31st. On the elite level, GDR party and state leader Honecker, in a yearend article published in East German papers on the 31st, reiterated the GDR's support for the Soviet move into Afghanistan.

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In less voluminous comment, the other two bloc hardliners, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, have endorsed the USSR's "internationalist" action. While not thus far joining the GDR with top leader statements or official party-government pronouncements, these two countries have carried commentaries in their party press and broadcasts strongly supportive of the Soviet action and critical of the West for its condemnation of the intervention. In what may be construed as criticism of the reluctance by Budapest and Warsaw so far to support the Soviet action publicly, the Sofia agrarian daily ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME on 3 January asserted that support for the Soviet aid to Afghanistan "is now a touchstone to test the class approach, the correct attitude toward historical processes."

HUNGARY, POLAND Budapest and Warsaw media have confined themselves largely to treating the Soviet intervention as a news event, conspicuously refraining from any direct endorsement of the move. Budapest, in fact, noted in a broadcast on the 29th that President Carter had "sharply attacked the Soviet Union for its support of Afghanistan," adding in mild terms that "observers note that Carter would like to make capital" out of the Iran and Afghanistan developments for his reelection campaign. More direct support for the Soviet move was implied by a Budapest TV commentary on the 3d which remarked that "it was a matter of course" that the new Afghan regime asked for and received help from the USSR.

Comment from Poland has been similarly unspecific. One of the few direct references to the Soviet role was a commentary in the Warsaw daily DZIENNIK LUDOWY on the 2d which observed that the new Afghan authorities had received help, "including military aid," from the USSR. Another commentary on the 2d from PAP's Kabul correspondent made no mention of the Soviet role in portraying the new regime as successfully taking steps on its own to bring the situation in the capital back to normal. The most striking indication of Polish reserve on the issue, however, was a Warsaw speech by party leader Gierek on 3 January which barely mentioned the Afghan takeover in the context of a broad review of international events, stressing that the prospects for detente remained good.

ROMANIA Bucharest's criticism of the Soviet intervention was indirect. It was implied in President Ceausescu's regular New Year speech to the diplomatic corps, carried by Bucharest radio on 29 December, and in a 4 January SCINTEIA commentary. Reiterating Bucharest's stock opposition to the "policy of domination, force, and interference in the affairs of other states," Ceausescu went on to say that he didn't wish to give examples of such a policy "since everybody knows what it is all about." The SCINTEIA commentary, reported by AGERPRES on 4 January, similarly scored the "policy of domination and dictate...no matter what form it would take, no matter where and how."

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YUGOSLAVIA Authoritative Belgrade reaction came in a Foreign Secretariat statement, carried by TANJUG on 30 December, which expressed "astonishment" and "deep concern" over the Soviet action and declared that "any form whatsoever of foreign intervention or the imposition of alien will on sovereign states is inadmissible." Zagreb radio's outspoken commentator Sundic on 29 December derided Soviet contentions that the intervention was on the invitation of the new government and was justifiable under the Soviet-Afghan treaty. Three days later on 1 January, Sundic noted pointedly that the "most worrisome aspect" of the intervention is that it was Moscow's first outside the Soviet bloc and thus has "broken the ice for similar moves in some other country which, like Afghanistan, does not belong to any military alliance."

ALBANIA Tirana comment on the action thus far has come in brief news reports and a 30 December ZERI I POPULLIT editorial on the Iranian situation. A Tirana radio report on 29 December said that the intervention "clearly indicates the aggressive and fascist nature of the Soviet social imperialists and their warmongering policy and actions." The ZERI I POPULLIT editorial linked the Soviet move to the U.S. pressures on Iran, saying that they reflect a "coordinated strategy" by the two superpowers which poses a "direct threat to the states of the Gulf and all the Arab peoples."

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HANOI, PHNOM PENH, VIENTIANE SUPPORT SOVIET INTERVENTION

Setting the tone for Indochinese communist comment on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Hanoi moved quickly on the 29th and 30th to express support for the Karmal regime, sending messages from state and party leaders congratulating Karmal on his appointments and pledging Vietnam's "resolute support" for Afghanistan's "development and national defense." A 31 December NHAN DAN editorial defending Moscow's actions dutifully denounced alleged U.S. and Chinese "interference" in Afghanistan and praised Moscow's dispatch of troops under the terms of the Soviet-Afghan treaty as a "noble and generous" action which saved Afghanistan from the type of genocide that took place in Kampuchea under Pol Pot. Hanoi has not yet commented on Karmal's request for possible military assistance from Vietnam. While a 3 January Hanoi radio report did take note of Karmal's call for assistance from "peace-loving peoples," it omitted Karmal's remarks specifically identifying Vietnam as one of those countries.

Phnom Penh and Vientiane followed Hanoi's lead, offering their support and praise for the Soviet actions and the new Afghan Government. PRK Foreign Minister Hun Sen, meeting with the Soviet ambassador on the 31st, called the Soviet actions "opportune and effective" and offered the KPRC's "total support" for the dispatch of Soviet troops. Vientiane offered its support to the new Afghan regime in a message from Lao leaders to Karmal on the 1st. A 3 January commentary in the Lao party paper SIANG PASASON denounced Amin, the United States, and China, while praising the Soviet dispatch of troops as "effacious and friendly assistance" which "positively" contributed to world peace.

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PRC SEES GRAVE THREAT, URGES STRONG INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The seriousness with which Beijing views Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan is apparent in both the authority and the substance of its public comment. Beijing issued a PRC Government statement on 30 December, and on the following day Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Haifeng called in the Soviet ambassador for an "interview," and RENMIN RIBAO published an editorial on the Soviet action.

The issuance of the government statement takes on particular importance because such statements traditionally have been reserved for events which Beijing has perceived as critically and directly affecting Chinese interests. The last such statements, in January 1979, concerned the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea; they were previously issued at major junctures in the Vietnam war, in 1971 on the Indo-Pakistani war, and in 1975 on the Indian annexation of Sikkim. Beijing's concern is also underlined in the decision to publish editorial comment. Previous instances of Soviet interference in Third World countries--in Angola in 1975, in the Shaba disputes of 1976 and 1977, and in the 1978 Somali-Ethiopian war--were all denounced in lower level RENMIN RIBAO Commentator articles.

PERCEPTION OF THREAT The toughly worded government statement "vigorously condemned" Moscow's "wanton violation" of all norms of international behavior and warned that its "hegemonistic action" poses a "grave threat to peace and security in Asia and the whole world." The statement called the Soviet intervention a "grave step for a southward thrust to the Indian Ocean," and it warned that Moscow's extension of the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" to nonalined and Islamic countries with which it has signed treaties of friendship and cooperation is an ominous portent. The statement "firmly demanded" the cessation of Soviet intervention and aggression in Afghanistan and the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces.

Zhang Haifeng's lecture to the Soviet ambassador went further than the statement in underscoring direct Chinese security concerns. According to the XINHUA account of the "interview" on the 31st, Zhang stated flatly that, because Afghanistan is "China's neighbor," the Soviet intervention "poses a threat to China's security" which "cannot but arouse the grave concern of the Chinese people."

The RENMIN RIBAO editorial elaborated Beijing's charges as set down in the government statement. It called the Soviet action "the most serious act of aggression" by Moscow since the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, compared Moscow's justifications to those of Hitler on the eve of World War II, and suggested that Moscow's direct use of its own military forces outside the bloc marks a "new stage" in its "aggression and expansion."

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CALL FOR JOINT RESPONSE Despite the evident gravity with which Beijing views the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, China's public statements have given no indication that it is contemplating any unilateral response. None of the Chinese comment, surprisingly, has offered even a perfunctory commitment of the Chinese Government and people to support the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation as, for example, Beijing had pledged to the Czech people in 1968. Beijing's comment has instead called for a strong international response, particularly from the United States.

The PRC Government statement, exemplifying Beijing's effort to muster world reaction, pledged that "the Chinese Government and people will work tirelessly with all countries and people who love peace and uphold justice to frustrate Soviet acts of aggression and expansion." Similarly, the RENMIN RIBAO editorial warned that world peace can be maintained only if the world's people "exert pressure on those hegemonists who stop at nothing to engage in aggression and expansion" in order to "stop them from committing aggression" and "force them to observe the most rudimentary principles" of international behavior.

That Beijing is looking to Washington for a strong response to the Soviet actions was pointedly underscored in XINHUA's 3 January account of PRC Ambassador to Washington Chai Zemin's banquet for Secretary Vance on the first anniversary of the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations. In the context of reporting Chai's routine observation that strengthened Sino-American relations are in the interests of "peace, security, and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large," XINHUA quoted Chai's enjoinder that "we should by no means underestimate the gravity" of the Afghan incident, as well as his call for "all peace-loving and justice-upholding countries" to consider how to take "forceful joint countermeasures to the Soviet acts of aggression."

Chai's call was echoed by Foreign Minister Huang Hua at a 3 January Beijing banquet hosted by U.S. Ambassador Leonard Woodcock to mark the same occasion. According to XINHUA, Huang stated in his speech that Moscow's "hegemonistic action has given rise to strong repercussions throughout the world and put people on the alert." He maintained that "we should deal with [the situation] seriously" and "take all effective measures to frustrate the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan," and he stressed that "only when all the Asian and Pacific countries, as well as other countries opposed to hegemonism, strengthen their friendly cooperation can world peace be effectively maintained and security and stability in the Asian and Pacific region be safeguarded."

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Chinese comment on the Soviet intervention has suggested that Western--and implicitly U.S.--indecisiveness in meeting Soviet challenges created the opportunity for Moscow's actions in Afghanistan. Linking the Soviet action to failure to deal firmly with the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea last year, the RENMIN RIBAO editorial recalled that "certain friends in the world have indulged in the illusion of making certain concessions to the aggressors" in hopes of seeking a "political settlement" of the Kampuchean question. "This kind of attitude," the editorial warned, "has not only encouraged Hanoi but has also boosted the courage of Moscow in laying its hands on Kabul." Noting Afghanistan's strategic position in South Asia, the editorial predicted that "subsequent developments" in the Afghan crisis will "exert an important impact" on the "pattern" of Soviet-U.S. rivalry and the world situation in the 1980s.

Beijing's coverage of the U.S. response thus far has concentrated on firm and strong high-level criticism of the Soviets. Thus, XINHUA on 1 January reported that President Carter in a 31 December ABC TV interview had accused Brezhnev of having given him a "false account" of Soviet actions. XINHUA on 3 January also reported both the recall of the U.S. ambassador from Moscow "in the light of the 'serious threat to peace'" posed by the invasion and the President's request for a postponement of Senate consideration of the SALT II treaty. Beijing has also favorably reported U.S. consideration of moves to seek condemnation of the Soviet Union in the UN General Assembly, and on 3 January XINHUA noted U.S. support for Security Council consideration of a demand for Soviet withdrawal in response to a letter to the council from 30 Western and Third World countries, including the PRC itself.

COMMENT ON AFGHAN RESISTANCE While Beijing has cautiously avoided explicit commitment of unilateral Chinese support for Afghan resistance to Soviet intervention and has rebutted Soviet charges of Chinese interference in the country, it has also called attention to the efforts of the Afghan rebel forces. XINHUA on 1 and 2 January, for example, reported that the internal situation in Afghanistan "remains tense" since Soviet troops were still fighting Afghan soldiers in Kabul itself and that the resistance had brought about a "complete breakdown" of communications throughout the country. In a 2 January XINHUA commentary criticizing the various justifications provided by PRAVDA for the Soviet action, Beijing rebutted charges that "'reactionaries' in Afghanistan were obtaining unlimited support from the United States, China, and some other countries" with the claim that the antigovernment Muslim forces had armed themselves with Soviet-made weapons taken from government troops. RENMIN RIBAO had suggested early on in the crisis--in a commentary on 16 December, for example--that in introducing its own forces into Afghanistan, Moscow would soon find itself in the same "quagmire" that the United States encountered in Vietnam.

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INDOCHINA

While continuing to consolidate its military control over Kampuchea, Hanoi has drawn attention to new tension on its border with China, claiming for the first time since the Sino-Vietnamese talks began ten months ago that the Chinese have occupied additional territory within Vietnam. Playing up its Soviet connection as a potential deterrent to any future Chinese attack, Hanoi has also publicized unusually explicit expressions of Soviet support, voiced by Admiral Gorshkov during his visit to Vietnam for army day, which appear to include the possibility of the use of Soviet troops in Vietnam. Moscow's failure to acknowledge Gorshkov's statements in Hanoi is consistent with its traditional reluctance to commit the Soviet Union to any specific counteraction in the event of another Chinese attack.

HANOI HIGHLIGHTS SOVIET TIES, CLAIMS CHINESE "PROVOCATION"

SOVIET TIES Hanoi used the visit by Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, vice-minister of national defense and commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, for Vietnamese army day celebrations to publicize what appears to be a new level of Soviet support for Vietnam. According to Hanoi, Admiral Gorshkov, in remarks during a 23 December visit to the Fifth Military Region, implied that Soviet "armed forces" might be used to aid Vietnam, thus going beyond the usual formulation that the Soviet "people" support Vietnam. Gorshkov reportedly declared, without elaboration, that the "Soviet armed forces are always ready to fulfill their internationalist obligations" to Vietnam, a characterization Hanoi itself uses to describe its own military presence in Kampuchea. Gorshkov touched on the theme of Soviet military support to Vietnam once again during a visit to the Seventh Military Region on the 25th. He pledged that the Soviets, in line with their obligations under the USSR-SRV treaty, will "step up" their assistance so that the Vietnamese people and army can "efficiently defend their country and strengthen their national defense."

Moscow is not known to have reported either Gorshkov statement. The 27 December RED STAR account of Gorshkov's visit to the Fifth Military Region excised all references to the admiral's remarks, reporting only those by the Vietnamese military region commander. In the past, Moscow had repeatedly stressed that its support to Vietnam reflects Soviet "loyalty" to its internationalist duty, but it has refrained from committing the Soviet Union to any specific

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counteraction should China attack again. This position was recently reflected by Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin in their message to the Vietnamese on the first anniversary of the USSR-SRV treaty in November.* In that message the Soviet leaders pledged only Moscow's "continued firm support" to the Vietnamese in their socialist construction and the "consolidation of their international position and security."

Although not as explicit as the remarks by Gorshkov, other Soviet officials have recently been more specific than usual in calling attention to Hanoi's relations with Moscow as a potential counterweight to any future Chinese action against Vietnam. For example, Central Committee official Nikolay Shishlin, in a Moscow radio commentary on the treaty anniversary, stressed the value of the pact in the face of the Chinese threat and reviewed the extensive Soviet-Vietnamese military relationship that now exists.

BORDER "PROVOCATION" Hanoi's claim of new tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border was reflected in a 29 December Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement. Issued with unusual promptness, apparently to reflect the gravity of the incident, the statement "strongly" protested a 28-29 December incident in Ha Tuyen Province which allegedly culminated on the 29th with the Chinese occupation of high point 1678, "more than 100 meters" inside Vietnamese territory. The spokesman's claim represents the first time since the Sino-Vietnamese talks began that Vietnam has officially charged Beijing with a new occupation of Vietnamese territory.

Hanoi's recent reporting on the actual conditions on the Sino-Vietnamese border bolsters its claim of increased tension there. A 2 January communique issued by the SRV Committee to Investigate PRC War Crimes claimed that in December Beijing engaged in 250 incidents of cross-border shelling. A November PRC War Crimes Committee communique had claimed only 380 land incidents of all kinds, In addition, Hanoi has underscored its claim of increasing tension by recently stepping up the number of its formal protests on border incidents, issuing one in October, two in November, and three in December.

BEIJING Chinese media have continued their pattern of recent weeks of playing down tension along the Sino-Vietnamese border while drawing attention to Vietnamese actions in the Thai-Kampuchean border area. Beijing has thus far not responded to Hanoi's 29 December Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, nor has it mentioned the alleged 28-29 December incident which prompted

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* The treaty anniversary is discussed in the 15 November 1979 TRENDS, pages 17-19.

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Hanoi's protest. The last border violations mentioned in Chinese media were incidents of firing across the border into Guangxi Province communes on 18 December, reported in a 25 December XINHUA review of Vietnamese provocations in the early December period. The last formal Chinese protest of Vietnamese provocations on the border came in an 18 December PRC Foreign Ministry note. While Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong charged at a session of the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations on the following day that Hanoi's provocations on the Chinese border had been "stepped up," he also reiterated Beijing's contention that such efforts to intensify hostility against China are a "smokescreen" for Vietnamese actions in Kampuchea.

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PEN SOVAN VISIT UNDERSCORES SRV MILITARY ROLE IN KAMPUCHEA

Judging by the activities of PRK Vice President and Defense Minister Pen Sovan during his first official visit to Vietnam, his 17-25 December stay provided an opportunity for coordination with Hanoi of joint dry season military operations. That military tactics were a major topic of discussion during the visit was implied by the composition of the two delegations to the bilateral talks. In addition, VCP Politburo member Le Duc Tho, a key figure in the 1975 campaign to take over South Vietnam, made several rare appearances in Hanoi before and during the visit, although he was not specifically reported to have met with Pen Sovan. The Democratic Kampuchean radio has charged that Le Duc Tho is the Vietnamese official actually in control in Kampuchea.

According to VNA, the SRV delegation was not headed by Pen Sovan's host, Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, but by VPA Chief of Staff Senior General Van Tien Dung, who was the chief architect of the 1975 campaign to liberate South Vietnam. Dung was joined at the talks by Major Generals Bui Phung, head of the VPA Logistics Department; Dang Vu Hiep, deputy chief of the VPA political department; and Le Ngoc Hien, deputy chief of the general staff--all members of the command structure of the South Vietnam liberation campaign; and Major General Vu Xuan Chiem, a vice defense minister and rear services specialist. The Kampuchean delegation included Di Phin, the head of the logistics department; a deputy chief of the general staff; and a deputy political department director.

Characterizing the bilateral talks in remarks at the 24 December reciprocal banquet, Giap noted that they focused on "important matters" of mutual interest for the revolution in both countries and that the two sides had "fully agreed" on the "necessary guidelines and measures" for strengthening defense capabilities and "consolidating and developing" the revolution in the two countries.

SRV, PRK DENOUNCE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEAN LEADERSHIP CHANGES

Consistent with Vietnam's longstanding position that the situation in Kampuchea is irreversible, Hanoi and its Phnom Penh ally have criticized the recently announced changes in the leadership of the Democratic Kampuchean forces, a reshuffle aimed at winning wider support for the ousted regime.* Capping Hanoi's view that the leadership changes represent a "farce" perpetrated by Beijing to breathe new life

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* See the 28 December 1979 TRENDS, pages 8-10, for a discussion of the announcement itself and Beijing's reaction to it.

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into the government overthrown by the Kampuchean people one year ago, a 29 December NHAN DAN article suggested that the reorganization will not result in any significant change in Kampuchea by calling attention to the fact that Pol Pot retains his army and party positions and Ieng Sary still holds his foreign affairs portfolio. Turning to the subject of Khieu Samphan's replacement of Pol Pot as prime minister, the NHAN DAN article asserted that he is "no better and no cleaner" than Pol Pot and must share responsibility for the former regime's crimes against the Kampuchean people.

Following its Vietnamese ally's lead, Phnom Penh dutifully denounced the leadership reshuffle in similar terms, labeling the installation of the "Khieu Samphan corpse" as a "desperate attempt" by Beijing, the United States, and ASEAN governments to restore the opposing regime. Focusing on the theme of ASEAN involvement in the leadership change, Phnom Penh radio on 28 December argued that foreign news reports on Thailand's premature surfacing of the reshuffle on the 21st--six days before it was announced by the PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of Democratic Kampuchea--demonstrated the "close contacts" between Thai authorities and Pol Pot, thus serving to weaken further Thai claims of neutrality on the Kampuchean issue.

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KOREA

KIM IL-SONG NEW YEAR SPEECH PLAYS DOWN REUNIFICATION ISSUE

Kim Il-song's New Year address failed to portray reunification as a North Korean responsibility, a sharp departure from previous speeches which while compatible with recent DPRK moderation toward the South also raises questions about the North's approach to the fundamental problem of the two Koreas. Kim was also silent on the United States and political developments in the South, thus maintaining Pyongyang's rhetorical restraint toward Seoul and Washington evident since ROK President Pak Chong-hui's assassination in October.

Concentrating on domestic issues, as he has in the past, Kim reviewed the year, set new priorities, and assigned economic, political, and military objectives for the coming year. In outlining the army's tasks, a subject he had not raised in the annual address since 1977, Kim did not go beyond a routine call for an increase in "combat readiness and efficiency" and for continued vigilance to "defend" the country.

REUNIFICATION Kim's New Year address, broadcast on 1 January, described reunification only as an objective for the South Korean people and, for the first time in eight years, did not list it along with economic work as a task for the North. In addition, his personal extension of "full support and encouragement" to the South Koreans in their "righteous patriotic struggle" gave less urgency to the reunification issue than in the past. Last year's address, for example, had labeled reunification "a sacred national duty of all Korean people." In his 1977 remarks, Kim had characterized reunification as the "greatest and cherished national desire of the entire Korean people" and had vowed that "our people are filled with . . . fiery determination to fight" for reunification.

Kim's handling of the reunification question was mirrored elsewhere: His New Year greeting to Chongyon, a pro-DPRK organization of Koreans in Japan, also placed less weight on the issue than had last year's message; and a 2 January NODONG SINMUN editorial, pegged to the Kim address, made no mention of reunification.

It is not yet clear whether Kim's treatment of reunification reflects a fundamental change in North Korea's position on the question or was prompted by other overriding DPRK concerns. His speech reinforced

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other indications that Pyongyang is preoccupied with internal economic and political preparations for the Sixth KWP Congress. Thus, in emphasizing the need for domestic preparations for the congress, Kim echoed a theme raised last month in the announcement that the congress would convene in October. Economic considerations do not appear to explain completely Kim's treatment of reunification, however. In his New Year addresses in both 1971 and 1978--years opening new economic plans--he had focused attention on economic tasks but had still given more attention to reunification than he did this year.

The North's economic planning, outlined again by Kim, would seem to suggest that Pyongyang is counting on a peaceful environment for at least the short term. He underlined, as he did last year, the importance of foreign trade and called for "great efforts" to develop that sector of the economy.

TREATMENT OF ROK, U.S. Following Pak Chong-hui's assassination in late October, Pyongyang shifted its approach to both the ROK and the United States away from harsh criticism and toward restraint and moderation. Pyongyang has continued to be circumspect in its treatment of developments in the ROK, and it has said nothing to contradict its offer--contained in a 9 November NODONG SINMUN editorial--for North-South cooperation. The North has almost entirely avoided direct criticism of the Choe Kyu-ha government, and even the normally acerbic Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, a clandestine radio beamed from North to South Korea, has displayed relative restraint toward the new authorities in Seoul. Kim's handling of the South in his New Year address was consistent with this DPRK policy of restraint; he did not go beyond noting that the people in the South are struggling "under great adversity," thus eschewing any derogatory description of the current ROK regime.

Kim's failure to mention the United States in his address was also consistent with recent Pyongyang restraint toward the United States.* Criticism of the United States has not disappeared entirely from DPRK media, but the tone and frequency of the criticism indicate that Pyongyang is carefully measuring its comment. The last important DPRK pronouncement on the United States, and clearly the one still operative, was a 21 November NODONG SINMUN article calling for a reassessment of U.S. policy in Korea in the wake of Pak's death. Pyongyang's low-key handling of a 7 December incident in which U.S. ground troops crossed into the North's side of the demilitarized zone exemplified the DPRK's cautious approach toward the United States in the past two months.

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* Kim's New Year address in 1979 also failed to mention the United States and was followed by a period of rhetorical restraint toward Washington until July, after President Carter's visit to Seoul and the announcement postponing the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea.

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YUGOSLAVIA

ASSEMBLY APPROVES CONTROVERSIAL FEDERAL BUDGET HIKE

The Yugoslav Federal Assembly on 26 December approved a sharp increase in federal spending for 1980 after one of the stormiest and lengthiest budget debates in recent years. The final version of the 1980 budget, reduced only slightly from the original government-sponsored draft, features an increase in total federal spending of about 30 percent. While defense spending constitutes more than half of total federal spending and thus was an important aspect of the issue, it did not figure in the legislative opposition, which was focused sharply on the inflationary impact of the overall budget and the additional tax burden it would impose on the regions. The budget controversy thus offers new evidence of the assertiveness being shown by the Assembly--and regional interest groups in general--as the economic situation has become more strained.

The budget debate, which began with the government's submission of its proposal in early October, contained numerous examples of legislative obstreperousness. Belgrade BORBA on 11 October, for example, reported several delegates had indicated that they would reject such a budget hike "regardless of who makes the demands." Similarly, Belgrade POLITIKA on 18 October reported that an Assembly finance committee, composed of representatives from each of the eight regions, "unanimously" criticized the proposal as excessive, inflationary, and posing an undue strain on regional resources. Assembly bodies later criticized related government proposals to float bonds for budget financing and to put a lid on personal incomes. The current controversy comes against the background of other recent examples of legislative independence, such as the Assembly's criticism in 1978 of a government economic resolution and the opposition by Vojvodina delegates last June to a government proposal on powerplant construction.*

Even the military, the main beneficiary of the budget hike, was more vocal than usual in professing dissatisfaction with the results, adding to the impression of growing special interest competition in Yugoslav legislative politics. Defense Secretary Ljubicic, in a speech to an Assembly body reported by TANJUG on 27 November, maintained that even the requested increase of 40 percent in defense spending called for in the draft budget--and ultimately passed largely intact--was less than the military is entitled to under previous agreements. Echoing themes aired

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* Criticism of the government economic resolution is discussed in the 25 October 1978 TRENDS, pages 5-6.

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in budget debates of recent years, Ljubicic complained that the military had not received the more than one billion dollars it had expected during the 1977-79 period, calling these funds "enormous resources which we needed and which we did not get." In an interview carried by Belgrade POLITIKA on 20 December, Ljubicic made a rare acknowledgment that military hardware programs might be affected by the funding shortfalls when he said that the military would have to postpone some of its modernization plans.*

* For earlier examples of military lobbying efforts, see TRENDS of 23 February 1979, pages 21-22, and 11 October 1979, page 21.

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USSR

SUPREME SOVIET NOMINATIONS CONFIRM POLITBURO STANDINGS

Accounts of the first day of nominations for the forthcoming elections to the republic supreme soviets confirmed the established standing of top CPSU Politburo members and the apparent stabilization, at least for now, of the often seesaw relationship between potential Brezhnev successors Kirilenko and Chernenko. Judging by the two main status indicators provided by the nomination accounts--personal characterizations and numbers of nominations--Brezhnev ranks far above all the others, followed by Kosygin, Suslov, Kirilenko, and Chernenko, in that order. Thus, Chernenko is again fifth in the leadership, having slipped to a lower standing at the 7 November October Revolution anniversary parade. Kirilenko was again characterized as a "prominent party and state figure"--an honor he unaccountably lost in last year's nominations accounts.

The careful gradations of epithets published in PRAVDA on 20 December clearly distinguished the top five Soviet leaders from all others.* Brezhnev was given the exclusive title of "outstanding figure of our party and state and the international communist and workers movement, true continuer of Lenin's cause, and tireless fighter for peace and the happiness of people." Kosygin ranked second as "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state," "one of the leaders" (rukovoditeli) of the party, and a "consistent fighter" for implementation of the decisions of the party and the behests of Lenin. Suslov was a "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state" and "one of the leaders of the party and state," and he was praised for his "contribution to the development of Marxism-Leninism." Kirilenko was a "prominent party and state figure" who "devotes all his strength, knowledge, energy, and rich experience" to the development of the homeland. Chernenko was termed a "prominent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state" but with no elaboration. Other Politburo members received no praise or characterizations in PRAVDA.

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* Nominations on the first day include the largest number of nominations and characterizations and set the pattern for the whole campaign. Except for the first day of district level nominations a few days later, the opening day is the only day when the central press carries praise and characterizations of Politburo members other than Brezhnev.

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This year's characterizations contrast considerably with those on the first day of nominations for the USSR Supreme Soviet elections in December 1978. On that occasion, PRAVDA characterized Kosygin, Suslov, Chernenko, Kunayev, and Romanov as prominent figures of the party and state, while Kirilenko was termed only a "prominent figure of the Communist Party." This clearly represented a slight to Kirilenko, since in previous elections he had been called a prominent figure of both the party and state in PRAVDA reporting. Moreover, while reports on nominations in some republic papers in December 1978 described him as both a party and state figure, this title was downgraded in the PRAVDA accounts of these nominations.

In reporting the number of nominations per candidate, PRAVDA followed virtually the same pattern used in last year's nominations. Brezhnev had twice as many as anyone else and Kosygin was clearly second, while Suslov and Kirilenko were set slightly ahead of Chernenko and other Politburo members.

	20 December 1979	28 December 1978
Brezhnev	20	23
Kosygin	8	11
Suslov	3	4
Kirilenko	3	4
All others	2	2

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 24 - 30 DECEMBER 1979

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3030 items)		
European Disarmament	11%	(13%)
Afghan Situation	8%	(--)
Brezhnev Greeting to President Karmal	4%	(--)
Supreme Soviet Ratification of USSR-PDRY Friendship Treaty	5%	(--)
Joint Communique on Japanese Communist Party Delegation in USSR	3%	(--)

Beijing (608 items)		
Democratic Kampuchea Government Reorganization	15%	(--)
Afghan Situation	5%	(--)
SRV-Kampuchea Conflict	4%	(2%)
PRC-Ecuador Establishment of Diplomatic Relations	3%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

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- Shcherbitskiy's complaint

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9 JANUARY 1980
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-U.S.-AFGHANISTAN

Moscow is seeking to play down the international impact of its military intervention in Afghanistan and to focus attention instead on what Soviet officials contend is a turn in U.S. policy toward confrontation with the USSR. An authorized TASS statement on 6 January, the only expression of leadership views thus far, accused President Carter of using events in Afghanistan as a pretext for turning away from detente. In carefully measured language the statement sought to project confidence that retaliatory measures, announced by the President in his televised address on the 4th, would fail. Soviet media have been minimizing the extent of the crisis and maintaining a veneer of business-as-usual by providing relatively low-key coverage of developments in Afghanistan as well as international reaction.

Moscow's harsh recriminations against U.S. policy in the wake of the Afghanistan crisis come against the background of increasingly pessimistic assessments of U.S. policy and the prospects for relations in its authoritative statements since last fall. In December, even before the intervention, Soviet officials had begun to point to the NATO decision to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles and the expanded five-year defense program announced by the Carter Administration to warn of a fundamental turn in U.S. policy away from cooperation with the USSR.

There has yet to be any comment on the Afghan crisis or its implications from individual Soviet leaders. This situation should change at least by the end of the month, when top leaders begin giving major addresses on foreign and domestic policy in connection with the republic supreme soviet elections scheduled for 24 February.

MOSCOW CALLS AFGHAN CRISIS PRETEXT FOR U.S. COLD WAR STEPS

Moscow has characterized President Carter's 4 January television address and the retaliatory measures he announced as evidence of a broader shift in U.S. policy away from detente rather than a consequence of Afghanistan events. A 6 January TASS statement, officially conveying that message, sought to convince the Administration that its steps would have no influence on Soviet foreign policy. Although the TASS statement was remarkably free of bluster or harsh invective, Moscow commentaries carrying a similar message have not shown commensurate restraint.

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The TASS statement portrayed the President's address as an announcement of hardening of U.S. policy toward the USSR for which events in Afghanistan served only as the "main pretext." In measured language that eschewed any sense of crisis, it sought to depict the President as trying to pressure the USSR, an effort it calmly predicted was doomed to fail. The President's actions, the statement declared, are "hostile to the interests of peace," permeated by a "cold war spirit," and indicate a lack of appreciation of the international situation. The President, the statement went on to suggest, has overestimated the American ability to influence states against which it plans to take "this or that step." Buttressing its argument that the President's actions grow out of artificial rather than legitimate causes, the statement linked them to considerations of the 1980 election campaign. The TASS statement's concluding expression of hope that "a sane, far-sighted approach to Soviet-American relations . . . will ultimately prevail" in the United States suggests that Moscow is not counting on any early improvements.

Soviet commentaries on the President's speech have accused the Administration of fabricating from Afghan events an excuse for cold war measures and a camouflage for its own foreign policy designs. In a 6 January PRAVDA article, senior political observer Yuriy Zhukov used Carter's address, which he described as the frankest and most cynical expression yet of the "doctrine of hegemonism," to illustrate that the United States "is turning the helm increasingly sharply" away from the foreign policies to which it had adhered in the first half of the 1970's. Foreign affairs observer Oleg Anichkin charged in an 8 January domestic radio commentary that Carter's speech "clearly falsified the facts." The President is misleading American and world opinion, he asserted, by claiming that a threat to international peace had arisen in Southwest Asia as a result of Soviet actions. The real cause of the threat to peace, he contended, was the U.S. search for "military-strategic springboards" in the area to replace its lost position in Iran.

SOVIET OFFICIALS SEE HARDENING OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow appears to have concluded by mid-December--prior to its move into Afghanistan--that U.S.-Soviet relations were headed for a period of serious deterioration because of a hardening of U.S. policy. This assessment of U.S. policy and the accompanying bleak outlook for U.S.-Soviet relations began to emerge last fall but crystallized with NATO's mid-December decision to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and with the new five-year defense program unveiled by the Carter Administration. Moscow's new stance appears to constitute a step away from the emphasis on

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relations with the United States closely identified with President Brezhnev, but its broader ramifications for the Soviet leadership are not yet clear.

Two of Moscow's chief foreign policy spokesmen, Central Committee officials Vadim Zagladin and Valentin Falin, analyzed what they described as the "new situation" in international politics in a wide-ranging discussion of U.S. foreign policy on a 22 December Soviet central television program. Zagladin and Falin offered Soviet viewers a gloomy assessment of the evolution of U.S. policy since the mid-1970's and warned of difficult times ahead. They charged that recent U.S. actions--including NATO's modernization decision, the Administration's expanded five-year defense program, U.S. plans for a worldwide rapid deployment force, and the stalemate of SALT II--signal a return to a "policy" of relying on force to achieve American foreign policy goals. They appeared to underscore the fundamental character of the harsher policies adopted by the Carter Administration by finding their origins under President Ford. Characterizing President Carter's 12 December Business Council speech as a "turn" in American policy toward a "doctrine of hegemonism," the two officials held that under present day conditions such a policy was anachronistic, carried the likelihood of "complete miscalculation," and could result in "serious tension" in East-West relations.

Expanding on this basic theme in the wake of President Carter's 4 January speech, Soviet commentators on Moscow domestic radio's 6 January foreign affairs roundtable program suggested that a combination of factors had played a role in changing the U.S. attitude toward the Soviet Union. LITERARY GAZETTE political observer Lomeyko opined that the "party of balance," a broad coalition of forces in the United States and West Europe that had accepted the principle of equality in interstate relations during the early and mid-1970's, lost influence as the "party of superiority," meaning those forces wanting to achieve military supremacy over the Soviet Union, grew stronger in the latter part of the decade. The forces of superiority were aided, Lomeyko added, by four factors: The "lesson" of Vietnam faded as the temptation for Washington to intervene overseas with force increased; Washington continued to blame others--Cuba, Moscow, Khomeyni--for the worldwide growth of anti-Americanism; the United States opted to play Beijing against Moscow; and the promotion of chauvinistic attitudes by the American right wing encouraged the notion that the Soviet Union's growing international authority was a challenge necessitating an American response. Lomeyko concluded that Washington was miscalculating by opting for a "policy of strength" and hinted that Moscow would not shrink from competing for influence against the United States. Under conditions

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of parity, he said, a boomerang effect occurs in international politics, and any temporary unilateral advantage Washington might gain would be offset by a loss of its position and authority "at another time and in another place."

Moscow's harsh appraisal of U.S. policy represents a culmination of earlier indications of serious concern over trends in U.S. foreign policy since the June 1979 Vienna summit. Falin first expressed concern over what he suggested was an emerging pattern of increased militarism in U.S. policy in a 19 September PRAVDA article outlining Moscow's objections to NATO's modernization program. These same doubts over U.S. intentions later received more authoritative expression in Defense Minister Ustinov's 25 October PRAVDA article on the military balance in Europe. Rhetorically asking what the United States had been "driving at lately," Ustinov complained of "an intensification of U.S. military preparations throughout the world." He warned that the "practical steps" taken by Washington since the signing in Vienna of SALT II were leading to "serious complications" that threatened to delay SALT III and "burden" U.S.-Soviet relations. In an earlier central television program broadcast four days before Ustinov's article appeared, Zagladin and Falin had described an emerging shift to the right in Western politics and policy and a "turning point" in East-West relations which it had brought about.*

USSR DEFENDS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGAINST "EXTERNAL AGGRESSION"

Moscow has not responded to Western speculation that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan portends further territorial expansion but has in effect turned the charge around, accusing the United States of aggressive designs on Afghanistan, Iran, and the region in general. It has dismissed the Security Council debate as a "hostile" U.S. campaign against the USSR and Afghanistan unsupported by "many" council members—without acknowledging that only the USSR and the GDR voted against the resolution and without mentioning the prospect that the issue will be raised in the UN General Assembly.

On developments in Afghanistan itself, Moscow has presented a mixed picture, portraying a gradual return to stability but conceding that insurgent activities continue within the country. Soviet media, as would be expected, have remained entirely silent on Soviet military operations inside Afghanistan. Moscow has adhered to its basic position that its "limited military contingent" is in

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* The remarks by Ustinov, Zagladin and Falin are discussed in the TRENDS of 31 October 1979, pages 6-9.

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Afghanistan to help repel "external aggression" and that these forces will be withdrawn as soon as the external threat is eliminated. And in justification of the intervention, it has depicted intensified preparations for cross-border incursions, under U.S. and PRC sponsorship, from Pakistani territory. Moscow appears to be reserving judgment for the time being on Islamabad's position--whether it "yields to pressure" from the United States or takes the path of cooperation with Afghanistan.

The central press has been treating Afghanistan as merely one more foreign affairs story, covered in TASS and press dispatches on the usual foreign news pages with no boldface or banner headline features. The moderate broadcast volume on the issue reflects the limited number of authoritative statements--confined to the "A. Petrov" article in PRAVDA on 31 December and the 6 January TASS statement--and there has been no discernible difference in Soviet handling of the situation for domestic and foreign radio audiences.

INTERNAL SITUATION Moscow is trying to build an image of a new Afghan leadership enjoying widespread support, while at the same time continuing to note intermittent "terrorist acts" within the country and increased threats to Afghanistan from abroad in an effort to justify the Soviet military presence. TASS reported from Kabul on the 9th, for example, that tribal elders were sending congratulatory messages expressing "complete support" for the new leadership and its "revolutionary program." TASS claimed that "the majority" of the tribal groups supported the regime, and in a further indirect admission of tribal disaffection, it maintained that Afghanistan's "external enemies" had long tried to set the various tribes against each other and against the Kabul government and that this "subversive policy" was continuing "even now." In a rare allusion to Soviet activity in the country, an IZVESTIYA report from Kabul on the 4th on efforts to restore communications disrupted by terrorists cited an Afghan engineer as saying "our Soviet friends are rendering us invaluable aid in this respect."

EXTERNAL "AGGRESSION" In an effort to document its charges of U.S.-inspired aggression against Afghanistan from abroad, Moscow has been expanding on accusations common since last spring that CIA officers, as well as British and Chinese "specialists," have been training and arming Afghan insurgents at camps in Pakistan. PRAVDA's Yuriy Glukhov, in an article on the 8th, for the first time raised the question of U.S. designs on Baluchestan when he cited a Pakistani weekly as saying last July that "American intelligence is entertaining plans for the formation of a 'greater Baluchestan' which would include territories belonging to Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan" to be used for interference in

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the internal affairs of the states of the region. Other recent Soviet accounts have named some of the 30 rebel training and staging areas said to exist in Pakistan, have charged that "Pakistani army officers" are helping train the rebels, and have alleged that the CIA is planning and implementing the entry into Afghanistan of "tens of thousands" of Afghan rebels.

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USSR

LOCAL LEADERS DETAIL FOOD SHORTAGES, INDUSTRIAL SHORTFALLS

An unusual outpouring of regional complaints about shortages has illustrated the seriousness of the "interruptions" in supplies of food and other products mentioned by Brezhnev in his 27 November CPSU plenum speech. Evidently interpreting Brezhnev's remarks as opening the door for franker discussion of problems, regional leaders at republic party plenums in December detailed shortages of meat, milk, bread products, and other consumer goods in their respective republics. The poor overall economic performance also acknowledged in a number of republics appears to guarantee that shortages will continue and perhaps worsen.

FOOD SHORTAGES Republic party leaders focused on meat and milk shortages, although they also cited problems with baked bread products, vegetables, and canned goods. The most urgent complaints were voiced in the Baltic republics and Belorussia, where two years of bad weather have dealt severe blows to livestock raising.

At their republic plenums, Estonian Second Secretary Lebedev and Latvian First Secretary Voss indicated that their republics were striving to restore 1977 levels of meat and milk products, a task which they charged to the personal responsibility of first secretaries of all local party committees. Lebedev, according to the 19 December SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, stated that a "more or less normal" supply of meat had been restored only in the second half of 1979 and indicated that milk output had begun rising only in August after a "sharp fall" last winter. Arguing for measures to boost meat production, Voss was reported by the 12 December SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA to have described meat shortages as having "taken on an extended character."

Estonia has faced special unrest because of public resentment over the export of Estonian-produced meat to Moscow. For several months Estonian leaders have been attempting to explain away the meat shortages and to assure the public that shipments to Moscow had not been increased in 1979. Resentment has focused on First Secretary Vayno, who has been the target of several assassination attempts, according to Western reports.* Despite the touchiness of the subject, Lebedev, in his 18 December report, twice referred to the task of

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* See the 22 August 1979 TRENDS, pages 14-15.

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"fulfilling deliveries to the All-Union fund" in addition to supplying the local population with meat. Estonia was the only republic where deliveries to Moscow were mentioned publicly and where the Russian second secretary instead of the native first secretary delivered the plenum report.

Although the picture in Lithuania appeared brighter, Lithuanian First Secretary Grishkyavichus, according to the 13 December SOVETSKAYA LITVA, indicated that 1979 meat and milk sales would be below the plan. Belorussian First Secretary Masherov declared that "in the exceptionally difficult circumstances" of the 1979 drought, Belorussia had fallen 40 percent short in grain production, and he warned that with continuing fodder shortages, the coming winter would be just as hard for livestock raisers as was the summer drought. According to the 13 December SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, he also admitted "interruptions" in the supply of milk and expressed alarm at the continuing decline in the number of privately owned cows.

Meat and milk shortages were also mentioned by Azerbaijan First Secretary Aliyev, as reported in the 19 December BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY; Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev, 13 December SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA; Turkmen First Secretary Gapurov, 12 December TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA; and Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze, 11 December ZARYA VOSTOKA. Aliyev warned that "certain difficulties" in meat supplies will continue next year and complained that even in Baku one can buy fresh milk only in the morning and "at that not everywhere."

Shortages of some bread products were mentioned in eight republics, although the complaints focused mainly on assortment and quality rather than quantity. Azerbaijan leader Aliyev complained that bakeries had stopped producing many kinds of breads and rolls and blamed the reduced assortment and lower quality partly on a decline in the quality of available flour. Turkmen leader Gapurov spoke of "interruptions" in supplies of bakery goods, while Kirgiz leader Usubaliyev complained that only one or two types of bread products were being produced in many places.

SHORTAGES OF INDUSTRIAL GOODS

Leaders in most republics also echoed and elaborated on Brezhnev's criticism of "interruptions" in supplies of other types of consumer goods, the complaints being most acute in the Baltic republics and Belorussia. Latvian First Secretary Voss indicated that such shortages were spreading, declaring that unfortunately the list of goods in short supply "is not being reduced but, on the contrary, is acquiring a steady tendency to increase," and often includes goods "of which there were plenty only yesterday." Belorussian First Secretary Masherov complained of shortages caused by wild rumors and panic buying:

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"Recently under the influence of various kinds of silly rumors about price rises, enactment of monetary reforms, etc.," there have been runs on various goods and hoarding. He indicated, for example, that purchases of flour in Minsk suddenly rose 1000 percent last summer. Such panic buying and the ineffectiveness of official attempts to reassure the public have also been admitted in Estonia recently.* Estonian Second Secretary Lebedev in his 18 December report again expressed "alarm" at shortages of consumer goods, blaming them on mismanagement. Lithuanian First Secretary Grishkyavichus indicated that demand was outstripping supply. Leaders at the Kirgiz, Turkmen, Azerbaijan, and Ukrainian plenums also admitted "interruptions" in supply. Azerbaijan First Secretary Aliyev declared that "in fact" various goods had simply "disappeared from the counters."

Belorussian First Secretary Masherov also raised the rarely discussed question of indirect price rises. He criticized the practice of increasing production of higher priced goods and gradually stopping output of cheaper varieties, forcing the public to pay more for the same goods. This creates a "false situation" resulting in a "general rise in prices" for certain goods, he said.

INDUSTRIAL SLOWDOWN Along with the revelations of shortages of food and consumer goods, speeches at the republic plenums and supreme soviet sessions presented a generally gloomy picture of industrial growth—a prospect promising more shortages in the future. Most republics failed to fulfill the 1979 industrial growth targets, and only Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Belorussia, and Estonia scored well enough to suggest they may have a chance to fulfill the 1976-80 five-year plan goals. Although some leaders tried to obscure the shortfalls, others frankly admitted failure.

The poorest performances were registered in the Baltic and Central Asian republics. For example, Turkmen leader Gapurov acknowledged that his republic's industry had grown only 7.1 percent in four years, 10.9 percent behind the planned rate. Latvian leader Voss stated that his republic's industry grew only 1.5 to 2 percent during 1979 and would not be able to reach its relatively modest 27 percent five-year plan target. Lithuanian leader Grishkyavichus blamed the cold and "interruptions" in electric power and transport for slowing 1979 industrial growth and making it impossible for Lithuania to achieve its five-year plan targets.

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* See the 22 August 1979 TRENDS, pages 14-15.

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SHCHERBITSKIY COMPLAINS ABOUT LEADERS WHO PLAY FAVORITES

In remarks which could be read as a complaint against Brezhnev, Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy has criticized unnamed leaders who play favorites among their subordinates and react negatively to those who show initiative and principle. Shcherbitskiy's criticism is included in a long interview in the 28 December PRAVDA which is appropriately deferential to Brezhnev, citing him several times as a source of guidance and inspiration in party leadership. Nevertheless, some of Shcherbitskiy's remarks so aptly describe his own apparent predicament vis-a-vis Brezhnev--for example, his complaint about leaders who hold subordinates "at a far distance"--that they seem more than innocuous rhetoric. The interview comes against a background of earlier signs that Shcherbitskiy is beginning to take a public role in presuccession maneuvering.

The Shcherbitskiy interview focused on innovation in party work, and his remarks on favoritism seemed to depart from his main theme. The impression that his comments were deliberate and had political significance was reinforced by his remark at the end of the digression that he had raised these problems because of the approaching republic supreme soviet elections and because "the next party congress" is also "not far off."

The favoritism problem arises, according to Shcherbitskiy, when a leader takes an "uneven attitude toward his subordinates," keeping some "close at hand" while "others he will seem to hold at a far distance." This, said Shcherbitskiy, limits the leader's "circle of contacts," makes it difficult for others to gain access to him to discuss important questions, and gradually results in the leader becoming surrounded by obsequious people "who very skillfully find his weak points and use them for their own advantage." He complained that in these circumstances the leader sometimes becomes subjective in his appraisal of others and begins to label as "upstarts" and "quarrelsome" those who are "real enthusiasts, who are not complacent, who strive, and who are uncompromising," in a word, those who are "needed most of all."

While Shcherbitskiy's remarks were ostensibly general, they closely fit the situation he has faced since early 1978. Brezhnev had still appeared supportive of Shcherbitskiy in September 1977 when he presented him with a special "Hero of Socialist Labor" award for harvest successes and warmly praised him in the presentation speech, recalling that they had both worked at the same plant in Dnepropetrovsk.

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Relations seemed to cool soon afterward, since Shcherbitskiy was clearly shortchanged in honors on his 60th birthday in February 1978. In July 1978, when Brezhnev finally got around to presenting the Order of the October Revolution as the birthday award--a lesser award than normally given on such occasions--he was distinctly cool toward Shcherbitskiy. In the same year, Brezhnev began advancing his new favorite and close associate Chernenko, presumably with an eye to the succession. Shcherbitskiy has had to remain in Kiev, where he is essentially outside the succession contest.

Shcherbitskiy's comments come against a background of other suggestions that he is growing impatient with this situation. Since September Shcherbitskiy, together with his close patron Kirilenko, has apparently been maneuvering to hasten the calling of the next party congress. Implying that the new congress would be or should be held in 1980, Shcherbitskiy and his Ukrainian press organs have been altering the call for a socialist competition in honor of the 110th birthday of Lenin in April 1980 to include the 26th party congress among the events to be honored--an event which, as Brezhnev indicated in his 27 November plenum speech, is not due until 1981.* In the present PRAVDA interview, in addition to linking his criticism of favoritism by leaders to congress preparations, Shcherbitskiy again refers to mass efforts that would "worthily greet" Lenin's birthday and the "coming" 26th congress.

The Shcherbitskiy interview is reminiscent of an unusual article on collectivity which appeared in KOMMUNIST in August 1979 warning a leader not to try to override the collective. This article also admonished leaders not to "humiliate" subordinates with whom they disagree or to encourage their colleagues to act as subordinate clients.** The present PRAVDA interview, like the collectivity article, may reflect resistance to Brezhnev's maneuverings on behalf of Chernenko during 1978 and 1979.

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* See the 15 November 1979 TRENDS, pages 22-23.

** See the 19 September 1979 TRENDS, pages 1-5.

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INDOCHINA

An unprecedented meeting of Indochinese foreign ministers in Phnom Penh has provided a measure of the growing political and military ties among Hanoi, Kampuchea, and Laos, a development apparently calculated to defer Beijing from attacking Vietnam or its allies. Although the joint communique marking the conference denied that the 5 January meeting should be interpreted as a sign of an emerging Indochina federation, Hanoi comment suggests that the three countries are at least moving toward formal collective security arrangements. The apparent trend toward more structured expressions of Indochinese unity was underscored in the communique which, for the first time, voiced trilateral positions on a range of issues, including the need for nonaggression treaties with neighboring Southeast Asian countries--a position previously espoused only by Hanoi.

VIETNAM, KAMPUCHEA, LAOS DEEPEN POLITICAL, MILITARY TIES

The foreign ministers meeting itself suggests that Hanoi is taking institutional steps to materialize its traditional goal of a special relationship among the three Indochinese countries. According to the communique, future joint meetings will become a regular feature of Indochinese intercourse, with the three foreign ministers meeting at "definite times." The communique routinely rejected the charge, often made by Beijing, that Hanoi is bent upon restoring an Indochinese federation, but it repeatedly emphasized the importance of strengthening regional solidarity and cooperation in the face of the threat from China, which was denounced as the "most dangerous enemy" of the three countries. The communique claimed without elaboration that the foreign ministers had discussed "measures" to strengthen solidarity, friendship, and cooperation among the three countries in "construction and defense" in order to build an obstacle to Beijing's expansionist designs on Southeast Asia.

While Hanoi and its allies have used similarly vague language in the past to advocate military cooperation, an 8 January NHAN DAN editorial on the conference clearly exposed Hanoi's intention to create a defense alliance. It proclaimed for the first time that an "enemy attack against one country means an attack against all three countries"--a formulation used, for example, by Moscow in its bilateral mutual assistance pacts with its Warsaw Pact allies--and that such an attack would be met with a "collective counterblow."

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Hanoi's intention had been suggested earlier in connection with its bilateral treaties--signed with Laos in July 1977 and with Kampuchea in February 1979. Although both treaties, like the current communique, mentioned defense cooperation only in general terms, Hanoi has used those treaties to justify its military involvement in Kampuchea and Laos. In addition, last April Hanoi press comment declared that in the event of a Chinese attack on Laos, Vietnamese armed forces in carrying out their obligation under the treaty would "fight beside" the Lao army to defeat the aggression and defend the two countries.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 31 DECEMBER 1979 - 6 JANUARY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (2933 items)		
Afghan Situation	16%	(8%)
Cuban Revolution Anniversary	7%	(--)
European Disarmament	5%	(11%)
USSR Party-Government New Year's Greetings	5%	(--)
People's Republic of Kampuchea Liberation First Anniversary	4%	(--)

Beijing (658 items)		
Afghan Situation	32%	(5%)
PRC Government Statement	3%	(--)
PRC New Year's Activities	9%	(--)
PRC-U.S. Normalization of Relations Anniversary	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- USSR on U.S. policy trends, Afghanistan
- Communist split on Afghan intervention
- Beijing on Secretary Brown's visit
- DPRK offer of North-South leaders talks
- Belgrade, Moscow on Tito illness
- Moscow on Iranian sanctions
- Soviet livestock feed shortages
- Indochinese developments

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-U.S.-AFGHANISTAN

President Brezhnev has provided the Soviet leadership's first comprehensive assessment of the impact on East-West relations of the Soviet move into Afghanistan. In a front-page PRAVDA interview on 13 January, Brezhnev repeated Moscow's contention that Afghanistan served only as a pretext for a turn toward confrontation with the USSR that was already emergent in U.S. policy. Brezhnev prepared the Soviet people for a period of serious deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations, while clearly signaling Moscow's hope that European detente can remain on track. In the wake of the retaliatory measures announced by the White House, Soviet commentary on the United States has sharpened as it elaborates on the origins and implications of the perceived shift in U.S. foreign policy.

Moscow has glossed over its defeat in the UN General Assembly with the passage of a resolution deploring armed intervention in Afghanistan and calling for withdrawal of "the foreign troops." It has said only that the resolution was aimed at undermining Afghan security and was "forced through" by the United States and the PRC. Without mentioning the final tally, Moscow has hinted at defections by erstwhile allies in explaining that some UN delegations simply failed to understand what was happening "in and around" Afghanistan.

BREZHNEV ASSAILS U.S. STEPS, STRESSES PROSPECTS FOR EUROPE

President Brezhnev's blunt criticism of recent trends in U.S. foreign policy and his description of a "noticeable deterioration" in the international situation represent a belated but clear acknowledgment for the Soviet people of the gravity of the crisis that has ensued from Moscow's military intervention in Afghanistan. Brezhnev's remarks were clearly calculated as a message of reassurance on two fronts. In the area of foreign policy, he attempted to demonstrate that the leadership had acted with appropriate deliberation in sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan and that Moscow's policy of detente is still viable, at least in Europe. On the internal front, Brezhnev sought to play down the effect of U.S. trade restrictions, especially the reduction in grain shipments.

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His promise of no reduction in bread and bakery supplies, however, served mainly to highlight his failure to mention the chronically more troublesome issue of meat supplies.*

Brezhnev appeared prepared for a period of tense relations with the United States as he reviewed Moscow's chronicle of complaints about the Carter Administration's three years of foreign policy and laid on it the blame for the current deterioration. As had the 6 January authorized TASS statement, Brezhnev charged that events in Afghanistan served only as a pretext for the Administration to "aggravate" the international situation. He maintained that a shift in U.S. policy away from detente had been emerging "for some time already" and that, in the absence of Afghanistan, "certain circles" in the United States and NATO would "surely have found" another pretext. Brezhnev said the turn in U.S. policy had become apparent in such measures as NATO's May 1978 decision to upgrade its forces in Europe, the recent acceleration in U.S. defense spending, the announcement of plans for a U.S. "rapid deployment" military force, and most recently NATO's mid-December decision to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles in West Europe. Brezhnev criticized the Administration's "arbitrary and unilateral" violations of bilateral agreements and suggested that the world will come to recognize the United States as an unreliable partner motivated by "whim, caprice and emotional outburst."

Brezhnev's interview offered the clearest evidence yet that, although Moscow is pessimistic about future relations with the United States, it is counting on West Europe to continue the East-West dialog. He pointedly underscored the successes of detente in Europe to date and professed optimism about what might be further accomplished in the "near future."**

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* Recent evidence of Soviet concern over shortages in livestock feed is discussed in the USSR section of this TRENDS.

** Brezhnev reiterated the interest in talks on medium-range strategic weapons in the European theater that he had first expressed formally in a 6 November PRAVDA interview but said that such talks were not possible on the basis of NATO's "present position." The 10 January communique issued at the conclusion of French communist leader Marchais' visit to Moscow stated that talks will be possible only in the event of "cancellation of NATO's decisions on the production and deployment of new American missiles in Europe or a real discontinuation of their implementation."

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MOSCOW TERMS U.S. STEPS CULMINATION OF ANTI-SOVIET TREND

The strong U.S. response to Moscow's move into Afghanistan has sharpened Soviet commentary on U.S. policy and has brought a new turn in the Soviet assessment of the Carter Administration. Soviet commentary on the retaliatory measures announced by the White House has made explicit Moscow's conclusion that the President has finally endorsed the tougher line toward the USSR that Moscow has up to now associated with only one faction within the Administration. The thrust of Soviet commentary suggests that Moscow holds out little hope of an early return to meaningful dialog with the Carter Administration.

Moscow has characterized the Administration's posture on Soviet-American relations as the culmination of its long, if erratic, slide toward anti-Sovietism, a slide now accelerated by the upcoming presidential elections. Soviet commentators have attributed the deterioration of bilateral relations to the triumph of the "Brzezinski line" within the Carter Administration at the expense of more moderate elements. International affairs journalist Vitaliy Kobysh proclaimed in IZVESTIYA on 11 January that the philosophy of national security advisor Brzezinski, who he said is "well known for his extreme anti-communism and morbid anti-Sovietism," had become Washington's official policy. "Everything indicates," Kobysh went on, "that it is precisely he and no other who today determines U.S. actions in the world and its foreign policy program." A 12 January SELSKAYA ZHIZN article described the White House's "irresponsible" actions against the Soviet Union as a natural consequence of Brzezinski's growing inf'uence and the gradual transformation of the present Administration.

SALT Soviet commentators have assessed the Carter Administration's handling of SALT II over the last three years as illustrative of its unreliability and inconsistency as a negotiating partner. PRAVDA's New York correspondent Tomas Kolesnichenko on 10 January maintained that the Administration had yielded to "reaction" step by step on the treaty and in the process had ultimately "devalued detente's principles and its important achievement--SALT II." IZVESTIYA political observer Stanislav Kondrashov saw President Carter's "defection" to the ranks of the "hawks" on the question of SALT II as only the latest in a series of "vacillations" and "direct retreats" that have marked his Administration. At the same time, Moscow has signaled its continued supported for SALT II. The 10 January communique on French communist leader George Marchais' visit to Moscow said that the ratification of the SALT II agreement "would be an important step."

BACKGROUND Current Soviet statements on the policies of the Carter Administration suggest Moscow sees the fulfillment of its fears about trends in U.S. policy, trends it had repeatedly warned against

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in earlier authoritative statements. A major 17 June 1978 Soviet press editorial article, for example, had expressed concern that forces it characterized as opposed to detente and favoring military rivalry with the Soviet Union were beginning to get the "upper hand." Moscow continued to complain regularly about the Administration's "vacillation" on relations with Moscow in the face of pressure from the right until the signing of SALT II and the Vienna summit brought temporarily a new measure of restraint.

BREZHNEV REAFFIRMS JUSTIFICATION FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION

Brezhnev's 13 January PRAVDA interview seems to have been designed, at least in part, to deflect mounting criticism of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on the eve of the UN General Assembly vote on the issue. Brezhnev maintained that the USSR had acted responsibly and legally in sending troops into Afghanistan with the limited goal of helping Afghan forces repel "external aggression." Disparaging attempts to "distort" the Soviet role in Afghanistan with "mountains of lies," Brezhnev strongly reaffirmed the Soviet contention that outside aggression against Afghanistan had posed a threat to the Soviet Union's own security interests. Referring only briefly to UN discussion of the issue, Brezhnev echoed earlier Soviet and Afghan complaints that the United Nations was being used for "interference" in Afghan internal affairs.

DECISION TO INTERVENE, SECURITY INTERESTS

In seeking to demonstrate that Moscow had acted with measured deliberation, Brezhnev in his interview asserted that it had been "no simple decision" to intervene. The decision had been made, he said, only after the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government, "in full awareness of their responsibility," had taken into account the "sum total of circumstances." Reinforcing this image of caution and even reluctance, Brezhnev reiterated earlier Soviet assertions that the Afghan leadership under former President Taraki, "and then later," had "repeatedly" requested Soviet military assistance. He repeated Moscow's justification for the intervention, maintaining that it was in conformity with the 1978 Soviet-Afghan treaty and the UN Charter. In further justification of the move, Brezhnev evoked the USSR's national security interests, a theme which began to emerge in the 31 December "A. Petrov" article in PRAVDA, Moscow's first authoritative commentary on the situation. Claiming that Afghanistan faced losing its independence and being turned into an "imperialist military bridgehead," Brezhnev said the USSR could not "watch passively" while a "seat of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state" was being organized "on our southern border." Brezhnev also indicated that the action should have come as no surprise: "We warned those concerned," he said, "that if the aggression was not stopped, we would not abandon the Afghan people at a time of trial."

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EARLIER WARNINGS After the Herat rebellion last March, Moscow twice addressed the Afghan security situation at the elite level. Brezhnev in a June speech denounced "constant, secret, and blatant" attempts to interfere in Afghan affairs and cautioned that the Soviet Union would not leave Afghanistan "in the lurch." Gromyko at the UN General Assembly in September asserted that outside interference in Afghanistan was "inadmissible" and "must be stopped." Moscow also complained in authoritative PRAVDA articles under the pseudonymous bylines "A. Petrov" and "I. Aleksandro that the USSR, as Petrov said in June, could "not remain indifferent" to external aggression against Afghanistan. Foreshadowing the notion of a threat to Soviet security interests, the Petrov article last June--which still stands as Moscow's strongest warning to Pakistan about "direct complicity" in subversion against Afghanistan--declared that "the matter is moving toward a conflict in our immediate vicinity," a case of "actual aggression against a state with which the USSR has a common border."

TREATMENT OF PAKISTAN Brezhnev appeared to signal an interest in accommodation with Islamabad over the Afghan issue by referring to Pakistan explicitly only in the context of denying any Soviet "expansionist" designs in the region. While Soviet media have for months routinely accused Pakistan of harboring Afghan insurgents and recently have been charging Pakistani "servicemen" with involvement in training of the rebels, Brezhnev did not even specify whose territory was being used in launching the "undeclared war" against Afghanistan. Moscow has indicated its displeasure at the prospect of increased U.S. military aid to Pakistan, however, and Brezhnev presumably had Islamabad in mind when he noted that the United States plans to expand its military support for "those elements" fighting the Afghan Government. While his reference was obscure, other Soviet commentary has made clear that Moscow sees U.S. military aid to Pakistan as intended, at least in part, for the Afghan insurgents.

SOVIET "CONTINGENTS," DURATION OF PRESENCE In speaking of "Soviet military contingents" in Afghanistan, Brezhnev in effect admitted that the USSR's military presence is larger than the "limited military contingent" acknowledged in previous Soviet comment. As for the duration of the military presence, he went no further than the previous vague formulation that the Soviet forces will be "fully withdrawn" when the causes of the Afghan Government's request for their presence "disappear." Brezhnev hinted, however, that the Soviet stay might be prolonged when he emphasized the magnitude of the "external" threat to Afghanistan--"thousands and tens of thousands" of insurgents "sent into" that country in an "undeclared war."

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Moscow has mentioned the role its troops are playing only through the device of selective citations of Western press accounts suggesting support functions: PRAVDA on the 10th carried a TASS report citing the New York TIMES as saying the Afghan army "is waging battles while Soviet troops support it." TASS further quoted the London TIMES as reporting that the Afghan army had not revolted against the Soviet troops--"as claimed in the West," TASS interjected--but rather was "actively operating in conjunction with Soviet troops."

"AFGHAN QUESTION" AT UN

Brezhnev gave short shrift to the Security Council and General Assembly discussions of the Afghan situation. Echoing earlier Soviet comment, he claimed that the United Nations was "being used" for "interference" in Afghanistan's internal affairs and pointed out that the Afghan Government had objected to UN consideration of "the so-called 'Afghan question.'"

Reporting the 14 January UNGA passage of the resolution--which "strongly deplored" the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan and called for "immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of the foreign troops" there--Moscow mentioned neither the 104-18 vote tally nor the substance of the resolution. Moscow radio explained to domestic listeners on the 14th that some UN delegates failed to "grasp" what was happening "in and around Afghanistan." The resolution, "forced through" by the United States and the PRC, was in effect aimed at undermining Afghanistan's security, according to the radio's explanation. Without specifying the resolution's demands, Moscow merely reassured its audience that the resolution was "not binding" and had only "the character of a recommendation." Moscow selectively replayed speeches by those countries supporting the Soviet position, seeking to give the impression that "many" countries were supportive and that "democratic, progressive opinion" was on the Soviet side.

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MODERATE EAST EUROPE STATES JOIN ALLIES IN SUPPORTING MOSCOW

In an apparent bow to pressure for bloc solidarity, Moscow's two moderate East European allies, Hungary and Poland, initially reluctant to declare support for the Soviet move into Afghanistan, now appear to be falling into line. The Hungarian Government has finally issued a statement of support, and initial reports on current talks in Moscow between the Polish foreign minister and the USSR's Gromyko suggest that a formal Polish endorsement, however qualified, may be forthcoming.

In contrast, maverick Romania, which earlier had indirectly criticized the Soviet action, was again out of step with its Warsaw Pact allies by refusing to take part in the UN General Assembly vote on the Afghanistan resolution. The Yugoslavs, who voted for the resolution, continue to maintain a strong stand against the Soviet intervention. Belgrade's apprehensions at the present juncture may be heightened by the precarious state of Tito's health following recent unsuccessful surgery.

HUNGARY The 10 January Hungarian statement supporting the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was issued in the name of the Council of Ministers only, thus carrying somewhat less weight than the 29 December East German statement issued jointly by the SED Politburo and GDR Council of Ministers.* While recording pro forma support for Moscow's "assistance" to Afghanistan, the Hungarian statement stopped short of the GDR's vow to "stand jointly with the USSR" and "extend help in a spirit of solidarity" to Afghanistan. Prior to the Hungarian Government statement, which Soviet media promptly publicized, Budapest had provided little grist for Moscow's propaganda mill on the Afghan crisis, although Hungarian support for Moscow did pick up somewhat after President Carter's 4 January announcement of reprisal measures against the USSR.

On the 15th, the party daily NEPSZABADSAG carried an editorial strongly endorsing the remarks by Brezhnev on the Afghanistan issue in his interview in PRAVDA. The editorial in particular supported Brezhnev's criticism of the West for exaggerating the Afghanistan situation. It is not, said the paper, a blow to the strategic balance, as Washington asserts, but "a secondary battleground of world politics in every respect."

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* The other two bloc hardliners, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, have registered their support for Moscow through voluminous media comment, without thus far issuing official statements on the Afghan situation.

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POLAND Soviet media have also been hardpressed since the invasion of Afghanistan to find any supportive comment from Warsaw to publish. PRAVDA's first use of Polish comment appeared in its 5 January issue, which reported remarks by PZPR First Secretary Gierek two days earlier welcoming the change of government in Kabul while omitting any mention of the Soviet intervention. Although subsequent Warsaw comment has been more supportive, particularly after President Carter's 4 January speech, it has still not been featured in PRAVDA roundups of foreign statements of support for the Soviet action.

Warsaw's restrained view of the Soviet action in Afghanistan was further in evidence in a speech by Polish Foreign Minister Wojtaszek at a Kremlin luncheon on the 15th, the second day of his current visit to the USSR. In replying to a speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Wojtaszek carefully crafted his remarks to convey an impression of generalized support while withholding full Polish commitment to the Afghan intervention. Thus, without fully endorsing the overthrow of the Kabul government, he supported "the Afghan people's aspiration" to implement the ideals of the April 1978 revolution. He stopped short of direct approval of Moscow's military action, noting only that "the Soviet Union's all-round assistance supports these efforts of the Afghan people."

It is likely that Wojtaszek was summoned to Moscow to discuss the Afghanistan developments. He similarly traveled to Moscow "at the invitation of the Soviet Government" in January 1978, just after President Carter's visit to Warsaw, which like the present situation carried sensitive overtones for Soviet-Polish relations.

ROMANIA Romania's decision not to participate in the UN General Assembly vote condemning the Soviet action in Afghanistan seems consistent with the position of disapproval it has assumed since early in the crisis. According to Bucharest radio on 15 January, the Romanian delegate refused to endorse the UN action because the UN did not accept a Romanian resolution on the issue. The Romanian resolution would have urged that foreign troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan and provided that "no state will grant support to the anti-government forces in that country." Like the earlier indirect criticism of Soviet policy expressed by Ceausescu in his New Year address to the diplomatic corps and in a following SCINTEIA commentary, the radio report reiterated Romania's standard strictures on independence and sovereignty and ruled out the use of force and interference in the internal affairs of any country.

YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade has reinforced its initial official condemnation of the Soviet intervention in a series of official statements and media commentaries. Reflecting concern to preserve its nonalined image, Belgrade has taken pains to portray the Soviet

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action as a reflection of bloc behavior, rather than just Soviet behavior. Several commentaries have criticized what they claim are parallel efforts by the United States to consolidate its influence in the region around Afghanistan.

Despite these occasional critical references to U.S. actions, the continuation of Belgrade's condemnation of the Soviet intervention has touched off a new round of polemics with Moscow, adding to the strains in Soviet-Yugoslav relations already visible over Yugoslavia's relations with China, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, and the orientation of the nonalined movement. Moscow's first sally came in a Vladimir Bolshakov PRAVDA article on 8 January, which charged that some articles in Ljubljana DELO "repeat the slanders of imperialist propaganda" alleging that the Soviet action is "nothing but 'intervention.'" DELO on 10 January, as well as some other papers, responded by defending Yugoslav media treatment and accusing the Soviet press of distorted and incomplete reporting. A PRAVDA report on 13 January added to the polemic by reiterating some of Bolshakov's charges and complaining that Belgrade reportage has ignored interference in Afghanistan by "imperialist" and other forces.

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CUBA SIDES WITH USSR IN UNGA VOTE, OFFERS NO EXPLICIT SUPPORT

Faced with the dilemma of supporting its Soviet patron or lining up with nonalined nations in condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Cuba has tried to steer clear of the controversy by concentrating on attacking the United States. Although Havana cast a negative vote against the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the intervention—thus breaking ranks with the majority of nonalined states—it has failed to offer explicit endorsement of the Soviet moves. Cuban embarrassment was underlined in its abrupt withdrawal from the three-month struggle to win a UN Security Council seat after erosion of support for its bid following the Soviet action. Authoritative comment has been confined to Cuban representative Raul Roa Kouri's UNGA speech, briefly reported to the Cuban domestic audience. No message of greeting from Fidel Castro to the new Afghan leader has been reported.*

Cuba has ignored the details of the Soviet role, while blandly replaying Moscow's version of events in its sparse broadcast attention to Afghanistan. In his UNGA speech, selectively reported by Havana's domestic service on the 15th, Roa made no mention of U.S. charges of a direct Soviet role in the overthrow and execution of former Afghan President Amin. He accused the United States of "gross manipulation" of events in Afghanistan in an effort to take advantage of "what took place in that country." Roa justified Cuba's negative vote by arguing that to have voted otherwise would have constituted a "vote against socialism and alongside the accomplices of Zionism." Havana radio's account of the speech failed to mention that Roa lamented the fact that Cuba's "highly esteemed friends"—apparently the nonalined countries which voted for the resolution—had failed to "perceive the foul character of imperialist deception."

Havana radio did report that Roa stressed Cuban support for the right of peoples to their sovereignty, but it did not mention his ambiguous rejection of the idea that defense of this right was at issue. At the time of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia—an event somewhat parallel to the Afghan situation—Fidel Castro did acknowledge that "flagrant" violation of Czech sovereignty was undeniable. He offered qualified Cuban support for the move, however, arguing that the decision could not be justified legally but "only from the political point of view."

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* Castro apparently also failed to offer the customary greeting to Amin last September upon the ouster of his predecessor Taraki immediately after the latter's return from the nonalined summit conference in Havana. Cuba normally observes such protocol formalities and had greeted Taraki on his assumption of power after the April 1978 revolution.

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Aside from the reporting by PRENSA LATINA and Havana domestic radio on the exchanges of charges between Washington and Moscow, Cuban attention to the Afghan issue--most notably a commentary on the Revolutionary Armed Forces-Interior Ministry (FAR-MINT) political information program broadcast by Havana's domestic radio on 5 January--has focused on U.S. reprisals against the Soviet Union. The FAR-MINT commentary said the U.S. Administration had postponed Senate consideration of the SALT II treaty "because it objected to the military aid" Moscow had given to Afghanistan. Recalling U.S. protests last fall over the presence in Cuba of a "so-called" Soviet combat brigade, the commentary dismissed U.S. concern over Soviet involvement in Afghanistan as a new pretext aimed at "sabotaging" the treaty and "defaming" the Soviet Union.

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CHINA-U.S.-USSR

BEIJING APPLAUDS CALLS BY BROWN FOR COOPERATION AGAINST USSR

Beijing has taken evident satisfaction in the visit to China of U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, portraying consultations between the two sides as having special significance in the context of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan. Chinese comment preceding the visit had signaled Beijing's support for firm Administration steps in response to the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, and Beijing obviously welcomed Secretary Brown's forthright denunciations of Moscow's actions and his calls for parallel Sino-American responses to them.

During the 5-13 January visit Secretary Brown had courtesy talks with both Premier Hua Guofeng and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. While the visit produced no formal agreements, Chinese media have favorably portrayed the extension of bilateral cooperation to areas of defense and security.

STRATEGIC COLLABORATION Beijing's satisfaction with Secretary Brown's readiness to criticize Moscow openly and to call for parallel Sino-American action in response to Soviet moves was clearly reflected in Chinese reporting as his visit progressed. Initial comment on the visit's purpose stayed within limits established during previous high-level U.S. visits since the normalization of relations and did not link the Secretary's trip to the world situation in the wake of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan. Such linkage became the underlying theme of Chinese reporting as the visit proceeded, however.

Beijing's initial limited expectations for Secretary Brown's visit were reflected in XINHUA's report on his arrival, which observed only that the visit was intended to allow both sides to "exchange views on the present international situation and bilateral relations." The measured Chinese approach was maintained in XINHUA's 6 January report of the speech at the welcoming banquet by Secretary Brown's host, PRC Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian. Xu bitterly denounced Soviet actions in Afghanistan and routinely called for all countries to "unite and take effective measures and fight relentlessly" against Soviet hegemonism. He did not, however, call specifically for joint Sino-U.S. responses to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, instead repeating only the usual enjoinder that Beijing and Washington view their relations from "long-term political and strategic considerations."

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Chinese readiness to place the visit within the larger context of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan increased visibly following the Secretary's remarks on Soviet actions in Afghanistan at the 6 January banquet and particularly after the first session of working-level talks the next day with Vice Premier Geng Biao. XINHUA's report on the Geng-Brown talks on the 7th, for example, noted that after a "lengthy" discussion of the Afghan situation, both sides agreed to hold "follow-on discussions" on the impact of Moscow's actions on the region and to "consult further on appropriate responses." Xu Xiangqian's comments at the reciprocal banquet on 9 January were similarly optimistic on prospects for Sino-U.S. collaboration, declaring that talks during Secretary Brown's visit were "especially significant in light of the current situation" and that the developing relations between Washington and Beijing "will exert an influence which is not to be ignored for the maintenance of peace in Asia and the world." The XINHUA correspondents' commentary summarizing the results of the visit borrowed Secretary Brown's observation in his 6 January banquet speech that the defense talks had taken place "at a critical moment" and noted, again using Brown's words, that both sides have agreed to "take parallel actions" in opposing Soviet hegemonism. With respect to Afghanistan, the XINHUA correspondents stated that both sides plan to "make respective response that they consider appropriate" and to hold further consultations in the future.

DENG XIAOPING'S STATEMENTS As XINHUA reported his remarks on 8 January, Deng Xiaoping appeared particularly eager to press Sino-American collaboration against the Soviet Union in his talks with Secretary Brown that day. XINHUA, which rarely quotes the substance of Chinese leaders' comments when receiving foreign guests in Beijing, reported Deng's remarks at unusual length. XINHUA thus highlighted the vice premier's conviction that Moscow's policies of "hegemonism and global expansionism" will never change and that nations and peoples should "unite and deal seriously" with Soviet aggression. Washington and Beijing, XINHUA cited Deng as stating, should "do something in a down-to-earth way" to respond to Moscow. Deng's position was not seconded in XINHUA's account of Hua Guofeng's meeting with Secretary Brown on the 9th. That report noted only that Hua had "discussed in detail the situation in Afghanistan," although XINHUA had quoted Hua's remarks strongly attacking the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in talks with a visiting Egyptian official the previous day.

XINHUA's handling of the Secretary's talks with Deng Xiaoping was also remarkable for the news agency's apparent misrendering of Deng's call for the world's peoples to "unite" against Moscow. XINHUA's English-language report on the 8th translated Deng's remark as a call for all nations to "enter into an alliance" against Moscow.

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XINHUA emended its rendering two days later on 10 January, first by transmitting a service message noting that Deng had called on all nations to "unite" against Moscow and then shortly thereafter by retransmitting the entire item on the Deng-Brown meeting with a notation that the original had contained "several mistranslations."

Despite XINHUA's efforts to correct its translation of the passage, it is possible that the insertion of the term "alliance" in the original English-language report was deliberate. That it was simply an error seems unlikely, in view of the fastidious care Beijing has always taken in discussing strategic relationships with other countries and the fact that Deng's formula was well known and unambiguous. Beijing is not known to have ever proposed an "alliance" against hegemonism, although until early last year it regularly called for the formation of an "international antihegemony united front" against the Soviet Union. Beijing has, in fact, taken particular care to indicate that its strategic relationships with other countries are not alliances. In his press conference on the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations last December, for example, Hua Guofeng insisted that China's newly normalized relations with Tokyo and Washington did not constitute the formation of an alliance.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

Moscow's military intervention in Afghanistan has exacerbated longstanding differences among West Europe's three main communist parties over international affairs and Soviet foreign policy. The strong condemnation of Moscow's actions by the Italian and Spanish communists contrasts sharply with the vigorous defense of Soviet behavior by the French party. Coming at a time when the French Communist Party (PCF) is moving to repair its strained ties with the CPSU--during French party leader Marchais' first visit to Moscow in six years--this latest disagreement among West European communists underscores the gradual deterioration of the relative consensus on both domestic and international matters that marked the "Eurocommunist summit" in Madrid in May 1977.

WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS SPLIT OVER USSR AFGHAN INTERVENTION

The strong Spanish and Italian communist objections to Moscow's actions in Afghanistan were registered in authoritative fashion--a 3 January Spanish Communist Party (PCE) Executive Committee communique and a 4 January Italian Communist Party (PCI) Directorate statement. Both parties keyed their criticism to Moscow's violation of the principles of sovereignty, independence, and noninterference in another state's internal affairs, principles they have made a particular cornerstone of their foreign policy since the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The statements of both parties expressed concern over the threat recent events pose for East-West detente, with the PCI statement criticizing recent U.S. steps as well as the Soviet Afghan intervention in this connection.

Characteristically, the Spanish have been the most emphatic in defense of the nonintervention principle. The PCE Executive Committee communique, reported in the party organ MUNDO OBRERO on 4 January, declared that Moscow's move into Afghanistan could not be "excused" by claiming that at other times the "imperialist" powers had used similar methods. Without considering any of the events preceding the invasion, the communique said, the PCE believes that the "entry of one country's troops into another" violates the principles of sovereignty and independence and makes international relations "more tense, creating new dangers for world peace." A MUNDO OBRERO editorial on 3 January was similarly concerned that the Afghan invasion, coming on the heels of equally disturbing events

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such as NATO's missile modernization decision, would seriously endanger world peace. It deplored the fact that the big powers were assuming "warlike positions" which threaten to move the world to the "precipice" of possible conflict.

The PCI assessed Moscow's Afghan move in equally stark terms. The directorate statement termed the intervention an "inadmissible" violation of the principles of sovereignty and national independence and registered the party's "complete disapproval." According to the 12 January L'UNITA, the PCI followed up the directorate statement with a sharply critical resolution submitted to the European Parliament by the PCI deputies to that body. The PCI's strong stand may be influenced by memory of the criticism produced by its initially hesitant response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. After first seeming to excuse the Vietnamese move, the PCI ultimately evolved a middle position--set forth at its 15th congress last May--that deplored the Vietnamese invasion, the Pol Pot regime's excesses, and China's subsequent strike into Vietnam.

The PCI Directorate statement expressed clear concern over the deterioration of the detente relationship between the United States and the USSR in the aftermath of the Afghan intervention, criticizing steps taken by the Carter Administration in the process. The statement called on the Italian Government to press for a meeting of the Common Market countries to express a joint European position favoring the continuation of detente. The party's proposed resolution to the European Parliament urged that body to condemn the Soviet intervention and to work to lessen the danger posed by the current situation to the hard-won results of the Helsinki Agreement. The PCI's expression of concern for detente reflects its longstanding position that only under conditions of reduced international tensions can medium-sized states like Italy exert any meaningful international influence.

In contrast to the Italian and Spanish communists, the French have exhibited full sympathy for Moscow's actions, and party leader Marchais has personally assumed the role of Moscow's most vigorous defender among West Europe's communists. A 4 January PCF Politburo communique, carried in L'HUMANITE the following day, fully endorsed Moscow's rationale that it was only responding to a legitimate Afghan request for "aid" against a "rebellion supported from outside." The PCF's endorsement was not unexpected in light of the party's return over the past two years to a more orthodox line in domestic affairs and to a pro-Soviet foreign policy orientation, a policy line presaged in the PCF's unflagging support for Vietnam over China in early 1979 and formalized at the 23d PCF Congress last May. Marchais himself gave an uncompromising defense of Moscow's policy during an interview in Moscow that was aired by French television on 11 January.

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According to a TASS report of Marchais' remarks, he claimed that for the principle of noninterference to become a reality it was necessary to fight "imperialism" and said he had seen proof that imperialism had interfered in Afghanistan, using Pakistan as an intermediary. For Moscow not to respond to the Afghan request for aid, Marchais was cited as saying, would have been "tantamount to a failure on its part to honor an agreement concluded."

Eurocommunist differences over Soviet foreign policy will likely accelerate the cooling trend in relations between the French party and its southern European counterparts stemming from their earlier disagreements over such issues as domestic political strategies, the Common Market, and the European Parliament.* Bilateral consultations among party chiefs Berlinguer, Carrillo, and Marchais over the past two years have apparently failed to mitigate such differences. The latest meeting--between Marchais and Berlinguer in Rome on 5 January--produced further signs of discord, with the communique on their talks noting that the two leaders had a "frank" exchange of views. Marchais subsequently confirmed to journalists prior to his departure for Moscow that the two had discussed Afghanistan; he defended the PCF's arrival at "different conclusions" from the other parties as an example of the PCF's independent line.

FRENCH COMMUNISTS REPAIR TIES WITH CPSU DURING MARCHAIS VISIT

PCF Secretary General Marchais' 7-12 January visit to Moscow signals the restoration of normal interparty ties between the PCF and the CPSU following a six-year hiatus. His visit represents the final step in the return of the PCF to a predominantly pro-Soviet posture in the wake of the failure of its "union of the left" strategy in the March 1978 French elections. Judging from the tone of the 10 January final communique and followup Soviet media comment on the visit, the French have not yet been restored to full favor in Moscow's estimation.

The final communique's reference to the "friendly and frank" nature of the talks between Marchais and Brezhnev makes clear that differences remain between the two sides despite the increased support for Soviet policy recently shown by the PCF. The document is an unusual amalgam. It expresses positions held jointly by the two parties, as well as formulations that appear to represent the views of one side but not the other. The document is replete with general observations on the international situation more appropriate to a

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* See the TRENDS of 31 October 1979, pages 22-24, and 18 October 1978, pages 8-9.

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declaration of principles than a communique on an interparty visit. Two of the document's most interesting points are unrelated to PCF-CPSU relations: It contains no mention of the issue of Afghanistan, despite Marchais' uninhibited espousal of Moscow's position justifying its intervention; and it clearly spells out for the first time since 12 December--when NATO decided to modernize its theater nuclear forces--Moscow's position that the decision must be canceled or its implementation discontinued before any talks on limiting European medium-range strategic systems can begin.

Marchais regularly visited the Soviet Union during the early 1970's, last stopping over in Moscow for talks with Brezhnev in late July 1974. Relations subsequently became strained by a variety of factors, including Soviet doubts over the PCF's strategy of left-wing union with the French Socialists and annoyance--occasionally erupting into public polemics--over what Moscow apparently felt was the PCF's penchant for bolstering its image among French voters at Moscow's expense. One of the most flagrant examples was Marchais' announcement that he did not feel it would be useful to meet with Brezhnev during the Soviet leader's June 1977 visit to France.* Following the 1978 electoral setback the PCF reverted to a more traditional, orthodox line in its internal affairs and to a more vocal pro-Soviet line on foreign policy, while firmly rejecting the urgings of PCF liberal critics to press ahead with a Eurocommunist line. This policy shift was ratified at the party's 23d congress last May.

* See the TRENDS of 10 January 1979, pages 14-16, and 29 June 1977, pages 8-9.

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KOREA

DPRK SIGNALS NEW WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH ROK GOVERNMENT

Pyongyang has proposed a direct meeting between the prime ministers of the DPRK and the ROK, a dramatic gesture apparently intended to convey the North's readiness to regard the ROK Government as a legitimate copartner in discussions on Korean reunification. The North's proposal for an "unreserved exchange of views" between the two sides was contained in a letter from DPRK Premier Yi Chong-ok addressed to the prime minister of the Republic of Korea and delivered at Panmunjom on 12 January. On the previous day Pyongyang had drawn special attention to the upcoming letter by releasing an "authorized" KCNA report noting that the letter contained "an important proposal" for reuniting the country; both the domestic radio and KCNA carried the text of the letter on the 12th. Inexplicably, there has been no comment from Pyongyang endorsing the initiative. Normally North Korean reunification proposals have been followed within two or three days by a NODONG SINMUN editorial.

Yi's letter lacked specific proposals, but he seemed to be indicating a readiness to hold authoritative, substantive discussions when he noted that the DPRK was prepared to bring talks between "high-level authorities" to "maturity." The North is known to have used the term "high-level talks" to refer both to the secret meetings which envoys from Pyongyang and Seoul held with Kim Il-song and ROK President Pak Chong-hui leading up to the release of the 4 July 1972 North-South joint statement on reunification, as well as to meetings of the North-South Coordination Committee, formed as a result of the 1972 agreement.

Yi's letter seems calculated to answer a number of objections Seoul has raised to previous Pyongyang proposals for contacts. Thus, the DPRK:

+ explicitly recognized the ROK Government as a counterpart in talks; even in the 1972 dialog, the North was careful not to portray contacts as between the two governments;

+ separated talks between the authorities from those between parties and other organizations;

+ made its offer in the name of the DPRK Government rather than in the name of a front organization. In 1979 Seoul rejected Pyongyang's

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offer for renewing the dialog partly on the grounds that the proposal was not authoritative because it was issued in the name of the Fatherland Front.

In calling for government-to-government contacts, Pyongyang has subordinated, but not yet publicly abandoned, its longstanding proposal for a broader based dialog in the form of a "political consultative conference" attended by political parties and organizations from both sides. As part of the same initiative in which Yi sent his letter, DPRK Vice President Kim Il dispatched letters to the heads of various Korean political parties and organizations and to prominent opposition figures calling for meetings with each to discuss reviving the dialog. In each of those letters Kim raised the prospect of wide participation in the dialog but was careful to separate talks between authorities from the larger forum. In 1972 the North also initially subordinated its call for wide participation in the reunification dialog in favor of talks between authorities of both sides. The disintegration of that earlier exercise in North-South cooperation became evident as Pyongyang began to reassert the primacy of the mass dialog over restricted, authoritative contacts.

EXTERNAL SITUATION Nearly all of the DPRK letters referred cryptically to the "complex situation" surrounding Korea. The description of external circumstances as "complex" is one Pyongyang has used in the past to allude to situations too sensitive to discuss forthrightly because they involve friends and allies. The current use of the formulation may represent veiled criticism of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan--a development Pyongyang media have not yet acknowledged. Pyongyang's apparent displeasure with Afghan developments has been signaled by its failure to send a greeting message to the Karmal regime; North Korea had promptly greeted the formation of the previous Amin and Taraki governments.

One of the letters, to opposition figure Yun Po-son, also warned against dancing to another's "tune" and thus "inviting" calamity by "falling prey to the tricks of outside forces." The warning appeared to be formulated with deliberate ambiguity that made it applicable to outside forces which might attempt to pressure either the North or South. A similarly vague formulation was used in a 9 November 1979 NODONG SINMUN editorial on the need for North-South cooperation.

BACKGROUND The North's latest initiative is consistent with evidence since Pak Chong-hui's assassination in October that Pyongyang saw Pak's death as presenting an opportunity to resume dialog with the South. The 9 November NODONG SINMUN editorial laid out Pyongyang's view that in the wake of Pak's death the two sides should renew efforts for collaboration and "cooperation." Underscoring that

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call, the North has withheld criticism of the new Seoul government and has displayed caution in treating political developments in the ROK. Pyongyang was especially careful in its treatment of the 12 December military power struggle in the South, an event which it could have exploited to dismiss the possibility of political progress in Seoul. Kim Il-song's low-key treatment of reunification in his New Year address this year also appears to have been a signal that the North has adopted a new approach to the issue.

The North's current proposals may also represent the culmination of a decision made at least as early as last year to renew the dialog. During the brief resumption of North-South contacts last winter, the North advocated reopening the telephone hotline the two sides had established in 1972, and it proposed that the South Korean delegation to the proffered talks include a representative of the ROK Government. Similarly, last summer Pyongyang seemed to relax its longstanding opposition to South Korean participation in future U.S.-DPRK talks on replacing the Korean armistice agreement, proposing that the South could attend as an "observer" and become a full participant under certain circumstances.

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YUGOSLAVIA

TITO CRISIS PROMPTS BELGRADE CONCERN, MOSCOW DISAVOWAL

A variety of indications from Belgrade suggest that the Yugoslav leadership is viewing with grave concern the state of President Tito's health following unsuccessful surgery and is taking initial steps to insure continuity in the event of his passing. Belgrade first acknowledged the failure of a vascular operation on Tito's left leg on the night of 12-13 January in a 14 January bulletin signed by his "Doctor's Council." The bulletin reported that the desired effect of the operation "had not been achieved," but added that his general condition was otherwise good. Medical bulletins issued on 15 and 16 January similarly maintained that his general condition is good, without reporting any improvement in his leg condition.

High-level meetings called both before and after the operation seemed calculated to bolster confidence that the leadership machinery constructed by Tito is functioning smoothly. A joint party Presidium-state Presidency session, chaired by current Presidium Chairman Stevan Doronjski, was convened on 11 January for a "comprehensive discussion" on domestic and international problems, including the Afghanistan crisis. An LCY Central Committee plenum convened on 15 January, again under Doronjski's chairmanship, heard a report on Tito's condition and reaffirmed the decisions of the earlier party-state meeting. The Central Committee "agreed with all the measures taken in connection with comrade Tito's state of health," TANJUG reported on the 15th.

Despite these efforts to underscore leadership solidarity, the two meetings contained signs of apprehension over the possible impact of Tito's death on the political stability of the country by implying the need for tightened security and other measures. For example, the joint party-state meeting on the 11th pointedly called for "strengthening vigilance and security in all social environments" and for struggling against "all those who are disturbed by our socialist self-management development and nonalined policy." The party plenum of the 15th affirmed the "assessments and measures" called for at the joint meeting and urged the "full activity" of all Yugoslav political forces to carry out these tasks.

SOVIET DISAVOWAL Moscow was quick to disavow any intention to take advantage of internal political problems caused by Tito's illness. A 16 January TASS commentary by Vladimir Goncharov, reacting to an editorial in the London DAILY TELEGRAPH apparently urging NATO support for Yugoslav independence, dismissed any assertions about a Soviet threat to Yugoslavia as "crude, provocative, and false"

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and stressed Moscow's adherence to such principles as equality and noninterference in its relations with Belgrade. Goncharov concluded that the article reflected the "covert but nonetheless obvious intention of NATO to interfere in Yugoslavia's affairs." Moscow has periodically issued denials to this effect, the most authoritative coming during Soviet leader Brezhnev's 1976 visit to Yugoslavia, when he ridiculed tales of a Soviet "wolf" threatening a Yugoslav "Red Riding Hood." Brezhnev also sent Tito a get-well telegram, reported by TANJUG on 16 January, in which he expressed hope that Tito would be able to "work for a long time and fruitfully in the interest of the people of Yugoslavia and of Soviet-Yugoslav friendship."

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IRAN

USSR VETOES UN SANCTIONS, ACCUSES U.S. OF THREATENING TEHRAN

Defending its veto of the Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions against Iran, Moscow has reiterated its support for the principle of diplomatic immunity and in effect has accused Washington of failing to take advantage of Iranian proposals to the United Nations to achieve the release of the hostages. Moscow is clearly sensitive to Iranian suspicions of Soviet intentions following the intervention in Afghanistan. Brezhnev himself offered reassurance, in his 13 January PRAVDA "interview," that the Soviet Union entertained no "expansionist plans" with regard to Pakistan, Iran, or other countries of the area. Moscow has assailed the Carter Administration for allegedly trying to "sanctify" reports of a Soviet military buildup on the Iranian-Afghan border and has accused U.S. "special services" of fabricating "unfriendly" Soviet statements about Iran. Along the lines of Brezhnev's assertion that it is the "colonialists," not the Soviet Union, who are "attracted by the smell of oil," Soviet media have stepped up their charges that it is Washington, not Moscow, which has designs on the region and is preparing "punitive actions" against Iran.

SOVIET VETO In a prompt rebuttal of a "high-handed" White House statement, Moscow has complained that Washington tried to distort the USSR's position in its 13 January veto of the Security Council resolution--an apparent allusion to the Administration's statement that the veto was "aimed at advancing Soviet designs in Iran." The response came in a TASS item on the 15th which was amended by TASS some three hours after initial dissemination by the addition of two paragraphs. TASS asserted that the White House statement tried to blame "somebody else" for the failure to obtain the hostages' release through peaceful means. Throwing back the charge that the Soviet veto was an "act of political cynicism," TASS in turn accused the Carter Administration of "cynical attempts" to use the hostage issue to "impose a policy of blackmail" against countries which do not align themselves with U.S. policy. The additional paragraphs had the effect of putting the blame on the United States for lack of progress on the hostage issue by failing to heed warnings by UN Secretary General Waldheim on the use of sanctions and by being unreceptive to Iranian proposals to the United Nations. TASS reiterated the Soviet position on observance of international agreements, including the principle of diplomatic immunity--as Soviet UN Ambassador Troyanovskiy had done in the council debate--but concluded that Washington was "deluded" if it

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thought that "blackmail and threats or a naval blockade" could secure the hostages' release.

Prior to the UN vote, Moscow's position on sanctions had evolved from ambiguity to forthright warnings that the USSR would not permit the United States to impose sanctions. The change in tone came as the USSR stepped up its countercharges of U.S. "threats" to Iran and the region as a whole in reaction to widespread criticism of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Up to the Afghan turning point, Moscow had been supportive of Iran but cautious in its speculation on U.S. intentions vis-a-vis a resolution of the hostage crisis. Soviet media have now dropped the earlier restraint in a stream of charges ranging from accusations of U.S. preparations for punitive operations against Tehran to claims that the United States is trying to sow discord among the country's minorities and between "religious and nonreligious forces" which overthrew the monarchy.

SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS Moscow's sensitivity with regard to its own uncertain relations with Tehran has been underscored in TASS rebuttals of Western news reports that Moscow is willing to provide military assistance to Iran and that Soviet troops on the Iranian-Afghan border are advancing to within striking distance of Iranian oil installations. The TASS rebuttals, on the 14th and 15th, took the line that such stories were being circulated in the wake of the failure of the sanctions resolution in the Security Council in order to divert attention from the U.S. designs against Iran. Moscow's concern over the effect of such "fabrications" in Tehran was suggested by its failure to mention the spate of Iranian denunciations--by Khomeyni himself and, on his instructions, by the Foreign Ministry and the Revolutionary Council--of the reported statement by the Soviet charge d'affaires in Mexico that the USSR was ready to provide military assistance should Iran request it. In effect chiding Tehran for its gullibility, the TASS rebuttal said "one should believe" that Iranian leaders are aware of the aims of those who circulate such fabrications and that they "will not fall" for provocations.

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USSR

CONTINUING FEED GRAIN SHORTAGES THREATEN LIVESTOCK HERDS

Local newspapers have revealed that feed grain shortages in the Baltic republics and Belorussia threatened livestock herds during the winter of 1978-1979 and that this major Soviet meat-producing area may need grain from national stocks to save herds again this winter. The precarious livestock situation was graphically spelled out in republic newspaper accounts of speeches by local leaders at the 28-30 November USSR Supreme Soviet session and at mid-December republic party central committee plenums. Accounts of the speeches available earlier in the Soviet central press had omitted almost all references to the livestock problems, thus suggesting Moscow's sensitivity to the gravity of the situation. Although comparable local speeches from the RSFSR, the Soviet Union's main meat-producing area, are not available abroad, it seems likely that part of the northwest area of that republic has been experiencing similar problems.

1978-1979 DISASTERS Deputies from the Baltic republics and Belorussia used their speeches at the November USSR Supreme Soviet session to describe in vivid terms the difficulties encountered in saving their livestock herds during the winter of 1978-1979 and to emphasize their continuing dependence on shipments of feed grain from Moscow. They appeared to be putting Moscow on notice that meat deliveries from the area will remain lower than normal and that renewed requests for allocation of feed grain from central stocks will be forthcoming.

In a particularly graphic description of the scale of the disaster in Belorussia, the republic's first deputy premier and Gosplan chairman V.A. Gvozdev, described how "literally all the people in the republic" had been mobilized to scour the "forests, swamps, and other nonfarm land" for enough fodder to preserve the herds. According to the 1 December SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA account of his speech, he declared that a "huge number of workers" had been pulled out of factories to save the herds. Gvozdev maintained that "our task now is to stop the fall in production of livestock products" and "to make up for the shortfall of milk and meat which occurred during the dry spring-summer period." He said the republic is hoping that central organs will make additional allocations of feed concentrate. In the IZVESTIYA account of his speech, Gvozdev was reported as saying merely that the year had been "unusually complicated" and that "great assistance" from the central government had been necessary to overcome "damage caused by the elements."

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Lithuanian Agriculture Secretary R.I. Songayla, in his Supreme Soviet speech, pressed for reduction of Lithuania's quota for delivering meat to USSR stocks. According to both the 1 December SOVETSKAYA LITVA and the 1 December IZVESTIYA, he stated that because of the "exceptionally difficult situation" caused by bad weather in 1978 and 1979, Lithuania will have only 72 percent of its fodder needs for the winter, even including "state resources." This means, he said, that it will be impossible for Lithuania to fulfill 1980 plans for supplying meat for its own people and for delivering meat to the central meat fund and that "therefore, we ask the USSR Council of Ministers to consider once again our request to tie these plans to the available resources of fodder."

Estonian First Secretary K.G. Vayno, according to the 30 November SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA account of his Supreme Soviet speech, stated that "after such a natural disaster" as occurred in the fall and winter of 1978, it "usually takes two or three years to restore the productivity of livestock," but because of "great help"--grain from "Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan"--"we managed to preserve the livestock herds." The 30 November IZVESTIYA reported him as saying only that livestock raisers were working intently to end the drop in livestock productivity caused by the "difficult fall and winter" of 1978 and as claiming that they had "managed to preserve the livestock herds."

Estonian Premier V.I. Klauson, according to the 1 December SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, stated that Estonia's agriculture in 1978 had "suffered a real natural disaster . . . as a result of which we gathered about half the normal year's harvest of grain, potatoes, and fodder." As "the weight, milk yield, and mating of animals began to drop sharply," he said, "the question arose of significantly cutting the livestock herds to avert forced losses from lack of feed." If this had continued, it would have taken "several years to restore the livestock herds and the output of livestock products," he declared, but added that because Moscow had rendered "huge assistance by allocating fodder from central resources, . . . we were able to normalize the livestock situation."* The 2 December IZVESTIYA reported him as admitting only that the present year was "not successful for the republic's agriculture."

The representative of the third Baltic republic, Latvia, made no revealing statements in his Supreme Soviet speech, but Latvian First Secretary Voss, in a 20 November speech to local livestock raisers, had similarly spoken

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* There had been earlier evidence of the scale of the disaster in Estonia. According to Vayno in the 22 February 1979 SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, in 1978 and early 1979 Moscow supplied Estonia with 490,000 tons of feed grain--almost equal to the republic's normal harvest. Despite this assistance, according to an article in the 21 March 1979 issue of the same paper, the quota for Estonia's meat shipments to Moscow for the first quarter of 1979 had to be cut 22 percent.

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of the "natural disaster" of 1978 and "difficulties" of mid-1979, indicating that Latvia had received "great aid" in the form of "concentrated fodder" from Moscow.

OUTLOOK FOR COMING WINTER Party leaders in the Baltic republics and Belorussia confirmed the continuing tight feed situation and presented a grim outlook for the coming winter in more recent speeches at mid-December republic central committee plenums. Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, according to the 13 December SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, warned that while farmers had managed to save the herds after the 1978 difficulties, they are still struggling with the results of the 1979 drought and will have a hard time getting their livestock through the present winter. Lithuanian First Secretary Grishkyavichus, in a speech published in the 13 December SOVETSKAYA LITVA, declared that the republic had not managed to gather enough fodder this year and that the situation is "very difficult." He expressed optimism that cattle herds will be fully preserved, and urging efforts to maintain hog stocks, as well, he criticized farms for rushing to slaughter pigs. Estonian Second Secretary Lebedev, according to the 19 December SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, called the winter fodder balance "tight" and indicated that only through a sharp increase in pig production will Estonia be able to supply its populace and still fulfill its obligations to deliver meat to central meat funds. Latvian First Secretary Voss, in his November speech to livestock raisers, stated that Latvia had managed to gather only 61 percent of its planned feed grain in 1979 and that, while a good supply of potatoes could partially make up for the feed shortage, the fodder balance will be "tight." According to the 21 November SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA account, he assailed local leaders for choosing the "easy path" of "mass sell-off" of pigs instead of trying to overcome the fodder difficulties.

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INDOCHINA

Laos and Kampuchea have again demonstrated their hesitancy to embrace publicly a policy line originated in Hanoi. Neither Vientiane nor Phnom Penh has echoed Vietnamese comment suggesting that a recent meeting of the foreign ministers of the three nations resulted in a de facto collective security arrangement among them. Beijing has warned that the foreign ministers meeting constituted an ominous effort by Hanoi to integrate the combined strength of the three Indochinese countries in preparation for Moscow-backed effort to assert strategic domination over all of Southeast Asia.

The foreign ministers meeting, held in Phnom Penh on the 5th, preceded by two days the first anniversary of the Hanoi-backed Kampuchean regime, an event Phnom Penh has attempted to use to strengthen its claims to legitimacy. Anniversary remarks by Kampuchean leaders pointed to alleged improvements in security and the economy and to increasing international and domestic acceptance as evidence of the regime's progress in rebuilding Kampuchean after years of decline during the reign of Pol Pot.

LAOS, PRK DIVERGE FROM HANOI IN CHARACTERIZING MILITARY TIES

VIENTIANE Last year Laos was slow to follow Hanoi's lead and become involved in its own polemical war with Beijing, a reserve which appeared to be reflected once again in a 9 January SIANG PASASON editorial on the Indochinese foreign ministers conference. Vientiane adhered only to the vague language of the communique in reaffirming its commitment to "strengthening" the solidarity, friendship, and cooperation among the three countries in "national construction and defense." While the editorial did cite a basic need for strong Indochinese relations in the face of a common threat from Beijing, it failed to endorse publicly Hanoi's position, voiced in an 8 January NHAN DAN editorial, that an attack on one Indochinese country represents an attack on all three.*

* Hanoi comment on the foreign ministers conference is in the TRENDS of 9 January 1980, pages 12-13.

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PHNOM PENH Despite its close dependence on Hanoi, Phnom Penh stopped short of endorsing Hanoi's concept of an Indochinese mutual security arrangement. The strongest Kampuchean statement was contained in a 6 January interview with the PRK ambassador to Moscow for the Soviet trade union publication TRUD. The ambassador reportedly declared that "everytime someone threatens" one of the three countries, their "militant solidarity and unity" becomes an "invincible force." Phnom Penh itself is not known to have reported the TRUD interview, and the 11 January Phnom Penh radio editorial on the foreign ministers conference noted only that in the face of a "common enemy," the three Indochinese countries are "determined" to increase their "solidarity, friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance."

BEIJING, DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA Beijing, in low-level XINHUA and RENMIN RIBAO commentaries, has called the Phnom Penh meeting a "danger signal" that Hanoi is preparing a new round of aggression, now directed at Thailand. A XINHUA commentary on 11 January, for example, suggested that Hanoi's "strategic designs" were revealed by the communique's pledge to integrate the three countries militarily and diplomatically, its declaration of allegiance to Moscow, its allegation that tension on the Thai-Kampuchean border lies on the Thai side, and its proposal for an Indochinese-ASEAN bloc of peace and prosperity. A XINHUA commentary on the 15th noted that conclusion of bilateral nonaggression pacts between the Indochinese and ASEAN states, as proposed by the meeting's joint communique, would permit Hanoi to consolidate its hold on the three Indochinese countries in preparation for an attack on Thailand and, in the context of Hanoi's treaty relations with Moscow, would "pave the way" for realization of Moscow's Asian collective security system.

China's Democratic Kampuchean ally promptly attacked the conference in a commentary broadcast on 7 January by the PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of Democratic Kampuchea. The commentary charged that the "Le Duan clique" was forced to convene the conference to tighten its control over Phnom Penh and Vientiane because the continued Kampuchean resistance had proven the futility of Hanoi's policy of ruling through puppet regimes.

HENG SAMRIN REGIME MARKS FIRST ANNIVERSARY, REVIEWS GAINS

Anniversary speeches by KPRC President Heng Samrin and Defense Minister Pen Sovan took an upbeat view of the threat to the regime from the remnant forces of Democratic Kampuchea and other antigovernment elements. Heng Samrin claimed, for example, that the Kampuchean army can now "effectively defend" Kampuchean sovereignty, security, and social order "even in the mountains and border regions." Elaborating

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on this claim, Pen Sovan declared that the Kampuchean armed forces have "crushed virtually all the enemy forces and frustrated their so-called protracted guerrilla war." Neither leader indicated concern that the regime might be threatened by efforts of antigovernment factions to unify against it--a factor that had prompted a warning in an authoritative statement last July.* Both leaders stressed the need for continued mopping-up operations, however, warning of the threat to Kampuchean security from the "small numbers of remnant troops" who have taken refuge in Thailand. Heng Samrin renewed previous charges that the opposition forces are conducting "repeated infiltration raids" into Kampuchea.

While Heng Samrin stressed Phnom Penh's unaltered intention to "crush all sabotage and subversive activities" by antigovernment elements, he denied that their military efforts constitute a threat to Thailand. "Any current threat in the border area," he declared, will be initiated by Thailand and not caused by combined Vietnamese and Kampuchean military operations to "smash subversive and aggressive maneuvers." While repeating Phnom Penh's past offer to cooperate with Thailand in making their joint border one of "long-lasting friendship," Heng Samrin failed to reaffirm a pledge made last fall that Kampuchean defensive actions would be conducted "within" Kampuchea's borders.

VIETNAMESE PRESENCE In marked contrast to Phnom Penh's assessment of the internal situation last July, neither Heng Samrin nor Pen Sovan indicated that the Vietnamese troop presence continues to undermine domestic support for the regime.** Thus, the two leaders avoided the belabored denials, common in statements last summer, that the regime was under Vietnamese control. As late as mid-November Pen Sovan had found it necessary to reassure a local audience that Vietnamese troops were not in Kampuchea to "control it or determine its fate."

CADRE PROBLEMS The anniversary speeches suggested that Phnom Penh has been successful in overcoming some of the domestic problems that plagued it last summer. Offering a striking contrast to Phnom Penh's complaints last July about its top-heavy, skeletal administrative structure, Heng Samrin claimed that "people's power" had been established "from the central to the grassroots level," and is being strengthened "step by step." The army, the KPRC president claimed, has also shown remarkable development, progressing from "small scattered and disorganized units" to regular divisions. Pen Sovan added that the army has developed in both "quality and quantity" and said that military cadres have become "more experienced" in leading their units.

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* See the TRENDS of 25 July 1979, pages 6-7.

** See the TRENDS of 8 August 1979, pages 14-16.

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Both leaders admitted that problems still exist. Heng Samrin, for example, noted that although the regime has achieved "most encouraging results" in fulfilling "vital urgent tasks," it has "not yet succeeded or done well" in the "general work." He also noted that consolidation of the regime's administrative structure remains the "most important goal." Pen Sovan indicated that the regime's efforts to consolidate its power are still hampered by the infiltration of antigovernment elements into the administrative structure. He did imply, however, that the infiltration problem has lessened in the last six months because of increased popular support for the regime. The people, he claimed, are "willing" now to expose "cruel elements who have wormed their way into the masses" and "do not hesitate" to "unmask" traitors in the administration.

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BRIEFS

MOSCOW ON INDIAN ELECTIONS: Moscow has welcomed the reelection of Indira Gandhi as Indian prime minister, assessing her return to power as an expression of her personal popularity and a vindication of the domestic and foreign policies she espoused, which had won Soviet support in the past. The upbeat congratulatory message to Gandhi from Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin contrasted with the correct, but terse, message which greeted Marorii Desai when he unseated Gandhi in 1977, underscoring once again the Soviet view that Gandhi's foreign policy orientation is more amenable than her predecessor's. The message, for example, noted Gandhi's personal contributions to Soviet-Indian relations, including the signing of the 1971 treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation, and it expressed the "firm conviction" that bilateral relations will "undergo new development" during her tenure. Moscow has predictably publicized statements by Gandhi and her new government supporting Soviet policies. TASS on the 11th noted a Gandhi interview on the previous day in which she favored Indian recognition of the pro-Soviet Kampuchean regime of Heng Samrin, and the news agency on the 12th reported that the Indian delegate at the United Nations had opposed General Assembly consideration of the Afghan situation.

VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT: The Democratic Kampuchean (DK) regime has moved to give official status to a Vietnamese Central Highlands resistance organization. The regime's PRC-based clandestine radio, Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (VODK), on 6 January broadcast a DK Foreign Ministry press communique announcing that the "Bigiar-FULRO Highland Government" had appointed a "special envoy" to Democratic Kampuchea as of 1 January and calling the appointment "a new stage in the development of the militant solidarity between the Kampuchean and Bigiar highland people." The nature of the organization is unclear, but its name has antecedents in the highlands Bagiaraka movement which opposed the South Vietnamese Government in the 1950's and later grew into FULRO (United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races)--a group denounced by Hanoi as a tool of the CIA. On 5 January VODK had carried a New Year greeting message from the Bigiar-FULRO regime's prime minister and president, and the radio has since routinely broadcast reports on the movement's resistance efforts. The DK radio began reporting on the FULRO movement in December 1978 and first indicated ties between the Vietnamese and Kampuchean resistance movements in November 1979, when it broadcast a message of support from "the prime minister of the provisional government of the FULRO movement." Neither Hanoi nor Beijing is known to have mentioned the

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alleged opposition highland government. XINHUA on 10 January, however, replayed one of the VODK accounts of FULRO's fighting, identifying the resistance forces only as "people in several places in Tay Nguyen area, South Vietnam."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 7 - 13 JANUARY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3279 items)			Beijing (780 items)		
Afghan Situation	12%	(16%)	Afghan Situation	38%	(32%)
Brezhnev PRAVDA Interview on International Situation	7%	(—)	U.S. Defense Secretary Brown in PRC	13%	(--)
			Egyptian Vice President Mubarak in PRC	9%	(1%)
People's Republic of Kampuchea Liberation First Anniversary	5%	(—)			
French Communist Party Leader Marchais in USSR	4%	(—)			
U.S. Defense Secretary Brown in PRC	3%	(—)			
Soviet Leaders' Greeting to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on Election	3%	(—)			
TASS Statement on President Carter's 4 January Address	3%	(2%)			

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on U.S. sanctions
- Soviet defense of Afghan intervention
- Implications of Sakharov exile
- Soviet fuel exports to East Europe
- Moscow on Sino-U.S. relations
- Belgrade on independence, Tito illness

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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U S S R - U. S.

MOSCOW SCORNS U.S. SANCTIONS, CITES EUROPEAN OPPOSITION

Moscow has vigorously denied that Soviet policies will be affected by the retaliatory measures announced or contemplated by the Carter Administration after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. In line with President Brezhnev's intimation in his 13 January PRAVDA interview that Moscow's confidence rests in part on the belief that other Western nations are unlikely to follow Washington's lead, Soviet media have seized on evidence that other nations are reluctant to impose similar sanctions.

Soviet domestic media have devoted predictably selective coverage to U.S. actions. They have reported the essence of the announced sanctions, but with a minimum of detail. Domestic press and radio monitored by FBIS have thus far failed to acknowledge the link President Carter has made between the proposed U.S. boycott of the Moscow Olympics and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Moscow has been guarded in discussing possible retaliation for U.S. measures. In his PRAVDA interview Brezhnev predicted that the steps announced by the President would "boomerang" against the United States. The only direct reference to possible retaliation came in a 10 January Moscow radio commentary by director of TASS Sergey Losev, broadcast in English to North America. Losev asserted that the USSR cannot leave U.S. moves "unanswered" and concluded that the President had "underestimated the possibility of Soviet retaliation."

OLYMPIC BOYCOTT Moscow has affected calm over President Carter's 20 January call for a U.S. boycott of the summer Olympics. Soviet media have been replaying foreign statements of opposition to a boycott. Press and radio commentary has warned of the effect such a move could have on the Olympic movement, while eschewing direct comment on the implications for the USSR. Thus, a TASS commentary of 21 January warned that the President's proposal would hurt the Olympic movement and sportsmen of the world and dismissed it as politically motivated. TASS confidently maintained that the President would prove to have scored "a goal into his own net." The commentary noted only in passing that President Carter has justified his call for a boycott by reference to developments in Afghanistan. The failure of monitored Soviet domestic media to

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acknowledge thus far the linkage made by the President between the proposed U.S. boycott and the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan is consistent with Moscow's continuing effort to play down the connection between Afghanistan events and what it has portrayed as the Carter Administration's turn back to cold war.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS Taking their cue from the tone of Brezhnev's PRAVDA interview, Soviet spokesmen have approached U.S. economic sanctions as another Western test of Soviet "mettle" that is bound to fail. IZVESTIYA's New York correspondent wrote on 23 January that it is hardly new for the United States to seek to "inflict damage, cost what it may, upon socialist construction, the material well-being of the Soviet people." IZVESTIYA's Aleksandr Bovin contended on the 16th that no one who understands Soviet history can hope that unilateral actions designed to "hurt" the USSR could change its "principled stand and policy."

Moscow's commentary for the Soviet audience on U.S. sanctions has had the effect of publicizing what has long been an unmentioned issue in Soviet domestic media--grain imports from the United States. While acknowledging that a reduction of grain shipments is part of the U.S. sanctions, Soviet domestic media have not reported its dimensions and have sought to minimize its effect. An 18 January PRAVDA commentary on the sanctions maintained that those who hope a restriction in U.S. grain shipments could "worsen" the food situation in the USSR have a "truly ridiculous notion" of the USSR's economic potential. Although domestic media have carefully avoided the issue of meat supplies, Soviet readers will have drawn appropriate conclusions from Brezhnev's failure to mention this sector while offering assurances about bread supplies in his PRAVDA interview.

In a series of statements for foreign audiences, Soviet spokesmen have projected equal confidence about the relative ease with which the USSR will endure U.S. sanctions. Only in interviews in foreign media have some conceded more openly that grain export restrictions will have an impact. In an interview broadcast in English to North America on 12 January, Boris Borisov, chairman of the Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry, declared that Soviet trade and commercial links with the United States are so insignificant and of such a nature that "their curtailment cannot be damaging to the Soviet Union in any way." Borisov argued that, while failing to influence Soviet policy, the curtailment of economic ties over the longer term would create unemployment in the United States and "badly hurt" American farmers. An unidentified Soviet diplomat in Washington, in a 14 January DIE WELT interview, was more candid but no less defiant. He conceded that the grain restrictions would be "painful" but contended that the

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USSR "will weather it" and, moreover, will "live without the United States" as long as Washington deems it necessary. NOVOSTI press agency journalist Gennadiy Gerasimov granted in an interview on West German television on 14 January that the lives of some Soviet cattle would be "shortened" by the U.S. grain sanctions.

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AFGHANISTAN

USSR PRESSES CHARGES OF "FOREIGN INTERFERENCE," DEFENDS "AID"

Soviet commentary echoing President Brezhnev's 13 January PRAVDA interview has sought to provide further corroboration of Moscow's public justification for its military intervention in Afghanistan. This effort has been highlighted by an authoritative PRAVDA article on the 19th by the pseudonymous "A. Petrov" which, in effect, repeated Brezhnev's criticism of Administration policy, charging the United States with using Soviet actions in Afghanistan as a pretext to continue to turn away from detente, to increase military programs, and to pursue an "anti-Soviet" policy. Petrov added minor details to previous accusations of U.S. association with Afghan insurgents to bolster the thesis that Kabul required Soviet "assistance" to repel an "external aggression" which coincided with a political conspiracy by former President Amin.

Moscow remains reticent about actual Soviet military activities, although low-level comment--including press and radio items for Soviet domestic audiences--has rebutted Western reports about Soviet clashes with insurgents and rebellious Afghan army units and about the massing of Soviet troops on the Iranian-Afghan border. Approving the recent expulsion of U.S. journalists from Afghanistan, Moscow backed the Afghan Government's assertion that the newsmen sought to "destabilize" the situation.

The Petrov article enlarged on earlier charges that the threat to Afghanistan's independence stemmed from U.S. collusion with Amin as well as American support for incursions by Pakistani-based Afghan exiles. The latter accusation dates back at least to the summer of 1978, when TASS began to complain of "subversive centers" in neighboring states where "hostile" groups were being trained and aided by the United States, China, and "certain reactionary regimes." Charges of CIA involvement with the Afghan rebels began appearing in comment at the time of the rebellion in Herat last March. The U.S.-Amin collusion story has been developing since the 27 December coup, with Moscow for the most part allowing Kabul to take the lead with the strongest accusations against Amin as an "agent of the CIA and U.S. imperialism."

U.S.-AMIN "CONSPIRACY" In still another effort to justify the overthrow of Amin, Petrov alleged that the former president had planned to have "many thousands" killed on 29 December but that "decisive action" by the "Afghans themselves"

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had deprived Amin of power and prevented this "large-scale massacre." Insinuating that Amin had been cooperating with the CIA, Petrov asked rhetorically whether President Carter had not been informed of Amin's "secret meetings with U.S. agents" and whether he had been unaware of Amin's plans for 29 December.

Petrov's cryptic reference to "documents discovered" and "testimonies of witnesses" against Amin could presage a Soviet-Afghan effort to present "proof" that Amin worked in collusion with the CIA. Judging from the recent record, Moscow would stand back and let the Afghan authorities initiate such revelations. Petrov's story is a short-hand version of Afghan allegations that Amin conspired with insurgent leaders and had U.S. encouragement to stage a coup in late December against the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) with the aim of renouncing the April 1978 revolution, dissolving the PDPA, killing all political opponents, and creating a new Afghan state. Afghanistan's interior minister claimed on 21 January, in remarks reported by TASS, that "official circles in Washington" had assured Amin that "if necessary, the conspirators would be assisted by U.S. armed forces." Earlier, Moscow's domestic service on 10 January had cited Karmal as saying that materials would be published "in the near future" allegedly proving U.S. participation with Amin in a conspiracy against Afghanistan. And TASS on the 17th and 21st, again citing Afghan officials, referred to "evidence" now coming to light that Amin had been acting on CIA orders.

U.S. 'MERCENARIES" Seeking to link the Afghan insurgents to Washington more directly, Petrov called them U.S. "mercenaries" and depicted this type of "aggression" as on a historical continuum with alleged U.S. use of mercenaries in Guatemala, Cuba, Africa, and elsewhere. Much of what Petrov said about the Afghan insurgents, including his mention of mercenaries, had appeared verbatim in a Moscow domestic service commentary by Oleg Anichkin on 8 January. While the "mercenary" description had not been used in previous authoritative Soviet press commentary on Afghanistan, it has appeared in lower level comment since last spring--and as recently as 1 and 5 January in articles in LITERARY GAZETTE and PRAVDA.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

MOSCOW REBUKES PCI, PCE FOR LACK OF SOLIDARITY ON AFGHANISTAN

Moscow has apparently decided to press the non-Soviet bloc communist parties to demonstrate their "revolutionary" credentials by supporting its Afghan policies. An editorial article in the latest NEW TIMES (No. 3, 18 January 1980)--a Soviet foreign affairs weekly regularly used to convey Moscow's views to foreign parties--is clearly intended as a rebuke to the Italian and Spanish parties for their condemnation of Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan. That Moscow views this issue as a litmus test of the parties' loyalty to basic communist principles was further suggested in subsequent remarks by French party leader Marchais, Moscow's most outspoken defender among West Europe's communists.

Not content with specific polemics over Afghanistan, NEW TIMES pressed the broader theoretical issue of the meaning of "internationalist solidarity." It clearly sought to define the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention as subordinate to the requirements of solidarity. Such a reassertion of orthodoxy under the guise of "internationalist solidarity" should draw protests from the independent-minded European parties that succeeded in substituting the concept of solidarity for the traditional "proletarian internationalism" at the Berlin conference of European communist parties in June 1976. If the NEW TIMES editorial article is an accurate preview, the Afghan invasion issue may narrow the limits of diversity within the communist movement that Moscow had seemed willing to tolerate since the Berlin meeting.

PCI, PCE REBUKE

The NEW TIMES editorial article made clear that Moscow will not allow Italian and Spanish criticism of its policy to go unchallenged, and it appeared to demand that those parties prove they are still revolutionary. After extensively quoting expressions of support from nonbloc parties, particularly the French, NEW TIMES complained that some parties had voiced doubts as to the correctness of Moscow's military aid and that some had even called it "interference" harmful to Afghanistan's sovereignty. The article rhetorically asked whether the "international solidarity of revolutionaries" consisted only in moral support and verbal wishes for success or also encompassed, "under extraordinary conditions,"

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material aid including military assistance. Implying that rejection of this definition was tantamount to relinquishing revolutionary status, NEW TIMES said that the history of the revolutionary movement--such as the case in Spain during the 1930's and in China during the 1920's--confirmed the "moral and political rightness of this form of aid." To refuse to use the "potential" the communist countries possess would be a failure to meet an "international duty," the editorial concluded, and would have the effect of aiding imperialism.

NEW TIMES also seemed eager to address the theoretical issue of the "nature and forms" of international solidarity and their "compatibility" with the principles of sovereignty and noninterference in another state's internal affairs. Asserting that a "lively discussion" on these issues had started in connection with events in Afghanistan, NEW TIMES left little doubt that Moscow felt the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention had to be subordinated to the requirements of international solidarity and that objections on the basis of these principles made by the Italian and Spanish communists were unacceptable. To portray this matter as though the Soviet Union and the United States were equally to blame for the situation in Afghanistan, the article declared, is "absolutely false," and ignores the fundamental difference between the "nature and goals of the foreign policy of socialism and imperialism." NEW TIMES' argument that Moscow's socialist ends justified its military action regardless of the sovereignty principle constitutes, in effect, a repudiation of the agreement on the primacy of autonomy, independence, and nonintervention in both interstate and interparty affairs that was embodied in the final document of the 1976 Berlin conference. Such a blatant revision of the intent of the Berlin meeting will draw protests from the PCI and the PCE, and it could rekindle the sharp polemics between the three parties that followed the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion.

MARCHAIS ROLE Acting as Moscow's chief advocate among West Europe's communists since his return from a trip to the USSR on 12 January, French party leader Marchais has spoken in the same spirit as NEW TIMES. In a 21 January interview on Paris television, which TASS reported the next day, Marchais claimed that his party was still firmly attached to the principle of noninterference but said that he would be a "funny kind of revolutionary" if he sat with arms folded while the imperialists slaughtered democrats struggling for progress. He argued that his differences with the Italian and Spanish parties on this issue merely prove that the PCF arrived at its views independently. Marchais went on to reject the notion that the Soviet action violated

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the general understanding of peaceful coexistence, saying that if "peaceful coexistence is that, I'm not playing." For the PCF, he said, peaceful coexistence means interstate disputes should not be solved by war, otherwise it represented the "class struggle in all its forms."

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USSR

HARDENING OF LEADERSHIP CONSENSUS SUGGESTED BY SAKHAROV ACTION

The Soviet Government's move on 22 January to strip Andrei Sakharov of his state awards and exile him from Moscow raises the prospect that a broader shift toward orthodoxy in the Soviet leadership consensus may be one consequence of the rapid deterioration of U.S.-Soviet detente over events in Afghanistan. The move against Sakharov reversed a policy of restraint toward the eminent scientist which the Soviet Union had followed since the early 1970's despite clear and occasionally publicized distaste for his dissident activities. In explaining the Soviet actions, IZVESTIYA on 23 January portrayed Sakharov as a consistent supporter of Western interests, hinting broadly that his association with Westerners may have included treasonous activities. An announcement on the same day that deputy premier and head of the State Committee on Science and Technology, Vladimir Kirillin, had resigned could also be connected with the Sakharov action, possibly reflecting dissatisfaction with his position on the affair.

The actions against Sakharov appear to have been prompted by recent statements and meetings with Western newsmen, described in Western reports as involving criticism of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and support for a Western boycott of the Olympic games and referred to vaguely by IZVESTIYA as alleged appeals to the West to "interfere in the internal affairs of the USSR." The charges outlined in the IZVESTIYA article are carefully framed to justify a range of retaliatory measures, including not only the administrative actions already taken but also a possible future trial for treason. The most serious charge lodged against the scientist is that in his meetings with Western diplomats and journalists he "repeatedly" blurted out things that any state protects as "secret." The article also used the word "traitor" in characterizing his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize for human rights advocacy, and it accused him of having "overstepped the lines drawn by law," without specifying the exact violation. While these charges carry an ominous ring, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Government would see an advantage in drawing further world attention to Sakharov's plight by putting him on trial.

While Soviet media have provided no explanation for Kirillin's resignation, it may be relevant to note that among deputy premiers he was most closely involved with overseeing the Academy of Sciences. It is possible that his resignation may be connected with his

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failure to force Sakharov's expulsion from the Academy of Sciences. Kirillin has long enjoyed a reputation among scientists as being relatively sympathetic toward their needs and interests, and on two occasions he refused to sign letters from members of the Academy condemning Sakharov. The fact that Sakharov has continued to enjoy all the rights and privileges of an Academy member despite his notorious challenges of government policy speaks volumes about the traditional prickly refusal of the Academy to accept government interference in its internal affairs. Kirillin's removal may clear the way for a new leadership effort to force the Academy to expel Sakharov.

SCHOLAR SAYS PARTY POLICIES MUST ACCORD WITH PUBLIC OPINION

During 1979 Soviet publications gave increasing attention to the notion that public opinion should play a bigger role in party and government decisionmaking, and some steps were evidently taken to implement this thesis. This argument was carried to the furthest extreme in an article last fall by Institute of State and Law scholar R.A. Safarov, who advanced the principle that leadership decisions should normally be based on a public consensus and that public opinion polls should be used to determine the consensus. Safarov's idea that authorities should actively seek to determine public opinion on policy issues through empirical studies can be traced back to an innovative group of Soviet sociologists who enjoyed a vogue in the mid-1960's and who have continued to exercise influence despite powerful opposition to their ideas in recent years. A more controversial part of Safarov's thesis--that party leaders should actually shape policy based on the results of such studies--has been given currency by the writings and speeches of Politburo member Chernenko and by practices actually implemented by the Georgian republic party leadership.

SAFAROV ARTICLE

Safarov argued, in an article in SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES, No. 4, signed to press in October 1979, that leaders should try to make their decisions on the basis of public opinion or should at least try to win public support for their policies by persuasion. Maintaining that the "effectiveness of political administration" depends partly on its reflecting the "demands of public opinion," he quoted Lenin as saying that among the masses the party is "a drop in the ocean" and that "we can rule only when we correctly express what the people recognize" as correct. Hence, wrote Safarov, "public opinion should be included to a still greater degree in party and state policy at all levels of its formulation and execution."

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The main tool to measure public opinion and channel it into decision-making is the public opinion poll, according to Safarov, and he claimed that Lenin was "the initiator of the method of political administration based on public surveys." The leadership should first seek to adopt decisions corresponding to public demands as reflected in such surveys, argued Safarov, but if it needs to adopt a decision which is unpopular, it must actively seek to persuade the public by explaining the decision and the results expected. Safarov avoided the delicate issue of what the leadership should do if the public is dead set against certain government decisions. If repeated public opinion surveys demonstrate continuing lack of support for a decision, he wrote cautiously, "competent organs should undertake necessary actions to overcome" this lack of support.

BACKGROUND Safarov's article has antecedents going back to the campaign to use sociology and polling for party work which peaked in the last half of the 1960's. Some sociologists at that time sold party officials on the idea that sociological surveys and public opinion polls could be reliable tools to increase the effectiveness of party work. A "party information sector" was set up in the CPSU Central Committee to study public opinion, and may local party organizations established their own sociological units to improve their information on public attitudes. A special Institute for Concrete Social Research was set up and conducted confidential polls and studies for party and government organs.

This trend was reversed in 1971-72 as some of the polls began producing disturbing results. Some empirically-minded sociologists were accused of unorthodox behavior and un-Marxist attitudes, and conservatives increasingly perceived sociology as a threat to orthodox Marxism-Leninism, both in theory and practice. Party officials shied away from sociology and polling, and sociology units in many organizations, including the Central Committee, were abolished or fell into disuse. The sociology institute itself was purged and put under the control of conservatives who restricted sociological surveys to innocuous subjects.

TRENDS IN 1979 Safarov's article came amidst signs not only of a general revival of sociology in recent years but also of its reemergence in party work and even pressure to give public opinion polls an important role in decisionmaking. Safarov himself declared that the party had recently taken steps to raise the "political role of public opinion," and he cited the 1975 creation of a Public Opinion Council in the Georgian Central Committee and the 1979 creation of a group in the CPSU Central Committee to analyze public opinion. Safarov described how Georgia, under new First Secretary Shevardnadze, recognized the harmfulness of adopting decisions in ignorance of public opinion, and he quoted Shevardnadze as stating that public opinion surveys are needed to determine public reaction to contemplated decisions.

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How Safarov's system might work in practice has been demonstrated by the Georgian republic leadership. The 6 July 1979 ZARYA VOSTOKA announced that the Georgian Central Committee's Council on Public Opinion had conducted a survey of attitudes toward abuse of private ownership and toward a possible state crackdown on these abuses. Announcing that it had found the public receptive, the republic leadership then adopted tougher measures to counter these abuses.

Within the CPSU leadership, Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Chernenko has been the leading advocate of a greater public voice in decisionmaking. Chernenko campaigned vigorously in 1979 to force party officials to take into account public opinion--as expressed in letters and opinion studies. In an article in the May 1979 PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, Chernenko stated that efforts in the Central Committee to improve the study of public opinion had led to the creation of a new sociological group and a special section to examine letters from the public. Safarov cited Chernenko's article in noting the formation of the Central Committee sociological group; no other Soviet source is known to have even mentioned the existence of this new organ.

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USSR-EAST EUROPE

USSR DENIES CURTAILMENT OF ENERGY SUPPLIES TO EAST EUROPE

Despite accumulating evidence of domestic energy difficulties, Moscow has insisted that its fuel deliveries to its East European CEMA partners are and will be adequate and that its pricing system for such supplies is equitable. These assurances, in a 14 January PRAVDA article by S. Baygarov denouncing Western charges on this score, come in the wake of Soviet admissions late last year of difficulties in exploiting oil resources in the USSR and shortfalls in plan fulfillment in the fuel and power field. The outspoken Yugoslavs, who maintain a loose association with CEMA, have portrayed the combination of Soviet fuel shortages and stepped-up needs on the part of the East European CEMA members as a worsening crisis situation.

The 14 January PRAVDA article, in the form of a reply to a reader's query and entitled "Myths and Reality," was characteristically vague regarding the extent to which planned increases in Soviet energy deliveries to East Europe during the upcoming 1981-85 five-year plan will actually be in petroleum rather than other fuels. Thus, in denouncing Western conjectures about "a reduction in sales of Soviet fuel to the other CEMA countries," the article stressed that such deliveries will reach almost 1 billion "standard tons of fuel" in the next five-year plan compared to 0.8 billion in the 1975-80 period.

The article also defended the change in the pricing system for Soviet oil which went into effect in 1975 and provided for an annual review of Soviet oil prices--to reflect world market conditions--rather than fixed prices for the entire five-year plan period. While conceding that the rise in world energy prices "was bound to affect" the CEMA countries, the article insisted that these countries are shielded from the "severe blows" afflicting capitalist states. Thus, it stressed that the annual review of oil prices "enables the consumer countries to adapt their economies gradually to increased contract prices without sudden upheavals."

BACKGROUND Evidence has accumulated over an extended period that the USSR is increasingly feeling the pinch in maintaining its role as the main supplier of fuel to East Europe. Thus, Soviet Premier Kosygin, in his speech at the Bucharest CEMA session in June 1978, made it clear that the CEMA partners would have to rely increasingly on their own resources and pointed out that these countries would have only a short time to come up with drafts for implementing the energy program adopted at that session. At the

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Moscow session a year later, he warned these countries that Soviet plans to increase fuel supplies in the next five-year plan would depend on improved conservation measures on their part.

Moscow in recent months has increasingly publicized the Soviet Union's own domestic energy difficulties. The problem prompted a special CPSU Central Committee session on 24 October 1979 which, according to PRAVDA, heard complaints on disruptions and plan fulfillment failures in the energy field and called on the petroleum and coal ministries to eliminate their "grave shortcomings." USSR Gosplan Chairman Baybakov, in his report to the Supreme Soviet on 28 November, said flatly that 1979 plan targets for production of coal and oil, among other things, "will not be fulfilled," and he again singled out the petroleum and coal ministries for censure.

Moscow commentaries, while acknowledging domestic energy problems, have maintained that the Soviet Union is making sacrifices to meet its fuel commitments to East Europe. Thus, Moscow World Service on 16 November and 2 December stated that fuel exports had increased in 1979 over the previous year, "despite the fact that extraction of oil has slowed down somewhat because of complicated weather conditions." And a 12 December Rachkov commentary on increased fuel deliveries to CEMA in 1981-85 observed that "as for problems existing at home, we speak openly about them," adding that "we must put a great deal of work still into development of western Siberia," an area with "enormously difficult geographical and climatic conditions."

YUGOSLAV COMMENT Belgrade, usually a reliable observer of Soviet bloc problems, commented on the energy situation in the 17 January BORBA. The paper noted that the discrepancy between growing East European oil consumption and mounting difficulties in extraction of USSR oil reserves "inevitably sharpens the already serious oil crisis" in the Soviet bloc. Noting that the CEMA states, except for Romania, now import more than 80 percent of their oil from the USSR, the article predicted that these countries will henceforth have to increase their imports from the OPEC states, stressing at the same time that such a shift will be "less and less possible" in view of the CEMA members' growing trade deficits with the West. Discounting Soviet claims to the contrary, BORBA asserted that the purported difference between the price of Soviet oil sold to East Europe and world market prices "is rapidly disappearing."

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CHINA-U.S.-USSR

MOSCOW SHARPENS ATTACK ON U.S.-PRC TIES FOLLOWING BROWN VISIT

The U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Afghanistan and Secretary of Defense Brown's early January visit to Beijing have imparted a new stridency to Soviet commentary on U.S.-China ties. No longer saving their harshest invective for Beijing, Soviet commentators are now attacking U.S. intentions in the relationship with equally indiscriminate fervor. While taking propaganda advantage of Secretary Brown's visit, Moscow has stopped short of suggesting that it sees any immediate security threat from his discussions on defense issues with Chinese leaders.

Moscow's new propaganda approach to the U.S.-China relationship was vividly illustrated in PRAVDA's 15 January article on Secretary Brown's visit. Reversing the traditional Soviet warnings to the United States about China's ultimate goals, the article cautioned Beijing that the Pentagon is "turning China into NATO's Asian appendage," thereby "dooming" China to subordination to U.S. strategic designs at the expense of Chinese national interests. PRAVDA went on to portray wide-ranging "imperialist" cooperation between the United States and China, with the U.S. military developing plans for Beijing's "broadest involvement in Washington's aggressive policy" aimed at China's Asian neighbors.

Although Soviet media highlighted U.S.-Chinese discussions of more active military cooperation during Secretary Brown's visit, Moscow has continued to find reasons for reassurance about security implications for the USSR. IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin, while softpedaling his previous insistence that important contradictions stand in the way of a U.S.-PRC alliance, argued in an 8 January article that under the present as well as the foreseeable future correlation of forces Washington could not make up for a deterioration of Soviet-U.S. ties by developing security ties with China. A 15 January commentary aired on Moscow radio's foreign service seemed equally sanguine in noting that statements on the results of the talks by the United States and China, along with stress on mutual objectives, "time and time again" expressed reservations that each intends to act independently "on this or that specific question."

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YUGOSLAVIA

BELGRADE PROJECTS CONFIDENCE AS TITO HEALTH CRISIS CONTINUES

Belgrade has stepped up its efforts to project confidence in the durability of the country's institutions as the crisis over President Tito's health continues. While Belgrade reported the amputation of Tito's left leg on 20 January and has continued to issue daily medical bulletins on his condition, Yugoslav spokesmen and media commentaries have issued a growing number of statements designed to underscore Yugoslavia's unity, defense readiness, and commitment to its traditional independent course. Moscow, sensitive to world concerns about its reaction to a possible Yugoslav leadership change, has taken new pains to reassure Belgrade and foreign audiences of its benign intentions.

A large part of the burden of Belgrade's assurances has been borne by middle- and high-level officials in their statements of recent days. A graphic reminder of the deep roots of Yugoslavia's independence was supplied by veteran Croatian leader and Tito confidant Vladimir Bakaric, who in a TV interview reported by TANJUG on 22 January dwelled on the events surrounding Yugoslavia's break with Stalin after World War II. Pointed warnings against foreign interference have been issued by Slovenian official Mitja Ribicic, in a speech reported by Ljubljana DELO on 14 January, and by Croatia's Jure Bilic, in a speech reported by Zagreb radio on the 20th. Ribicic expressed confidence in the patriotism of the Yugoslav people, and Bilic warned both the Soviets and the West against showing any undue concern for Yugoslavia's future. Similarly, at a press conference reported by TANJUG on 18 January, Foreign Secretariat spokesman Kalezic asserted that Yugoslavia is a "firm and stable community" which has "never accepted anyone's patronage" and is "capable of preserving its independence."

MOSCOW, OTHER COMMENT Following an initial TASS commentary on 16 January, Moscow has issued some half dozen commentaries denouncing as "fabrications" and "provocations" Western speculation about a Soviet threat to Yugoslavia. Statements to this effect have come from Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, in an interview reported by Moscow radio's Serbo-Croatian service on the 21st, a 20 January PRAVDA article by Maslennikov, and several TASS commentaries. The USSR's allies Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, often in the forefront of Soviet bloc criticism of Yugoslavia, have expressed similar reassurances,

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although Bulgaria has not ceased to needle Yugoslavia about disputed bilateral issues.

Albania has renewed a pledge made by party leader Enver Hoxha at the 1976 party congress to "stand by the Yugoslav people" and fight together" with them if Yugoslavia is ever attacked. The pledge was contained in a ZERI I POPULLIT editorial, carried by ATA on the 19th, which implied that the Soviet Union and its "Bulgarian tool" are, along with the United States, the most likely potential aggressors against Yugoslavia.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 14 - 20 JANUARY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3154 items)			Beijing (630 items)		
Afghan Situation	9%	(12%)	Afghan Situation	24%	(38%)
Polish Foreign Minister Wojtaszek in USSR	6%	(--)	PRC Particle Physics Symposium	5%	(--)
U.S.-Iranian Crisis	4%	(--)	Hua Guofeng Greeting to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on Election	4%	(--)
			PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua in Pakistan	4%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- PRAVDA on State of the Union address
- Moscow on European arms dialog
- Gromyko visit to Syria
- PRC on Southwest Asia, USSR response
- PRC approval for U.S. foreign policy
- Pyongyang on North-South leaders talks
- Shcherbitskiy maneuvering
- Moscow treatment of Sakharov
- Changes in Chinese regional leadership

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

With the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations capped by the Afghanistan crisis, Moscow is stressing propaganda confrontation with the Carter Administration over arms control and defense issues rather than diplomatic dialog. Soviet media eagerly exploited President Carter's State of the Union message last week for ammunition in their broadside against the new "Carter doctrine," finding no common ground with the President even on the core issue of SALT. At the same time, Moscow has adopted an unyielding stance on European arms control negotiations, insisting that NATO's mid-December decisions on European armaments are an unacceptable basis for talks on either theater nuclear arms or MBFR. Judging from its statements since the first of the year, Moscow is hoping to offset the East-West stalemate on arms control with stress on such political forums as the November CSCE review conference in Madrid.

MOSCOW SAYS PRESIDENT SEEKS MILITARY BUILDUP, NOT ARMS DIALOG

Moscow has taken President Carter's State of the Union address as an opportunity to press its case that his Administration has forsaken the arms control dialog in favor of an effort to reestablish U.S. military dominance. PRAVDA's lengthy 29 January editorial article, devoted to the State of the Union speech on the 23d as well as to the earlier presidential message to Congress, was more a political tract than a serious reply. It accused the President of announcing an "openly militaristic and hegemonistic platform," while it carefully sidestepped intimations of any potential U.S.-Soviet military confrontation. Supporting Soviet media commentaries, like the editorial article, have linked the President's stance against the USSR to election campaign considerations, but they paint a picture of longer term trends in U.S. policy that do not auger well for bilateral relations beyond next November.

The PRAVDA editorial article represented Moscow's harshest indictment yet of what Soviet media have been eager to label the new "Carter doctrine," but it carefully avoided language evoking urgent alarm. It described the President as promoting a "cult of brute force" and a wave of "jingoism" in the United States, but it found transient cause in part in the 1980 election campaign. It accused the Administration of seeking military dominance over the Third

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World as well as the USSR, but it professed confidence that any such calculation is based on an unrealistic assessment of U.S. capabilities. It found evidence that the President is turning U.S. policy back to the times of Truman, Dulles, and the cold war but concluded with bravado that Washington will not be able to "impede the march of history." Expanding on a theme President Brezhnev introduced in his 13 January PRAVDA interview, the article claimed to find support for the President's approach only from the "most bellicose circles in NATO" and from leaders in Beijing.

While Soviet media have reported critically elsewhere on the President's warning that the United States would respond with military force if necessary against efforts by "any outside force" to gain control of the Persian Gulf region, PRAVDA chose not to treat the matter as one raising the prospect of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Sidestepping the warning, the article sought to make political capital out of the Administration's "unceremonious" proclamation of "various areas of the globe" as U.S. vital interests, even on the borders of the USSR. PRAVDA attacked such statements as a reversion to the tactics of 19th century imperialism that violates recognized norms of interstate relations.

The editorial article claimed support for its contention that the Administration has embarked on a program of militarism in the President's statements on SALT and arms control. It cited a lack of "concrete proposals" on disarmament and the absence of any desire to "really engage" in the search for mutually acceptable solutions in this area. It accused the President of paying lip service to the importance of SALT II while assigning the ratification of the treaty last priority on the Administration's agenda.

MEDIA COMMENTARY While Moscow clearly believes that the 1980 election campaign has influenced the President's actions, Soviet commentators have been looking back to find broader trends behind the shift in U.S. policy. Some, like President Brezhnev, have emphasized NATO's May 1978 force modernization decision as a turning point, but many have gone further. A 22 January PRAVDA article, for example, found current U.S. policy outlined like a "genetic code" as early as 1977 in Presidential Review Memorandum 10, prepared under national security adviser Brzezinski's supervision. The article concluded that what had seemed earlier to be zigzags in U.S. policy have now revealed themselves as "a trend reflecting the predominant way of thinking of the people at the helm" in Washington. Perhaps on the basis of such considerations, TASS chief Sergey Losev offered a markedly pessimistic preview of U.S.-Soviet relations on a 24 January commentary broadcast to North America. Losev said that "we" do not share the illusions of some in the United States that a change of presidents in November will repair the current damage. President Carter's attempts to turn a regional conflict into a world crisis he asserted, "will worsen the international atmosphere for a long time to come."

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UNYIELDING ON EUROPEAN ARMS, MOSCOW STRESSES CSCE FORUMS

Moscow appears to be insisting that progress in MBFR as well as negotiations on medium-range strategic systems is contingent on alteration of NATO's December decision to deploy new American missiles in Europe. In Soviet commentary on European security since the 19th round of talks at Vienna ended in late December, MBFR has emerged as clearly subordinate in Moscow's thinking to the goal of blocking NATO's decision. Moscow has appeared to question the efficacy of the six-year-old Vienna talks themselves in the light of what the Soviets continue to insist would be the effect of the new missiles--altering the military balance in NATO's favor.

Moscow appears intent on offsetting the stalemate on concrete arms control negotiations with the West by emphasizing the East's interest in continuing the dialog in broader political forums. Recent statements by the East, echoing the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' communique released on the eve of NATO's December decisions, have placed special stress on preparations for the November 1980 Madrid CSCE review meeting and on the Pact's May 1979 proposal for a European conference on military detente. The joint communique on Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov's 24-26 January Moscow visit noted pointedly that under "present conditions" the Pact's proposal for such a conference is of "even greater topicality." According to the 27 January PRAVDA, Mladenov and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko also affirmed their readiness to work with "other interested countries" to insure a successful meeting in Madrid.

VIENNA MBFR TALKS While commentary on MBFR has taken a back seat to more urgent issues since the first of the year, Moscow's subordination of the Vienna talks to the issue of NATO modernization was apparent in Soviet MBFR delegate Tarasov's closing remarks at the last session. According to a 20 December TASS report, Tarasov contrasted the East's efforts to impart momentum to talks in Vienna--citing President Brezhnev's 6 October announcement of plans for withdrawing 20,000 troops from the GDR--with what he termed as NATO's attempts to gain military advantage through its missile modernization plan. Moscow would study the latest Western force reduction offer, he said, but would judge its sincerity against the West's reaction to earlier Eastern initiatives. In a 20 December commentary in Moscow radio's foreign service, TASS chief Sergey Losev dismissed the Western MBFR offer as a "cover" for NATO's modernization decision. The West has revised its positions in Vienna, Losev observed, but "for the worse."

The linkage between broader considerations of NATO defense policy and the MBFR negotiations was made more explicit in a comprehensive review of the prospects for European disarmament by West Europe

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specialist Nikolay Portugalov in the 9 January LITERARY GAZETTE. Portugalov argued that prevention of the implementation of NATO's modernization plan would create the proper conditions for rapid progress on European arms control issues but that NATO was attempting to disguise its lack of interest in disarmament talks by offering initiatives such as the "Vienna package." He dismissed the Western MBFR offer as a "substitute" for a direct reply to existing Eastern initiatives, and he claimed that it failed to address the central issues of European security. The "main point," Portugalov declared, was that new American missiles in Europe under the NATO plan "jeopardize" the whole concept of the Vienna talks and the possibility of achieving further measures to strengthen East-West confidence in the context of the Helsinki Agreement.

NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES

Moscow has also confirmed that--in the spirit of Foreign Minister Gromyko's warning in Bonn last November--it will make negotiations with the West on medium-range strategic systems in Europe contingent on the halting of NATO's decision to deploy U.S. missiles. The joint communique released following French Communist Party chief Marchais' early January Moscow visit authoritatively outlined Moscow's approach. As published in the 11 January PRAVDA, the communique declared that the "cancellation" or the "real discontinuation" of the implementation of the NATO program was necessary before "effective talks" on limiting medium-range missiles in Europe could begin. To underscore that Moscow would not countenance negotiations under the conditions offered by NATO, Soviet commentators have rejected NATO's call to discuss limiting medium-range missiles under SALT III--setting forth a limitation on the agenda for SALT III that Moscow had previously avoided. TASS chief Losev, in his 20 December remarks cited above, said that the NATO proposal was "absolutely unacceptable" and contradicted the understanding reached at the Vienna summit that SALT III would discuss intercontinental strategic armaments. Portugalov's LITERARY GAZETTE article reaffirmed that position.

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USSR-MIDDLE EAST

GROMYKO DEFENDS SOVIET REGIONAL POLICIES DURING SYRIAN VISIT

Moscow is seeking to deflect Muslim criticism of its actions in Afghanistan, to counter charges that it has designs on Iran or the Persian Gulf, and to refocus Arab attention on what should be the primary target: the United States as the "enemy of Islam" and the supporter of Israel. This was the thrust of Foreign Minister Gromyko's statements in Syria this week, a message echoed in the 29 January PRAVDA editorial article which responded to President Carter's State of the Union speech. The Gromyko visit also attempted to reconfirm Soviet-Arab ties, particularly with Syria, the only Arab state aside from South Yemen and Egypt not attending the Islamabad conference of Islamic foreign ministers which condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The visit also came as Israel and Egypt proceeded with normalization of relations under the March 1979 treaty--the signing of which had occasioned another sudden Gromyko visit to Syria. The two sides presumably touched on Syrian internal unrest in the wake of the recent murders of Soviet advisers there.

REGIONAL ISSUES The joint communique on Gromyko's 27-29 January visit summed up Gromyko's thesis by accusing "imperialist circles" of creating a "hullabaloo around the events in Iran and Afghanistan" to divert Arab attention from the problem of Israel, split the ranks of Arab and Muslim countries, and drive a wedge between them and the USSR. Gromyko in particular decried what he called U.S. attempts to stir up Iranian hostility toward the USSR with "falsehoods" about concentrations of Soviet troops near Iran's northern borders, as well as allegations that the Soviet Union has designs on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. He did not, however, repeat his recent complaint--at a Kremlin luncheon on the 24th for the visiting Bulgarian Foreign Minister--that "some people in Iran itself seem interested" in the circulation of "inventions" about Soviet intentions toward Iran. Other than this cryptic remark, Moscow has ignored Iranian officials' criticism of the Soviet role in Afghanistan. With an eye to the Syrians' reserve on that matter, Gromyko touched only briefly on Afghanistan, suggesting that the United States has little room for criticism of the Soviet move when it maintains a military base in Cuba against that government's wishes. Damascus was not forthcoming in offering support to Moscow: Foreign Minister Khaddam in his dinner speech merely remarked that imperialist and other circles "exaggerated" the events in Afghanistan, and the

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communique urged respect for Afghanistan's desire to defend its unity, territorial integrity, and nonalined policy.

Gromyko's attempt to focus Arab attention back on the Israeli problem was particularly evident in the communique's transparent appeal to Arab emotions over Jerusalem. The standard Soviet formulation on a settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue contained a virtually unprecedented reference to Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967, "including the eastern part of Jerusalem." Moscow has avoided any prescriptions for resolution of the sensitive Jerusalem question and seldom broaches the issue at all. Only on one other occasion since 1967--the visit of a Supreme Soviet delegation to Jordan in 1975--is an Arab-Soviet communique known to have specified eastern Jerusalem in the withdrawal formula.

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE Implicitly addressing the USSR's Muslim critics gathered in Islamabad to discuss the Afghan situation, Gromyko offered assurances that the Soviet Union is a "true friend" of all Islamic peoples and "profoundly respects" the religious beliefs of its own people. Gromyko himself made no mention of the Islamic conference in Pakistan, and limited Soviet comment for domestic and foreign audiences has obscured the rebuke to the USSR in the main conference resolution, which condemned "Soviet military aggression" in Afghanistan and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops. As in its treatment of the UN General Assembly resolution on 14 January, Moscow complained of "interference" in Afghan internal affairs and disguised the nature of the resolution with generalities about "slander" concerning Soviet assistance to Kabul. It stressed that the Afghan question was one of several agenda items and sought to draw attention to these other issues, such as the status of Jerusalem and U.S.-backed sanctions against Iran.

BILATERAL RELATIONS During the visit Gromyko was received by President al-Asad, and he also met with Syrian Communist Party leaders and PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat. According to TASS, the meeting with al-Asad produced "full identity of views" on Middle East issues, but Damascus radio's account suggested less than complete accord in their review of the Middle East situation and international issues: Gromyko "explained the Soviet Union's stand and President al-Asad explained the developments in the Middle East." The joint communique on the visit noted the sides' intent to observe the "appropriate provisions" of the October 1979 communique--on al-Asad's last visit to Moscow--with regard to continued Soviet assistance "in the consolidation of Syria's defense potential."

There were no allusions during the visit to the unsettled Syrian domestic scene, but TASS, in an atypical admission, reported on 20 January the deaths of two Soviet advisers at the hands of a Muslim Brotherhood

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"band." Moscow only recently acknowledged the internal unrest, in a 1 January NEW TIMES article by A. Nikolayev, who observed that events in Syria had taken a "dangerous turn." Nikolayev denied what he called American press claims that outbreaks of violence in two Syrian cities had been spontaneous. He blamed the Muslim Brotherhood and alleged Western, Israeli, and Egyptian backers for "bloody reprisals against the Alawites in Syria," without mentioning Sunni Muslim resentment of the minority Alawites' inordinate share of power in the country. In a cryptic remark apparently intended to caution the al-Asad regime against blaming Iraq for the unrest, Nikolayev observed that "the Syrian leadership knows perfectly well who is creating religious strife in the country," and he added that a similar "conspiracy" was being carried out in Iraq where "foreign agents" were provoking clashes between Shi'ites and Sunnis.

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CHINA-USSR-SOUTHWEST ASIA

PRC ADJUSTS BILATERAL TIES FOLLOWING AFGHAN INTERVENTION

While continuing to denounce USSR intervention in Afghanistan as a threat to world peace and to call for broad international responses to the Soviet action, Beijing has cautiously attempted to adjust its bilateral ties in the Southwest Asian region. PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua renewed Chinese solidarity with its traditional ally Pakistan during a long-planned visit to Karachi. Chinese media coverage of the visit was unusually muted, however, and statements of unilateral Chinese support for Pakistan and for Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation were cautiously subordinated to a call for wider international assistance. Beijing has also gone to unusual lengths to induce improvement in relations with India's newly-installed government under Indira Gandhi, a leader whom China had in the past criticized for tilting India toward the Soviet Union.

SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN While Chinese commentary in recent weeks has become increasingly specific in identifying Pakistan and Iran as the next victims of Soviet "aggression" in Southwest Asia, Beijing's low-key treatment of Huang Hua's 18-23 January visit to Pakistan appears to reflect Chinese recognition of Pakistan's sensitivities in the current situation. Thus, although Huang pointedly remarked upon his arrival that his long-planned visit to Pakistan had taken on "new significance" because of "recent developments in Afghanistan," his public statements of support for Pakistan were relatively guarded, and XINHUA coverage of the visit was unusually terse. XINHUA departed from normal practice, for example, by reporting none of the banquet toasts during the visit; and XINHUA's report on the foreign minister's talks with Pakistan President Haq stated only that the two leaders had discussed "the development of the regional situation" and had "exchanged views on further strengthening cooperation" between the two countries. In a press conference on 22 January, Huang, according to XINHUA, added only that both sides had agreed to "continue their consultations" and would take "some follow-up actions" to "increase their cooperation."

The only substantive declaration of Chinese support for Pakistan also came in XINHUA's account of Huang's press conference at the end of his visit, which noted that the foreign minister had "reaffirmed" that "the Chinese Government and people firmly stand by the Pakistan people in standing up to the external threat." Even here, however, XINHUA seemed to play down the PRC commitment by quoting directly Huang's statement that the West European countries, Japan, and the

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United States "should offer genuine assistance to Pakistan and all other countries that are faced with threat and aggression," assistance which "should be commensurate with the present developments" and which "should not be symbolic or temporary out of expedient considerations."

In contrast, when Pakistan was facing Indian-abetted dismemberment in late 1971, Beijing was markedly less restrained in its pledge of unilateral support. At an early November 1971 Beijing banquet for a visiting Pakistan delegation led by then People's Party Chairman Zulfiqar Bhutto, acting PRC Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei voiced the Chinese Government's and people's "resolute support" for Pakistan's "just struggle" and highlighted joint Sino-Pakistani cooperation without focusing on the need to mobilize international support. This direct support was reiterated by other Chinese leaders when Indian troops moved into East Pakistan later in November and was given substance in a December government statement which declared that China was providing "material assistance" as well as political support to the Pakistanis.

SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN RESISTANCE On 20 January Huang Hua visited an Afghan refugee camp, where he declared that "the Afghan people are not isolated in their struggle" and that "the Chinese people will do what they can to help relieve your suffering." However, the XINHUA accounts of Huang's remarks implied that Chinese assistance to the Afghan cause is limited only to humanitarian relief supplies directly to the refugee camps within Pakistan. Huang's suggestion at his 22 January press conference that "timely, adequate, and effective assistance should be given to the Afghan people and their resistance movement," moreover, appeared to be tagged to the kind of assistance which he thought the West European countries, Japan, and the United States should provide.

While thus voicing support for the Afghan resistance effort and regularly reporting Soviet difficulties in suppressing the rebellion, Beijing has shown sensitivity to Soviet charges of direct Chinese military support to the rebels. In the most recent rebuttal of such "fabrications," a 25 January XINHUA correspondent's commentary claimed that Moscow was attempting to divert world opinion from its worsening predicament and to provide new excuses for perpetuating its occupation of Afghanistan.

RELATIONS WITH INDIA In an apparent further effort to stem what it perceives as growing Soviet influence in Southwest Asia, Beijing has gone to unusual lengths to cultivate good relations with the new Indira Gandhi government in India and has taken favorable note of India's belated criticism of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In sharp contrast to its comment on Gandhi's election defeat in March 1977, which typically portrayed her

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regime as unpopular, dictatorial, corrupt, and pro-Soviet, Chinese media reported her return to power this January without criticism; and on 14 January XINHUA carried a political profile on Gandhi which failed to mention any of the excesses which Beijing had attributed to her previous administration. Significantly, Premier Hua Guofeng's 15 January greeting to Gandhi on her election, which expressed the hope that the trend in improved Sino-Indian relations "will continue to develop in the interest of peace and stability in Asia," was notably more enthusiastic than Hua's March 1977 message to Morarji Desai, who had gained the prime minister post upon Gandhi's ouster.

Beijing's current conciliatory approach was also demonstrated by Huang Hua's attendance at the Indian Embassy's 26 January banquet marking India's 30th National Day and the extensive replay the XINHUA account on the dinner gave to remarks by Huang and the Indian ambassador on their mutual commitment to improving Sino-Indian ties. Huang is the highest ranking Chinese leader to have attended the embassy's national day celebrations since Vice Premier Chen Yi attended such a banquet in 1961, prior to the deterioration in relations which led to China's 1962 preemptive strike into India. Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong headed the Chinese delegation to the banquet last year; and although an improvement in Sino-Indian relations was signaled the next month with the long-delayed visit of Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee to Beijing, relations were immediately soured by China's incursion into Vietnam while Vajpayee was still in China.

Beijing exhibited concern when the Gandhi government initially wavered on opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the UN General Assembly special session earlier this month, but Chinese media have repeatedly replayed subsequent official Indian criticism of the Soviet action, beginning with XINHUA's 17 January report of Gandhi's own denial that India supports the Soviet moves. XINHUA earlier had called the Indian representative's remarks at the 11 January UNGA session defending the Soviet action an "odd approach" to the invasion, and promptly and favorably replayed the State Department's 12 January criticism of India's position. On 14 January XINHUA also noted reports of criticism of the stance by Indian opposition leaders.

Beijing has also been prompt in rebutting what it claims are Soviet efforts to foment Indian fears of renewed Chinese attacks against India. RENMIN RIBAO in a 22 January commentary responded to an 18 January TASS claim that China was massing military forces on India's northern border to "mount an attack at any time," calling the report "clumsy rumormongering" designed to divert attention from Afghanistan.

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MOSCOW SLOW IN RESPONDING TO BEIJING'S HARSH CRITICISM

Moscow's sharply intensified attack on U.S. foreign policy in connection with the Afghanistan crisis has for the moment relegated polemics with Beijing to a secondary position. Moscow has been slow to acknowledge the signs of China's hardening anti-Soviet stance since the Afghan intervention. China's decision, announced on 20 January, to postpone indefinitely the second round of Sino-Soviet talks has been noted only in Moscow broadcasts in Mandarin, and Soviet media have yet to respond to a series of authoritative RENMIN RIBAO Commentator articles calling for world unity against "Soviet hegemonism." Despite the lag in a direct Soviet rejoinder to China, there are signs in Moscow's comment on Secretary of Defense Brown's 5-13 January PRC visit that the Soviets are concerned about the expansion of Sino-U.S. cooperation.

The significance for the USSR of the continuing development of Sino-U.S. ties was stressed in CPSU Secretary Konstantin Rusakov's 29 January RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech. Speaking in Rostov-on-Don, Rusakov asserted that the USSR could not fail to consider "with all seriousness" the fact that a "real alliance or partnership" is being established between Washington and Beijing. Similar concern over the potential danger of Sino-U.S. defense ties was graphically expressed in IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin's 16 January commentary on the U.S. response to Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Noting that U.S.-PRC defense cooperation could take many forms, Bovin remarked that any U.S.-China "joint operation" would certainly mean "joint suicide."

The tenor of some Soviet commentary in the last few weeks suggests that one response to growing Sino-U.S. ties may be an invigorated effort to appeal to elements in the Chinese leadership disgruntled over the increasing tilt toward Washington. PRAVDA's 15 January commentary on Secretary Brown's visit was largely a heavy-handed attempt to accuse the current Beijing leadership of selling out to the United States. PRAVDA accused Beijing of "groveling before U.S. imperialism" and sacrificing the Chinese people's national interests. This theme has also been prominent in Moscow radio's Mandarin programming, where it has long been a background theme.

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The Soviet-oriented clandestine radio Ba Yi was characteristically the most explicit on this issue.* In a 27 January commentary, Ba Yi maintained that "a certain person in the CCP Central Committee"--presumably Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping--had ignored former Premier Zhou Enlai's warning that a truly independent country must control its own foreign policy and, yielding to Secretary Brown, had "brazenly" ordered a break in the Sino-Soviet talks on normalizing relations.

* Radio Ba Yi was first monitored by FBIS in the spring of 1979, after the Chinese attack on Vietnam. While it poses as a Chinese clandestine station and broadcasts only in Mandarin, it is clearly Soviet-oriented. Its commentary is heavily directed toward the People's Liberation Army, as its title, August 1--which is PRC Army Day--suggests.

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CHINA-U.S.

BEIJING APPLAUDS TURNING POINT IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Beijing has registered strong approval of what it perceives to be a major about-face in the Carter Administration's strategic policies toward the Soviet Union in the wake of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan. Chinese media have hailed the President's State of the Union address as encapsulating the major shift in U.S. foreign policy toward a more resolute defense of American interests against Soviet challenges and have portrayed a growing consensus behind the President. Beijing at the same time has welcomed new advances in Sino-American bilateral relations as having heightened strategic significance in the current international context.

STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS Beijing's highly favorable evaluation of President Carter's State of the Union address came in a 30 January RENMIN RIBAO article attributed to the regular pseudonymous commentator Fang Min. Observing that the President's address makes a "new and uncompromising stand" in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, Fang noted in particular that the President predicted the 1980's will be a decade of international turmoil, that he avoided referring to detente with the USSR, and that he pledged to increase defense spending and meet challenges to U.S. vital interests by all necessary means, including military force. Fang contrasted at length the current Administration stand on relations with the Soviet Union with its conduct of such relations since 1976, noting that during the past three years Washington has "said much and done little," has been "irresolute and indecisive," and has been "relatively weak and helpless" in the face of repeated Soviet challenges.

Fang called the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan "sobering medicine for people in power in the United States," and he concluded from President Carter's address that the President has recognized "the dangers of undue restraint and concession" under the "former U.S. policy of appeasement and accommodation" of Moscow. The President's current effort to move the United States from its "state of inertia" internationally to defend U.S. interests and "play a leading role in the world," Fang suggested, "accurately reflects the popular sentiments" in the United States. While acknowledging that "it remains to be seen" how the Administration adjusts its policies to meet its rhetoric, Fang concluded that "after the outbreak of the Afghan situation, the United States has obviously felt it necessary to 'mend the fold.'"

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Earlier comment on the President's address had similarly been favorable. An initial 23 January XINHUA report on the address had highlighted his commitment to defend the Persian Gulf area against threat of foreign control, and a brief RENMIN RIBAO commentary on the 25th observed that the President had departed from normal precedence of domestic affairs over foreign policy to concentrate heavily on "how the United States will deal with the grave Soviet challenges in the 1980's."

The positive treatment of the President's address caps a sharp, favorable swing in Chinese media treatment of the Carter Administration's conduct of Soviet-American strategic relations since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Chinese media have welcomed various actions taken by the Administration to modify U.S. relations with Moscow as a result of the Soviet action and have praised Administration steps to increase defense spending. Chinese media treatment of the Administration has also reversed Beijing's longstanding characterizations of Washington as uncertain of U.S. interests internationally, susceptible to Soviet pressure, and helpless in the face of Soviet intransigence--unfavorable judgments evidenced most recently in Beijing's treatment of the issue of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba last fall.

Accompanying its increasingly favorable evaluation of the President's policies toward Moscow, Chinese media have also begun to portray broad Congressional and public support for a firm stance against the Soviets. The 25 January RENMIN RIBAO commentary on the President's State of the Union address, for example,observed that Congress' applause for the speech "showed that a tremendous change has taken place in the political atmosphere" in Washington since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and noted that "even Senator McGovern" "expressed his support" for the President. Previous Chinese commentary critical of what it characterized as U.S. weakness and indecision in meeting Soviet challenges in recent years has attributed such behavior in part to the lack of a public consensus behind U.S. foreign policy in the wake of Vietnam and in particular to division between the President and the Congress over the U.S. role abroad.

BILATERAL TIES Concurrent with its positive appraisal of the Administration's stance against the Soviet Union, Beijing has sought to draw out the wider international significance of several recent advances in Sino-American bilateral ties. While Beijing has repeatedly urged in the past that China and the United States should view their bilateral relations from the "long-term political and strategic" perspective, Chinese media appear to have gone to somewhat greater lengths to stress such linkage in the current international context. This greater emphasis is consistent with Chinese calls since the Afghan intervention for closer international "unity" and cooperation against the Soviet Union, and it seems to have gained particular impetus from the 5-13 January Beijing visit of

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Secretary of Defense Brown. Chinese media during that visit noted with evident favor remarks by Administration officials that Washington has dropped its evenhanded approach to its relations with Beijing and Moscow in the wake of the Afghanistan situation. Instances of a stronger linkage between Sino-American bilateral and strategic relationships include:

+ XINHUA's 24 January report on Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's comments to U.S. delegates to the first session of the Sino-American joint commission on scientific and technological cooperation cited Deng's denunciation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. According to the XINHUA report, Deng stressed the need under such tense international circumstances to "unite and deal seriously with Soviet hegemonism" and added that "such unity should be concrete in content" and based on "solid work." In that respect, Deng observed, the six scientific and technical cooperation agreements signed during the joint commission's session are "a very good thing."

+ XINHUA's 24 January report on final Congressional approval of most-favored-nation trading status for the PRC noted that many congressmen supported the measure as a "significant movement forward" in the interests not only of both countries but also of "stability and peace in the world." While Beijing in the past has stressed the urgency of such preferential trading status to the development of Sino-American bilateral relations, PRC media have not previously suggested that the issue is of strategic importance. Beijing seemed to be drawing tacit satisfaction from Washington's shift away from evenhanded treatment of China and the Soviet Union when the 24 January XINHUA report on the Congress' measure noted that Senators Jackson and Vanik in particular had "strongly" supported it.

In the area of Sino-American military cooperation--a topic with extremely sensitive strategic connotations for the Chinese--Beijing media have thus far avoided comment on the Pentagon's announced readiness to sell defensive military equipment to the PRC. XINHUA reported the Pentagon's announcement neutrally in a brief dispatch on 25 January.

TAIWAN Consistent with Beijing's stress on the link between Sino-American bilateral relations and broader strategic cooperation, it apparently decided not to protest publicly Washington's announced intention to sell weapons to Taiwan. Beijing's only public reaction to the announcement thus far has been XINHUA's 3 January report which noted that the U.S. decision was made despite Washington's termination of all official relations with Taipei, that the State Department spokesman announcing the decision had referred explicitly to the "Government on Taiwan," and that Beijing had stated its opposition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan at the time of normalization of PRC-U.S. relations. By contrast, PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua had formally protested passage of congressional draft resolutions on

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U.S. relations with Taiwan in March 1979, although subsequently Beijing failed to protest formally the passage of a final Taiwan bill.

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KOREA

DPRK CONFIRMS WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG

In responding positively to Seoul's acceptance of the DPRK proposal for a meeting between the premiers of North and South Korea, Pyongyang has confirmed that it is now willing to accept the ROK Government as a legitimate negotiating partner. North Korea's purpose in attempting to initiate the high-level dialog is unclear, and the full extent of its concession of ROK legitimacy remains uncertain. While agreeing to government-to-government contacts, Pyongyang has continued criticism of Seoul for suppressing opposition figures and has repeated calls for a wider North-South dialog to include more than just authorities of the two sides. At the same time, the radical nature of the North Korean initiative--which could be read by others as implying the recognition of two separate Korean states--suggests that Pyongyang is strongly motivated to break the deadlock on the Korean question. If that is the case, it may even be considering tacit acceptance of the status quo of a divided peninsula as long as an image of cooperation between the two sides, and the ideal of eventual reunification, can be maintained.

The official Pyongyang reply to a 24 January letter from ROK Prime Minister Sin Hyon-hwak to his DPRK counterpart Yi Chong-ok came in a 30 January letter from Yi to Sin, carried by KCNA in a special transmission timed to coincide with the delivery of the letter at Panmunjom. Yi's letter welcomed Sin's acceptance of his 12 January offer for direct talks and agreed to the South's proposal for a preliminary meeting on 6 February at Panmunjom to arrange the high-level discussions. Preceding Yi's letter on the special KCNA broadcast was an authorized KCNA statement presenting an official Pyongyang explanation of the current status of the North's initiative to the South.

Both Yi's letter and the KCNA statement confirmed Pyongyang's earlier recognition of the ROK Government as a partner in bilateral discussions. Yi's letter, like his letter of 12 January, was addressed to the "Prime Minister of the Cabinet of the Republic of Korea." Moreover, the KCNA statement noted that there will now be a meeting between the "premiers of the two sides"--a description which reinforces the image of the equivalency of the parties to the negotiations. Had it so chosen, Pyongyang could simply have noted that the meeting would be between "authorities" of the two sides, a formulation which would have diminished the sense of legitimacy which the North has begun to impart to the ROK Government.

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Possibly further reflecting Pyongyang's incremental public acceptance of the ROK, authoritative North Korean pronouncements on the proposed dialog seem to be conferring legitimacy on the position of South Korean prime minister. Thus, both a 29 January authorized KCNA report as well as the statement of the 30th omitted quotation marks around the title "prime minister." Quotation marks continue to be used to set off references to the ROK prime minister in lower-level DPRK comment, but their omission from authoritative statements is nevertheless significant. It used to be standard practice for all DPRK statements to qualify titles of ROK cabinet positions either with the pejorative "puppet" or by putting the position in quotes, indicating that in Pyongyang's eyes it lacked legitimacy.

BROADER CONTACTS

As in the initial set of DPRK letters on 12 January, the most recent North Korean comment raised the question of "wide range" contacts between "responsible politicians" of North and South without making such contacts a precondition to talks between authorities. In fact, Yi's latest letter and the KCNA statement both portrayed the anticipated meeting between the premiers as a "beginning" to the process, indicating that there is no necessary link between the two tracks of dialog. Both went on to note the efficacy of broader contacts, but neither specifically raised the subject of holding a North-South "political consultative conference"--a long-standing DPRK proposal which was most recently repeated in Yi Chong-ok's 12 January letter as well as in several letters from DPRK Vice President Kim Il to South Korean political figures.

The KCNA statement went beyond Yi Chong-ok's letter in noting that the North had not yet received replies from anyone other than the South Korean prime minister. It maintained a positive tone, however, eschewing the line taken by North Korean comment in recent weeks which had suggested that Seoul was deliberately attempting to limit the scope of the dialog. Rather than sound such a negative note, the statement took the position that "everybody has the intention to have sincere discussions," and it expressed the hope that affirmative replies would be forthcoming from recipients of the other letters.

In the weeks following the 12 January DPRK initiative, Pyongyang media have contained what appear to be conflicting signals on the North's stance toward dialog. Initially, the North demonstrated restraint: It did not respond to South Korean President Choe Ky-ha's 18 January press conference, in which he favorably acknowledged the North's proposal, nor did it report Choe's remarks several days later in which he sounded a warning about the North's intentions. This noncommitt silence was broken on 22 January, however, with the start of press comment criticizing the South for the arrest and trial of several opposition figures who had been sent letters from the North. The comment suggested that suppression of such figures was a stumbling bloc to North-South

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dialog. Moreover, on the 23d a NODONG SINMUN editorial article and a statement by the North's Fatherland Front--both marking the anniversary of a North Korean proposal of last year for dialog--warned against any attempt to limit the current dialog to "specific persons" or to accept one proposal while rejecting the others. Significantly, this warning was omitted from the versions transmitted by KCNA to foreign audiences.

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USSR

SHCHERBITSKIY STRENGTHENS ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION, POLICY IMAGE

In a series of moves seemingly calculated to increase his ability to play an influential role in the post-Brezhnev succession, Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy has tightened his control over the Ukrainian party organization and has assumed an increasingly clear-cut position on national policy issues. He recently ousted the first secretary of the Kiev city party organization and carried forward an ongoing purge of Ukrainian ideological leaders, and he continues to make sharp hardline statements on foreign and domestic issues. Judging by the pace and character of his activities and statements, Shcherbitskiy's goal seems to be to create an image of himself as the most ideologically oriented and hawkish of the potential candidates to succeed Brezhnev.

OUSTER OF KIEV LEADER In a bold organizational action which changed the balance in the republic leadership and which could not have been taken without the permission of the CPSU Politburo, Shcherbitskiy ousted Kiev First Secretary A.P. Botvin, a member of the 11-man Ukrainian Politburo. An 11 January Kiev municipal party plenum personally supervised by Shcherbitskiy elected Ukrainian Agitprop head Yu. N. Yelchenko to replace Botvin as Kiev party first secretary. The announcement said that Botvin was being transferred to unspecified "diplomatic" work.

The 61-year old Botvin, who had never been close to Shcherbitskiy, clearly left under a cloud, since he and his deputies had been repeatedly attacked by Shcherbitskiy in recent months. As Kiev oblast second secretary in the early 1960's, he had worked as deputy to Shcherbitskiy's archrival Shelest, who appointed Botvin first secretary of Kiev city in 1964. His survival after Shelest's fall in 1972 presumably was due to Shcherbitskiy's need for allies against the Donetsk faction led by Ukrainian Premier Lyashko and Kiev oblast First Secretary Tsybulko. In 1975 Shcherbitskiy carried out a complicated political operation which had the effect of separating and reversing the relative importance of the Kiev city and oblast party organizations. The upshot was that city secretary Botvin became Kiev's representative in the Ukrainian Politburo, while oblast secretary Tsybulko, Shcherbitskiy's foe, lost his Politburo status.

Shcherbitskiy began publicly turning on the Kiev city leaders in 1978. He assailed the work of city Executive Committee Chairman V.O. Gusev at the December 1978 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum, and he sharply

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criticized both Botvin and Gusev by name for poor leadership of industry at the January 1979 Kiev city party conference. He assailed them again by name at a June 1979 ideological aktiv meeting, and on 1 November Gusev was ousted and demoted to republic deputy minister of industrial construction. Botvin's fall was foreshadowed during the late December 1979 nominations for the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet elections, when he was the only Ukrainian Politburo member not nominated.

Botvin's replacement, Yelchenko, is an apparent hardliner trusted by Shcherbitskiy. After serving as Ukrainian Komsomol first secretary from 1960 to 1968, he was active in combatting Ukrainian nationalism as Lvov party second secretary from February 1969 to November 1971 and as Ukrainian culture minister from 1971 to October 1973. Shortly after Shcherbitskiy became first secretary, he chose Yelchenko to head the Ukrainian Central Committee's Agitprop Section, and Yelchenko has served in this post throughout the crackdown on Ukrainian cultural nationalism under Shcherbitskiy.

IDENTIFICATION WITH IDEOLOGY In other politically significant moves, Shcherbitskiy has been projecting the image of an authority on ideology--a role which could give him added stature in the upcoming succession. The great importance Shcherbitskiy attaches to ideology has been readily apparent in his recent books and speeches: The five books he has authored have focused largely on ideological topics, and he has organized theoretical conferences and anniversary ceremonies as forums for making lengthy ideological statements. The importance he attributes to ideology was also reflected in his choice of an ideological specialist--Yelchenko--to succeed Botvin as first secretary of the Ukrainian capital. Leadership of such major cities is usually entrusted only to individuals with long experience in industrial management.

Shcherbitskiy has also apparently taken a personal role in overseeing Ukrainian ideological work, an interest which has resulted in a remarkable turnover of officials in the fields of culture, education, and ideology. Since mid-1977 he has replaced virtually all top officials in these fields, including most of those he himself appointed in 1972 and 1973 to assist in eliminating nationalist "deviations" permitted by his predecessor Shelest. Most notably, in January 1979 V.P. Kozachenko, Shcherbitskiy's chief hatchetman in the writers union and head of the union since April 1973, resigned as the union's first secretary, ostensibly to return to "creative work"; in April 1979 Shcherbitskiy's chief ideological supporter and prime Russifier, 50-year-old V. Ye. Malanchuk, was dismissed as Central Committee ideology secretary. Shcherbitskiy's personal involvement in this purge became publicly obvious at a 7 June 1979 aktiv meeting in which he assailed Education Minister O.M. Marinich, Chairman of the State Committee for Cinematography V.G. Bolshak, and chief editor of the education paper

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RADYANSKA OSVITA S.P. Zavoloka. Marinich and Zavoloka were removed in early July, while Bolshak, himself a Shcherbitskiy appointee, was replaced in December.

The reason for Shcherbitskiy's ideological purge is unclear, since the victims were mostly hardline Russifiers appointed by Shcherbitskiy himself and could hardly be faulted for softness. Shcherbitskiy's statements indicate that no softening of pressure on ideology can be expected. At this point, the most that can be said is that the replacements by and large may be better administrators than those they succeeded.

STANCE ON ISSUES Apparently as part of his maneuvering, Shcherbitskiy has been developing an image both as an advocate of firmness in dealing with domestic dissidents and as a vigorous hawk on international affairs. His attacks on dissidents at home are hardly unique among provincial leaders, but his insistence on repeatedly speaking out forcefully on international issues is highly unusual and smacks of deliberate political self-advertisement.

True to his hardline record in the past, Shcherbitskiy has kept up a drumbeat of criticism of dissidents within the Soviet Union and of Western attempts to defend human rights in the USSR, raising these subjects in speeches in October and November 1977; March, April, and July 1978; and May and June 1979. In a 7 June 1979 speech he characterized "demagogic talk about 'free exchange of people, ideas, and information'" as simply a mask for "ideological aggression." His actions against Helsinki monitors and other dissidents have been exceptionally harsh.*

In the last two years Shcherbitskiy has increasingly addressed international issues, making sharp attacks on revisionism in the international communist movement and stressing vigilance and reliance on military strength in dealing with the West. On the first point, in a 27 July 1978 speech he clearly identified himself with an uncompromising ideological line in condemning Eurocommunism, any kind of ideological concessions, and talk of "multi-variants" of socialism. He again raised this subject in a 27 December 1979 speech to party veterans and ideological workers, assailing "revisionism and opportunism of all kinds" and any attempts to reduce the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism. Calling for "constant defense of the purity of Marxism-Leninism," he warned that "anyone who deviates from Leninism and tries to revise it unavoidably slides into the swamp of compromise with the bourgeoisie and betrays the cause of the working class."

In dealing with the West, he has stressed the need for power rather than cooperation. In a 20 September 1979 speech he declared the "determining trend" in international affairs to be the shift in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism, and he stated that the international situation "requires of us . . . high vigilance and further strengthening

* See the TRENDS of 19 April 1978, pages 12-14.

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of the economic and military might of our country." In his 27 December 1979 speech, he cited NATO's December decision to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe as proof of the futility of goodwill gestures and of the need for reliance on power. He characterized the decision as a rude rebuff to Brezhnev's Berlin proposals and unilateral troop withdrawals and as evidence that the West is intent on "military superiority" over the Soviet Union. Under conditions of such Western aggressiveness, he argued, the USSR's "first task" must be to strengthen its economic and military might.

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SIGNS INDICATE NO SAKHAROV TRIAL NOW; KIRILLIN REPLACEMENT NAMED

World reaction to the Soviet measures to discredit and silence dissident scientist Andrei Sakharov has evoked additional justifications from Moscow but no signs of a change in policy. Moscow seems to be digging in along the lines staked out in its original actions against Sakharov: Soviet spokesmen and commentators have again charged the dissident with criminal offenses, while giving reassurances that there will be no trial, and the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences has voted a mild censure. A discordant hint of possible future legal action was raised in a LITERARY GAZETTE article, possibly to warn the Sakharovs against a repeat of the news conference held on 28 January by Sakharov's wife, Yelena Bonner. In the meantime, a new overseer of the scientific community, Guriy Marchuk, has been named to replace Vladimir Kirillin, who was dismissed on the same day Sakharov was denounced.

It now appears that measures against Sakharov will stop short of placing the Nobel prize winner on trial, although the door has been left open for such a move against him in the future. The initial indictment of Sakharov, made in IZVESTIYA on 23 January, charged him with treason and being "used as a channel for the passing of important state secrets" to Western intelligence. The ominous implications of this accusation were mitigated, however, by authoritative CPSU foreign affairs spokesman Valentin Falin in a 24 January interview with the West German news weekly STERN, in which he stated that Sakharov would not be prosecuted. This assurance was reiterated by TASS on 25 January in a commentary by Yaroslav Khabarov. However, an article in the 30 January LITERARY GAZETTE, according to TASS, accused Sakharov of libel, "a punishable offense under the law." This new hint of possible legal action may be intended to serve notice on Sakharov that any further demonstrations, such as the Bonner news conference, will bring new retribution.

The action by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences in censuring Sakharov is relatively mild, considering the fact that the Academy reportedly has been under pressure to expel him. According to a 28 January TASS report Sakharov was censured by the Presidium of the Academy for "actions contributing to international tensions and denigrating the lofty title of Soviet scientist." He was, however, still addressed as "academician." It remains to be seen whether the membership of the Academy itself will take any further action, but any attempt to expel Sakharov would require the support of two thirds of all academicians to succeed. There are no recent precedents for such actions, and previous measures directed against Sakharov have found

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little support among academicians. A 29 January English-language broadcast by political commentator Vladimir Pozner pointed out that Sakharov retains his position as an academician and the generous salary that goes with it, an observation that suggests Sakharov will be allowed to remain in the Academy for the present.

A salient difference between the new chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, Guriy Marchuk, and his predecessor, Vladimir Kirillin, is that Marchuk was among the signers of an October 1975 letter from academicians condemning Sakharov, whereas Kirillin was not. If Kirillin was dismissed because of an unwillingness to condone the measures against Sakharov--a possibility suggested mainly by the timing of his dismissal--Marchuk's record of support for an earlier action against Sakharov may have been one of the recommendations for his new appointment. In other respects, Marchuk has a public record much like Kirillin's. Until now, he has been serving as president of the Academy of Sciences' Siberian branch and as a vice president of the Academy. In addition, he was recently appointed chairman of the Science and Technology Commission of the Council of Nationalities and has been a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1976. Like Kirillin, Marchuk has shown an interest in Western technology and has also taken an active role in promoting computer capabilities. Marchuk's appointment appears to have been made at the expense of Deputy Chairman of the State Committee D.M. Gvishiani, Kosygin's son-in-law. Gvishiani's reputation as a leading advocate for cooperation with the West may have counted against him, given the circumstances of the shift and current climate in international relations.

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CHINA

BEIJING TRANSFERS, DISMISSES HIGH-LEVEL REGIONAL OFFICIALS

The reassignment of several highranking PRC regional military and civilian leaders in recent weeks appears to have resolved a number of longstanding and politically difficult issues involving officials who played controversial roles during past periods of political turmoil in China. Revealed in regional and national broadcasts since late December, the new appointments may have been the result of a recent highlevel leadership conference in the capital. Although the new regional appointments appear to be the outcome of an effort to balance divergent political interests within the central leadership, on the whole they seem to ratify gains by party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping. The new appointments include the transfer of several former central-level officials to the provinces and may therefore signal both a trend toward assigning leaders with national experience to regional duties and a renewed effort to deal with remaining opponents at that level of the current modernization policies.

CHEN XILIAN The most important and politically sensitive change to be revealed was the replacement of Beijing Military Region commander Chen Xilian by his former political commissar Qin Jiwei. Reported in RENMIN RIBAO on 23 January, Chen's dismissal is a significant gain for the party wing led by Deng Xiaoping. Even though Chen had been one of Deng's wartime subordinates, his involvement with leftist causes in Liaoning following the Cultural Revolution and his role in Beijing in the events leading to Deng's purge in 1976 had occasioned oblique public criticism and explicit wallposter attacks. A 24 January RENMIN RIBAO article seemed, moreover, to confirm indirectly that Chen was removed with a less-than-favorable performance evaluation. The article applauded the advances in military preparedness made in the region and attributed the current good situation, "which had not been seen for years," entirely to the "vigorous and meticulous political work" done in the region during the "past 12 months or more"--a period of time coinciding with Qin Jiwei's term as the region's first political commissar.

The pattern of Qin's advances since arriving in Beijing in early 1976, together with the 24 January article and earlier favorable media treatment, underlines Qin's association with Deng. A victim of the Cultural Revolution, Qin served under Deng in the PLA before 1949. After his rehabilitation in 1973 Qin became commander of Chengdu Military Region, but in early 1976 he was transferred to become second political commissar of Beijing Military Region in place

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of now discredited CCP Politburo member Wu De. Qin was promoted in November 1978 to first political commissar of the region, replacing another Politburo member with leftist political inclinations, Ji Dengkui. In revealing Qin's November 1978 displacement of Ji, XINHUA left no doubt about Qin's political affiliations, reporting that he personally carried from Shanghai to the Beijing Military Region's cultural units the script of a play favorably portraying the Tiananmen demonstrations in April 1976, which had been suppressed by Chen at the time of Deng Xiaoping's purge.

Chen has not appeared since his replacement was identified in the press, but like other Politburo members discredited after 1976, he probably retains his titles on the Politburo and State Council. Unless Chen receives another military position, it seems possible that he will lose his seat on the Military Commission, the party's military policymaking organ.

OTHER MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS

The implications of the appointment of former Nei Monggol party chief You Taizhong to command Chengdu Military Region, revealed on 25 January in XINHUA and Chengdu radio transmissions, are more ambiguous. Before 1949 You was subordinate indirectly to Deng Xiaoping and directly to Chen Xilian. Removed in late November 1978 from leadership of Nei Monggol, which he had headed for seven years, You's future prospects then seemed bleak. Under his management the region had seemed quick to endorse leftist causes in 1976 and slow to implement policies adopted in the wake of the purge of the gang of four. After leaving Nei Monggol, however, You retained his rank of deputy commander of Beijing Military Region under his old commander, Chen Xilian, possibly because of Chen's continued patronage.

You's promotion this month to head units based largely in Deng's native Sichuan province, however, is not likely to have been accomplished without at least Deng's sufferance, and perhaps after some debate. There has been no open sign of an argument over the decision, but the delay in filling the position may reflect controversy: The Chengdu post had been vacant since the transfer of the region's former commander, Wu Kehua, to Xinjiang in April 1979. The region, bordering on India, is currently not as important strategically as the neighboring Kunming and Xinjiang Military Regions, but the prolonged failure to fill the vacancy, nonetheless, is unusual.

The appointments of new commanders in Beijing and Chengdu may also presage at least one other change of a military region commander. Han Xianchu, the commander of Lanzhou Military Region, has not been named publicly since August 1979 and may no longer hold that post.

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PROVINCIAL TRANSFERS Among recent changes in civilian leaders at the provincial level, three appointments seem to strengthen already well-established leadership groups at that level. These assignments may thus be intended to free the leaders of those three provinces, two of whom are strong supporters of Deng Xiaoping, for central leadership responsibilities in the capital.

+ Tan Qilong's transfer from Qinghai, where he had been party first secretary, to Sichuan as second secretary of the provincial party committee was acknowledged by XINHUA and Chengdu radio on 25 January. The Chengdu post is his second reassignment in just under three years. Although his posting to Sichuan must have been made with the approval of Sichuan's party chief, CCP Politburo member Zhao Ziyang, and the rest of the Deng wing of the party leadership, Tan's ties to that faction seem more the result of common suffering against leftist political attacks than clear past career ties. Tan's appointment to back up Zhao in China's most populous and most nationally praised province seems curious, nevertheless, in the light of Tan's recent problems in handling determined political opposition. Leftist agitation was extreme in Zhejiang during his regime from 1973 to 1977, and in 1975 he required the intervention of high-level national leaders and the PLA to restore order.

Tan appeared to have a less turbulent experience in Qinghai, to which he was transferred in March 1977, but his leadership still seemed ineffective. Reporting Tan's replacement by his subordinate Liang Buting for the first time, Xining radio on 7 January broadcast implied criticism of Tan's leaderhip. The broadcast stated that Liang criticized the provincial party committee for not having effectively promoted the discussion on practice being the sole criterion for truth--the ideological campaign against leftist policies--and for vacillating in the face of disorder. The leadership associations of Liang Buting are vague. Before the Cultural Revolution he had been an official in the now defunct State Council Agriculture and Forestry Staff Office under current NPC Vice Chairman Tan Zhenlin. Liang was apparently purged during the Cultural Revolution and reappeared in Qinghai in 1977.

+ The assignment of former Minister of Finance Zhang Jingfu as second secretary in the Anhui party committee followed his election as provincial governor at the 31 December session of the provincial people's congress. Zhang's assignments lend support to another strong backer of Deng, CCP First Secretary Wan Li. Zhang's affiliations in Beijing are not entirely clear, but he has been serving in the State Council since 1975 as Minister of Finance, an area supervised by Politburo member Li Xiannian. Zhang's new assignment may be a slight demotion to a position more suited to his limited experience. With

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a background in administration of science, Zhang seemed ill prepared for the Finance Ministry post, and he was dismissed abruptly and without explanation from the State Council in September 1979. Although no open criticism of him has appeared, his role as nominal manager of the state's finances in 1978, when domestic spending and import-buying overcommitted China's limited financial resources, may have led to his replacement.

+ Chen Guodong, appointed municipal party second secretary in Shanghai, like Zhang Jingfu is a former State Council minister with unclear leadership affiliations. A central official involved with food production and distribution since the 1950's, Chen left behind in Beijing his portfolio as Minister of Food, acquired only last June when the ministry was reestablished.

Two provincial assignments which appear more directly related to central leadership maneuvering over remaining leftist sympathizers at the provincial level came in Hebei and Hunan. In Hebei, XINHUA's 25 January identification of Jin Ming as that province's party chief, replacing Liu Zihou, is, like the removal of Chen Xilian, another gain for Deng Xiaoping. Liu's removal caps a two-year period during which he had been repeatedly criticized by hiuself and others, both directly and indirectly, for a variety of leadership failures. Liu's continued survival could only be attributed to his past organizational associations with party chairman Hua Guofeng. Liu's replacement, Jin Ming, is also an official with primarily national-level experience. Another victim of the Cultural Revolution, he had been secretary general of the State Council since his rehabilitation in 1978. Before 1966 he had held both provincial and central posts, among the most notable, vice minister of finance under current Vice Premier Li Xiannian.

Liu Zihou's departure from Hebei leaves Hunan still relatively untouched as the principal redoubt of Deng Xiaoping's conservative opponents--slow to embrace current modernization policies and to criticize leftist ones of the past. One recent reassignment, revealed during Changsha radio's coverage of the Hunan People's Congress in December, seemed to strengthen Hunan's appearance as a conservative haven. The radio's 25 December report of the congress session noted the arrival of former Guangdong second secretary Jiao Linyi. Jiao, who was subsequently identified as the province's third-ranking party secretary, has suffered a demotion, but apparently a career-saving one. Until the arrival of Xi Zhongxun in Guangdong in late 1978, Jiao had been de facto head of the province while the province's party chief Wei Guoqing served concurrently in high-level posts in Beijing. After Xi arrived, Jiao was indirectly criticized in provincial party meetings, and he dropped out of public view until a brief appearance in the province in November 1979.

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MORE PURGES POSSIBLE Beijing has not confirmed the timing or substance of a meeting in the capital to discuss regional leadership appointments. An unusually low level of public activity by party Politburo members in Beijing for a two-week period beginning about 10 December, together with Zhao Ziyang's failure to appear at Sichuan's people's congress until its concluding session on 25 December, suggests that such a meeting may have been held in mid-December.

It seems likely that such a meeting, in addition to resolving sensitive personnel issues, would also have ruled on other important matters. One possibility, related especially to the dismissals of Chen Xilian and Liu Zihou, is that the central leadership has decided to sharpen criticism of remaining ideological opponents of current modernization policies. That possibility was implied in media treatment of a session of the party's Discipline Inspection Commission held from 7 to 25 January. A 28 January RENMIN RIBAO editorial marking the conclusion of the conference said that "it is even more necessary for [discipline inspection work] to include the inspection of the practice of stubbornly going in for factionalism and anarchism and the double-dealing behavior of feigning compliance to the party's line, principles, and policies in public but opposing them in private."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21 - 27 JANUARY 1980

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Moscow (3150 items)			Beijing (603 items)		
Afghan Situation	8%	(9%)	Afghan Situation	25%	(24%)
Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov in USSR	6%	(--)	U.S. Scientific Delegation in PRC	5%	(--)
Brezhnev-Kosygin Greeting to India on Independence Anniversary	4%	(--)	Foreign Minister Huang Hua in Pakistan	5%	(4%)
Soviet Dissident Sakharov	3%	(--)	UN Industrial Development Conference, New Delhi	3%	(--)
			Suspension of Sino-Soviet Negotiations	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on Afghanistan, Gulf
- Gromyko visit to Romania
- Public unease in East Europe

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+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

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  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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USSR-AFGHANISTAN-GULF

MOSCOW DENIES DESIGNS ON GULF, ROLE IN AFGHAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Recent authoritative Soviet pronouncements have evinced Moscow's continued defensiveness over its role in Afghanistan and Western speculation about its intentions toward the Persian Gulf. Two sensitive issues were broached for the first time at the elite level by Politburo candidate member Boris Ponomarev when he maintained that there had been no clashes between Soviets and Afghans and denied that Soviets are running the Afghan Government. Focusing on the Gulf, an authoritative "A. Petrov" article in PRAVDA insisted that the USSR has no designs on, or need for, the area's oil resources. Continuing to charge the United States and China with backing aggression by Pakistani-based counterrevolutionaries, Moscow has criticized national security adviser Brzezinski's visit to Pakistan as aimed at drawing Islamabad into U.S.-Chinese strategic plans for the region.

In addressing two sensitive questions concerning the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Ponomarev clearly aimed not only at countering foreign speculation but at reassuring the Soviet public as well. The text of his 4 February speech--one of the continuing series of leaders' republic-level supreme soviet election speeches--is not available, but his remarks on Afghanistan were carried by TASS and PRAVDA, and recorded portions of the speech, including most of the Afghan section, were broadcast on Moscow radio's domestic service. Judging from available reports, other Soviet leaders who have touched on Afghanistan in their electoral speeches--Politburo members Romanov and Grishin and candidate members Demichev and Aliyev--have confined themselves to recalling Brezhnev's PRAVDA interview last month and reaffirming Moscow's standard defense of its Afghan policy.

+ Soviet-Afghan Clashes: Denying U.S. media reports of Soviet-Afghan clashes, Ponomarev assured his constituents that Afghan officials and people "are very friendly" to Soviet servicemen. Earlier, some routine comment had denied Western reports that Afghan army units were fighting Soviet troops. Western news reports of Soviet casualties have been ignored by Moscow media, but foreign estimates of Soviet losses were dismissed as "fantasy" by V. Falin, the first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department, in an interview in the 31 January West German STERN. Although reticent about the functions of the troops other than to ward off outside "aggression," Moscow did spell out some duties in a foreign-language commentary on 3 February which said that the Soviet troops

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were guarding lines of communication, bridges, and roads, and that as a result "bandit attacks" had diminished.

+ Soviet Role in Afghan Government: Without directly saying there had been allegations to the contrary, Ponomarev was at pains to deny that Moscow is in effect running affairs in Kabul. Claiming that the Soviet Union had not infringed on Afghan sovereignty "in the slightest," he maintained that "exclusively Afghan citizens" are operating the state and administrative structure, which is "sovereign from top to bottom."* Earlier Soviet comment had not directly addressed this issue, although Moscow had contrived to make the same point through repeated interviews with a variety of Afghan officials.

In effect defending the credentials of the new Afghan officialdom, Ponomarev characterized the leaders as "long known" to their countrymen and champions of Afghan interests. Moscow has been expansive on this theme, seeking to depict the regime as enjoying widespread support and portraying the new leaders as devout Muslims who are respectful of Afghan "traditions and customs"--an indirect acknowledgment of the earlier revolutionary leaders' overzealous reforms.

+ Persian Gulf: Buttressing a rash of elite denials of any Soviet designs on the Persian Gulf, the 2 February A. Petrov article in PRAVDA was even more categorical than Gromyko had been the previous week in Damascus. The Soviet Union, Petrov said, "has never had and does not have now" any intention to "push its way to the warm seas." Unlike the United States, Petrov said, the USSR has "never claimed other people's oil resources, nor has it ever declared oil-containing areas a 'sphere of its vital interests.'" Petrov asserted that limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean and termination of military rivalry there would "best meet our interests and our security." Speaking in more general terms in a 4 February Kremlin speech for a visiting Kampuchean delegation, Brezhnev called for elimination of "conflict situations" in the region and transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Brezhnev's earlier remarks on the subject in his PRAVDA interview last month were echoed by Ponomarev, who again insisted that the Soviet Union threatens neither Pakistan nor Iran and seeks neither sources of raw materials nor footholds in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The Petrov article is the strongest authoritative denial thus far of any Soviet intent to establish control over other countries' oil

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* A news report on Ponomarev's speech broadcast by Moscow in Dari to Afghanistan noted his denial of clashes between Afghans and Soviet troops but made no mention of his remarks on Afghan staffing of the government.

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resources or to "dictate to other countries" the terms of their oil supplies to the world market. Soviet recognition of the importance of oil to the West was made clear by the director of the USA Institute, G. Arbatov, in an interview with the Washington STAR last July. The Soviet Government, he said, would "certainly not interfere" with Western oil supplies from the Middle East; this would be a very hostile act, "close to a declaration of hostilities," Arbatov said.

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USSR-EAST EUROPE

GROMYKO VISIT TO BUCHAREST REFLECTS CONTINUING DIFFERENCES

Differences between Moscow and Bucharest over Afghanistan and other issues apparently were not resolved during the "friendly" visit of Soviet Politburo member and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko to Romania from 31 January-2 February. The visit featured three days of talks between Gromyko and Romanian leader Ceausescu and produced a final statement which carefully balanced Soviet and Romanian views without signaling major concessions by either side. The visit comes at a time when Romania is conspicuous among its Warsaw Pact colleagues for failing to endorse the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, as evidenced by its implicit criticism of the Soviet action and its nonparticipation in the UN General Assembly vote on Afghanistan. Romania has also failed to join with other East European countries that have canceled planned contacts with the West, apparently to show solidarity with Moscow.

The final statement on Gromyko's Bucharest visit, unlike the communiques on his recent talks with the Bulgarian and Polish foreign ministers, contained no endorsement of the current Afghan regime or explicit reference to the situation in Afghanistan. The statement endorsed Soviet viewpoints in general terms, blaming "imperialist" forces for interfering in some unspecified countries, endangering independence, fueling the arms race, and intensifying the danger of war. But it also contained assurances to the Romanians by reaffirming the principles of sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and peaceful settlement of conflicts. In one discrepancy suggesting Romanian concern about the effects on East Europe of recent Soviet-U.S. tensions, the SCINTEIA--but not the PRAVDA--version of the statement noted the need to "prevent the deterioration of the (international) situation." The talks were said to have been held in a "frank, comradely" atmosphere, the same euphemism for disagreement used in other recent Soviet-Romanian statements.

Romania's independent stance among Moscow's East European allies was underlined by two other foreign visits preceding Gromyko's arrival. In the last week of January Bucharest played host to U.S. State Department Undersecretary David Newsom and FRG opposition leader Franz Josef Strauss. In contrast, some exchanges between the West and other East European countries have been called off in recent days, apparently as a result of the cooling of Soviet-U.S.relations in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Among tne planned visits which have been affected are those of Hungarian parliamentary leader Apro to the United States, FRG Chancellor Schmidt to East Germany, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher to Czechoslovakia, and Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja to the FRG.

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EAST EUROPE

OFFICIALS ANSWER TELEPHONE QUESTIONS ON SENSITIVE ISSUES

In a curious coincidence of efforts to influence public opinion in East Europe, three countries recently conducted programs in which officials answered telephoned questions on foreign and domestic policy. The Czechoslovak program was carried live on radio, Hungary's was recorded, and Poland's was published in the press. In all cases, the programs seemed calculated to support official policy: The Hungarians and Czechoslovaks were concerned about the implications of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan--an event which must have stirred uneasy memories in those populations--and the Polish program dealt mainly with consumer goods shortages, a chronic source of discontent in that country. The use of phone-ins suggests a belief on the part of the governments concerned that the issues discussed were worrisome enough to the peoples of East Europe to warrant putting on shows of direct consultation between officials and the public.

HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The officials who manned the telephones in Budapest and Prague took pains to assure listeners that the detente process will continue despite the U.S. countermeasures against Moscow in response to the Afghan intervention. In the phone-in aired on 24 January, Hungarian Central Committee Foreign Affairs Department Chief Janos Berecz agreed that "cold war" measures by a great power such as the United States are "cause for concern" but added that he is optimistic because "the foundations of detente are very deep." Berecz called on the Carter Administration to exercise the same kind of restraint as that shown by Moscow in 1972 when it received President Nixon despite the U.S. blockade of North Vietnam and the bombing of Hanoi. In a further report on the same phone-in program by MTI five days later, Berecz similarly appealed for U.S. restraint regarding the Olympics, recalling that the games were held as usual during both the Korean and Vietnam hostilities.

Prague on 31 January broadcast a lengthy call-in radio program which began with an invitation to the public to "phone in your questions directly here to the studio" and claimed that calls had already been received "from all over the Republic." The officials answering the public queries were listed as Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Milos Vejvoda; Kvetoslav Faix, first deputy central director of Czechoslovak

radio; and Karel Kvapil, chief of Czechoslovak radio's editorial office of current affairs. Like their Hungarian counterpart, the Prague radio speakers took the tack of reassuring listeners alarmed over Washington's vigorous anti-Soviet stance in the wake of Afghanistan. Thus, to the query whether the present "development in the United States resembles the period preceding the growth of fascism," a spokesman replied, "I do not think so," adding that "it is no doubt just a demonstration of the election campaign." The speakers were similarly reassuring on prospects for detente, one remarking that despite "temporary reverses," it is "a tendency that must be implemented." The program wound up with an assertion that the USSR and its allies are committed to the principle that "the process of detente must continue."

POLAND The Polish phone-in on 7 January, featuring calls to Polish Domestic Trade Minister Adam Kowalik, was carried in transcript form in the 12-13, 16, and 18 January issues of the government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY. The paper had carried an announcement in its 29-30 December issue inviting the public to phone in their questions to Kowalik. Described in the paper as "precongress consultations about the problems of the domestic market," the phone-in was apparently aimed in large part at defusing public discontent over consumer goods shortages on the eve of the Polish party congress, scheduled to open on 11 February. The minister, in responding to the often sharply worded questions from consumers, freely acknowledged the shortages, giving limited assurances that conditions will improve and, at the same time, stressing that it is up to the public to improve conditions by working harder. Replying to questions on the explosive issue of meat supplies, Kowalik admitted that such supplies are one quarter below demand, while also insisting that there will be no meat rationing and that meat prices at government-operated shops will remain at present levels. He added that the only way to solve the meat problem is to increase production--a task not for the government alone but for "all the people." The minister also had little comfort for a caller who complained that the "Pewex" shops--stores similar to those in other East European countries which sell Western luxury goods for hard currencies--benefit only the "very few, while the general run of our society reaps no benefits." Kowalik could only cite indirect benefits for the average consumer by noting that profits from the Pewex shops are used by the government to buy goods for the general domestic market.

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BRIEF

MOSCOW ON SUMMER OLYMPICS: Moscow continues to play up world opposition to the U.S.-proposed boycott of the summer Olympics in the USSR and to profess confidence that the games will take place as scheduled. By glossing over the subtleties of pronouncements abroad, Soviet media have conveyed the impression in particular that West Europeans favor unconditional participation in the games. Moscow has thus far refrained from raising the prospect of Soviet counteraction, but Soviet media have replayed intimations by sports officials abroad that a U.S. boycott could bring International Olympic Committee review of U.S. involvement in future games. Soviet domestic media have still not reported that the U.S. boycott proposal is linked to the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. While commentary in domestic media has been relatively guarded, Soviet officials in remarks to newsmen abroad have been more willing to admit concern over the boycott as well as to address the question of counteraction. In a 31 January STERN interview, CPSU Central Committee International Information Department official Valentin Falin termed President Carter's call for a boycott "one of the most unfortunate decisions" flowing from the Afghanistan crisis. The first deputy chairman of the Moscow Olympics Organizing Committee, Vladimir Popov, in remarks reported by the London Press Association on 25 January, asserted flatly that the Soviet Union will not retaliate by boycotting the winter games in Lake Placid this month or the 1984 summer games in Los Angeles.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 28 JANUARY - 3 FEBRUARY 1980

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Moscow (3766 items)			Beijing (610 items)		
Gromyko in Syria	11%	(--)	Afghan Situation	20%	(25%)
Vietnam	8%	(--)	PRC Foreign Ministry Document on Xisha, Nansha Islands	7%	(--)
USSR-SRV Diplomatic Relations 50th Anniversary	5%	(--)			
Communist Party 50th Anniversary	3%	(--)	Islamic Conference, Islamabad	8%	(--)
Afghan Situation	4%	(8%)	Proposed Boycott of 1980 Summer Olympic Games	4%	(--)
PRAVDA Editorial Article on President Carter's State of Union Message	3%	(--)			

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Soviet troop movements near Iran
- Moscow on U.S. role in world
- Polish party congress
- Romanian divergence from Soviet bloc
- Vietnamese leadership changes
- Beijing on Vietnamese CP

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USSR-IRAN

MOSCOW CHIDES TEHRAN ON ACCEPTANCE OF TROOP MOVEMENT REPORTS

Moscow has sought to counter proliferating Iranian criticism of Soviet military activities along their joint northwestern border, as well as in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, with pledges of noninterference in Iran's affairs. Denunciations of U.S. "misinformation" about Soviet troop movements have followed the traditional pattern of questioning Washington's intentions without specifically denying the substance of the "false rumors." Showing concern to convince Tehran of its own--and Kabul's--desire for friendship, Moscow has refrained from taking issue with individual Iranian leaders but has hinted at impatience with those who "want to be deceived."

TROOP MOVEMENTS

An initial complaint by TASS political observer Kulik on the 9th about Washington POST "fabrications" concerning Soviet troop activity in the region of the Iranian border was followed the next day by an unsigned TASS retort which in tone and language seemed to fall just short of an "authorized" TASS statement. Like similar such items in the past, occasionally labeled TASS "announcements," it cited "competent Soviet bodies" as rejecting the "U.S. version" about Soviet troop movements in the border area. However, it provided no details other than to scoff at reports of the number of divisions "allegedly engaged" in maneuvers. While the Kulik commentary focused on the United States' own "aggressive" policies toward Iran, the subsequent TASS item--which was the subject of a commentary broadcast in Persian two days later--indicated that its message was directed at least in part to Iran. TASS pointedly complained that some Iranian officials, refusing to understand Soviet policy toward their country, made "official statements on the basis of these falsehoods." And a brief TASS dispatch from Washington on the 12th, citing Pentagon "inventions" on the same subject, observed that they would be accepted "only by those who want to be deceived."

BREZHNEV MESSAGES, IRANIAN RESPONSES

Avoiding any suggestion of Soviet-Iranian discord at the official level, Moscow has selectively reported the Iranian replies to President Brezhnev's 3 February protocol message to Bani-Sadr on his investiture as president and to his messages to both Bani-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeyni a week later on the Iranian revolution anniversary. In congratulating Bani-Sadr on his election, Brezhnev routinely expressed hope that Soviet-Iranian relations would continue to develop on the basis of the principles of goodneighborliness,

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respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and noninterference in each other's affairs. All three messages took an "anti-imperialist" tack: those to Bani-Sadr wished the Iranians success in safeguarding their sovereignty against imperialist "encroachments" and "intrigues," while Khomeyni was greeted on the anniversary of the "antimonarchist, anti-imperialist" revolution.

In reporting the replies, Moscow made no mention of Bani-Sadr's hope that the USSR would avoid actions which could "give rise to any anxiety among its neighbors" or of Khomeyni's warning about any aggression against Third World or Islamic countries, "particularly in this region." A TASS report on a 9 February Iranian Foreign Ministry statement condemning the naval buildup in the Persian Gulf did acknowledge the ministry's "pronouncements" critical of Soviet "assistance" to Afghanistan. The closest Moscow has come to criticism of an individual Iranian official was in an 8 February Persian-language commentary which indirectly took Defense Minister Chamran to task, attributing to Western media reports of Chamran remarks about "the USSR's intervention in Iran's affairs" and about clashes in Azarbayjan "that had apparently been instigated by Soviet elements." Moscow has again assured Tehran--as in the TASS item on the 10th on troop movements and a PRAVDA article on the 7th--that the Soviet Union has never coveted "the oil or other resources of Iran or Saudi Arabia."

PERSIAN BROADCASTS ON AFGHANISTAN

In addition to replaying Soviet central press treatment of the Afghan situation, Radio Moscow's Persian-language service from time to time has originated commentary aimed at reassuring listeners of Kabul's good intentions toward Iran. For example, a 7 February talk cited Afghan Foreign Minister Dost's call for friendly Afghan-Iranian relations and urged both countries to expand their ties in order to thwart U.S. designs. And an 8 February PRAVDA correspondents' report on Afghan refugees--broadcast only in Persian--seemed to imply that there was no need for Afghans to seek refuge in Iran when it denied the existence of hunger, mass reprisals or any other reasons for Afghans to "flee to foreign lands." Attempting to explain the continuing presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the dispatch cited an Afghan official as claiming that nomadic Afghans have been prevented from returning to their country because of new border restrictions imposed by Pakistan.

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U S S R - U. S.

SOVIETS CLAIM BALANCE OF FORCES, WORLD TRENDS LIMIT U.S. ROLE

The Afghanistan crisis has brought a new tone of defiance to Soviet statements on U.S.-Soviet relations. Authoritative statements, notably the 29 January PRAVDA editorial article, have strongly admonished Washington to accept the limits imposed on the U.S. role in the world by the current course of international developments and the altered correlation of forces. The unyielding tone of such statements has betrayed no hint of compromise, despite the deterioration in East-West relations that has ensued from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. President Brezhnev's public comments have been more restrained, acknowledging concern over the current increase in international tension and the fate of detente. Whether Brezhnev is advocating a response to the downturn in East-West relations less defiant than that exhibited by Moscow thus far may become more clear as he and other top leaders speak in the republic supreme soviet election campaign that culminates on the 24th.

Moscow's admonitions on the proper U.S. role in world affairs appear to respond to the recent stiffening of U.S. and NATO defense policies. Soviet officials have charged that the West is trying to reestablish a position of military superiority in order to halt the advance of socialism and national liberation in the Third World.

DEFIANT TONE Moscow's current defiant tone first appeared in the 6 January TASS statement reacting to President Carter's speech on the 4th announcing retaliatory measures for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and it pervaded the 29 January PRAVDA editorial article on the President's State of the Union address. Both were boldly confident, advising the United States against overestimating its "real weight" in the present-day world. TASS derided the President's retaliatory measures as a "hopeless undertaking" that would have no effect on Soviet foreign policy and opined that the President had "underestimated the potentialities" of the states that the measures were intended to influence. PRAVDA took a similar tack, asserting that the Carter Administration's attempts to "impede the march of history and prevent changes that are ripe" in the world are as "doomed" as all the efforts by his predecessors who had "laid claims to world leadership." A similar tone of confidence about the current course of world events was the signal feature of the joint

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communique released at the end of French Communist Party chief George Marchais' early January visit to Moscow.

Politburo candidate member and CPSU Secretary Boris Ponomarev--chief of the Central Committee's International Department and its leading official for relations with nonruling communist parties--graphically illustrated in two recent statements the linkage between the tone of defiance in Soviet statements on the Afghanistan crisis and Moscow's interpretation of recent trends in U.S. policy. In a January 1980 KOMMUNIST article, Ponomarev maintained that the 1970's had seen a further change in the "correlation of forces" in favor of "socialism, peace, and progress." Lies about the hand of Moscow behind revolution in the Third World, Ponomarev argued, are designed to blame the natural course of world development on external "intrigues" and thereby justify counterrevolution. The Carter Administration is "prisoner" to such thinking, Ponomarev said, hence its attempt to "return the world to the times when socialism and the other revolutionary forces were not yet capable of substantially limiting the arbitrary will of imperialism on the world scene." According to the 5 February PRAVDA, Ponomarev also told electors in Saratov that "imperialism" does not want to resign itself to the "upsurge" of the world revolutionary process over the past few years and is resorting to military might to stop the "inexorable" march of history.

Belorussian leader Petr Masherov, a stalwart conservative on ideological issues, expressed similar views in his 7 February supreme soviet election speech. Imperialism's recent "ventures," Masherov said, are a sign of weakness rather than strength, a reflection of its "dissatisfaction with the consolidation of the positions of socialism which is marching triumphantly all over the world."

BREZHNEV'S POSITION Brezhnev's statements on the Afghan crisis to date, like his statements on the European arms issue last fall, have been measurably more moderate than most other expressions of leadership views. In his 13 January PRAVDA interview, for example, Brezhnev shared in the common interpretation of the causes of U.S. policy but took a different approach in his assessment of the international situation. Attributing the recent deterioration in the international climate to "specific circles in the United States" displeased over the strengthening of socialism's position, Brezhnev chided those "who have a deeply ingrained habit of behaving in a cavalier manner with other states." While expressing confidence that the USSR can weather U.S. sanctions, Brezhnev eschewed tendentious expressions of defiance about the advance of socialism and the U.S. international role. His only assertion of optimism addressed the future of detente rather than the progress of social change. Against the background of the defiant tone of the 29 January PRAVDA editorial article, Brezhnev's remarks at a 4 February Kremlin dinner for a

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visiting Kampuchean delegation seemed even more dissonant. Devoting as much of his brief speech to East-West relations as to Southeast Asia, Brezhnev softpedaled rhetoric, recalled the benefits of detente, and termed an easing of the tension that has developed to be a "common concern" for the world.

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EAST EUROPE

SUSLOV, GIEREK ENDORSE BLOC UNITY AT POLISH PARTY CONGRESS

The Eighth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) opened on 11 February in Warsaw against a background of concern in East Europe over the implications of the Afghanistan crisis. For the first time, all of the East European delegations were led by men of secondary rank, a practice which the Soviets have followed since 1976 by sending leaders other than Brezhnev to the last three European orthodox party congresses. Like the Soviet delegation head Suslov, the leading East European representatives at Warsaw were all veteran party secretaries, men well chosen to discuss such subjects as interparty solidarity and cooperation.

Suslov and his host, PZPR First Secretary Gierek, voiced standard support for communist unity, with the Soviet visitor characteristically more militant than Gierek in urging the communist states to rally against the West. As he had done in precongress speeches, the Polish leader presented a dismal picture of his country's economic development since the mid-1970's and offered no panaceas for a quick improvement of the situation.

SUSLOV CPSU Politburo member and Secretary Mikhail Suslov on the 12th delivered a diatribe against the United States and China, in effect calling on the Poles and visiting party delegates for greater militancy in the East-West struggle. The "Leninist international policy" of the communist countries, he asserted, combines a concern for peace with "firm defense of socialism and effective solidarity" with peoples fighting against imperialism and "all manifestations of hegemony." He saw as "links of a single chain" China's action against Vietnam, the NATO missile decision, alleged American military pressure on Iran, and "the training and sending of armed groupings into Democratic Afghanistan that compelled the government of that country to ask the Soviet Union for assistance." Just as China had threatened to "punish" Vietnam, he added, "people in the United States" are now talking of punishing Iran and "even the Soviet Union." The future of the peace struggle by the forces of socialism, Suslov stressed, depends on "the precise direction and unity of their actions."

Suslov paid a standard tribute to Gierek as a "tireless fighter for the prosperity of socialist Poland" and for the cohesion of the socialist camp and the world communist movement.

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GIEREK PZPR leader Edward Gierek appeared intent on underscoring Poland's credentials as a steadfast member of the Soviet bloc, while at the same time manifesting anew Warsaw's somewhat reserved stance on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Thus in his speech welcoming the foreign delegates, he stressed that Poland "is a strong link in the community of socialist states" and that "we have always attached the greatest importance to strengthening the solidarity and unity of the bloc countries and the international communist movement." In his congress report, he gave only limited support to the USSR on Afghanistan and stopped short of endorsing the Soviet intervention. Noting only that "we welcome with hope the return to the ideals" of the April 1978 Marxist revolution, he expressed "solidarity with the working people and all progressive forces of Afghanistan" in their efforts to end "intervention from outside by the forces of aggression." Gierek's reserved stance contrasted with the explicit support for the Soviet move into Afghanistan voiced by the GDR's Verner and Czechoslovakia's Bilak in their congress speeches on the 12th.

In his remarks on domestic affairs, Gierek maintained the policy of candor which has apparently been a major factor in his staying power up to now in the face of worsening consumer goods shortages.* Thus he reported that the second half of the 1970's--the period since the last Polish congress--"brought about a marked deterioration in economic conditions, both externally and internally," mainly as a result of the world oil crisis and "a few years of poor crops." These factors, he added, led to serious imbalances in imports and exports, difficulties which were compounded by poor economic management. He went on to note that "the pace of development slowed down" and that there were "important" shortfalls in plan fulfillment during the 1976-79 period. At the same time, despite past failures, Gierek declared that the 1981-85 plan will "continue the strategy of the 1970's in its most fundamental focus on people and the satisfaction of many social needs."

* The specter of public dissatisfaction on the eve of the congress was raised in a Warsaw television commentary on the 5th which referred to "certain tensions in the coastal economy"--the Gdansk region where food price riots in 1970 led to the overthrow of the Gomulka regime.

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ROMANIA CONTINUES DIVERGENCE ON AFGHANISTAN, TIES TO WEST

Several days after Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Romania and at a time when other East European countries are demonstrating their solidarity with Moscow, Bucharest has taken new steps to underline its independent course. Romania broke ranks with its allies at a 6-7 February socialist parliamentary conference in Sofia, where it refused to subscribe to a bloc statement on Afghanistan and some other issues. Moreover, Bucharest has continued to develop ties with the West when some other East Europeans have cut back on theirs: On 8 February, according to Western sources, Romania signed an unprecedented agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC), and on 10 February the Romanian foreign minister arrived in Austria for a visit.

Romania's show of independence at the Sofia parliamentary conference was conveyed in a final communique, carried by RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 8 February. The communique listed Bucharest as endorsing a general statement on international relations but did not include the Romanians--or the North Koreans--among the 10 bloc countries endorsing the final part of the document. The section from which Romania abstained expressed solidarity with the new Afghan regime and approval of its efforts to protect Afghan independence and stressed the need to prevent aggressive acts by "American imperialist and Beijing hegemonist forces" against Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, and Iran. Over the past year Romania has abstained from several other bloc conference statements, most notably one on the Middle East at a November 1978 Warsaw Pact summit meeting and another on the Sino-Vietnamese conflict at a February 1979 parliamentary conference in Bucharest.

Romania's new arrangement with the EEC, reported by Paris LE MONDE on 10-11 February but thus far not by Bucharest media, involves the establishment of a mixed Romanian-EEC commission to discuss trade relations--the first between the EEC and a CEMA member country. Romania's action runs directly counter to Moscow's longstanding effort to control the relations of CEMA members with the EEC. Romania for several years has indicated an interest in an independent trade arrangement with the EEC, even in the absence of a prior EEC-CEMA organizational agreement. For instance, Romanian leader Ceausescu in February 1979 said that Bucharest would "find the most appropriate solutions" for its relations with the EEC if EEC-CEMA negotiations "last a long time." Similarly, a 9 June 1979 SCINTEIA article on CEMA's 30th anniversary stated that "Romania has concluded a series of agreements with the Common Market and is interested in expanding economic collaboration with this organization."

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VIETNAM-CHINA

HANOI RESHUFFLES LEADERSHIP OF MAJOR STATE MINISTRIES

Hanoi has undertaken a sweeping reshuffle of the leadership of several key state ministries, a move which may signal preliminary restructuring of the state apparatus in anticipation of the long-awaited implementation of Vietnam's new constitution. A 7 February decree from SRV President Ton Doc Thang revealed that four veteran Politburo members--Vo Nguyen Giap, Le Thanh Nghi, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Tran Quoc Hoan--had been relieved of their ministerial responsibilities. No reason was given for the leadership changes, but they do not appear to reflect a conflict over policies or any decline in the party standing of those involved, with the possible exception of former Interior Minister Tran Quoc Hoan.

TRAN QUOC HOAN, NGUYEN DUY TRINH

The biggest losers in the reshuffle appear to be Tran Quoc Hoan, who lost his post as interior minister, and Nguyen Duy Trinh, who lost both his Foreign Ministry and vice premier portfolios. However, only Hoan appears to be in political trouble. Public security minister since 1953 and interior minister since 1975 when the two posts were merged, Hoan's last reported appearance was in mid-October at an Interior Ministry conference which aired shortcomings in security work. Although Hoan does not often appear in public, it seems significant that he is the only Politburo member who has not made an appearance thus far this month. He is also one of only three Politburo members who have not been reported as receiving a new party membership card; the other two, Vo Van Kiet and Nguyen Van Linh, both recently appeared with their Politburo titles intact.

Vietnam's perennial security problems--corruption, malfeasance, and thievery--coupled with last year's Chinese invasion and alleged Chinese attempts to provoke dissension among ethnic minorities on the border--may have posed security challenges too great for Hoan to manage. The seriousness of the security situation was reflected in October when Hanoi republished two decrees from the 1960's on punishments for counterrevolutionary crimes and on the need for protection of public and private property. A 25 October NHAN DAN editorial on the decrees stressed their continued validity for Vietnam's security needs. In what may have been a signal of displeasure with the performance of Hoan's ministry, Hanoi at the same time moved to inject stronger party control into security work by establishing an internal affairs

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department in the party Central Committee, headed by Vice Interior Minister Le Quoc Than, and resurrected the Internal Affairs Board in the Premier's Office, which had been abolished in 1971.*

Tran Quoc Hoan was replaced as interior minister by veteran Politburo member Vice Premier Pham Hung. Pham Hung in recent years has not been linked with security work, although in April 1979 he "sponsored" a conference on coastal security. Pham Hung's longtime service as Hanoi's senior official in the South, where from 1967 to 1975 he served as head of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and as head of the southern branch of the party, would appear to make him uniquely qualified to handle Vietnam's persistent security problems, many of which are particularly rampant in the southern part of the country.

Nguyen Duy Trinh's replacement as foreign minister had been foreshadowed as early as last May when VCP Central Committee member and Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach was appointed "minister of state acting for the premier in foreign affairs." Since that appointment, Thach has handled many of Trinh's traditional responsibilities. For example, Thach, instead of Trinh, represented Vietnam at the foreign ministers conference preceding the August 1979 Havana nonalined summit. In addition, Trinh's limited public appearance record in 1979 stands in marked contrast to his active 1978 schedule, suggesting that poor health may have been responsible for the loss of both his foreign minister's job and his vice premiership.

Trinh does not appear to be in political trouble. He was reported to have received his party membership card, was listed as a Politburo member attending the 2 February VCP anniversary celebrations, and has received prominent attention for authoring an article published in PRAVDA to mark the recent anniversary of Hanoi's ties with socialist countries.

VO NGUYEN GIAP, VAN TIEN DUNG — Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap's replacement as defense minister by Van Tien Dung does not appear to reflect a demotion for the veteran military leader but rather a recognition of Giap's diminished role in military affairs in recent years, a gap Dung has gradually moved to fill. Giap's increasing concentration on nonmilitary matters has been reflected in his activities in recent months. For example, he delivered the government report at the May 1979 National Assembly session, a duty usually performed by Pham Van Dong or Le Thanh Nghi. In contrast,

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* In revealing the reestablishment of the Internal Affairs Board, Hanoi identified only its deputy chief, Phang Minh Nam. Tran Quoc Hoan had headed the board from 1960 to 1965.

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Dung has been particularly prominent in his military role, delivering the speech on behalf of the armed forces at the December Army Day celebrations--a function traditionally performed by Giap--and playing a major substantive role during the Kampuchean defense minister's December visit, while Giap limited his involvement to protocol appearances.

As if to underscore Giap's undiminished political standing, Hanoi in recent days has given considerable attention to his activities. Following his 7 February departure for Warsaw as head of the party delegation to the Polish party congress, Hanoi kept Giap in the public eye by publicizing his "recent" visit to several provinces and by noting the issuance of his party membership card. One facet of Giap's new responsibilities was underscored by a 9 February Moscow radio report which noted that during his Moscow stopover en route to the Polish congress, the vice premier discussed scientific and technological cooperation--a field with which Giap has been identified in recent years.

LE THANH NGHI

Le Thanh Nghi's loss of his position as chairman of the State Planning Commission--a post he had held since 1974--does not seem to spell a decline in his political fortunes. Since his removal, Le Thanh Nghi has welcomed a Czechoslovak party and government delegation with his Politburo and vice premier titles unscathed and has received his party membership card. His removal may reflect a recognition by Hanoi of the pressing need to improve the state economic planning apparatus and the corresponding need for an infusion of technocrats into the state bureaucracy, a theme party chief Le Duan touched on in his speech for the recent VCP anniversary. The importance the leadership attaches to improving economic planning, particularly as planning for next year's new five-year plan intensifies, was further underscored by the promotion to vice premier of the planning commission's new chairman, Nguyen Lam--a veteran member of the commission who served as chairman from 1973 to 1974. In addition, the announcement noted that Tran Quynh, a longtime official of the State Science and Technology Commission, and Tran Phuong, former publisher of one of Hanoi's principal economic journals, will be vice chairmen of the planning commission with the rank of minister.

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PRC RENEWS ATTACKS ON LEGITIMACY, POLICIES OF SRV LEADERSHIP

Beijing has seized on the occasion of the VCP's 50th anniversary and on the reshuffle of SRV leaders to launch new attacks on the legitimacy and performance of the Le Duan leadership. Eschewing the sort of commemoration of the VCP anniversary that would have been expected had Sino-Vietnamese party ties not been suspended over the past two years, Beijing instead publicized a scathing attack on Hanoi's leaders by former VCP Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan. At the same time, Beijing has suggested that the recent changes in Vietnam's state leadership reflect persisting difficulties brought about by Hanoi's policies of regional aggression and domestic repression.

VCP ANNIVERSARY

Beijing obviously intended to have Hoang Van Hoan's speech represent China's views on the Vietnamese party on the occasion of its 3 February anniversary. The speech was released just two days before the anniversary and was given heavy play in Chinese media. It was first carried in a "special" XINHUA transmission "for RENMIN RIBAO and other newspapers in Guangxi, Yunnan, Guangdong, Fujian, and Hong Kong." On the 2d the CCP newspaper RENMIN RIBAO highlighted the speech on its front page, and Beijing radio's Vietnamese-language service has broadcast it almost daily since 3 February.

The speech had clearly been delivered much earlier and held for release to coincide with the Vietnamese party anniversary. XINHUA's 1 February account of the speech stated that it had been delivered in Yunnan Province, evidently during Hoan's tour of southern China, from which he returned to Beijing on 28 January. According to a 17 December XINHUA account of Hoan's stay in Yunnan, Hoan was honored at a banquet in Kunming on the 12th at which "those present" criticized "Le Duan's anti-China activities and his acts aimed at undermining traditional Sino-Vietnamese friendship."

In his speech Hoan reiterated the substance of charges made at the time of his defection to China last summer, declaring that the "Le Duan clique" has betrayed Ho Chi Minh's revolution by taking a Soviet-instigated, anti-China stance and by pursuing expansionist policies.* Hoan called for a "second revolution" in Vietnam to overcome the Le Duan leadership's inability to unify the north and south, improve the lot of the people, and establish an independent, responsible foreign policy.

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* Hoang Van Hoan's defection to China and initial attack on Le Duan's leadership role are discussed in the TRENDS of 15 August 1979, pages 11-13.

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Except for two brief XINHUA reports on VCP party chief Le Duan's anniversary speech in Hanoi on 2 February and a belated 13 February XINHUA feature focusing on the CCP's nurturing of the Vietnamese party in its formative years, Chinese media have not mentioned the VCP anniversary. By contrast, Beijing marked the party's 45th anniversary in 1975 with a CCP leadership message and an editorial in RENMIN RIBAO. The two XINHUA reports on the Le Duan address, transmitted on 4 and 8 February, focused on Vietnam's efforts to forge close ties with other Indochinese countries and its decision to intensify the purge of party members who have opposed Le Duan's party line.

GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE Beijing has thus far offered little comment on the recent Vietnamese cabinet reshuffle, except to relate the changes to problems Hanoi is encountering as a result of its domestic and foreign policies. For example, an 8 February XINHUA report, quoting a VNA announcement of the previous day, enumerated the changes and called the reorganization "sudden" and "unprecedented in the history of the republic." The account cited the view of "many diplomats" that the reshuffle resulted from "serious difficulties" encountered in the invasion of Kampuchea and from Vietnam's foreign and internal policies and predicted that the leadership changes in themselves will have little effect on Hanoi's "present predicament."

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BRIEF

MOSCOW ON EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA: The upsurge of political violence in El Salvador and Guatemala has prompted a spate of stereotyped Soviet charges that the U.S. policy of supporting "repressive" military regimes is responsible for the continued turmoil in Central America. While Havana has cautiously refrained from comment, confining itself to reportage on events in these countries, Moscow has depicted the El Salvadoran and Guatemalan regimes as creatures of the United States, subject to replacement if necessary to preserve U.S. interests in the region. Moscow has claimed that Washington sacrificed former Salvadoran leader Romero in the face of mounting popular opposition to his regime and created a military-civilian junta in a maneuver to prevent a Nicaraguan-style revolution in El Salvador. A PRAVDA article on 6 February, broadcast in Spanish to Latin audiences, saw the junta's "gradual rightward slide" and its failure to implement promised reforms as partially responsible for the recent violent clashes. But PRAVDA placed most of the blame for the disturbances on the "local oligarchy and reactionaries," accusing them of working in tandem with U.S. officials in El Salvador to provoke a civil war and return the country to "fascist" rule. TASS on the 6th pointed out that the recent visit to El Salvador by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bowdler followed closely on the 22 January antigovernment demonstration in which 40 leftists had been killed; TASS attributed to the Latin American press the view that the United States is preparing a "Chilean-type" solution for El Salvador. As for Guatemala, a Moscow broadcast in Spanish on the 4th claimed that Guatemalan leader Lucas Garcia had been brought to power by the United States but that Washington would "probably attempt to replace him with another figurehead, as it did in El Salvador," in view of the suffering he has inflicted on the country's masses.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 4 - 10 FEBRUARY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3310 items)			Beijing (673 items)		
Kampuchean Leader Heng Samrin in USSR	9%	(—)	Afghan Situation	16%	(20%)
Afghan Situation	6%	(4%)	Vice Premier Deng Yingchao in Thailand	8%	(—)
U.S. National Security Adviser Brzezinski in Pakistan	3%	(—)	PRC Letter on SRV Cease-fire Proposal	3%	(—)
			Proposed Boycott of 1980 Summer Olympic Games	4%	(4%)
			Disarmament Conference, Geneva	3%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Gromyko on Pakistan, Afghanistan
- Beijing on Gromyko visit to India
- Beijing overtures to Tehran
- Polish ouster of premier, economic ills
- Reemergence of Kirilenko protege

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-SOUTHWEST ASIA-PRC

With Soviet-Indian relations clouded by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Gromyko focused attention on Pakistan during his recent visit to New Delhi, pressing Islamabad to choose between a policy of peace and one of enmity with its neighboring states. His remarks fall in line with Moscow's dual-track approach since last spring, simultaneously criticizing Islamabad for its involvement with the Afghan insurgents while holding the door open for accommodation. Picking up an idea already broached in a recent Afghan Government statement, Gromyko cryptically called for "guarantees" that intrusions from Pakistani territory into Afghanistan will cease. But Moscow initially has not been receptive to the European Economic Community (EEC) proposal for an international guarantee of Afghan neutrality in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal; and it has dismissed out of hand President Carter's suggestion of a neutral Afghan government during a transition phase after withdrawal.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has fueled a Chinese campaign to encourage stability and strengthen PRC influence in other Southwest Asian countries as a bulwark against further Soviet expansion. In this context, Beijing has denounced the Gromyko visit to India as a clear attempt to undermine Indo-Pakistani reconciliation and has taken cautious steps to improve its own relations with Tehran following the recent election of Iranian President Bani-Sadr.

GROMYKO IN INDIA CAUTIONS PAKISTAN ON ITS AFGHAN POLICIES

Although TASS characterized the atmosphere of Gromyko's 12-14 February talks in India as "warm" and "friendly," the first Soviet "exchange of views" with the new Gandhi government apparently failed to satisfy New Delhi on the issue of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. An uninformative joint statement issued on the visit said little about bilateral relations--which are being extolled in Soviet comment on the 25th anniversary of economic ties--and nothing at all about the Afghan situation. Soviet sensitivity to Indian views on Afghanistan was indicated in PRAVDA's treatment of External Affairs Minister Rao's speech at the 12 February welcoming dinner. The paper omitted his remarks that each country must be free to develop "according to its genius" and that all nonalined countries must be permitted to live in peace "without being dragged into confrontation."

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TREATMENT OF PAKISTAN Gromyko warned in his 12 February dinner speech, without elaboration, that continued use of Pakistani territory for "aggression" against Afghanistan will undermine Pakistan's position as an "independent state." At a dinner for his counterpart the next day, Gromyko maintained that Islamabad had spurned overtures by its neighbors, including readiness by Moscow to develop political, trade, economic, "and other" relations with Pakistan, "provided" that country seeks peace. In the manner of a 10 February Afghan Government statement--issued unilaterally at the end of Afghan-Indian talks in Kabul--Gromyko said the Soviet Union believes that if Pakistan wants to live in peace with Afghanistan, it should stop intrusions from its territory into that country, and that this should be "guaranteed." The Afghan statement, as reported in IZVESTIYA on the 13th, went further than Gromyko in assuring that the Soviet troops would be withdrawn "as soon as there are firm guarantees" that outside aggression against the country has ended.

Gromyko's remarks on Pakistan apparently were tailored to the occasion and calculated to appeal to his Indian hosts. Once back in Moscow, he made no mention of Pakistani policies in his RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech on the 18th, according to available accounts, but merely defended Soviet policy in the whole region. Again repeating the Soviet refrain that the USSR has no "dark design" for expansion, he maintained that the Soviet Union has a "sufficient amount" of warm- and cold-water ports and has no claims on the "oil or other wealth" of states of the region.

Since the USSR's December intervention in Afghanistan, authoritative Soviet statements have appeared to leave the door open to an accommodation with Islamabad and have attributed the most sinister roles in the region to Washington and Beijing.* This approach was evident in Brezhnev's 13 January PRAVDA interview and in "A. Petrov" PRAVDA articles on 31 December and 19 January. The same tack has appeared in several recent republic supreme soviet election speeches by Soviet leaders, including Defense Secretary Ustinov's 13 February remarks that Washington is trying to use military aid as a means

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* Continuing to present the United States, along with China, as responsible for the tension in the region, Moscow has predictably seized on recent American press reports of U.S. arms supplies to Afghan insurgents, as well as the "ostentatiously warm welcome" given in Washington to Afghan "counterrevolutionary" leader Nasiri, as further evidence of U.S. interference in Afghan internal affairs.

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for turning Pakistan into a "new strongpoint of American imperialism" and a "base for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union and Afghanistan."

In routine-level comment, Moscow has continued the usual mixture of charges of both inadvertent and conscious Pakistani involvement. A Grachev IZVESTIYA article on 27 January included elements of both and foreshadowed Gromyko's reference to Pakistani loss of independence when it accused the Zia regime of promoting the Afghan insurgency and warned that Pakistan might have to pay for proffered U.S. military and economic aid by surrendering the "independence of its foreign policy." In recent accusations of deliberate aggressive Pakistani actions, TASS dispatches have asserted that Pakistani regular army units have been moved to the Afghan border and have taken up "combat positions" and that Pakistani air force planes have been "systematically violating" Afghan airspace.

EEC, U.S. PROPOSALS Moscow has offered no elaboration of Gromyko's remark on "guarantees" of nonaggression against Afghanistan and has responded negatively to the EEC foreign ministers' 19 February initiative to offer guarantees of Afghan neutrality in return for a Soviet withdrawal. In initial reaction, TASS on the 20th cited the view of a Soviet proxy, the French Communist Party: L'HUMANITE, TASS said, called the EEC proposal regarding Afghan neutrality "harmless at first glance" but "in reality absolutely unacceptable." The paper objected that the EEC took the U.S. position when it placed responsibility for present international tensions on the Soviet Union, and it pointed out that the proposal was advanced by Britain, which "unreservedly" shares Washington's views.

President Carter's suggestion, at his 13 February news conference, of a "transition phase" in Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal was even more roundly rejected by TASS in an unusually distorted account of his remarks. The TASS report--published in PRAVDA on the 15th--ignored the reference to Soviet withdrawal and the idea of a transition phase and obscured the President's suggestion of a neutral government, charging that he "claimed some 'right'" to decide what government should be established in Afghanistan. Where the President put forth the idea of a peacekeeping force, perhaps composed of Muslim troops under UN aegis, TASS represented him as saying that Muslim countries "must, in his opinion, take part in Washington's intervention" against Afghanistan.

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PRC SCORES SOVIET AIMS DURING GROMYKO INDIA VISIT

Chinese commentary on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to India has sought to keep alive Indian concern over the implication for Southwest Asia of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Beijing has impugned Moscow's motives for the Gromyko visit, has attempted to reassure New Delhi about international efforts to strengthen Pakistan militarily, and has encouraged India and Pakistan to set aside longstanding differences and mutual suspicion for the sake of unity against a common Soviet threat. Beijing's comment on the visit thus complements its efforts since the Afghan intervention to rally Southwest Asian opposition to the Soviet action and to improve Sino-Indian bilateral ties.*

Capping Chinese treatment of the Gromyko visit, a 16 February XINHUA commentary denounced the visit as an "obvious" ploy to woo Indian assistance in escaping "the heat of universal condemnation" for the Afghanistan intervention and as a "crude" attempt to undermine Indo-Pakistani efforts to overcome their longstanding differences. The commentary charged that Gromyko's "veiled threats" against Pakistan during the New Delhi visit violated "elementary diplomatic courtesy" and warned that his "intimidation" was ultimately "not directed against Pakistan alone."

XINHUA reports on the visit persistently highlighted indications of Indo-Soviet discord over Moscow's actions in Afghanistan. The news agency on 13 February favorably depicted Indian Prime Minister Gandhi as insisting on the unacceptability of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan during a "prolonged" conversation with Gromyko, and on the 14th XINHUA observed that the "short" joint statement at the end of the visit had avoided mentioning the Afghanistan issue. The latter dispatch cited the Indian press for the view that the joint statement's weak commitment to renew consultations in the future was "the only kind of public pronouncement possible" under the circumstances without "seriously damaging Indo-Soviet relations" by openly addressing differences between the two sides.

Earlier RENMIN RIBAO had signaled Beijing's support for Indian efforts to reconcile differences with Pakistan when it went to the unusual length of devoting a Commentator article to the early February visit to Islamabad of Indian Foreign Secretary Satthe. Expressing "gratification" at the "good progress" made toward improved Indo-Pakistani relations during the Satthe visit, the 8 February Commentator article hailed both sides' "desire for friendship," in the context of the Soviet intervention in

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* Chinese moves to improve ties with India are discussed in the TRENDS of 30 January 1980, pages 8-10.

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Afghanistan, as an "understanding of major significance" which will "have a positive influence on the development of the situation in South Asia." It sought to dispel Indian concern about the arming of Pakistan, accusing Moscow of using the issue to cause discord between India and Pakistan and maintaining that international assistance to Pakistan is needed solely because of the Soviet threat and is "certainly not aimed at India and still less is it a threat to that country."

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BEIJING SIGNALS DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN

Beijing's efforts to improve its ties with Tehran appear to be motivated by the hope that a new government under Iranian President Bani-Sadr may end both the prolonged Iranian domestic contention and the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations over the U.S. hostages. Since the founding of the Islamic republic last year, Beijing has repeatedly signaled its concern that Iranian instability and hostility toward the United States could open the way for an expansion of Soviet influence.

EFFORTS TOWARD IMPROVED RELATIONS

Beijing's authoritative call for better relations with Tehran came from PRC Vice Premier Ji Pengfei at an Iranian Embassy reception on 11 February marking the first anniversary of the Iranian revolution. Ji expressed the desire of the Chinese Government and people to "enhance mutual understanding, friendship, and cooperation" between the two countries. He also voiced the wish that Iran will achieve "new successes in opposing foreign aggression and threats and safeguarding its national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as in defending world peace, developing its national economy, and improving the life of the Iranian people." Chinese interest in improving relations with Iran had been indicated earlier when on 31 January the PRC dispatched an Islamic Association delegation to attend revolution anniversary ceremonies in Tehran.

The PRC greeting message to Bani-Sadr on his election as Iranian president also underlined the new trend in Chinese policy. The message was warmer than PRC Premier Hua Guofeng's message last February greeting Mehdi Bazargan on his appointment as Iranian prime minister and extending PRC recognition to the Iranian provisional government. The greeting to Bani-Sadr, sent by National People's Congress Standing Committee Chairman Ye Jianying on 30 January, extended "warm and sincere congratulations" to the new president and hoped that the "friendship and amicable cooperation" between China and the "fraternal" Iranian people will "continue to grow and develop." In his message last year to Bazargan, Hua had expressed hope that "friendly" relations would "continue to grow in strength" and that the "traditional friendship" between the two peoples would "witness a new development."

REPORTAGE ON IRAN

Iranian President Bani-Sadr has been portrayed favorably in PRC media as a leader seeking to bring stability to his country and to limit the potential for intervention in the region by the two superpowers. In recent weeks XINHUA has called attention to Bani-Sadr's remark that the threat of Soviet influence equals that of the United States, to his criticism of domestic militants for acting independently of Iranian authorities, and to his indications of flexibility in dealing with the question of the U.S. hostages. On 27 January, for example, XINHUA reported his press

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conference remarks of the same day that Iran should steer a foreign policy course independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and on 3 February XINHUA highlighted statements by the Iranian president that he views the resolution of the U.S. hostage issue with "an optimistic eye."

In keeping with Beijing's concern that the U.S.-Iranian crisis over the American hostages be defused for the sake of wider strategic interests, the PRC has also favorably noted signs of U.S. flexibility toward Iran. An 8 February XINHUA report on the U.S. decision to delay the imposition of economic sanctions against Iran, for example, observed that there has been a "noticeable change" in Washington's attitude toward Tehran since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And a 1 February RENMIN RIBAO analysis of the Iranian presidential election suggested that both Iran and the United States are coming to realize that the Soviet threat overshadows their own bilateral problems.

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POLAND

PREMIER JAROSZEWICZ REPLACED BY BABIUCH, POLITBURO RESHUFFLED

Polish First Secretary Edward Gierek put on a show of strength at the concluding session of the PZPR congress on 15 February by dropping Piotr Jaroszewicz as premier and replacing him with a younger figure, Edward Babiuch, whose main credential appears to be loyalty to Gierek himself. The shift, casting Jaroszewicz in the role of scapegoat, has the appearance of merely a cosmetic approach to the country's economic ills, since Babiuch's background has been largely in the party organizational field rather than in economics. Gierek's muscle was also in evidence in the removal from the Politburo and Secretariat of Stefan Olszowski, who had been put in charge of the faltering economy in 1976 and has been viewed in Western media as a potential rival of Gierek for the party leadership.

In other changes, Jozef Kepa and Jozef Tejchma were also dropped from the Politburo. Long out of favor with Gierek, they were demoted a year ago from posts as deputy premier to the leadership of minor ministries--positions which no longer warranted Politburo status. Newly named to full Politburo membership at the congress were two ideological specialists, Jerzy Lukaszewicz and Andrzej Werblan, State Planning Commission Chairman Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk, and Warsaw City party leader Alojzy Karkoszka.

The 70-year-old Jaroszewicz was clearly selected to bear the brunt of the blame for the country's economic straits, a fate he earned in part by his unfortunate role during the June 1976 riots over food price increases, which he both announced and rescinded. In announcing Jaroszewicz's resignation both as premier and Politburo member, Gierek made no effort to disguise the fact that he was being dismissed in ill favor. He noted, for example, that just as in 1970, "difficult problems" and "tension" still persist in the economy, a situation resulting from "previous neglect." The party leader softened his criticism of the ex-premier somewhat by conceding that problems were bound to arise in view of the country's rapid industrialization program during the first half of the 1970's and by recalling Jaroszewicz's role in the liberation of Poland in World War II.

The change in premiers was accorded unusual publicity in comparison with the cryptic treatment generally given such high-level shifts in Soviet bloc countries--treatment which had the overall effect

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of humiliating Jaroszewicz and underscoring Gierek's enhanced control. In his formal speech of resignation at the Sejm (parliament) session on the 18th, the ousted premier thanked the Sejm leaders both for their support and for their "critical, often harsh evaluations" of his work, adding that "we did not succeed in achieving all that we intended and all that was expected from us" in the functioning of the economy and the state. At the same time, defending his overall record, he declared that "the shortcomings and deficiencies do not alter the general assessment of the last decade as a period of particularly dynamic socioeconomic development."

BABIUCH The biography of Babiuch carried by PAP on the 18th cited no prior experience in economic management--the most troublesome sector--noting only that he had "completed economic studies" in the Central Party School of the PZPR Central Committee. His principal past activities were as head of the Organizational Department of the Central Committee and chief editor of the party monthly ZYCIE PARTII. Gierek, in nominating Babiuch--his close associate with roots in his own home base of Katowice--similarly stressed the new premier's "political" experience, recalling that he had taken part in "numerous important international meetings and conferences." He refrained from any predictions of success for Babiuch, remarking only that he "has some difficult duties ahead" and will "spare no efforts" to do his job well.

For his part, Babiuch vowed in his acceptance speech to concentrate on improving management efficiency, but in the same breath he underscored the magnitude of the problems confronting him as premier. On the economic results for last year, he said, "I must say frankly that in some sectors they are worse than earlier estimates made them." Without making promises to increase the supply of consumer goods, Babiuch merely offered the prospect of improved general economic conditions through more efficient organization of production, reiterating such standard goals as cutting down fuel imports in favor of domestic coal reserves and reducing the country's foreign trade deficit. He said Poland will continue its trade with Western countries, based on "mutual advantage," while at the same time strengthening its ties with CEMA and the Warsaw Pact and giving "priority" attention to its ties with the USSR.

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USSR

KIRILENKO PROTEGE RYABOV REEMERGES AFTER 1979 ECLIPSE

Recent articles have confirmed that Yakov P. Ryabov, a protege of CPSU Politburo member Kirilenko, is reemerging from political disgrace after having been ousted from the Central Committee Secretariat in April 1979. Ryabov, whose name disappeared from the press for four months after his ouster, has begun writing articles on planning reform, and in his post as Gosplan first deputy chairman, he appears to be in charge of efforts to change planning methods. His reemergence coincides with signs of increased prominence for Kirilenko, just as his fall coincided with signs that Kirilenko was in difficulty with Brezhnev.

RYABOV'S FALL AND RECOVERY

The first indication that Ryabov was in trouble came on 15 February 1979, when he was appointed Gosplan first deputy chairman--a post incompatible with the position of Central Committee secretary. His removal as Central Committee secretary for defense industry was announced at the 17 April plenum, and his name subsequently disappeared from the press. That this press treatment was deliberate and a clear indication of his disgrace has become apparent in recent accounts of a 17-18 May 1979 economic conference. Unusually delayed reports on the conference, in the December QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS and the January ECONOMIC SERIES of the Academy of Sciences, have revealed that Ryabov opened the May conference with a speech and chaired the committee which organized the conference. Despite this leading role, Ryabov was not even mentioned in the May 1979 IZVESTIYA and SOCIALIST INDUSTRY accounts of the conference or in the long reports on the meeting in the July and August issues of PLANNED ECONOMY which named many of the other participants.

Ryabov's reemergence has coincided with renewed prominence for his presumed patron Kirilenko. Ryabov's name first reappeared in the press on 18 August as the author of an article in SOCIALIST INDUSTRY. Subsequently, the 30 October PRAVDA reported that he had delivered a speech the previous day to a meeting of the Supreme Soviet's planning and budget commissions, and the December issue of Gosplan's organ, PLANNED ECONOMY, carried a long article by Ryabov. Kirilenko became quite active during this same period, addressing a media conference on the 1979 economic decrees on 13 August, delivering an award speech in Magnitogorsk on 30 August, writing a September PARTY LIFE article, visiting Hungary in October, and delivering the 6 November October Revolution address. Ryabov's ties with Kirilenko apparently go back to the days when Kirilenko was Sverdlovsk first secretary and Ryabov was a local party official.

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Ryabov's 1976 promotion to Central Committee secretary appeared due to Kirilenko's influence, and his 1979 removal clearly coincided with a period of decline in Kirilenko's status.

LINK TO PLANNING REFORM Although Ryabov's demotion meant his exclusion from the inner circle of the political leadership, he has apparently continued to perform highly important and sensitive work in Gosplan. The latest articles by and about Ryabov provide strong evidence that his Gosplan assignment involves the task of implementing reforms in planning. His articles in SOCIALIST INDUSTRY and PLANNED ECONOMY and his speech on 29 October all discussed planning reform, and the January issue of ECONOMIC SERIES revealed that the May 1979 conference organized by Ryabov had also focused on this issue. According to the journal, Ryabov's speech to the meeting stressed the urgent need for improved planning, and the discussion by the 2,000 participants--including many of the country's key planners and economists--ranged through a wide variety of planning problems.

Ironically, Ryabov's assignment to lead reform within Gosplan places him in the awkward position of having to carry through hotly contested reforms desired by Brezhnev, even though Brezhnev is the leader probably most responsible for his disgrace. Reform of Gosplan apparently has been a subject of contention ever since Brezhnev announced at a November 1978 plenum that the Politburo had recently adopted a special decree on reorganizing Gosplan. The Soviet leadership has never published the decree, Premier Kosygin has consistently ignored it, Gosplan has announced no steps to implement it, and the July 1979 decrees on planning reforms failed even to mention it. Brezhnev in his November 1979 plenum speech reminded his audience that over a year had passed since the decree to improve Gosplan's work had been adopted, and he stated that "practical implementation of this decision should be speeded up."

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BRIEF

MOSCOW-PHNOM PENH RELATIONS: Apparent disagreement between Moscow and the Hanoi-backed Phnom Penh regime surfaced during the first official visit to the USSR of KPRC President Heng Samrin. Without offering any clue as to the possible area of dispute between the two sides, the joint statement marking the 3-11 February visit resurrected a rare formulation--not seen in a Soviet communique since a 1978 Vietnamese visit--to characterize the Soviet-Kampuchean talks as having been held in an atmosphere of "cordiality, comradely frankness, and mutual understanding" with "full unity of views on all issues discussed." The statement's use of the term "frankness"--a traditional code word for discord--is surprising, particularly since it was not present in earlier characterizations of the formal talks which took place on the 4th and 5th. Reports on those meetings described the atmosphere respectively as one of "cordiality, comradeliness, and complete mutual understanding" and as one of "fraternal friendship and complete unity of views." If differences did emerge during the visit, they did not appear to be reflected in the statement's listing of Soviet and Kampuchean positions on a number of routine bilateral and international topics. Soviet backing for Phnom Penh was reaffirmed in the statement, and during the visit five new agreements on trade and gratis aid to Kampuchea were signed. Moscow called attention to its new aid commitments on the 15th when TASS reported that five Soviet ships carrying aid in accordance with the terms of the new agreements had already arrived in Kampuchea.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 11 - 17 FEBRUARY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3757 items)			Beijing (691 items)		
USSR Republics Supreme Soviet Election Campaign	14%	(10%)	Afghan Situation	10%	(16%)
Ustinov Speech	3%	(--)	PRC Spring Festival	8%	(--)
Chernenko Speech	3%	(--)	Sino-Vietnamese Dispute	5%	(7%)
Gromyko in India	9%	(--)	Fifth National People's Congress Standing Committee 13th Session	5%	(2%)
Polish Communist Party Congress	8%	(--)	Vice Premier Deng Yingchao in Thailand	3%	(8%)
Suslov Speech	4%	(--)			
Afghan Situation	4%	(6%)			
Kampuchean Leader Heng Samrin in USSR	3%	(9%)			
Iranian Revolution First Anniversary	3%	(--)			

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Brezhnev on Afghanistan guarantees
- Ustinov on party control of army
- Belgrade, Moscow on post-Tito era

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN

BREZHNEV SEEKS BORDER GUARANTEE, CONCEDES U.S. OIL CONCERNS

Soviet President Brezhnev's carefully qualified offer in his election speech to withdraw troops from Afghanistan once a halt to "outside interference" is guaranteed may signify interest in working out some face-saving solution to the USSR's Afghan impasse. Taken in conjunction with his statement that U.S. concern over the safety of its oil routes is "understandable," Brezhnev's remarks on withdrawal could indicate receptiveness to a formula leading to withdrawal which would recognize Soviet interests in Afghanistan as well as U.S. concerns in the Persian Gulf. The impression that Moscow is seeking to signal interest in dialog was accentuated in subsequent remarks by Brezhnev and by Central Committee official Leonid Zamyatin, both of whom professed Soviet readiness to seek political solutions to existing problems. However, these followup statements, like the Brezhnev election address, also held the United States responsible for the deterioration of the international situation. It cannot be ruled out that Moscow is merely adopting a calculated pose of reasonableness and sincerity to counter international condemnation of the Soviet intervention.

As yet there has been no Soviet comment on press reports that President Carter, in a 25 February letter to Yugoslav President Tito, proposed that the United States and the USSR join other nations in guaranteeing Afghan neutrality; and Moscow, after its initial negative reaction, has said nothing further about the EEC foreign ministers' similar proposal last week.

Moscow promptly blamed the general strike and anti-Soviet protests in Kabul on Washington and various accomplices, but recent PRAVDA articles have acknowledged that the Afghan regime faces complicated religious, ethnic, communications, and educational problems within the country.

BREZHNEV SPEECH — Brezhnev left Soviet options open in his lengthy discussion of Afghanistan in his republic supreme soviet election speech on 22 February. While echoing his 13 January PRAVDA interview in promising that Soviet "troops and military contingents" will be withdrawn when the reasons for their presence cease to apply, he added the proviso that the Afghan Government will also have to confirm that their presence is "no longer necessary."

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Brezhnev went on to declare emphatically that the USSR will be ready to "begin" withdrawal as soon as all outside interference has ceased--again leaving a loophole as to the timing of a total withdrawal. Calling in his next sentence on the United States and "Afghanistan's neighbors" to "guarantee" a complete cessation of such interference, he said the "need" for Soviet military aid would then end, but he did not specifically pledge that withdrawal would follow. A speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in India on 12 February had raised the subject of guarantees without either mentioning a Soviet withdrawal or specifying the guarantors.*

Brezhnev went on to accuse the United States of seeking to expand its influence in Asia and the Middle East and to exploit the natural resources of the region, but he also acknowledged the reasonableness of some U.S. concerns. Thus, he observed that Washington likes to talk about the necessity of insuring the safety of U.S. oil supply routes, and "in a way this is understandable." Brezhnev then asked rhetorically whether this could be achieved by turning the region into a powder keg when the result would be the opposite.

That some connection between the Afghan and Gulf situations may have been intended by Moscow was suggested in the way IZVESTIYA's authoritative political observer Aleksandr Bovin linked the two problems. In remarks on Moscow radio's weekly observers roundtable program on the 24th, Bovin described the U.S. positions on Afghanistan and the Gulf as similarly paradoxical because in both cases Washington by its actions is complicating the situations. In Afghanistan "they would like us to withdraw our troops," he said, but are doing everything to make this more difficult. And, citing Brezhnev, he added that the United States seeks stability in the Gulf--"and this is understandable because it affects their interests connected with oil"--but through its military presence and political pressure it is destabilizing the situation.

SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS Two further statements from Moscow in the week following Brezhnev's election speech underscored the impression that Moscow is seeking to appear open to a negotiated solution to the Afghan crisis even as it presses its attack on the Carter Administration. On 26 February Leonid Zamyatin, the Central Committee's senior international information official, offered his first press commentary on the Afghan crisis. In a LITERARY GAZETTE article, as publicized by TASS, Zamyatin blamed the Administration for the impasse in relations that has developed but

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* Gromyko's remark--which was preceded by an Afghan Government statement linking guarantees with withdrawal--is discussed in the 21 February 1980 TRENDS, page 2.

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pointedly professed Moscow's "readiness and indeed resolve to achieve a political solution to all problems that exist or may arise." The next day Moscow reported remarks made by Brezhnev during a meeting with U.S. industrialist Armand Hammer in the Kremlin which struck a similar note. According to Moscow radio's domestic service, Brezhnev asserted that the "only sensible course" is to "search for mutually acceptable solutions to arising problems on an honest and just basis." However, Brezhnev was also reported to have said that the complications in bilateral relations are a "direct consequence of the current course of the U.S. Administration."

AFGHAN INTERNAL PROBLEMS

Soviet reporting on the city-wide shutdown in Kabul which began on the 21st has focused on the arrest of "one American and 16 Pakistanis" to make the case that the turmoil was engineered by U.S. and "other imperialist special services," Pakistan, and China. The reports, notably vague as to the reason for the disorders, have maintained that an indignant citizenry, in collaboration with government, party, and people's organizations, "rendered harmless" assorted terrorists, bandits, and armed gangs of counterrevolutionaries and that the city is returning to normal.

A 24 February PRAVDA account from Kabul correspondent Mironov gave Soviet readers some inkling of the troubles the Afghan regime is encountering when it referred to government pledges regarding freedom of religion and assistance for agricultural production. Acknowledging unspecified "difficulties and current problems," Mironov also admitted that rebels and reactionary clergy had been able to enlist a "certain confused section of the population" in the unexplained "rebellion." Moscow had similarly used the term "rebellion" to describe the uprising in Herat last March which first prompted major Soviet press attention to the problems faced by the year-old revolutionary government. Some of the internal difficulties were mentioned in "A. Petrov" articles at that time, but since then the Soviet press has generally obscured the domestic problems.

Prior to the recent flareup in Kabul, an 18 February dispatch by PRAVDA's Mironov and Demchenko was atypically explicit in reviewing Afghan domestic problems and failed to make the usual effort to attribute all of the country's ills either to foreign interference or to the regime of the now-disgraced late President Amin. The correspondents acknowledged that the new regime has to overcome "flagrant errors" of the "recent past" but only once specifically referred to Amin. Thus, while they attributed to Amin the mistaken use of "ultrarevolutionary phraseology," they were imprecise in describing when and how the "simple people" of Afghanistan became "frightened away" from the regime and lost their trust in the leadership. They conceded that there are "deep rifts" among the people and even within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

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They acknowledged that the task of uniting such an "extraordinarily complex" country is not simple, and they singled out such problems as the ethnic and religious composition of the people, the large nomad population, the difficulty faced by "central power" in reaching isolated areas where "the word of the mullah or tribal elder" has force of law, and the overwhelming difficulty--"how many years will it take?"--to achieve literacy when 80 to 90 percent of the population is illiterate. The correspondents warned that the goal is distant: The Soviet forces are creating "favorable external conditions" for Afghanistan, they said, but "within it" there is still much to be done to establish a "peaceful life."

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USSR

USTINOV STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF PARTY CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES

A hint of tension between the civilian and military sides of the Soviet leadership was contained in Defense Minister Ustinov's annual article on Armed Forces Day. Instead of the routine account of Soviet military history with which he and his predecessors have usually marked the day, Ustinov delivered a whip-cracking lecture on the party's central role in all aspects of military affairs. Coming at a time when the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan may well have placed new strains on the traditionally delicate military-political relationship, the article reads suspiciously like a warning to the military that it does not have the right to question the ultimate authority of civilian leaders on basic policy issues.

Ustinov's article, published in PRAVDA on 22 February, was not only a paean to the party's central role in all things military but also a textbook-style explication of why it must exercise this responsibility. Drawing on arguments that have long been familiar in Soviet military-theoretical literature, Ustinov asserted that the "complexity" of the processes taking place in the world and the need for "correctly analyzing" situations and taking "timely" measures require the party to take a larger and larger role in military affairs. He recalled Lenin's appreciative assessment of the party's leadership of military affairs during the Russian civil war of 1918-1921 and quoted him as having written that the Soviet military successes would have been impossible without the daily "harmonious" work of the political leadership. Consistently, his only reference to Soviet military doctrine--the magna carta of the military's role in top-level decisionmaking--avoided any reference to the military's contribution and asserted that the party "determines" the content of military doctrine.

The tendentiousness of Ustinov's article is thrown into sharper relief when compared with his previous Armed Forces Day offerings. In 1977, his first year as Minister of Defense, he published articles in PRAVDA and KOMMUNIST which were entirely routine and contained only the most fleeting references to the party. In 1978, a decennial year, his report on the anniversary, which was carried on Moscow domestic service, portrayed the history of the armed forces as an achievement of the military and of the nation as a whole, not the party in particular. In 1979 Ustinov's article in PRAVDA dwelt on the people's role in the history of the armed forces and was entirely innocuous from the standpoint of military-political relations.

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BACKGROUND Although there is nothing in Ustinov's article to connect his strictures on party authority to current policy issues--his remarks on Afghanistan, for example, are relatively brief and entirely consistent with current Soviet propaganda--circumstances and history lend some plausibility to the theory. There were intriguing hints last fall that Brezhnev's force reduction initiatives in his 6 October East Berlin speech were the subject of controversy in the Soviet leadership and in East Europe, focused perhaps on the conciliatory aspects of Brezhnev's offer. These hints included a case of direct tampering with Brezhnev's speech text by the East German party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, apparently aimed at hardening Brezhnev's warning to West Germany against accepting U.S. medium-range missiles. In addition, there were several assertions by Soviet spokesmen that Brezhnev's proposals were an act of "courage"--assurances that seemed aimed at disputing some unstated contention that they were unduly conciliatory.* Perhaps the most significant sign was a notably defensive statement by Marshal Chuykov on Moscow domestic service on 17 October maintaining that the Brezhnev initiatives "do not show weakness."

The most celebrated previous case of an apparent reprimand of the military over an issue of policy by a high-ranking military officer occurred shortly after the Cuban missile crisis. Marshal Chuykov, then commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces, was also a central figure in that case. Writing in RED STAR on 17 November 1962 in an apparent response to some undisclosed military grumblings over Khrushchev's backdown on the missile issue, Chuykov warned officers against holding incorrect "attitudes and opinions." He went on to recall that Lenin had upbraided Stalin once for asserting that "our diplomacy sometimes most effectively spoils the results of our military victories."

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* Brezhnev's proposal and attendant commentary, including some of the hints mentioned here, are discussed in the TRENDS of 11 October 1979, pages 1-4, and 17 October 1979, pages 2-3.

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YUGOSLAVIA

BELGRADE, MOSCOW PROFESS CALMNESS OVER POST-TITO PROSPECTS

Faced with the critical deterioration of President Tito's condition and Western press speculation about future Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Belgrade and Moscow are continuing their individual efforts to point out that they anticipate no major disruptions in the post-Tito era. Belgrade, while issuing terse but candid bulletins on Tito's health, has projected an image of a leadership ready to assume responsibility for maintaining the country's independence and defense readiness. The Soviets and some of their East European allies have indignantly denied any aggressive intentions toward Yugoslavia and have denounced Western speculation to this effect as gratuitous and intended to provoke tension.

YUGOSLAV COMMENT Belgrade has used both words and deeds to convey the message that it is managing the present crisis and that it faces the future self-confidently. Recent commentary has included assertions that the collective leadership machinery created by Tito has been working smoothly, and reports on leadership meetings have been couched in routine terms, apparently to convey an impression of business as usual. Since setbacks in Tito's recovery were revealed on 10 February, sessions of the party Central Committee, the state Presidency, the National Defense Council, and several high-level regional bodies have been held. Belgrade has conveyed leadership continuity by announcing on 21 February that Tito had authorized Vice President Lazar Kolisevski to issue the previously approved texts of special messages to several foreign leaders on the world situation. Kolisevski on the 22d also sent his first routine national day greeting telegram on Tito's behalf.

Statements by party Presidium members have also been aimed at bolstering confidence in the transition period. Presidium Secretary Dusan Dragosavac on 27 January, for instance, declared that "our country has been and will remain stable and independent." Foreign affairs expert Milos Minic on 11 February similarly asserted that Yugoslavia "guards its security with its own forces" and "does not need anyone's patronage." Presidium member Aleksandar Grlickov on 19 February said that Yugoslavs anticipate the future with *serenity, and fellow Presidium member Stane Dolanc on the 20th* said that Yugoslavia's "invincibility" is clear to Yugoslavs, and "let it also be clear to everyone outside our borders."

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This posture of self-confidence has also been reflected in Belgrade's insistence that it has not sought and does not need foreign support. Thus, a Foreign Secretariat statement on 31 January rejected as "disinformation" a TIME magazine story claiming that Tito had asked Washington for security guarantees, and Belgrade has replayed official U.S. statements--including those by President Carter at his 13 February press conference--expressing confidence in Yugoslavia's independence and defense capability. Moscow's failure to report Yugoslav statements about its independence and defense readiness prompted Belgrade to sound a note of irritation in a 24 January TANJUG report. The report said that if Moscow would replay these statements, Soviet readers would discover the "full truth" about Yugoslavia, and any "anxiety over Yugoslavia would be put in its proper place."

SOVIET BLOC COMMENT Moscow has continued to reject Western suggestions that the Soviets intend to interfere in Yugoslavia and has reassured Belgrade of its friendly disposition. The latest Soviet assertions on this subject came in response to President Carter's statements at his press conference on the 13th about protecting Yugoslavia from potential Soviet threats and domination. While ignoring the President's remarks about Yugoslavia's capacity to defend its own independence, a Konstantin Ivanov TASS commentary on 14 February declared that Belgrade "does not need self-styled 'patrons'" and rejected the notion that "Yugoslavia is ostensibly ready to fall into the embrace of the United States of America." Ivanov said that while Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policy views are "not identical on all matters," relations between the two countries are "friendly," and cooperation is developing "normally." The same stress on friendship had been evident in a get-well message sent by Soviet leader Brezhnev to Tito, carried by PRAVDA on 19 January.

Moscow's stalwart Balkan ally Bulgaria, also a target of suspicion because of its longstanding dispute with Yugoslavia over Macedonia, has reacted authoritatively to Western speculation about its intentions. In an 11 February speech, carried by RABOTNICHESKO DELO the next day, Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov charged that Western media have used Tito's health condition to make "despicable insinuations and speculations addressed at Bulgaria and the USSR." Zhivkov reiterated previous assertions that Sofia has "no territorial claims on the SFRY" and "recognizes the political realities and state borders established after World War II." In the weeks before Zhivkov's comments, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian media had similarly rejected Western speculation about Soviet bloc intentions toward Yugoslavia.

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BRIEFS

MOSCOW ON ZIMBABWE PATRIOTIC FRONT: On the eve of this week's black parliamentary elections in Rhodesia, Moscow has signaled its displeasure with the decision of the two wings of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front to field separate campaigns, making the point that their election strategy may serve to weaken Front coleaders Nkomo and Mugabe in the critical post-election period ahead. Following the London agreement on Rhodesia last December, Moscow had avoided discussion of the factions' decision to mount separate campaigns; but a broadcast on 18 February contained an unprecedented swipe at Mugabe, naming him as the person responsible for suggesting that the Front parties campaign as separate organizations, a policy which white Rhodesians have allegedly used to split the Front. A Moscow broadcast to Africa on the 19th predicted that the parties led by Nkomo and Mugabe will win a combined total of 60 to 80 percent of the parliamentary seats, but it cited "observers" as giving little hope to the possibility that either party alone will command an absolute majority, a failure Moscow linked to the lack of unity within the Front. The broadcast warned that "local reactionaries" in Rhodesia see the Front's election strategy as an opportunity to use traditional tribal rivalries between the two groups to fuel a permanent split, thus serving to weaken the political force of the Front as a whole. It also pointed to "provocative" predictions of "colonialist fortune tellers" to register its apparent concern that a coalition government may be formed after the elections without representation from "either ZAPU or ZANU," the two factions of the Front. Moscow's hope that the Front will be able to enter into any future coalition bargaining from a position of unified strength appeared to be reflected in the weekly roundtable discussion on the 17th. It pointed to a recent unpublicized meeting between Nkomo and Mugabe as representing a "reassuring" tendency toward joint action.

MOSCOW ON SAUDI ARABIA: In an apparent sign of displeasure over Saudi Arabian condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Moscow has accompanied its ritualistic observance of the anniversary of the establishment of Soviet-Saudi diplomatic relations in 1926 with critical references to Saudi domestic policies and to alleged Saudi support for Afghan insurgents. This is the first such criticism of the regime in a year of sporadic Soviet expressions of interest in improved relations, as Moscow sought to exploit the changed situation in the Persian Gulf after the downfall of the shah. This year's anniversary commentary, broadcast in Arabic on 17 February, deplored the absence of Soviet-Saudi diplomatic ties and again argued that the "philosophical and ideological conflict" between Islam and communism should not hinder the adoption of a unified stand on issues of mutual concern. Pointing to common ground, the

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commentary noted Soviet "understanding" of the Saudi position on a Middle East settlement and approvingly recalled Riyadh's insistence on Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem. Sparse Soviet attention to Saudi Arabia this year has included the usual pickups of Saudi leaders' remarks favorable to the USSR, but recently Moscow has also replayed unidentified Arab condemnation of "repressions" by the Saudi regime. On the positive side, for example, TASS in January noted Crown Prince Fahd's cryptic remark in a December interview that Saudi Arabia has good economic and trade relations with the USSR. In early February Moscow observed that Saudi Arabia was showing restraint in refusing to provide the United States with bases and cited Fahd as saying there is no proof that the USSR has "aggressive intentions" in the Persian Gulf. However, in a departure from its cautious, factual treatment of the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca last November, Moscow recently has indirectly criticized the Saudis on the highly sensitive subjects of royal authority and religious dissension. A 13 February TASS dispatch from New York cited "circles of Arab delegations" as saying that unrest in Saudi Arabia is aimed at "restricting royal power" and that Saudi Shi'ites are leading "mass actions" against the regime. Three days later TASS reported a "representative of the national movement of Saudi Arabia" as saying that regime "repression" of the masses had intensified after the mosque seizure.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 18 - 24 FEBRUARY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3585 items)			Beijing (525 items)		
USSR Republics Supreme Soviet Election Campaign	29%	(14%)	Afghan Situation	14%	(10%)
Brezhnev Speech	11%	(--)	Sino-Vietnamese Dispute	4%	(5%)
Gromyko Speech	5%	(--)			
Suslov Speech	4%	(--)	PRC Spring Festival	4%	(8%)
Kosygin Speech	4%	(--)			
Soviet Armed Forces Day	5%	(--)			
Afghan Situation	5%	(4%)			

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-GULF-AFGHANISTAN

In another move to defuse speculation about Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf stemming from its intervention in Afghanistan, Moscow has floated the idea of a conference to discuss guarantees for access to and delivery of Persian Gulf oil. The informal proposal, advanced by a TASS commentator, was linked to Brezhnev's recent election speech remark on "understandable" U.S. concern over oil route security. Incorporating the interest of the Soviet Union in Middle East oil alongside that of West Europe and the United States, the proposal was set in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Moscow has not flatly ruled out consideration of U.S. and West European ideas on "neutralization" of Afghanistan as a possible solution to the crisis, but a recent spate of comment has been sharply critical of the notion. Correspondingly, Moscow has pressed for Western acceptance of Brezhnev's 22 February offer to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan if a halt to "outside interference" is guaranteed. Moscow's orthodox East European allies, in voluminous comment, have strongly supported the Brezhnev proposal.

USSR SUGGESTS HELSINKI SIGNERS GUARANTEE OIL ACCESS, ROUTES

In a 29 February TASS commentary, Nikolay Portugalov proposed including the problems of the security of oil communications and "equal commercial access" to Persian Gulf oil sources on the agenda of an "all-European" conference on energy.* According to Portugalov's scenario, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act signatories would work out "appropriate guarantees" which would be forwarded to the United Nations for acceptance.

An apparent trial balloon, the proposal has thus far been given no radio or press publicity by Moscow and has not been broached in comment routinely criticizing U.S. policies in the Persian Gulf. Portugalov

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* Portugalov in the past specialized in West German issues, serving as LITERARY GAZETTE special correspondent and NOVOSTI correspondent in Bonn.

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himself, as if awaiting reaction, said the USSR's "concise" point of view on the Gulf--as set out in President Brezhnev's 22 February election speech--"could become" the point of departure of an "all-European initiative of global significance." Moscow has long proposed a CSCE conference to address the question of energy but has never before suggested specific topics outside of the immediate European context.

The Portugalov comment clearly signaled that the USSR sees access to Middle Eastern oil as a vital potential interest of its own, as well as an immediate one claimed by the United States. By tying his proposal to Brezhnev's remark that U.S. concern over the security of its oil supply routes is "understandable in a way," Portugalov gave it an authoritative cast. At the same time, he confirmed that Brezhnev's remark was a calculated insertion of the oil issue into the Western discussion of the USSR's Afghan intervention. While the proposal has the effect of linking Moscow's interest in Middle East oil to the crisis in a manner Moscow had earlier tried to avoid, it clearly does so in a cooperative rather than a confrontational framework--since CSCE decisions require a consensus of all European countries as well as Canada and the United States. While not directly suggesting Soviet interest in Persian Gulf oil, USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov's 3 March PRAVDA article offered a philosophical rationale for the cooperative approach implicit in Portugalov's proposal. Arbatov, in an argument directed nominally at Washington, maintained that the question of insuring oil supplies from the Gulf "does not lend itself to a military solution." The necessary conditions, he went on, are peace in the region and "abandonment of interference in its countries' internal affairs."

EUROPEAN CONSUMERS, GULF OIL PRODUCERS

In an appeal to West Europe, Portugalov portrayed U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf as a threat to West European oil interests. He played on fears that Middle East oil sources are physically vulnerable and admonished West Europe to "sound the alarm." Portugalov charged, in a repetition of standard Soviet themes, that U.S. oil monopolies are determining U.S. policy on "questions of war and peace" and are creating an explosive situation in the Persian Gulf area. If this "powderkeg" were to explode, he warned, the consequences would be disastrous for Western energy supplies. Depicting a rapacious United States ignoring its allies' needs, Portugalov accused the United States of seeking preferential, if not exclusive, access to foreign oil, even though West Europe and Japan, he said, are more dependent on that oil.

Portugalov was vague on the role which Middle East oil-producing countries would play in the process of working out guarantees. He did not specifically call for producer participation in the European consumer conference. He did imply that the producers' views would be incorporated when he said that equal access to the oil, "with the

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agreement of those to whom it belongs," would be correlated with the issue of oil route security, first within an all-European framework and then at the United Nations. And he said that the producers' agreement would be needed should the United Nations extend the guarantees to cover the producing countries' territorial integrity and independence.

SOVIET INTEREST To make a plausible case for Soviet participation in international deliberations on the Persian Gulf, Portugalov had to modify the standard formulation of Moscow's position. A recent spate of elite-level Soviet statements, countering Western speculation about Moscow's intentions, had insisted without elaboration that the USSR does not intend to "push its way to the warm seas."* Portugalov maintained that the Soviet Union is "not striving to 'get a route to the warm seas' for itself by force," but is interested in the "security of oil routes" in the Gulf. And in an apparently unprecedented, if indirect, acknowledgment that in the future Moscow might purchase Mideast oil, Portugalov recalled West German Chancellor Schmidt's recent remark that the Soviet Union, "as a potential purchaser of Near East oil, has a legitimate right of access to its sources." This means, Portugalov argued, that "all" European nations have "parallel" interests in the oil issue.

Moscow in the past has occasionally acknowledged fuel difficulties in at least some parts of the USSR, as in an April 1977 TASS commentary which said that "reserves of organic fuel in the European part of the USSR can no longer fully meet the growing needs of the economy." But Moscow had disputed published CIA reports that the Soviet Union will become a net oil importer in the coming decade. And it has previously denied any designs on Mideast oil, protesting, as did Brezhnev in his January 1980 PRAVDA interview, that it is the imperialists who are "attracted by the smell of oil." In fact, as recently as 2 February an "A. Petrov" PRAVDA article on the Persian Gulf maintained that the Soviet Union "fully supplies its own needs" in oil, has never claimed other people's oil resources, and has never declared oil areas to be spheres of its vital interests.

CSCE ROLE Although Moscow has never previously suggested that a CSCE conference take up the question of Middle East oil supplies, it raised the possibility of a CSCE meeting on energy at least as far back as 1975. Brezhnev, in a 9 December 1975 speech, proposed "European congresses and international conferences on questions of cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection, the development of transport, the field of energy, and so on." Brezhnev's conference proposal has periodically been recalled, and the Soviet president, in a 2 November

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* Remarks by Brezhnev, Ponomarev, and others on this issue are discussed in the 6 February 1980 TRENDS, pages 2-3.

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1977 speech, reaffirmed Soviet interest in solving a number of global problems, including that of energy supplies, through "systematic international cooperation."

USSR COOL TO "NEUTRALITY" IDEA, PRESSES CALL FOR "GUARANTEES"

Moscow has begun to voice opposition to U.S. and West European suggestions that "neutralization" of Afghanistan form part of a solution entailing Soviet withdrawal. After initial negative but noncommittal reports on the Western ideas, Moscow had fallen silent until Soviet President Brezhnev made his own withdrawal-after-guarantees offer in his 22 February election speech and Britain formally presented a "neutralization" proposal to the USSR at the end of the month. Recent low-level comment has now attacked the neutrality notion as "intervention" in Afghan internal affairs, an affront to the country's sovereignty, and part of a plan to "overthrow" the Afghan regime. While such comment does not appear to close the door to further exploration of the neutrality idea, Moscow is pressing for Western acceptance of its own proposal.

Moscow has been vague as to the nature of the Western suggestions. A Moscow domestic service commentary on 4 March, for example, without mentioning President Carter clearly alluded to his 13 February news conference remarks when it complained that the United States is sabotaging Afghanistan by "publicly discussing" such matters as the neutralization of Afghanistan, a deadline for Soviet withdrawal, and the replacement of Soviet troops by "mythical Muslim peacekeeping forces." Other Soviet criticism, including a 2 March SOVIET RUSSIA article and a 4 March commentary on Moscow radio's English-language World Service, seemed to be referring to the EEC foreign ministers' 19 February proposal, advanced by British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington, to offer guarantees of Afghan neutrality in return for a Soviet withdrawal. An article in the current NEW TIMES, as reported by TASS on the 5th, specifically criticized the "Carrington plan" as an attempt to avoid responding to Moscow's proposals and to deflect world attention from the "undeclared war" being waged against Afghanistan by the imperialists and their accomplices. NEW TIMES noted in this context that the recent civil disorders in Kabul had occurred "under the cover of talks on the 'neutralization' of Afghanistan." (The neutrality issue was not mentioned in a 28 February PRAVDA article by "A. Petrov" which, in effect, elevated to an authoritative level earlier Soviet charges of U.S. and Pakistani involvement in the Kabul disturbances.)

As for its own proposal for guarantees against "outside intervention," Moscow has offered a few specifics, primarily insisting on an end to arms supplies for Afghan insurgents and the closing of Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, described by Moscow as rebel training and staging

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bases. Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department, indirectly addressed the guarantee issue in a 27 February LITERARY GAZETTE article. Zamyatin said that if the United States wants peace in the region, President Carter must curtail arms supplies and liquidate mercenary bases--"in a word, halt all forms of interference" in Afghanistan. Afghan President Karmal gave much the same list in a Norwegian press interview reported by TASS on 27 February: There can be no reliable guarantee for the restoration of peace, he said, without elimination of the bases and camps in Pakistan, an end to the provision of arms and foreign currency to "terrorists," and an obligation by Pakistan and the United States to "keep away" from Afghanistan.

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EAST EUROPEANS SUPPORT "PEACE" INITIATIVES ON AFGHAN ISSUE

The hope of some lessening of tension over the Afghan crisis appears to have struck a responsive chord in some East Europe capitals, where sharpening East-West confrontation has clearly caused apprehension. Even before Brezhnev made his proposal on guarantees and withdrawal in his 22 February election speech, East Europeans had broached the idea of a compromise solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Since that speech, the Soviet Union's orthodox East European allies appear to have breathed a collective sigh of relief, attested by a heavy volume of approving commentary. The Poles and Hungarians, initially reluctant to endorse the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, have apparently been reassured by Brezhnev's offer or pressured by Moscow to joint the chorus of support. Only the Romanians, early promoters of a compromise deal in discussions at the United Nations, have maintained their usual reserve and have refrained from commenting on Brezhnev's remarks.

ANTICIPATION OF BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL

There were inklings of East European interest in a compromise solution to the Afghan issue in advance of Brezhnev's 22 February proposal. The idea had been floated by the Romanians in the United Nations in mid-January: Bucharest radio on 15 January reported Romania's UN delegate as proposing the adoption of a resolution aimed at bringing about the "withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan" and at guaranteeing that "no state will grant support to the antigovernment forces" in that country. The report said the Romanian delegate was acting with the "mandate" of his government. The idea was also discussed unofficially in Warsaw at the time of the Polish party congress, according to a Western press report. The Oslo daily AFTENPOSTEN on 12 February reported from Warsaw that "Polish circles" were discussing a Western suggestion in "unofficial and cautious terms." Finally, a participant on Budapest television's "Foreign Political Forum" on the 20th explicitly predicted the Soviet initiative. Responding to a question on whether GDR and Hungarian troops would be sent to Afghanistan, the participant declared that not only would no other forces go to that country but that, "according to my information," the Soviet Union is most willing to withdraw its forces. He added that it might make an offer to withdraw in the near future if the United States and Pakistan would guarantee noninterference.

REACTION TO BREZHNEV SPEECH

The possibility, however remote, of a compromise solution has evidently made it easier for the moderate Hungarians and Poles to line up more strongly in support of the Soviet position on Afghanistan. Thus a 24 February NEPSZABADSAG editorial on Brezhnev's speech said it showed that "despite any unfavorable manifestation apparent today, the world is not lurching toward war." And the communique of a Hungarian Central Committee plenum, issued on 1 March, declared that the Soviet bloc's continued dedication to detente "got a clear expression" in the Soviet leader's election speech.

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Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU, in its editorial of 23-24 February, called Brezhnev's speech "firm as well as calm and most meaningful" and noted approvingly that he had "stated most resolutely" his proposal on Afghanistan.

At the same time, the Hungarians and Poles have shown a new willingness to echo Moscow's propaganda charges against the United States as an instigator of the Afghan crisis. Thus the 1 March Hungarian plenum communique denounced "the American measures and anti-Soviet campaign launched under the pretext of condemning legitimate Soviet assistance" to the Afghan revolution. And the 23-24 February TRYBUNA LUDU editorial said the firm, calm tone of Brezhnev's speech was "in glaring contrast to the anti-Soviet hue and cry raised in the West, especially in the United States." These statements stand in sharp contrast to such earlier examples of the public positions of these two countries as the 10 January Hungarian Council of Ministers statement on Afghanistan, which condemned "imperialist" interference but failed to mention the United States, and Polish First Secretary Gierek's congress report on 11 February, which condemned "outside" intervention in Afghanistan but also made no mention of the United States.

Predictably solid support for Brezhnev's statement was registered by the bloc hardliners--Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria. At the other end of the spectrum, Romania, which has generally avoided direct reportage on the Afghan controversy, has been the only Warsaw Pact member not to report Brezhnev's proposal.

YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade has shown scant interest thus far in Brezhnev's proposals, although it has openly criticized the European Economic Community's proposal to "neutralize" Afghanistan. Reflecting concern that neutralization would strip Afghanistan of its standing in the nonalined movement, Foreign Secretary Vrhovec said on 25 February that Yugoslavia prefers a "nonalined" to a "neutral" Afghanistan. Outspoken Belgrade BORBA commentator Teslic on the 24th described the idea of neutralization as concealing an "old approach of big powers to a small country" and not providing a "just solution" to the problem. Vrhovec on 24 and 27 February also raised the possibility of a nonalined ministerial conference on Afghanistan but implied that this needs further discussion. Belgrade's most authoritative attack on the Soviet rationale for its intervention was made by LCY Presidium member Stane Dolanc, who declared on 20 February that the principle of "internationalist solidarity" should not be used for "suppressing independence, interference in internal affairs, and imposing certain models" on other countries.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

ARBATOV REAPPEARS, OFFERS DEFENSE OF DETENTE POLICY

Moscow's foremost Americanologist, USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov, has published a 3 March PRAVDA article on the Afghanistan crisis that argues forcefully for the continued viability and necessity of Soviet cooperation with the United States. In his first central press assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations since their sharp downturn in the spring of 1978, Arbatov echoes other Soviet officials in citing a shift in U.S. policy predating Afghanistan as the chief cause of the current impasse. But he offers an interpretation of U.S. politics and of the factors behind U.S. policy less alarming than earlier Soviet statements on the crisis and strongly supportive of renewed dialog, even in the near term.*

Arbatov's reappearance--he argued similarly on 1 March in a Soviet central television program--interjects for the first time the voice of Moscow's academic specialists on the United States into public discussion of the Afghanistan crisis. The tone of the article differs measurably from the defiant bravado about world historical trends which first greeted White House initiatives in the wake of the Soviet intervention. His arguments--echoed in recent commentary by other Soviet social scientists with a liberal reputation--seem to question the appropriateness of a Soviet policy, which thus far in the crisis has emphasized propaganda confrontation with the Carter Administration to the virtual exclusion of prospects for dialog, even on arms control. In that light, Arbatov's reappearance could represent a reassertion of influence by more moderate elements in the regime.

The signal feature of Arbatov's argument is a strong profession of optimism that an easing of U.S. policy toward cooperation with the USSR is a realistic prospect--even in the relatively near term.

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* That Arbatov's article was more an internal polemic than an official statement of Soviet policy is clearly suggested by the pattern of replay accorded it in other Soviet media. It has been summarized only by TASS and Moscow radio's domestic and North American services. Previous articles in PRAVDA by Arbatov received widespread publicity on Moscow radio's foreign-language service.

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Recent U.S. measures, Arbatov maintains, do not constitute a final turn from detente. The struggle over basic foreign policy trends in the United States, he contends, is not over but is only "flaring up with new force." He predicts that a change of political sentiment in Washington "can be expected." While one should not expect the United States to approve of Soviet action in Afghanistan, he concludes, the "true proportions" of recent events and an atmosphere of "common sense" will emerge when the dust of the crisis settles.

Arbatov's analysis of the causes of recent trends in U.S. policy differs from assessments by regime ideologists in ways clearly supportive of his relative optimism about the prospects for detente. In common with other assessments, he maintains that a "sharp turn" in U.S. policy away from detente was already apparent by mid-December of last year--in the decisions to accelerate the "buildup of the military might" of the United States and its allies and the rapprochement with Beijing on an anti-Soviet basis. But Arbatov links the turn in U.S. policy to a series of factors that will strike readers as less threatening to the USSR and the prospects for U.S.-Soviet cooperation than those cited by other officials:

+ U.S. difficulties in adjusting psychologically to an era of military parity with the USSR after its relative superiority and invulnerability for a long period after the end of World War II.

+ the hopes of some in Washington that alinement with China will allow the United States to get along without detente--hopes which, Arbatov assures, Washington will eventually find "illusory."

+ U.S. concern over the vulnerability of its sources of oil and natural resources.

+ the fact that important policy decisions coincided with the start of a presidential election campaign, a "bad time for good policies" in the United States.

Arbatov's interpretation stands in contrast to the thrust of several official statements in the early stages of the crisis and to remarks by many Soviet leaders during the republic supreme soviet election campaign. The latter have professed to see at work a broad historical trend, linking a return to "force" in U.S. foreign policy with Washington's concern over adverse trends in the historical competition between socialism and capitalism and its intention to regain military superiority in order to reverse them. CPSU Secretary Boris Ponomarev's 5 February election speech was a notable case in point. Ponomarev, one of the regime's chief ideological spokesmen, concluded that imperialism is turning to a buildup of military strength out of concern to forestall the "upsurge" in the world revolutionary process and the "inexorable march" of history.

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ARGUMENTS AGAINST COLD WAR

Writing as an important regime adviser with a long vested interest in cooperative relations with the United States, Arbatov makes a transparent case for the continuing viability and necessity of U.S.-Soviet detente. He does so not only in his relatively reassuring interpretation of U.S. policy but also in an assertion of the untenability of a return to cold war that is directed in form toward the United States but in substance seems to apply even more to the USSR. A second cold war would be more dangerous than the first, Arbatov maintains, because of the greater potential destructiveness of the world's weapons arsenals. It would increase the threat of nuclear proliferation, Arbatov adds, citing specifically Soviet neighbor Pakistan. Finally, he concludes, a return to cold war would complicate the solution of growing "global" problems, notably the provision of sufficient supplies of "natural resources, energy, and food"--problems which it is increasingly clear are of serious concern to the USSR.

SIGNIFICANCE OF ARBATOV'S REAPPEARANCE

Arbatov's reappearance in PRAVDA at this time seems the more significant since it appears to reverse a long decline in the visible signs of his institute's influence on Soviet policy toward the United States. Arbatov and several of his senior colleagues at the institute were the chief interpreters of U.S. policy in the Soviet press in the early and mid-1970's. Their visibility declined sharply after Moscow's early difficulties with the Carter Administration in 1977 and 1978. Arbatov, whose PRAVDA articles for several years had marked each critical juncture in U.S.-Soviet relations, last appeared in the central press in March 1978. In the wake of the sharp downturn in relations in the spring of 1978--following NATO's decision in May on a long-term defense modernization program and national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's journey to Beijing the same month--Moscow's key statements on U.S. policy were left to more traditional vehicles from the Soviet propaganda apparatus.

SOVIET SOCIAL SCIENTISTS ON AFGHANISTAN

Arbatov's article maintains a position on Moscow's Afghan intervention and the ensuing international crisis clearly distinct from the picture presented by the Soviet propaganda apparatus. It points to U.S. policy trends as decisive in producing the current international crisis but offers reassuring explanations of the factors behind such trends. It offers a strong rationale for a continuing Soviet policy of broadening relations with the United States. It eschews the heavy-handed Soviet propaganda justifications for the Afghan intervention and sidesteps the issue of U.S. interference. Finally, it suggests that Washington has overreacted and misinterpreted the Soviet intervention, but in the process it concedes that the West could hardly be expected to approve.

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A similar position was recently taken in press commentary by two other liberal social scientists. Fedor Burlatskiy, current head of the philosophy department at the Central Committee's Institute of Social Sciences and a central figure in past Soviet policy debates, presented many of the same arguments as Arbatov in the 13 February LITERARY GAZETTE. Burlatskiy argued that the struggle between two trends in U.S. foreign policy--which he labeled "moralists" and "realists"--goes on and predicted, like Arbatov, that a recognition of the necessity of "moving away from the brink" will surely emerge in U.S. policy. Refraining from any direct defense of the Soviet intervention, Burlatskiy said that the White House "of course" has a different assessment of it than does the USSR. An even clearer expression of this philosophy on the Afghanistan issue came in a 15 February NEW TIMES article (No. 7) by another social scientist, I.S. Kremer. He saw a disproportion between the "cause" and Washington's reaction to it but found U.S. disapproval understandable nonetheless:

> It is understandable that Washington is displeased at the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. One can fully admit that the Soviet argumentation and explanation of the reasons for this action are not represented sufficiently clearly there.

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MOSCOW TEMPERS CLAIMS OF WEST EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR DETENTE

Moscow may be having second thoughts about its original posture that the USSR's relations with West Europe would weather the Afghanistan crisis on the basis of detente's past accomplishments alone. Moscow initially hoped--and publicly asserted--that the West Europeans would dissociate themselves from the United States on the crisis in a sober calculation of self-interest. Moscow showed no inclination to tailor its policies to produce that result, however. Recent statements of understanding for U.S. policy aims by West European leaders--especially West German Chancellor Schmidt--appear to have tempered Moscow's earlier judgments. On the eve of Schmidt's visit to Washington for consultations on the crisis, Moscow released a sharp attack on the West German leader's 28 February foreign policy statement before the Bundestag. Moscow may increasingly feel pressure for concrete gestures on its part in order to influence West European opinion.

As U.S.-Soviet relations began to deteriorate in early January over Soviet Afghan policies, two factors were prominent in Moscow's assertions that no return to cold war was imminent, namely, the changed world "correlation of forces" and the "deep roots" detente had set down, especially in West Europe.* Moscow typically contended that for geographic and historical reasons West Europeans have an overriding interest in preserving detente. Soviet media vigorously pressed this theme during January, and initial West European reluctance to endorse Carter Administration moves against the Soviet Union was highlighted in Soviet commentaries as demonstrating the alleged incompatibility of U.S. and West European interests.

Soviet policy actions during this period seemed to assume a West European attachment to detente as an article of faith and made little effort to cater to West European sensibilities. Moscow's harsh treatment of dissidents Sakharov and Kopelev proceeded with clear disregard for their strong support in West European intellectual circles. Similarly, attention to West Europe was noticeably sparse during the just-completed round of election speeches by the Soviet leadership. Foreign Minister Gromyko, who could be expected to have prime responsibility for such matters, suggested only that detente has too many supporters for one state to have a deciding say in resolving its fate, but he offered the West Europeans no concrete indication of Soviet willingness to compromise on issues dear to them--such as

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* Soviet views on the "correlation of forces" are discussed in the TRENDS of 13 February 1980, pages 3-5.

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the stalled arms reduction talks. Party Secretary Suslov appealed in a general way to the West European governments to show farsightedness in determining their actions in the present situation, a view echoed briefly by President Brezhnev, while Premier Kosygin did not address the question of West European policies at all.

Since early February, however, when French President Giscard D'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt met and agreed that detente had become "uncertain" in the wake of the Afghanistan intervention, Moscow has taken note of indications that West Europe's role in safeguarding detente cannot be taken for granted. Clearly displeased with the results of that meeting, Moscow criticized both leaders for distorting events in Afghanistan to please Washington. Schmidt's 28 February statement outlining his policy to the FRG Bundestag drew further sharp criticism from Moscow. A TASS report published in the 1 March PRAVDA interpreted Schmidt's remarks as an indication that the FRG is "yielding more and more to the pressure of the United States." The report quoted Schmidt as planning further steps to insure a "collective" policy in the West to exert pressure on the USSR. Clearly acknowledging the FRG's conditional position on participation in the summer Olympics, the report accused Schmidt of "sacrificing the FRG's independent line" on this issue. The report concluded by taking exception to Schmidt's failure appreciably to discuss detente and mutually advantageous East-West cooperation, despite the chancellor's earlier "high-sounding" declarations. PRAVDA's FRG specialist Mikhaylov, in a 5 March domestic radio commentary on Schmidt's U.S. visit, charged the Schmidt government with "duplicity" in giving verbal assurances of devotion to detente while supporting policies that serve U.S. interests. Mikhaylov suggested that Bonn is using the Afghanistan events for such "self-seeking ends" as the strengthening of the FRG's dominant position in NATO and West Europe.

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PRC-TAIWAN

BEIJING IGNORES UPRISING DATE, CAUTIOUSLY ENCOURAGES KMT FOES

Recent Chinese comment on Taiwan has maintained Beijing's relatively moderate approach to the question of the island's reunification with the mainland but has given heightened attention to what it portrays as popular opposition on Taiwan to the Taipei regime. Beijing ignored the 28 February anniversary of the 1947 Taiwan uprising, an occasion regularly used in the past to voice PRC policy toward Taiwan, but pressed its views on the Taiwan issue at an unusually authoritative level in connection with the annual celebration of the Spring Festival.

Beijing may have made a tactical decision to ignore the Taiwan uprising anniversary this year in order to avoid marking an event with implicitly hostile connotations for Taipei. The Spring Festival, focusing on Chinese kinship and community solidarity, apparently was viewed as a more congenial framework for the current conciliatory PRC approach to Taiwan. Such considerations had not stopped Beijing from marking the uprising anniversary in past years, however, regardless of the focus of its position. For example, Beijing made a pitch to Taipei for accommodation when the anniversary was celebrated in 1973 for the first time in several years. Similarly, Beijing comment on the occasion last year strongly underscored the main themes of the PRC's appeal for "peaceful reunification" made a few weeks earlier in a National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee new year greetings to Taiwan. During the 1973-1979 period the anniversary always prompted a meeting hosted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and addressed by Beijing's Taiwan affairs specialist, Liao Chengzhi.

Beijing's upgraded Spring Festival activities directed at Taiwan this year included letters to the Taiwan people on 15 February from the CPPCC National Committee and on the 16th from the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League--a political organization formed in reaction to the 1947 Taiwan uprising and thereafter coopted by the PRC as a coexisting "democratic party." The latter organization also hosted a Spring Festival party on 18 February which was addressed by CCP Politburo and United Front Work Department Director Ulanhu. Last year the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League hosted a film reception, but no high-level CCP leader was named attending the event. In addition, last year the PRC-controlled Kuomintang organs in Beijing, as well as CPPCC and Overseas Chinese affairs offices in several

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provinces, held parties to appeal to Taiwan to consider seriously Beijing's new approach to the island as enunciated in the NPC's new year greetings.

Comment on Taiwan during this year's Spring Festival activities did not deviate from the main themes stressed in Beijing's conciliatory and gradualist approach to the Taiwan question since they were set down in the 1979 NPC message. Speaking at the party on the 18th, Ulanhu reiterated Beijing's pledge to "respect the realities on Taiwan" in incorporating the island into the PRC and its policy of preferring Taiwan's "peaceful" reunification with the PRC. The CPPCC letter of the 15th recalled that the NPC's 1979 new year greetings had "put forward the basic principles and policies for solving the Taiwan problem" and urged Taiwan, as commentary has done in the past year, to open communications and shipping links with the mainland as a first step.

The Spring Festival comment followed a declaration first made by CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping in his 16 January speech that Taiwan's reunification with the PRC is one of three "major tasks" for China in the 1980's. Deng's statement does not appear to signal a more aggressive approach to Taiwan reunification, as he noted further in his speech that modernization is the principal task and that its completion will provide better prospects for the reunification with Taiwan. In the same vein, at a CPPCC new year gathering last year to discuss the NPC's landmark message to Taiwan, Deng had declared that Taiwan's reunification with the PRC was "placed on our concrete agenda" as one of three significant aspects of China's current situation.

KAOHSIUNG INCIDENT While reaffirming Beijing's standing policy on the Taiwan issue, comment during the Spring Festival also voiced authoritative support for active political resistance to the Kuomintang by denouncing Taipei's "suppression" of the opposition movement in the wake of the December Kaohsiung incident, in which violence erupted at an antigovernment rally. Beijing comment portrays the opposition movement as a potentially significant factor in weakening Kuomintang control of the government on Taiwan but also seems to reflect concern that the movement's growth may lend impetus to Taiwan independence rather than to reunification with the mainland. Since the beginning of Beijing's conciliatory approach toward Taiwan, PRC media had reported and offered low-level commentary on instances of political opposition to the Kuomintang in Taiwan--notably the Yu Teng-fa trial last year--but had previously withheld authoritative comment.

The 15 February CPPCC letter denounced Taipei's use of the Kaohsiung incident as a pretext to suppress "patriotic" opposition to the Kuomintang and demanded the release of those arrested in the wake of

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the incident. At the same time, it praised the Taiwan "compatriots'" traditions of "opposing 'two Chinas' and 'Taiwan independence,' opposing schism, and fighting for reunification." More authoritatively, Ulanhu at the meeting on the 18th declared that Beijing supports Taiwan's "patriotic and democratic movement" but opposes the "'two Chinas' concept and 'Taiwan independence.'"

Beijing's interest in the fate of the opposition movement on Taiwan since the Kaohsiung affair had been evident earlier. A 16 December commentary on the incident, broadcast to Taiwan, suggested that the riot had been in reaction to "a series of actions to suppress democracy" taken by Taipei since the normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington. A XINHUA commentary on 30 December stated that the Kaohsiung incident had been the "natural outcome of intensified conflicts" sparked by the Taiwan people's "long discontent" with the Kuomintang's "autocratic rule" and rebutted charges, attributed to Taipei, that the incident had been organized by the Taiwan independence movement in collusion with Beijing. A 27 January XINHUA dispatch claimed that "mass arrests and persecution" of non-Kuomintang public figures since the Kaohsiung incident were aimed at suppressing "the patriotic and democratic movement which has been developing vigorously on the island in recent years and to silence the ever louder calls for reunification" with the PRC.

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KOREA

PYONGYANG SIGNALS CONTINUING INTEREST IN NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG

Since January, when Pyongyang first proposed contacts between the premiers of North and South Korea, the DPRK has continued to signal its interest in sustaining the momentum of the dialog and in maintaining a favorable atmosphere for the talks. North Korea has failed to spell out just what it expects from a meeting between the premiers, however, indicating only that it sees the talks as the start of a long-running series of government-to-government discussions. Although it continues to refer to the premiers' talks as a "link in the chain" of a larger dialog, Pyongyang has not pressed for non-governmental contacts and has thus far played down--though not abandoned--its longstanding contention that North-South talks should be open to all segments of society.

PANMUNJOM MEETINGS North Korea has viewed with public optimism the three procedural meetings held thus far at Panmunjom to work out details for the premiers' talks, emphasizing evidence of progress and momentum toward a final agreement. Reports on the meetings have avoided characterizing the positions of the two sides as irreconcilable and have noted, for example, the North's willingness, expressed at the 4 March meeting, to consider Seoul's proposal that an agenda for the talks be fixed before the premiers meet. DPRK reports on the second Panmunjom meeting on 19 February highlighted points of agreement or near agreement between the two sides before taking up their differences, and comments on the first meeting on 6 February said it had been "hopeful" and "inspiring." The North has also avoided denigrating the South's positions at the talks; by contrast, DPRK accounts of last year's February-March round of North-South meetings at Panmunjom characterized the South's position as "insincere" and "absurd."

ATMOSPHERE FOR DIALOG Pyongyang comment has pressed the longstanding DPRK position that the dialog should be encouraged by a moderation of public statements by both sides, and it has continued the restraint on criticism of Seoul that has marked its comment since the assassination of ROK President Pak Chong-hui last October. The DPRK similarly advocated a halt to North-South polemics at the time of contacts between the two sides early last year, and the 4 July 1972 North-South agreement on dialog had endorsed a prohibition on "slandering" and "calumniating."

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Recent Pyongyang criticism of the South has focused on activities which the North claims are harmful to the atmosphere needed for a productive dialog or which, in its view, cast doubt on Seoul's commitment to the talks. For example, Pyongyang has protested recent highly publicized military exercises in the South but has devoted little attention to the ROK administration's handling of domestic political problems. Not surprisingly, the North reacted sharply to ROK President Choe Kyu-ha's remarks in early February questioning Pyongyang's intentions in proposing talks. A carefully worded 15 February NODONG SINMUN commentary avoided attacking Choe by name but warned that recent comments by a "high-ranking" South Korean authority make it "difficult" to expect progress in the dialog. Similarly, on the 21st another commentary in the same newspaper complained about South Korean broadcasts "vilifying" the North's position on talks and thus throwing "cold water" on the dialog.

In addition to restraining its criticism of the South, Pyongyang also appears to be taking care in disseminating its censure. Thus, over the past two months KCNA transmissions--which are aimed at foreign audiences--have failed to carry the full texts of critical radio and press comment, often omitting the harshest attacks on the South. In several cases the abbreviated versions have dropped the passages detailing the reasoning behind the North's complaints. Such tailoring of the criticism may, in part, reflect an effort to avoid creating a polemical propaganda environment while still signalling the South on ways to advance the dialog.

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BRIEFS

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: Beijing's unusually sharp rebuttal of attacks on China by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi probably reflects its calculation that prospects are dimming for Chinese efforts to promote Sino-Indian reconciliation in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. A 1 March RENMIN RIBAO commentary denounced as "slander" statements made by Gandhi on 21 February that the PRC has occupied portions of Indian, Bhutanese, Nepalese, and Burmese territory and "poses a danger" to the Indian border. Her comments, the paper charged, were intended to "hinder a reasonable solution" to the Sino-Indian border issue and to "sow discord" between China and its other South Asian neighbors. After flatly blaming India for precipitating the Sino-Indian border dispute in the 1950's, the commentary recalled that the newly elected Indian Government had expressed a desire to raise "all questions," including the border issue, in seeking improved Sino-Indian relations, a "gesture" which China "welcomes." Such an effort, the commentary suggested, is impaired by "unfriendly statements and actions." The commentary noted pointedly that China had amicably negotiated its boundary questions with Nepal, Bhutan, and Burma in the early 1960's, an example of Beijing's "good faith and sensible approach" to boundary disputes with its neighbors. Earlier, on 28 February, XINHUA promptly reported a Nepalese Foreign Ministry spokesman's rejection the day before of Gandhi's allegations against the PRC as "entirely baseless." The sharpness of Beijing's response to Gandhi's attacks contrasts with its effort in media treatment of Sino-Indian relations in recent years to play down the belligerence of the 1960's and to deemphasize the importance of an early boundary settlement to improving relations overall. Beijing's recent effort to improve bilateral relations with New Delhi complemented an effort to rally South Asian opposition to Soviet actions in Afghanistan and to promote Indian reconciliation with China's longstanding South Asian ally Pakistan. Concurrent with this effort, however, Beijing has continued to report promptly expressions of foreign policy independence by leaders of Bhutan and Nepal, states where China has traditionally competed with India for influence.

YUGOSLAV-EEC AGREEMENT: Belgrade comment on a major new agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) has stressed Yugoslavia's intention to maintain its nonalined status. The agreement, which was initialed on 25 February and will come into force in July, provides for an easing of restrictions on Yugoslav exports to the EEC and improved benefits for the thousands of Yugoslav guest workers employed in EEC countries. Rejecting speculation that the agreement shows Yugoslavia's intention to "draw closer to the West," Belgrade radio commentator Dragan Colovic on 1 March said that Yugoslavia has

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always sought good ties with both the EEC and the Soviet bloc economic organization CEMA but, he added, "not at any price." Similarly, Belgrade POLITIKA's Momcilo Pantelic on 28 February hailed the agreement as "an important impetus to the Yugoslav economy" but added that Belgrade "knows how to preserve its independence outside supranational 'umbrellas.'" The negotiations over the agreement, which began two years ago in February 1978, followed a long history of complaints by Belgrade about EEC trade policies; President Tito in December 1975 had insisted that trade with the EEC must be "more equal" and had warned that failure to ease restrictions could force Belgrade to reorient its economic ties toward the Soviet bloc.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 25 FEBRUARY - 2 MARCH 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3159 items)			Beijing (659 items)		
Afghan Situation	9%	(5%)	Afghan Situation	19%	(14%)
U.S. Businessman Armand Hammer Meeting with Brezhnev	7%	(--)	11th CCP Congress Fifth Plenum Communique	12% 6%	(--) (--)
USSR Republics Supreme Soviet Elections	6%	(29%)	Romanian Economic Delegation in PRC Meeting with Hua Guofeng	8% 4%	(--) (--)
Hungarian Defense Minister Czinege in USSR	3%	(--)			

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Tougher Soviet stance on SALT II
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- Plan to change USSR population trends

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

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In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW TOUGHENS STANCE ON SALT II, U.S. DEFENSE MOVES

Moscow appears to be hardening its attitude toward the expanded defense effort being contemplated in Washington. PRAVDA's weekly international review column on 9 March, in a forcefully worded promise to respond measure for measure, sharpened Moscow's warning about the augmented U.S. effort. And Soviet radio and television observer Valentin Zorin, in two separate appearances last week, cited U.S. defense moves when placing limits for the first time on Moscow's willingness to adhere to the SALT II treaty before it is ratified.

The PRAVDA review by Valentin Sharov rephrased more forcefully Moscow's earlier pledge not to allow the United States to upset the existing military balance. "Everything will be taken into account," the review said, and "nothing will be unanswered--be it the creation of military bases, the deployment of new American missiles near Soviet borders, or attempts to instigate states lying near the USSR to take unfriendly steps against us." Sharov tied his comments to criticism of recent remarks by national security advisor Brzezinski to the Foreign Policy Association. His statements, Sharov declared, show how far Washington remains from a "sober assessment" of the current international situation.

Zorin enunciated Moscow's position on SALT II in an appearance on Soviet television on 5 March and in his regular weekly radio commentary for North American listeners on the 8th. He appeared to be pressing the Administration to proceed with ratification rather than raising doubts about Moscow's commitment to the treaty itself, a commitment which was officially reaffirmed as recently as 12 February in a USSR-Kampuchean joint statement. Zorin told his radio listeners that it is "totally unrealistic" to think the United States can increase its military might and alter the strategic balance in its favor while the Soviet Union, bound by the signed but unratified SALT II agreement, just looks on. "The Soviet Union," he declared, "will abide by SALT II only when it takes legal force and not one day earlier."

Confirming that Zorin's remarks were more than just a personal opinion, the same message was conveyed, if less sharply, in an 8 March TASS report on the President's annual report to Congress on the activities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. TASS acknowledged White House announcements that the United States

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intends to fulfill the terms of the treaty in lieu of ratification. But it questioned the reliability of assurances from an Administration that has renounced "dozens of international agreements" and asserted flatly that the treaty will not come into force until "after its ratification by the legislative bodies of the sides signing it."

Prior to Zorin's remarks, Moscow's policy had been strictly to avoid revealing its hand on the question of observing SALT II prior to ratification. In the spirit of that policy, Soviet media had consistently ignored earlier statements from the Administration announcing its intention to abide by the agreement in any event.

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USSR-ZIMBABWE-CHINA

Moscow has expressed cautious optimism over the results of the 27-29 February Rhodesian parliamentary elections, in which guerrilla leader Robert Mugabe won an absolute majority and the right to form the country's first independent, majority-rule government. However, the magnitude of Mugabe's victory, capturing nearly 63 percent of the votes, collides with earlier Soviet suggestions that neither Mugabe's ZANU party nor the Soviet-backed ZAPU faction led by Joshua Nkomo could win an absolute majority by campaigning separately. In light of the election verdict, a development Moscow may see as lessening its chances of using its ties to Nkomo to influence the new government, Soviet comment and reportage has sought to identify Nkomo with the Mugabe faction and to stress the need to restore unity between the two parties. In assessing the regional impact of the passing of power to the Patriotic Front, Moscow has predicted that the election victory will improve the prospects for peace, not only in Zimbabwe but in the region as a whole.

Chinese comment on the election has focused on Mugabe's need, despite his absolute election majority, to unite potentially contentious political groups into a stable coalition government. The comment reflects Beijing's traditional concern that internal political discord in Zimbabwe will provide an opportunity for the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.

MOSCOW LINKS NKOMO TO MUGABE'S LANDSLIDE VICTORY, URGES UNITY

The importance Moscow attaches to a closer cooperative relationship between Mugabe and Nkomo during the crucial postelection stage was underscored in Soviet President Brezhnev's message congratulating the two leaders on the election results. The message, published in PRAVDA on 6 March, observed that the election victory had created only the "necessary prerequisites" for building a "truly" independent and sovereign Zimbabwe and stressed that further progress in this direction will depend on the unity and cohesion of the "patriotic forces" and their vigilance against the "schemings of imperialists and racists." Similarly, a TASS commentary on the 4th warned of the danger of South African interference and of efforts by white Rhodesians to exploit differences between the two factions of the Patriotic Front, making the point that the Front's election victory

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is fragile and that Mugabe will need Nkomo's support to frustrate the "neocolonialist conspiracy."

Moscow's sensitivity to the Nkomo faction's poor showing in the balloting has been reflected in its general portrayal of the election results as a victory for the "patriotic forces," a formulation which obscures Mugabe's majority and implicitly links Nkomo's party with ZANU's victory. For example, a commentator on Moscow's domestic service on the 9th attempted to brush aside the Nkomo faction's actual standing in the elections by stating that the two parties belonging to the Patriotic Front alliance, "having garnered 77 out of 80 seats allocated for Africans in parliament," have won the "legitimate right to form a government of national unity."

Soviet interest in skirting the issue of the imbalance of power between Nkomo and Mugabe in the wake of the elections was further reflected in Moscow's careful treatment of Mugabe's cabinet appointments. Thus, an English-language commentary broadcast to Africa on the 11th obscured ZAPU's limited role in the coalition government, saying there was "no need to dwell" on individual ministerial posts. "What is more important," the commentary stated, is that the "overwhelming majority" of the posts belong to "representatives of the patriotic forces."

Moscow has generally adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward Mugabe's strikingly moderate domestic program and his conciliatory approach to his former military foes. However, the 9 March Moscow domestic service commentary appeared to advise Mugabe against retaining key personnel from the government of former Rhodesian Prime Minister Muzorewa and also alluded to the apparent wrangling between Nkomo and Mugabe over ZAPU's role in the new government. The commentary noted that Mugabe's consultations with both his allies and his "recent foes on the battlefield" were leading to a number of unspecified "difficulties" and stressed that solutions to such problems as land redistribution, the status of the new army, and the implementation of social reforms "will depend on who is in the government."

EXTERNAL IMPACT Moscow has viewed the guerrillas' ascension to power as signaling a "radical change in the alinement of forces" in southern Africa which should increase the prospects for peace in the region. A Moscow radio commentary on the 10th said the new government's major task is the establishment of peace and acknowledged the new leaders' desire to stabilize the situation on its borders as well as in Zimbabwe itself. While the 11 March Moscow broadcast to Africa said the new government will support antiapartheid movements inside South Africa, it acknowledged Mugabe's pledge that such support will be limited to the political

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and diplomatic fields. Noting that Mugabe will maintain contacts with South Africa "in certain areas of the economy," the commentary seemed to concede the reality of the economic situation in the region, saying "traditional relations" between Salisbury and Pretoria "cannot be ignored." However, the commentary did report that Mugabe is opposed to South African plans to create a "so-called community of states" in southern Africa. A Moscow radio commentator on the 4th endorsed Mugabe's pledge to follow a policy of nonalinement. The commentator claimed that Mugabe's foreign policy will be based on "mutually advantageous cooperation with all countries and, to a greater extent, with socialist countries," an alleged tilt Mugabe himself is not known to have announced.

PRC URGES DOMESTIC SOLIDARITY TO FORESTALL SOVIET INFLUENCE

Beijing's hope that Mugabe will be able to bring stability to Zimbabwe was indicated in Premier Hua Guofeng's 8 March congratulatory message crediting the victory both to Mugabe's party and to "other Zimbabwean patriotic forces" and wishing Mugabe success in building an independent and prosperous Zimbabwe by rallying all the patriotic forces. A 6 March RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article on the election observed in the same vein that transition to black majority rule "will not be smooth" and that Mugabe must now obtain the withdrawal of South African troops, disarm white Rhodesian forces, and heighten vigilance against Soviet "plots and schemes" in southern Africa.

Beijing's lower-level comment similarly stressed the need for political stability in Zimbabwe in the context of the region's volatile situation. A combined XINHUA-RENMIN RIBAO postelection interview with Mugabe, released on 7 March, focused on his intention to form a broadly based coalition government which will reconcile the races and "eradicate ill feeling and hostility." The interview also acknowledged Mugabe's intention to follow a foreign policy of nonalinement and neutrality, which will include coexistence with South Africa and good relations with the West and China. Other postelection comment described Mugabe's victory as resulting from the Patriotic Front's "protracted struggle," and a 5 March Beijing radio commentary highlighted the role Nkomo's party faction had played in the front.

Chinese comment in the weeks just prior to the election had reflected increasing concern that the situation in Rhodesia was deteriorating and that London appeared unable or unwilling to keep the country free from outside interference during the elections. Beijing's concern was most directly voiced by PRC UN Representative Chen Chu, who urged Britain at a 31 January Security Council session to enforce the provisions of the London agreement "strictly and fairly." According to the XINHUA account on the same day, Chen Chu charged that South African forces

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and mercenary troops remained in Rhodesia with the "tacit consent of the administering authorities" and warned that "hegemonists from the outside" were "casting a covetous eye and seeking every opportunity to carry out infiltration and expansion in this area."

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USSR-CHINA

MOSCOW SEES VICTORY OF ANTI-SOVIET FORCES AT BEIJING PLENUM

Moscow has assessed the leadership changes at the February plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee as a victory for Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and the most anti-Soviet elements of the Chinese leadership. This assessment has accompanied a belated acknowledgement by Moscow, in a 1 March PRAVDA article, of Beijing's intensified anti-Soviet rhetoric since the Afghan crisis. Nonetheless, a CPSU Central Committee official, commenting on the changes, has again found cause for optimism about the future of China's policy toward the USSR because of the pragmatic direction the post-Mao leadership continues to demonstrate internally. In this connection, Moscow may still hold out some hope for the Sino-Soviet political negotiations that began last year--Soviet media have yet to acknowledge to the domestic audience Beijing's indefinite postponement of their second round last January.

Soviet officials, remarking on the CCP Central Committee's Fifth Plenum last month, have without hesitation identified Deng as the clear winner and his victorious faction of rightwing "pragmatists" as the most hostile to the USSR. Fedor Burlatskiy, a prominent social scientist and China observer, warned in a domestic radio commentary on 2 March that Deng's group is even more anti-Soviet and opposed to U.S.-Soviet detente than the "leftists" who were the chief losers at the plenum. Burlatskiy tied Deng's tilt to the West to his desire to build up China's "military-industrial complex." A 4 March commentary on the plenum by the official news agency TASS conveyed the same general message but with a characteristically more propagandistic coloration. TASS concluded that the plenum decisions were aimed at furthering "China's accelerated transformation into a powerful militarist state" and at strengthening its ties with international "reaction."

One of the CPSU Central Committee's leading media spokesmen on China, however, gave a distinctly more optimistic cast to Deng's victory. Nikolay Shishlin, in a 5 March domestic radio commentary, chose to stress the "realistic" domestic policy implications of the plenum and its "most important decision"--the rehabilitation of former Premier Liu Shaoqi. There is an increasingly untenable contradiction, Shishlin maintained, between China's realistic and pragmatic course at home and its unrealistic anti-Soviet foreign policy, which he

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compared to an effort to cross "a palm and a pine tree." Through its sensible domestic policy changes, he argued, Beijing is undermining the very foundation for this peculiar hybrid. Underscoring the prospect of further changes, Shishlin concluded that the February plenum decisions are of a "comparatively intermediate nature."

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USSR

NEW EVIDENCE ON SAKHAROV: ACADEMY SILENT ON EXPULSION

There is new evidence that Soviet authorities were hesitant in their handling of the Sakharov affair, and they clearly remain frustrated in their efforts to silence the dissident scientist. It has now become known that Soviet authorities, apparently concerned about the impact on world opinion of actions against Sakharov, kept secret the fact that official sanctions against him, announced on 23 January, had actually been decided on more than two weeks earlier. No further light on the Sakharov affair was provided by the annual meeting of the Academy of Sciences, which apparently failed to exercise its authority to force Sakharov's explusion.

New evidence on the timing of the Soviet actions against Andrei Sakharov shows that the Soviet leaders acted with less decisiveness and perhaps with more concern for their public image than the public record had previously suggested. According to the BULLETIN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, No. 5--published on 30 January--the ukase stripping Sakharov of his state honors and awards was adopted on 8 January, more than two weeks before this action and the decision to exile Sakharov to Gorkiy were announced. The reason for the delay between the decision and its announcement is unclear, although it seems likely that considerations of public image were paramount in the Soviet leaders' minds in the first weeks after the Afghan intervention. They may have been concerned to avoid the impression that the action against Sakharov was intended as a response to the American grain embargo and other measures announced by President Carter on 4 January.

No further actions against Sakharov were taken by the annual meeting of the Academy of Sciences on 4-6 March and PRAVDA reports on the session contained no reference to him. The failure to move against Sakharov despite the January decree removing his state honors and the condemnation of him by the Academy's own Presidium, which appeared in PRAVDA on 29 January, suggests that the prestigious Academy continues to exercise its traditional independence in managing its internal affairs. Academy rules specify that voting is by secret ballot, and any move to expel Sakharov would have required the support of two-thirds of the full members--a plurality which history shows has been extremely hard to achieve for the expulsion of a member.

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SCHOLAR URGES STEPS TO REDRESS CENTRAL ASIAN POPULATION BOOM

Policies designed to achieve a change in the relative birthrates of the European and Central Asian populations of the Soviet Union have been advocated by a leading Soviet demographer as a solution to the growing demographic problems facing the country. The measures to be employed would be indirect, according to B.Ts. Urlanis, writing in the prestigious BULLETIN OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, No. 1, 1980. Nationality groups to be encouraged, he indicated, would be given incentives to produce large families, while those to be discouraged would not. Despite the gradualist nature of these measures, the goals of the proposals go far beyond those generally promoted by other Soviet demographers and thus are not likely to enjoy smooth sledding in the Soviet bureaucracy. Nevertheless, they are bound to strike a responsive chord among many Soviet officials whose concerns about demographic trends have no doubt been heightened by the confirmatory evidence in the new Soviet census.

The problems stemming from the growing demographic imbalance between the European and Central Asian populations of the USSR have long been a source of concern to Soviet officials. The European areas, where the bulk of Soviet industry is located, are manpower short; the Central Asian republics have a growing surplus of manpower. But efforts to match the resources with the needs have floundered on the Central Asian workman's reluctance to migrate and on his many cultural and linguistic differences. Problems of a social and psychological nature can also be foreseen as the Soviet military services take a larger and larger proportion of recruits from the Central Asian areas. Even on the political level, the growing populations of the Central Asian republics are likely to be translated into political weight, if only in the sense that their claims will demand the attention of central authorities.

POPULATION CONTROL

Urlanis indicated alarm at the sharp and persistent differences between the birthrates in the European and Central Asian parts of the Soviet Union. He pointed out that between 1970 and 1978 the birthrate in Central Asia was consistently over twice that in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and the Baltic republics. Urlanis cited this trend as evidence of the need to develop regional demographic policies, and he asserted that it is "the objective of party and state policy to smooth out these differences."

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The latest census figures, which appeared almost simultaneously with Urlanis' article, underscored his concerns. The new 1979 census figures revealed that since 1970 the populations of Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan grew by over 30 percent, more than five times faster than that of the RSFSR. According to the census about one third of all families in those Central Asian republics had seven or more members, compared to only 2 percent of families in the Russian republic. Other Muslim areas of the Soviet Union have also been growing at rates far above those for the RSFSR.

To reverse current trends, Urlanis suggested that the Soviet Union "manipulate the course of demographic processes" by implementing regional demographic policies. He pointed out that "socialist society offers extensive possibilities for controlling the demographic processes" and that the "powerful levers" it possesses should be utilized. Controlling the birthrate, he said, is the primary task. Specifically, he advocated "stimulating the birthrate in the republics" where it is lowest, that is, in the European areas. As for curtailing the rate of population growth in Central Asia, he appeared to favor a policy of benign neglect, commenting that "there is nothing to fear" if policies there result in a lower birthrate. Urlanis' specific measures to encourage higher birthrates in the favored republics are primarily economic, such as, child support payments favoring urban over rural areas, improved maternity benefits for second and third children, and additional financial incentives for raising large families in certain areas.

As for the more immediate problem of the "tremendous disproportion" between areas where there are manpower shortages and surpluses, Urlanis suggested measures which could lead to forced migration. Currently, Urlanis revealed, the flow of migration is "proceeding in the reverse direction, namely, out of labor-deficient areas into labor-surplus areas." He disclosed, presumably on the basis of new census data, that Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus, contrary to expectations, have been experiencing a net in-migration. To counter this trend, Urlanis called for a new migration policy utilizing the "entire system of social, economic, legal, and administrative levers" to stimulate an exodus from rural areas with relatively unproductive labor surpluses. He contended that in determining migration policy, it is wrong when the "interests of the national economy are made secondary to the interests of the individual."

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES Soviet specialists began to take note of the demographic shift among the nationalities of the USSR at the time of the 1970 census, and concern over this trend has been building ever since. By the mid-1970's

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this problem was being widely discussed, with most experts agreeing on the need for a Soviet demographic policy. Opinion has divided, however, on whether this should be a single uniform policy applied blindly to all nationalities of the USSR or whether it should consist of varying policies applied to different regions. Proponents of a uniform policy argued that birthrates were already dropping virtually everywhere and that a "differentiated" regional approach to depress Central Asian growth was not necessary. Until now, those favoring the regional approach have cautiously stated their position in general terms, typically advocating that quantitative growth must be accompanied by concerns for controlling the "quality" of that growth. As G.I. Litvinova explained in SOVIET STATE AND LAW (1978, No. 1), "the state cannot be indifferent to what kind of population" increase occurs, "whether it is highly mobile or, owing to a variety of circumstances (including large families and language barriers), bound to one specific region." Urlanis clearly went far beyond such cautious generalities and appears to have opened a new stage in the discussion of Soviet demographic policy.

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YUGOSLAVIA

SLOVENIA CONCEDES NEED FOR CURBS ON LOCAL ECONOMIC AUTONOMY

Belgrade seems to have made some headway toward dampening potentially one of the most divisive problems which will face the post-Tito leadership--demands by such wealthy northern republics as Slovenia for increased economic autonomy. In late February the Slovene party leadership, after complaining repeatedly about the detrimental effects of certain economic stabilization policies on the Slovenian economy, publicly bowed to the need to abide by federal economic guidelines. The Slovene declaration comes at a time when both northern and southern regions, their resources pinched by federal import and investment controls, have been airing their grievances more openly.

In an apparent display of self-criticism, a session of the Slovene party Presidium on 25 February, reported by Ljubljana DELO the next day, conceded the need "consistently and concretely to respect the positions adopted by the federal councils" and to "respect the common interests" of the country on economic policy. The seeming Slovene retreat on this issue is the more notable in that it comes against the background of expressions of heightened concern in Slovenia over the sanctity of local decisionmaking. Slovene officials had voiced some sharp complaints on this score at an LCY Central Committee plenum last October and in Slovene LC Presidium sessions in November and January. Other high-ranking Slovenians, such as LCY Presidium member Stane Dolanc and Slovene Premier Anton Vratusa, appeared to air discontent with federal controls in interviews with Ljubljana DELO on 29 December and 16 February, respectively. Vratusa agreed with the interviewer that federal restrictions have been excessive and shortsighted, and Dolanc insisted that aid to the southern regions "will not, should not, and dare not hinder development of the developed parts of Yugoslavia."

Several commentaries since the 25 February Slovene Presidium session have suggested an effort by Slovenia to appear more responsive to Yugoslav-wide needs. For instance, Ljubljana DELO on 27 February and TANJUG on the 29th underscored Slovenia's interest in expanding its investment in Kosovo and other less developed regions. Despite these professions of cooperativeness, TANJUG on 28 February cited official

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complaints about the continuing "unwillingness on the part of the developed regions to help the economically weaker" ones, and Ljubljana DELO on 5 March reported the "concern and objections" of the Slovenian front organization that certain federal restrictions "apply to some and not to others."

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BRIEF

MOSCOW, GIEREK ON WARSAW MEETING: Soviet media have given strong support to the suggestion made by Polish First Secretary Gierek last month that Warsaw be the locale of a conference of European states, plus the United States and Canada, to discuss reducing military confrontation in Europe. The idea of a Helsinki-style conference on military detente was first raised by the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee last May. Gierek's proposal--made at the Polish party congress on 11 February--was hailed in Soviet followup comment on the congress including recent plugs in PRAVDA on 7 March and on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program on the 9th. PRAVDA on 8 March approvingly reported Gierek's reiteration of his proposal in an election speech in Silesia two days earlier, including his statement that "we are prepared to examine all constructive proposals promoting the speediest convening of the conference in the Polish capital."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 3 - 9 MARCH 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3120 items)		
Zimbabwe Elections	8%	(2%)
Brezhnev Greetings to Patriotic Front Leaders Mugabe and Nkomo	3%	(--)
Afghan Situation	7%	(9%)
USSR Republic Supreme Soviet Elections	7%	(6%)
International Women's Day	7%	(--)
CPSU CC Greetings to Soviet Women	4%	(--)
UNSC Resolution on Israeli Settlements in Arab Lands	3%	(--)

Beijing (710 items)		
Afghan Situation	15%	(19%)
Zimbabwe Elections	6%	(--)
Hua Guofeng Greetings to Prime Minister-Designate Mugabe	3%	(--)
Sino-Vietnamese Dispute	6%	(1%)
PRC Foreign Ministry Note on Sino-Vietnamese Negotiations	3%	(--)
Democratic Kampuchean Premier Khieu Samphan in in PRC	5%	(--)
Hua Guofeng Greetings to Thai Premier Tinsulanon on Election	4%	(--)
11th CCP Central Committee Fifth Plenum	3%	(12%)
International Women's Day	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on Afghan political solution
- Beijing opposition to Afghan neutrality
- Soviet-Iranian relations
- Soviet-Yugoslav polemic

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19 MARCH 1980
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN-PRC

MOSCOW WELCOMES "POLITICAL" SOLUTION, INSISTS ON GUARANTEES

Moscow is creating the impression that it is not averse to discussion of a solution to the Afghan impasse, but on its own terms. Soviet commentary has sharply criticized Western ideas for neutralization of Afghanistan, while indicating that the Soviet Union is awaiting a response to Brezhnev's withdrawal-for-guarantees proposal last month.* Foreign Minister Gromyko used the occasion of Afghan Foreign Minister Dost's 13-14 March visit to "welcome" a "political" solution to the Afghan question, but he made it clear that the Brezhnev proposal is the Soviet position. He showed no receptiveness to non-Soviet suggestions, and his Afghan counterpart turned down "imperialist" proposals for neutralization as "foreign interference" which cannot be accepted.

DOST VISIT Moscow gave the Dost visit little publicity, and there was no joint communique. PRAVDA on the 15th carried merely a two-paragraph report, entitled "On the Visit," which gave meager information on the subjects discussed, and a companion report, "In a Friendly Atmosphere," which contained some elements of a standard communique, an account of the Gromyko and Dost luncheon speeches, and a mention of Dost's departure. The absence of a communique does not in itself suggest any difficulties in the discussions. The first report said that views on questions of mutual interest had been exchanged and that agreement had been reached on "practical questions" regarding the "temporary stay"--a standard phrase--of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. This cryptic formulation may relate to Soviet-Afghan coordination on international proposals for Soviet withdrawal and could also apply to the Soviet forces' military role in Afghanistan.

The second report listed those taking part in the talks--including Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Ogarkov and two deputy foreign ministers on the Soviet side, and only an official of the economic department of the Afghan Foreign Ministry and the Afghan charge d'affaires ad interim in the USSR on the Afghan side. The report said the talks had been held in an atmosphere of "friendship and full mutual understanding." Gromyko in his luncheon speech declared that the talks reaffirmed "complete unity, I repeat, complete unity," of views on all subjects discussed and pledged continuing, all-round Soviet aid and support.

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* Brezhnev's 22 February proposal is discussed in the TRENDS of 27 February 1980, pages 1-2.

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Dost last met with Gromyko during a 16-17 January stopover in Moscow en route home from the UN General Assembly emergency session on Afghanistan. TASS on 17 January reported that they had had a "warm, comradely conversation" and luncheon, and Kabul radio two days later described Dost's stay as only a "one-hour" stopover during which the two foreign ministers discussed "matters of mutual interest, international and regional issues."

AFGHAN "NEUTRALITY" In his luncheon speech on the 14th, Gromyko did not explicitly mention the British-EEC neutrality plan, nor did he flatly rule out any such suggestion. But he did predict "no future" for any plans that encroach on Afghan sovereignty, bypass the Afghan Government, or fail to guarantee a halt to outside aggression. Soviet media since late February have criticized the neutrality proposal on these grounds. In a current example, a Kobysh LITERARY GAZETTE article on 12 March denounced what it called NATO variations on the theme of Afghan neutrality which all aim to eliminate the current Afghan regime and the system established by the April 1978 revolution and which are being advanced without consulting the Afghan Government. Similarly, a TASS report on the 14th that British Foreign Secretary Carrington had recently given Romanian President Ceausescu a proposal on neutralizing Afghanistan commented that the "British version" of the neutrality plan foresees a change in the present Afghan system and signifies "interference" in Afghan internal affairs. The 7 March NEW TIMES (No. 10), reported by TASS on the 5th, noted that President Carter is a supporter of Lord Carrington's neutralization proposal, which it described as an attempt to "avoid giving a straight answer" to the Soviet proposals. And TASS' Ivanov, in a followup commentary on the Dost visit, observed on the 17th that the West has not replied to Brezhnev's proposal and, recalling Gromyko's speech, insisted that the Afghan problem cannot be solved without consulting Afghanistan and giving it guarantees against aggression.

SOVIET MILITARY ROLE Whatever the "agreement" on Soviet forces reached during Dost's visit, Moscow has refrained from acknowledging military actions by its troops in Afghanistan, except to claim that they are there to help "repel" outside aggression. Soviet media have been depicting the country as gradually returning to a normal life but still subjected to periodic rebel attacks, especially in the eastern provinces next to Pakistan. In part to reassure Soviet audiences, comment has stressed that Soviet soldiers are supported by the Afghan people and are carrying out "peaceful" civic action projects, such as bridge repair and flood relief.

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RED STAR, in a dispatch from Kabul on the 11th, admitted that not all Afghans originally welcomed the Soviet troops but said that those who at first believed "liars" are now "increasingly" aware that the Soviet troops came "with good intentions." As examples of Soviet troop activity, the dispatch cited Soviet military doctors giving medical aid to local Afghans and Soviet soldiers visiting schools, giving children presents, and building "friendship rooms" in local enterprises, adding that in the spring peasants will need help repairing their sowing equipment. RED STAR published photographs with the dispatch purporting to illustrate the theme of fraternization between Soviet and Afghan soldiers and civilians.

Such Soviet comment, at pains to stress the "peaceful" nature of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, may be intended to counter foreign reports--and domestic rumors--about mounting Soviet casualties in counterinsurgency operations. This subject has not been mentioned in monitored Soviet media material. The only known reference to the casualty issue by a Soviet official appeared in the West German STERN of 31 January 1980 in an undated interview with V. Falin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department. Asked about Soviet casualties, Falin acknowledged losses "in nightly ambushes, particularly on streets," but he dismissed Western figures on Soviet casualties as "fantasy" and said that Soviet losses "are minimal, not even 100."

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PRC OPPOSES AFGHAN NEUTRALIZATION PLAN, URGES AID TO REBELS

Beijing has expressed serious concern over tentative Western efforts to explore with the Soviet Union the possibility of a political settlement of the Afghanistan question. A flurry of highly authoritative Chinese comment has rejected as ill-advised efforts to seek guarantees for a "neutral" Afghanistan, has alleged Soviet expressions of interest in such plans as duplicitous, and has insisted that the only "correct way" to resolve the Afghan issue is for the West to maintain firm solidarity against Moscow until it withdraws completely. The Chinese comment appears to address recent British-Soviet discussions of a British proposal for Afghan neutrality and a call for a "neutral, nonalined Afghanistan" contained in the 7 March joint political statement adopted at the ASEAN-EEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

Capping Beijing's authoritative commentary, a 15 March RENMIN RIBAO Observer article noted that Moscow had "recently hinted" through "various channels" its interest in discussing a "guarantee" of Afghan "neutrality." Since Moscow has explicitly rejected the concept of a neutral Afghanistan, Observer's sharp attack on the idea of such a solution to the Afghan crisis seemed prompted primarily by Beijing's concern that the West may lack firmness and indulge in wishful thinking about Soviet intentions in Afghanistan.

Without mentioning British Foreign Secretary Carrington's initiative explicitly, the Observer article warned that any attempt to "tolerate or connive at the aggressors" is "absolutely intolerable" and will provide Moscow with opportunities to prolong and legitimize its occupation of Afghanistan and weaken and undermine Western solidarity against Soviet aggression. "Any proposal capable of providing a genuine solution" to the Afghanistan question, Observer declared, must be preceded by an immediate and unconditional Soviet withdrawal and must allow the Afghan people to settle their affairs themselves.

Earlier, XINHUA reported that Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng and Vice Premier Li Xiannian, in conversations with foreign guests on 9 and 10 March, had expounded Beijing's view that the key to the Afghanistan issue lies in an immediate Soviet withdrawal, in freedom for the Afghan people to decide their own affairs, and in continued world support for the Afghans' "just struggle." Li Xiannian, in particular, cautioned that "so-called political or other solutions" which depart from these three "principles" are "unrealistic."

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Beijing's concerns were also reflected in a RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article on the 9th that praised the ASEAN-EEC meeting's "common stance" against Soviet and Vietnamese aggression and its linkage of the Afghan and Kampuchean questions--a linkage which Chinese commentary has persistently drawn. Like the Observer article, the Commentator article reflected Chinese misgivings about the implications of the meeting's call for the creation of a "neutral and nonalined" Afghanistan. Both Kampuchea and Afghanistan were neutral and nonalined countries until they were invaded by Vietnam and the Soviet Union, respectively, Commentator noted, and the withdrawal of "all their troops of aggression" and Kampuchean and Afghan freedom to decide their own affairs are the necessary conditions for the restoration of neutrality and nonalinement. A "proposed guarantee for a neutral Afghanistan"--particularly when linked to calls for a Soviet withdrawal--is therefore "an uncalled-for move which harms rather than respects" Afghanistan's sovereignty and helps Moscow to "evade its crime and extricate itself from its dilemma," the article warned.

In conjunction with its admonitions against efforts to discuss a political solution to the Afghanistan question, Beijing has sharpened calls in its media for international support--including military aid--for the Afghan resistance. A 13 March RENMIN RIBAO commentary, in particular, declared that it is a "bounden duty for all countries" to provide "energetic support and assistance" to the rebels opposing the Soviet Union and to Kampuchean resistance against Vietnam, and it favorably cited a call by Singapore's foreign minister for "all forms of assistance, including military aid," to the resistance in each country. Consistent with its practice since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, however, Chinese media continue to obscure Beijing's role in supporting the Afghan rebels.

BACKGROUND Beijing's current attacks on tentative efforts to explore political solutions to the Afghan issue follow a series of clear Chinese warnings that Moscow, in the wake of its intervention in Afghanistan, would begin a "peace offensive" designed to exacerbate differences between the United States and West Europe over how to deal with the Afghan issue specifically and over Western relations with the Soviet Union in general. A series of three RENMIN RIBAO Commentator articles, on 22 and 27 February and 5 March, stressed the long-term strategic importance of maintaining Western solidarity against Soviet actions in Afghanistan and resisting Soviet attempts to revive East-West detente. In this context, Chinese comment quickly and vociferously denounced Soviet President Brezhnev's suggestion in his 22 February republic supreme soviet election speech that Moscow will begin to withdraw its troops once the United States and Afghanistan's neighbors guarantee a cessation of outside interference in Afghan internal affairs. A 2 March

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RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article, for example, called Brezhnev's statements a "carefully devised move to resist withdrawal" and warned against Moscow's "tough and soft tactics" designed to "revive the appeasement line of thinking" in the West.

Beijing had quietly acknowledged initial Western interest in the idea of Afghan neutrality as the basis for a political solution to the Afghanistan question in low-level XINHUA reporting and without explicit comment. XINHUA reported President Carter's 13 March press conference statements on the desirability of a neutral Afghanistan, for example, and his support for "a neutral and nonalined Afghanistan" in his 25 February letter to Yugoslav President Tito, citing U.S. news reports.

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USSR-IRAN

MOSCOW CHIDES IRANIAN OFFICIALS FOR "UNCONSTRUCTIVE" STANDS

Seeking to turn Iranian hostility toward the United States to its own advantage, Moscow continues to praise Iran's steadfast stand against imperialism and to support "just" Iranian demands against the United States, while generally avoiding comment on the "so-called" hostage crisis. But Moscow is having problems with its own "superpower" image in Iran. It has avoided responding to Iranian criticism of the Soviet role in Afghanistan, but its uneasy relationship with Tehran is evident in low-key sniping over various bilateral issues.

GROMYKO ENDORSEMENT, MEDIA REPROOF

Soviet approbation for Iran has been voiced at the elite level, while the carping has appeared only in media commentary. Foreign Minister Gromyko, at a 17 March luncheon for his Hungarian counterpart, hailed Iran for "giving a good example of steadfastness" in defending itself against "imperialist pressure, blackmail, and threats." Soviet commentaries have clearly registered Moscow's distress over evidence of Tehran's hostility toward the Soviet Union but have only mildly criticized Iranian leaders:

+ Mossadeq Period: Gromyko's tribute followed by less than two weeks a TASS complaint, replayed in the 8 March PRAVDA, about Iranian President Bani-Sadr's remarks on the anniversary of the death of Prime Minister Mossadeq. Bani-Sadr's inclusion of the USSR among the opponents of Mossadeq's regime amounted to "distorting the essence" of Soviet-Iranian relations in that era and stemmed from "insufficient knowledge of the documents of that period," TASS said. Moscow's Persian-language service found Bani-Sadr's statement "surprising."

+ Student Militants: A current and much more sensitive issue was handled obliquely. PRAVDA on 15 March rejected a Western press report of Soviet influence over the Iranian militants holding the American hostages. The paper did not, however, acknowledge Bani-Sadr's remark in a recent interview that the militants occupying the U.S. Embassy are sometimes influenced by "some political groups favorable to the USSR, like the Tudeh Party."

+ Soviet "Superpower": Disagreement with Ayatollah Khomeyni, as well as with Bani-Sadr, was cautiously expressed by IZVESTIYA's authoritative political observer Aleksandr Bovin, who in the past year and a half has periodically offered Moscow's most candid

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assessments of Iran's difficulties. On the weekly Moscow domestic service observers roundtable on the 16th, Bovin cited Bani-Sadr as referring to the Russian "superpower" and saying that after the Soviet Union completes its "business" in Afghanistan, it will "take us in hand too." And he quoted Khomeyni as condemning both "American domination" and "the assault by the aggressive East." These statements, Bovin mildly complained, are "all in all not what I would call a constructive way to formulate the question." This was the first time Moscow reproved Khomeyni by name--albeit in a program not broadcast to Persian audiences--although Bovin last September did indict unidentified Iranian "theologians." A Persian-language broadcast on 14 February even contrived to present Khomeyni as having been misquoted on the subject of superpowers--a frequent topic in his pronouncements. Suggesting that "Beijing hegemonists" and those "who do not wish to make a basic distinction between socialism and imperialism" were responsible, the broadcast contended that some "radio talks" had commented on Khomeyni's statements as though his criticisms had been aimed "equally at the two superpowers." These people, the radio said, sought to create discord between Moscow and Tehran and to split the "united front of the anti-imperialist revolution of Iran."

+ Soviet Security: That instability in Iran would arouse Soviet concern over the security of that portion of its southern border was suggested in remarks by Middle East expert Igor Belyayev in a 12 March "dialog" with his former PRAVDA colleague, Oriental Institute Director Yevgeniy Primakov. Belyayev cryptically raised the question of Soviet security in a reference to the USSR's 1921 treaties with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey. Invoking Lenin, he called the Soviet Union's southern border region a "zone of good-neighborliness" but went on to add that while the USSR makes no territorial claim on the three states, it "cannot allow these countries to be used to undermine its security"--an argument Moscow has been using to justify its Afghan intervention. The anniversary of the February 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty was commemorated routinely in a Persian-language commentary that maintained the Soviet silence on Iran's November 1979 abrogation of two treaty articles outlining the conditions under which either side might dispatch military forces into the other's territory.

+ Gas Price: The recent stalemated Soviet-Iranian talks in Tehran on the price of gas exported to the USSR prompted both complaints about Iran's "unconstructive and somewhat strange position" and reminders of Soviet generosity in economic agreements with Iran. A 7 March interview with a Soviet foreign trade official--broadcast in Persian prior to the departure of the Soviet negotiators for Tehran--indirectly challenged recent statements by Iranian Energy Minister Mo'infar on the price question and called him a "newcomer in this field." Pointing out that Iran has no competitive buyer

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for its gas, the official concluded that Soviet-Iranian cooperation is "apparently" advisable and cryptically suggested that "some personalities" in Iran should "show courage for this purpose and regard reality with genuine feelings." Following the breakdown of the talks, TASS on the 17th complained that the Iranian price is "clearly exaggerated and economically unjustified" but remained hopeful that a "reasonable approach"--clearly by the Iranian side--to problems of economic cooperation, including gas supplies, will prevail.

HOSTAGE ISSUE Moscow's selective treatment of the hostage crisis has continued to focus on Iran's "just" demands, carefully avoiding judgment on the seizure and detention of the hostages. During the UN commission's 23 February-11 March stay in Tehran, Soviet media reported the commission's activities and noted statements by Iranian officials to the effect that the group's work had nothing to do with the hostages. TASS on 11 March attempted to reconstruct the events of the last few days of the commission's stay as Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh, the student militants, the Revolution Council, and Khomeyni's office issued conflicting statements about a commission meeting with the hostages and whether the hostages would remain under the militants' control or whether the council would assume responsibility. TASS concluded only that in the opinion of "the majority of Iranians," the release of the hostages should be accompanied by compliance with Iran's demands that the United States recognize its past "unlawful" interference in Iranian affairs and undertake not to interfere in the future and not to prevent the extradition of the shah and the return of his "plundered" wealth. IZVESTIYA's Bovin, in the 16 March radio roundtable discussion, said the "official Iranian viewpoint" is that "the whole business will be resolved" when the Iranian parliament meets in May.

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"NATIONAL VOICE" SUPPORTS IRANIAN DEMANDS FOR RETURN OF SHAH

The Baku-based clandestine radio "National Voice of Iran" (NVOI) continues to offer support to Ayatollah Khomeyni while at the same time attempting to influence Tehran to adopt policies more agreeable to the Soviet Union. The radio has not repeated its oblique calls of last November for the release of the U.S. hostages.

In addressing the hostage question, NVOI now generally parrots the pronouncements of Ayatollah Khomeyni, although it has aired some cryptic intimations that Iran should seek a resolution of the issue. Scorning the "promises and confessions" of American officials as a quid pro quo for release of the hostages, a 15 February talk maintained that Iran's "legitimate and just" demands for the return of the shah and his wealth must first be satisfied. But the commentary also maintained, without elaboration, that the problem should be resolved on the basis of Khomeyni's "guidelines," Iran's "national interests," and the preservation of Iran's "credibility." A 24 February commentary left the solution open; it dismissed as useless and unfounded any expectation that President Carter will confess past U.S. "crimes" in Iran or fulfill any other Iranian demands and declared that it is up to the Iranian people and government "to decide what they should or should not do." As for the mission of the UN commission in Iran, NVOI noted on 1 March, in a commentary reflecting statements by various Iranian officials, that the group was to investigate the "crimes" of the shah and the United States, "and nothing else."

The radio has repeatedly warned against alleged liberal, conciliatory, and even pro-American tendencies on the part of important--but unnamed--officials. Following the UN commission's departure from Tehran, NVOI praised the militants for their loyalty to Khomeyni and cautioned what it called highly placed circles for allegedly showing a spirit of conciliation toward the United States. Anti-American demonstrators, it remarked, had recently called for "death to the conciliators." Other talks have attacked "adaptable liberals" for supposedly supporting imperialism and have approvingly noted that Khomeyni is gradually pushing "these gentlemen" aside. Similarly, in pressing for Iranian reciprocity to Afghan bids for goods relations, NVOI has criticized "certain responsible officials" in Iran for using the Afghan events as an "alibi" to restore U.S.-Iranian relations. Before the January presidential elections, the radio, in implicit rejoinder to various Iranian officials' condemnations of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, accused unidentified presidential candidates of bringing up the "bogey of communism and so-called communist threats." Other comment in recent

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weeks has featured such standard themes as the need for purges in the government and army and has routinely attacked Iranian "feudalists" and condemned assorted Iranian "enemies" such as the United States, China, and Egypt.

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USSR-YUGOSLAVIA

MOSCOW, BELGRADE TRADE POLEMICS OVER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Moscow has provided graphic new evidence of its willingness to risk a quarrel with Belgrade over Yugoslav challenges to its foreign policy while continuing to reassure Belgrade of its friendly intentions. The latest Soviet rumblings on this score came when PRAVDA on 13 March reprinted a biting Vietnamese criticism of Yugoslavia's positions on Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and other issues. Belgrade, its usual sensitivity to Soviet attacks heightened by Tito's critical illness, responded with characteristic forcefulness.

The PRAVDA reprint of an article in the 10 March Vietnamese army daily QUAN DOI NHAN DAN used the issues of Kampuchea and Afghanistan to question Yugoslavia's credentials as a leader in the nonalined movement. It maintained that Belgrade's positions or foreign intervention in these countries played into the hands of Washington and Beijing, set Yugoslavia "at loggerheads with the lofty aims" of nonalinement, and made Belgrade "lose authority" in the movement. It also charged that recent efforts by the Yugoslav foreign secretary to convene a nonalined conference on Afghanistan were intended to encourage the nonalined countries to "act against the Soviet Union and Afghanistan."

Belgrade has sharply refuted the Vietnamese allegations and has questioned Moscow's motives in republishing them. Outspoken Belgrade BORBA commentator Teslic on 16 March rejected charges that Yugoslavia has joined the "chorus of Washington and Beijing" or "any other chorus," and accused Moscow of "twisting Yugoslav policy" and trying to "sow dissent in the ranks of the nonalined countries." He said that Moscow has shown a "lack of respect" for Yugoslavia's basic principles of independence--the same principles, he noted, on which Soviet-Yugoslav relations are based. Similarly, TANJUG on 13 March called the Soviet allegations an "unprincipled, biased, and completely groundless attack against Yugoslavia" and complained that Soviet readers have repeatedly been kept uninformed of Belgrade's real stands on international issues.

While the Vietnamese criticism--endorsed by Moscow--is unusually sharp and wide-ranging, it is generally consistent with complaints Moscow has lodged against Yugoslavia during the past year and a half. Moscow has attacked Belgrade for allegedly siding with the United States and China on both the Kampuchean and Afghanistan issues--the latter

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criticism appearing in PRAVDA on 8 January and in TASS on 12 and 23 January and 4 March. It has also played down Yugoslavia's importance as a leader in the nonalined movement and, on at least one occasion, termed Belgrade's nonalined positions "frequently anti-Soviet." Despite such criticism, Moscow in recent weeks has professed indignation over Western speculation about its intentions toward Yugoslavia after Tito dies and has noted approvingly the efforts of the Yugoslav party to "enhance its leading role."

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USSR

BREZHNEV KIN CHURBANOV PROMOTED TO FIRST DEPUTY MVD CHIEF

The promotion of Yuriy M. Churbanov to first deputy minister of internal affairs, revealed in a list of new RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputies published in IZVESTIYA on 28 February, fills the post vacated by the mysterious death of Viktor Paputin and continues the upward momentum of a career that has shown the marks of special favoritism in recent years. Churbanov, reputedly Brezhnev's son-in-law, achieved national-level status while still in his thirties, becoming chief of the political administration of the MVD internal security forces in 1975, member of the Central Auditing Commission in 1976, and deputy minister of the MVD in 1977. Frequently noted in recent years among the dignitaries at airport arrival and departure ceremonies for Brezhnev, Churbanov recently became the subject of a new burst of personal publicity in connection with his appearances at meetings around the country devoted to militia-related subjects.

Churbanov began taking the spotlight from the more senior deputy ministers during 1979. His signature on a 7 August obituary of another deputy minister followed that of First Deputy Minister Paputin--out of alphabetical order and ahead of all other deputy ministers. Moreover, during late 1979 he began speaking at various meetings around the country, lecturing on a new Central Committee decree on improving law and order, on ideological work, and on the image of the militiaman. These activities were extensively reported in the press, with some newspapers carrying quoted passages from his speeches, an honor usually reserved for high-level political or military leaders. The popular picture magazine OGONEK carried photographs of Churbanov at some of these events, and in one case it carried a picture of Churbanov rather than the main speaker at the conference, Politburo candidate member Rashidov.

Churbanov's latest promotion is a byproduct of the mysterious death of First Deputy Minister Paputin on 28 December. Paputin, who died at age 53 of causes unknown, was apparently in some political disgrace at the time of his death, judging by his obituary. Unlike the obituaries of other deputy internal affairs ministers--for example, those published in PRAVDA on 17 April 1974 and 7 August 1979--Paputin's was not signed by senior Politburo members, included no photograph, and was placed on the back page. Churbanov was advanced over other more senior deputy ministers in being chosen to take Paputin's place as first deputy.

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BRIEFS

MOSCOW ON U.S. PRESIDENTIAL RACE: Moscow's speculation on the outlook for the U.S. presidential election contest has been cautious, and its reporting on the early primaries has been largely factual. Soviet commentators have concentrated their fire against the policies and campaign tactics of President Carter, with Soviet media characteristically replaying criticism of current Administration foreign and defense policies by the other candidates. The President's challengers also have come under attack, and Moscow has only indirectly and halfheartedly suggested any preference among them. Soviet commentators have roundly condemned the atmosphere of cold war rhetoric and chauvinistic "hysteria" in which they maintain the campaign is being conducted. Moscow's skeptical approach to the campaigns of both the President and his challengers was demonstrated in a 10 March article by PRAVDA's New York correspondent Kolesnichenko. Kolesnichenko accused Republican candidates Reagan, Bush, Baker, and Connally of trying to outdo the President in anti-Soviet rhetoric. Noting that Senator Kennedy has adopted a "fairly realistic stance," he said that even the Senator is falling in with the general mood "in some respects." Kolesnichenko simply ignored Congressman Anderson and Governor Brown. Regarding a second term for President Carter, he remarked that it is admittedly unwise to change horses in midstream--"but only as long as the horses are not drowning."

DPRK-DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEAN RELATIONS: Pyongyang's discomfort with the Kampuchean situation was apparent during the 11-14 March visit of Democratic Kampuchean Prime Minister Khieu Samphan. The low-key DPRK attention to the visit appeared to reflect Pyongyang's reluctance to become publicly embroiled in the dispute between China and Vietnam over Kampuchea, as well as possible misgivings about the DK regime. Although North Korea had indicated its opposition to the December 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and DPRK-SRV relations have deteriorated over the issue, Pyongyang gave no attention to the Kampuchea issue in its media during the past year, even failing last April to publicize its greetings message on DK National Day. North Korean wariness of the Khieu Samphan visit was indicated by Pyongyang's failure to note at whose invitation he was visiting; normally such high-level visitors are reported by North Korean media as having been invited by either Kim Il-song or the DPRK Government. Pyongyang also chose to portray the visit as only a "goodwill" trip. By contrast, Khieu Samphan's earlier stop in China was designated in the usual fashion as an "official" goodwill visit. In line with the characterization of Khieu Samphan's Korean visit as unofficial, Pyongyang kept fanfare for his stay at a minimum.

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There was, for example, none of the usual press comment welcoming such a high-ranking visitor, nor was there the normal round of banquets, an omission which obviated the need for speeches. Pyongyang was thus able to sidestep once again its own dilemma over taking a public position on current Indochina tensions, and it successfully precluded any public airing of charges against Vietnam and the Soviet Union by Khieu Samphan. That DPRK-DK relations have cooled was suggested by Pyongyang's description of the "friendly" atmosphere during Kim Il-song's meeting with Khieu Samphan--a characterization less cordial than that normally used for such occasions and notably cooler than the "comradely, cordial, and friendly" atmosphere reported at talks between Kim and Pol Pot in October 1977.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 10 - 16 MARCH 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3095 items)			Beijing (712 items)		
Afghan Situation	14%	(7%)	Democratic Kampuchean Premier Khieu Samphan in PRC	16%	(5%)
Foreign Minister Dost in USSR	6%	(—)			
Suslov KOMMUNIST Article on Lenin	4%	(—)	Afghan Situation	14%	(15%)
			ASEAN-EEC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Kuala Lumpur	4%	(1%)
			PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua in Philippines	3%	(—)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on SALT ratification
- USSR-Hungarian relations
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26 MARCH 1980
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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SALT

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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SALT

MOSCOW PRESSES RATIFICATION, WARNS TREATY COULD BE OUTDATED

Moscow has been wielding the stick along with the carrot in pressing Washington on ratification of the SALT II Treaty since President Carter asked for postponement of Senate consideration on 3 January. The latest evidence of Moscow's new attitude was Central Committee official Oleg Anichkin's intimation in a 23 March commentary that if ratification continues to be delayed, Moscow might insist on an extension of the treaty protocol provision limiting the deployment of long-range cruise missiles. Anichkin's remarks were the latest in a series of warnings from Soviet commentators that continued delay in ratification will not be without serious consequences--warnings that have not yet appeared in authoritative Soviet statements.

Anichkin's comments on the SALT II protocol came in the context of a seemingly routine commentary on the Carter Administration's "zigzags" on SALT. Noting renewed speculation that the Administration might soon ask for Senate action on the treaty, Anichkin offered his own reasons for speedy ratification. There is a "serious possibility," he cautioned, that the treaty will become "outdated." He found it "unfortunate" that ratification is improbable in an election year since the protocol provision "controlling American cruise missiles" is scheduled to expire at the end of 1981. "The question arises," Anichkin pointedly concluded, whether the treaty can be acceptable if that provision is not extended.

Anichkin's speculation on the status of the SALT II protocol, which includes limits on U.S. systems that were of special concern to the USSR in the negotiations, is not Moscow's first effort since the Afghanistan crisis to suggest that its patience is wearing thin:

+ In an earlier 8 January domestic radio commentary, Anichkin said Washington had assumed "great responsibility" in postponing consideration of the treaty. Arms control talks are lagging behind the development of new weapons, he maintained, and when the Administration decides to resume the process of ratification "the situation may have changed greatly."

+ In a 19 January TASS commentary, the well-connected commentator Nikolay Portugalov appeared to suggest that postponement of ratification could affect Moscow's attitude on the MX ICBM, another U.S. weapon whose deployment is limited by the protocol. The White House promise

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to return to the question of ratification "after the Presidential elections," Portugalov stressed, must be viewed against the fact that the "MX mobile missiles, the deployment of which will have begun by that time, will upset the carefully adjusted balance of the treaty."

+ In a domestic television commentary on 5 March and a Moscow in English to North America broadcast of the 8th, veteran Soviet commentator Valentin Zorin for the first time announced that Moscow does not consider itself bound by the provisions of the treaty before it is ratified. Zorin claimed it is "totally unrealistic" to expect the USSR, bound by a signed but unratified SALT agreement, just to look on while the United States seeks to alter the strategic balance in its favor through the deployment of new systems.

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USSR-HUNGARY

MSZMP CONGRESS UNDERSCORES CLOSE MOSCOW-BUDAPEST RELATIONS

Judging by the opening speeches of Hungarian leader Kadar and Soviet delegation leader Kirilenko, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) congress, which began on 24 March, seems aimed at providing a show of mutual esteem and support between the two countries. The Hungarian leader strongly endorsed the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan, while the Soviet visitor warmly raised the Hungarians' liberalized economic management system--a gesture of mutual solidarity evidently intended to refute Western conjectures regarding Moscow-Budapest differences on these issues.

As at the Polish party congress last month, all the East European delegations were led by figures of secondary rank, putting them in line with the practice that the Soviets have followed since 1976. The Hungarians announced in advance of the congress that the only foreign delegate speeches at the session would be by the Soviet, Vietnamese, and Cuban representatives, explaining that this restriction was in keeping with the "working" nature of the congress.

KADAR In his keynote speech, Kadar gave a direct endorsement for the first time of the Soviet policy in Afghanistan, thus adding his personal authority to the generally supportive position that the Hungarian media have taken toward the Soviet intervention in recent weeks. He declared that "everyone knows that the lawful Afghan Government, on the basis of an existing treaty between the two countries, has requested military aid to counter external threats and that this has been granted by the USSR in harmony with international law." He added that "the USSR has already clearly declared that . . . it will be ready to withdraw its troops" when the reasons for the intervention cease to exist. Kadar's explicit support for the Soviet intervention went beyond the more general remarks on Afghanistan by Poland's Gierek at his party's congress last month.

The Hungarian leader was effusive on the subject of Budapest-Moscow ties. He asserted that "our internationalist unity with the world's first socialist state, the mainstay of the cause of human progress, our liberator, the Soviet Union, has further strengthened" since the last Hungarian congress in March 1975. Adding a tribute to Brezhnev in this connection, he recalled the 30 May-1 June visit to Budapest by "our true friend, the outstanding fighter for the cause of peace and progress, Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev."

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Consistent with his past pronouncements, Kadar stressed the independence of the parties in the world communist movement as well as their obligation to support "common" principles in accordance with proletarian internationalism. He denounced all forms of anti-Sovietism, citing the Chinese leaders as the chief offenders in this regard.

Kadar gave a mixed report on the country's liberal economic management system, in effect since 1968. While praising the system as reflecting both "general" laws and individual national features, he said that "in some respects it leaves something to be desired," charging that it adapts too slowly to changed conditions and is slow in reaching decisions. He appeared to indicate, however, that the remedy lies in more efficient implementation of the system--such as enterprise independence and material incentives--rather than in its abandonment. Underscoring at the same time his devotion to orthodox principles, Kadar asserted that socialist construction "has its own strict rules, which may not be disregarded." He added that the "essence" of Hungary's management system is the socialist planned economy and that the system is being implemented "in accordance with the rules."

KIRILENKO The Soviet delegation leader warmly praised Kadar and his policies. He stressed "the Marxist-Leninist policy of the MSZMP" and noted that Hungary enjoyed the indestructible friendship and cooperation of the other Soviet bloc countries. He went on to declare that "the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism . . . live on and develop in the remarkable achievements of communism" in Hungary. In a notably lengthy tribute, Kirilenko referred to Kadar as "the experienced leader of the Hungarian communists and active fighter for the prosperity of his motherland, for the consolidation of unity and cooperation among countries of the socialist community and for the cohesion of the world communist movement, our militant friend and comrade in arms."

Kirilenko reminded his hosts that the USSR, despite "increased difficulties" with its petroleum and natural gas extraction, was continuing delivery of these products to East Europe, "including the Hungarian People's Republic, at a high level" and at "preferential" prices. He also welcomed the signing "the other day" of long-term Soviet-Hungarian economic cooperation agreements up to 1990.

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USSR-NICARAGUA

NICARAGUAN GUESTS GIVEN CONVENTIONAL THIRD WORLD TREATMENT

The official visit by a Nicaraguan party-government delegation evoked the Soviet leadership turnout, media attention, and practical results customary for such delegations from the Third World. Moscow characteristically hailed the visit--the first since the overthrow of former President Somoza last July--as a "new stage" in relations, and several agreements and protocols were concluded. But Soviet statements were typically guarded on the key question for Nicaragua of economic assistance. Moscow used the visit to repeat allegations of U.S. political and economic "diktat" in Latin American and it again cited the Nicaraguan revolution as an example for other states in the region.

The Nicaraguan delegation--led by junta member Moises Hassan and including members of the National Directorate of the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN)--is only the fifth high-level noncommunist delegation from Latin American to visit Moscow in the past seven years.* The delegation was received on the Soviet side at appropriate protocol level by Politburo member and CPSU Secretary Andrey Kirilenko and Boris Ponomarev, CPSU International Department head, both of whom have hosted various Third World party and governmental delegations. The Soviet side also included Deputy Premier Arkhipov, who has handled foreign economic ties. Moscow did not go out of its way to emphasize the visit, which was given normal publicity. The delegation was not accorded a meeting with Brezhnev, for example, although the Soviet president occasionally in the past has received visitors who were not of equivalent rank, such as Libya's Jallud and South Yemeni Prime Minister 'Ali Nasir Muhammad.

The communique on the 17-22 March visit, published in PRAVDA on 23 March, said the talks had been held in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding, marked by a "community of views" on important international problems. The sides expressed satisfaction with the development of cooperation and determination to further strengthen "mutually advantageous links" in trade, economic, cultural, and

* The Nicaraguans were preceded by Mexican President Luis Echeverria in 1973, Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister Eric Williams in 1975, Venezuelan President Carlos Perez in 1976, and Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley in 1979.

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"other spheres." No details were given on the various accords signed, which included economic, technical, and trade agreements; a consular convention; and a plan for CPSU-FSLN relations apparently along the lines of CPSU arrangements over the years with various Third World parties such as the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'th and the Algerian FLN. But the communique appeared to place a caveat on an agreement on "practical steps" to develop trade exchanges and economic links, cryptically adding that the sides took into account "the possibilities and needs of the economies" of both countries.

With an apparent eye to the conditions placed by the U.S. Congress on the Nicaraguan reconstruction aid package proposed by the Carter Administration, both sides went on record as opposing the use of economic assistance to exert "political pressure" and undermine the independence and sovereignty of states. Although not mentioning the United States by name, the communique also condemned the attempts of "some states" to establish domination over other peoples "by arbitrarily declaring whole regions of the world as spheres of their vital interests."

However, Kirilenko took the opportunity of his 19 March luncheon speech to assail the United States for the deployment of a military task force in the Caribbean, as well as for plans to create "other special interventionist forces," calling this proof of Washington's desire to "dictate to other peoples what path of development they should follow." In his reply speech as reported in PRAVDA, Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge made no mention of the United States, but pointed to the Moscow visit as evidence that the Nicaraguan Government enjoys freedom of action, makes its own decisions, and pursues an independent foreign policy.

Nicaragua's sensitivity to the notion that the Sandinist victory could serve as an impetus for other Latin American liberation movements was reflected in the fact that this subject was not raised in the dinner speeches or the communique. But Soviet comment on the visit stressed the line--consistently voiced by Moscow, but only recently introduced by Fidel Castro in a speech broadcast on Havana's domestic service on 8 March--that the Nicaraguan revolution is "already an example for many neighboring countries." Claiming that the United States was trying to prevent a "second Nicaragua" from developing in Central America, a panelist on Moscow radio's weekly observers roundtable program on the 23d drew a parallel between the Nicaraguan revolution and the current upheaval in El Salvador and asserted that the Salvadoran people's struggle would also be victorious.

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U S S R - U. S.

NEW TIMES COUNSELS MODERATE APPROACH TO EAST-WEST DISPUTE

Two recent editorials in Moscow's foreign affairs weekly NEW TIMES have appeared to urge a more flexible approach to resolving the current U.S.-Soviet dispute. Both editorials, in issues dated 22 February and 7 March, offer much that reads like the official line--including the familiar contrasts between Moscow's sober approach to East-West relations and Washington's "reckless" initiatives. But they also contain some unusual language that cautions against overreaction on Moscow's part and suggests that Soviet diplomatic initiatives offer the best prospect for preserving detente. NEW TIMES at least once before has served as a conduit for maverick views on U.S.-Soviet relations.

Both editorials contained admonitory remarks that seem directed to an internal as well as a foreign audience. The 22 February editorial (No. 8)--a paean to the East's past diplomacy--clearly implied that some additional initiative is needed in the current situation. Noting that the socialist states persistently seek "constructive opportunities" to improve international security, the editorial maintained that the past has shown that socialist diplomacy "reacts sensitively to all realistic trends in the West." The current atmosphere of "political hysteria" has made things difficult for Western "realists," it asserted, and what is particularly needed now is a "point around which all healthy and sensible trends can crystallize." Without elaborating on what this "point" might be, NEW TIMES concluded with a tribute to the contribution that the "many foreign visits" by socialist representatives can make--despite the Soviet imposed restrictions on such East-West contacts that have been reported in the West.

Where the 22 February editorial had stressed the importance of pragmatic diplomacy, the 7 March issue offered a supporting rationale for a Soviet policy of restraint. The editorial emphasized that the U.S.-Soviet relationship is the "basis" for safeguarding peace in the nuclear age. Noting that "some commentators" have been wondering whether Moscow would continue to implement its previously announced decision to withdraw 20,000 troops from East Germany, the editorial characterized the decision to proceed with the withdrawals as a sign of the USSR's "strength" and confidence and its conviction that those who value detente must act to make its continuation possible.

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The weekly underscored its message of restraint by invoking--without attribution--some pointed language in this connection from CPSU Secretary and Brezhnev protege Chernenko's 15 February election speech in Moscow. The editorial cautioned against "brinkmanship" in light of the fact that "bellicose circles would very much like to provoke a 'retaliatory toughness' on the part of the Soviet Union" in order to further exacerbate the situation. Chernenko had excoriated the specter of "retaliatory toughness" in underscoring the importance of remaining "calm and clear headed" in the current "complex" situation.

NEW TIMES' role as a vehicle for views at variance with the current line on U.S. policy is not unprecedented. In the summer of 1977, NEW TIMES counseled "reserve and patience" in responding to the Carter Administration's early initiatives on SALT, defense, and human rights issues and concluded in an article two weeks later that Washington was indeed "rectifying" its foreign policy.*

* See the 10 August 1977 TRENDS, page 1.

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USSR-SYRIA

MOSCOW ATTRIBUTES SYRIAN UNREST TO U.S., ISRAEL, "REACTION"

Moscow has recently acknowledged Syria's mounting internal problems in a spate of reports that have typically obscured the domestic and sectarian nature of the unrest. Other than brief references late last summer and in January--when TASS admitted the deaths of two Soviet advisers at the hands of a Muslim Brotherhood "band"--Moscow had virtually ignored the disturbance in Syria.

Moscow has joined with Damascus in blaming the United States and Israel, as well as "reactionaries" led by the Muslim Brotherhood, for Syria's domestic tension. PRAVDA correspondent Geyvandov on 15 March reported "increasingly overt" acts of "terrorism" by the Muslim Brotherhood in several Syrian cities and underscored the seriousness of the problem by mentioning decisions taken at "emergency sessions" of Syrian "activists" to create armed detachments to defend the working people's gains. The "galvanizing of Syria's reactionary forces," he said, must be viewed in the context of Syria's struggle with "U.S. imperialism" and Zionism. A TASS report in PRAVDA on the 17th, replaying Syrian President al-Asad's increasingly strident accusations against the United States, cited his charge that the CIA was attempting to complicate Syria's internal political situation and his pledge that "internal agents of American imperialism and Israel" would be smashed.

Moscow has acknowledged that religion is a factor in the Syrian situation but has offered no elaboration. A 7 March commentary broadcast in Arabic and in Moscow's domestic service accused Syria's enemies of trying to split the country's national unity and fan "religious dissension." Earlier, the weekly NEW TIMES, in its first issue of 1980, had referred to "bloody reprisals against the Alawites in Syria" without mentioning Sunni Muslim resentment at the minority Alawites' inordinate share of power.

Comment has pointed up the Syrian Communist Party's credentials as a supporter of the regime in favorably reporting on the role of the Progressive National Front, of which the party is a member. The Front is helping to counter reactionary intrigues, Moscow has said, and is participating in "explanatory work"--not further defined--among the population. And TASS on the 18th, recalling the party's view that the struggle is of a "class nature," said the Syrian communists support consolidation of the unity of all national patriotic forces of the country and "steadfastness and cooperation" with the Soviet Union.

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As for Soviet-Syrian relations, TASS on the 17th noted without comment Syrian Prime Minister al-Kasm's recent remark that if the United States continues to escalate its "agressive actions" against Syria, "we shall turn to our friends" and request "appropriate cooperation." Despite Arab media reports, past and present, that Moscow has urged Syria to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union, Moscow has not been known to press Damascus publicly on this issue, and the TASS report failed to mention that al-Kasm's remarks were in response to a question concerning the possibility of concluding such an agreement.

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CHINA

NEW LEADERSHIP RANKINGS IMPLY FURTHER SUCCESSION ARRANGEMENTS

A new ranking system for high-level CCP leaders is reflected in Chinese reporting of leadership appearances since the party's fifth plenum last month. Although Beijing has offered no explanation on the subject, the intent of the changes may be to distinguish a "first line" of leaders--those active in day-to-day affairs--from a "second line"--older leaders who have retired into senior advisory roles.

Chinese media procedure in reporting public appearances by the party leadership on party occasions before the fifth plenum had combined a rank order for the top leaders with what amounts to an alphabetical listing for leaders at the next level down. Media reports thus always listed party Chairman Hua Guofeng first, followed by the five party vice chairmen--who with Hua comprise the Politburo Standing Committee--in a strict rank order, and then listed the rest of the Politburo full and alternate members according to the number of brushstrokes in the Chinese character of their individual surnames. An appearance list of the full party leadership--but excluding those removed at the fifth plenum--according to this procedure read as follows: Hua Guofeng (party chairman); Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Chen Yun (vice chairmen and Politburo Standing Committee members); Wang Zhen, Wei Guoqing, Ulanhu, Fang Yi, Deng Yingchao, Liu Bocheng, Xu Shiyou, Li Desheng, Yu Qiuli, Zhang Tingfa, Chen Yonggui, Hu Yaobang, Geng Biao, Zhao Ziyang, Nie Rongzhen, Ni Zhifu, Xu Xiangqian, Peng Chong and Peng Zhen (full Politburo members); and Chen Muhua and Seypidin (alternate Politburo members).

Judging from XINHUA reports of 17, 20, and 23 March on recent leadership functions, the top group--the leaders who have heretofore been listed in rank order--is now split in two. Listed first, as before, is Hua Guofeng, followed by the four party vice chairmen remaining on the Politburo Standing Committee since the plenum removed former member Wang Dongxing. Listed next is a group of five ordinary Politburo members--also apparently in rank order--followed by the two Politburo Standing Committee members appointed at the plenum who are not party vice chairmen concurrently. Finally, the remainder of the Politburo is listed as before, also in the Chinese character stroke order.

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The new listing reads as follows: Hua Guofeng (chairman); Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Chen Yun (Politburo Standing Committee members who are vice chairmen); Liu Bocheng, Xu Xiangqian, Ni Rongzhen, Peng Zhen and Deng Yingchao (Politburo members); Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang (Politburo Standing Committee members who are not vice chairmen); Wang Zhen, Wei Guoqing, Ulanhu, Fang Yi, Xu Shiyou, Li Desheng, Yu Qiuli, Zhang Tingfa, Chen Yonggui, Geng Biao, Ni Zhifu and Peng Chong (remaining full Politburo members); and Chen Muhua and Seypidin (alternate Politburo members).

Chinese media have offered no explicit rationale for the new party leadership ranking procedure, and no formal institutional change undertaken at the fifth plenum itself directly accounts for it. The new procedure may reflect, however, an informal division of the Politburo into a "frontline" of leaders active in day-to-day administration of the party and a "second" line of leaders who, because of their experience and age, have taken on more purely advisory roles in the leadership. Such an informal arrangement was discussed among the Chinese leadership as early as the eighth party congress in 1956 but apparently was not successfully implemented because of emerging conflict between Mao Zedong and other leaders in the Chinese party hierarchy of that period. Media reporting on party leadership appearances after the 1956 party congress strictly followed a rank ordering for the entire Politburo and its newly created Standing Committee and did not reflect a division of "front" and "second" rank leaders.

That such a division of leaders into an active front rank and an advisory second rank has in fact been informally established by the recent plenum is suggested both by commentary since the plenum and by the current roles of the various leaders involved. A RENMIN RIBAO editorial on 10 March discussing the problem of arranging a smooth succession among an aging party leadership observed that "a good way to pass on experience and to help and guide young cadres is to let a group of selected young people move to the frontline while veteran comrades retreat to the second and third lines." "This method of establishing the frontline and the second and third lines," the editorial remarked, will allow younger leaders to gain experience and at the same time allow veteran leaders in failing health to "spend much of their time pondering the major issues of our party and state" unburdened by pressures of current administration.

The group of five Politburo members interspersed among the Standing Committee members in the new appearance listings, moreover, seems to consitute such a "second" or "third" line group of veteran leaders.

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Most have had persistent health problems and have fulfilled generally presidential or advisory functions among the leadership. The remaining group of Politburo members--those still listed in character stroke order in reports of leadership appearances--by contrast are generally younger by overall Politburo standards, and most occupy active posts either in the party Secretariat, a body which the plenum restored to oversee implementation of party policy more aggressively, or in important party, state, or military organs.

If the new leadership ranking system does reflect such a division of the party's leadership according to advisory and activist roles, the move supplements several other actions taken by the recent plenum to arrange for an orderly succession in an aging leadership and to insure long-term continuity in the current leadership's modernization policies. The division of the Politburo leadership into front and second ranks, moreover, lends credence to recent reports in the Hong Kong communist press that several veteran party leaders--including Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian--intend voluntarily to cede several important party and state posts to younger leaders and take on elder advisory functions.

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KOREA

DPRK REACTS TO RWANDA'S RECOGNITION WITH EYE ON KOREAN TALKS

Pyongyang failed to seize upon Rwanda's recent decision to break diplomatic ties with South Korea as an opportunity to heap the customary level of sharp criticism on Seoul's international standing. By not exploiting Rwanda's new view that the DPRK is the sole legal government of Korea, the North may be seeking to limit any possible negative political fallout of Rwanda's action on the current biweekly procedural talks at Panmunjom, which are keyed to producing a meeting between the heads of government of the two sides.

North Korea welcomed Rwanda's 15 March announcement recognizing the DPRK as the sole legal government of Korea in a relatively restrained manner. Pyongyang, for example, failed to publicize a message from Kim Il-song greeting Rwanda's decision, an omission breaking the precedent set on three similar occasions in the past six years. DPRK comment on Rwanda's action also avoided the harsh rhetoric which characterized past discussions on the issue of South Korea's international position. For example, a low-key 20 March NODONG SINMUN editorial article claimed only that the current South Korean "rulers" have been "denounced and isolated" by the world for maintaining a policy of "division, fascism and war." By contrast, in September 1978, following Afghanistan's break in relations with the ROK, a scathing editorial article in the newspaper charged that this action showed that Seoul was viewed as "a band of despicable traitors and fascists" and the South Korean "puppets" were "human scum. . . truculent fascist hangmen and bellicose elements seeking a way out in war." Similarly, NODONG SINMUN, following Togo's severing of relations with Seoul in September 1974, claimed that South Korea had been rejected as "a traitor, quisling and murderer without an equal in the world."

In hailing Rwanda's action, the 20 March NODONG SINMUN article reaffirmed Pyongyang's longstanding position that the DPRK is the "sole legitimate state" of the Korean nation. The North did not, however, go on to endorse, in its own words, Rwanda's view that the DPRK is the only legal Korean "government." In recent years, Pyongyang appears to have made a distinction between the terms "legal state" and "legal government" of Korea, a delineation which may reflect the North's decision to negotiate with the ROK Government. Pyongyang is not known to have publicized any claim to be the only legal Korean government--though it has noted that third parties hold this position--since September 1978, when Kim Il-song suggested that the

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DPRK was again ready to deal with the regime in Seoul. That was followed, in March 1979, by Pyongyang's decision to allow the ROK Government to be officially represented at the North-South talks then in progress.

PRC, USSR Beijing, which has previously endorsed Pyongyang's claim to being the only Korean state, noted Rwanda's move in a brief XINHUA report on 20 March. As usual, Moscow, which has withheld full public backing for the DPRK position, ignored Rwanda's action. In recent years, the closest Moscow has come to supporting Pyongyang's claim was late 1978, when a TASS report on Afghanistan's break in relations with South Korea noted Kabul's stand that it recognized "only one Korea." Similarly, a PRAVDA article in October of the same year, on the 30th anniversary of USSR-DPRK relations, noted that Moscow recognizes "only one Korea," a formulation which seemed to fall short of North Korea's claim to being the sole legal Korean state.

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USSR

EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL TARGET OF NEW UKRAINIAN PLAY

A new play that recently opened in Vinnitsa to rave reviews in the Ukrainian press appears to reflect an effort by republic officials to place obstacles in the way of Jewish emigration to Israel. The play, "Lost Horizon," depicts a young Jewish scientist in Kiev who, despite having everything—"a fine apartment, a good job in a scientific research institute, the respect of his colleagues"--comes to believe he is the object of discrimination because of his race and hence emigrates to Israel, where he finds a life of bitter disappointment. The play comes at a time when, according to Western press reports, the Ukraine is sharply restricting emigration to Israel, a policy apparently inconsistent with overall USSR policy and one that is not being followed by the other republics. Whatever the reasons for the Ukraine's aberrant behavior, it seems consistent with republic leader Shcherbitskiy's reputation as an independent-minded hardliner.

The author, Grigoriy Davidovich Plotkin, is a Kiev writer specializing in anti-Israel propaganda: He wrote a book entitled "Trip to Israel" (1959), a play entitled "The Promised Land" (1960), and a PRAVDA article (12 December 1969) attacking Israel and denying the existence of any "Jewish question" in the Soviet Union. Like some other anti-Zionist propagandists, his name suggests he may be Jewish.

The reviews leave no doubt that the play's chief value lies in its anti-Zionist propaganda message and that the authorities actively promoted it precisely for this purpose. Since its nomination for the Shevchenko Prize on 8 January, the play was lauded in reviews by Ukrainian Higher Party School rector Ivan Grushchenko and art critic Leonid Baraban in the 15 February issue of the Ukrainian Writers Union newspaper LITERATURNA UKRAINA and by the first deputy head of the Ukrainian theatrical society, G. Lyagushchenko, in the 3 February issue of the Ukrainian Culture Ministry paper KULTURA I ZHYTTYA. Grushchenko, who was Vinnitsa obkom ideology secretary until August 1979, stated that as Vinnitsa secretary "I took part in deciding the question of including" the play in the Vinnitsa theater's repertoire and that he liked it "primarily for its political sharpness" and because its plot and characters were "true to life." The three reviews focus their praise on the play's

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exposure of Zionism and the "renegades" who desert their homeland for Israel. Lyagushchenko lauded the play for "patriotically" exposing the ideas of "a worldwide Jewish nation," "the chosen people," and the "nonexistent 'Jewish question' in the USSR," and stated that by staging the drama, the Vinnitsa theater had shown itself to be "on the forefront of the ideological struggle."

While indicating that there are also good, patriotic Jews, the play--by stressing the ingratitude of some Jews in betraying their homeland--appears likely to stimulate anti-Semitism among non-Jews. According to Grushchenko's review, the scientist's older brother, a war hero, declares that "our fatherland is here on Soviet soil," and "I always have felt myself an equal member of the united family" of Soviet peoples. Nevertheless, the story is focused on the egotistical, ungrateful young Jew who betrays the Soviet Union for a better life in Israel. The play also includes an assortment of other treacherous Jewish characters, such as Israeli "tourists" sent to the Soviet Union to subvert Soviet Jews.

The aim of the play appears related to a broader effort by Ukrainian officials to stem Jewish emigration. Western news reports have indicated that Jewish emigration from the Ukraine has been drastically curtailed in recent weeks as Ukrainian officials have raised new obstacles--even though emigration from other parts of the Soviet Union reportedly continues at past levels. This apparent Ukrainian initiative in cracking down on emigration may reflect an effort by Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy to project the image of an independent-minded leader capable of decisive action on popular issues.

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BRIEFS

CUBAN-ANGOLAN RELATIONS: The most notable feature of Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos' official visit to Cuba 17-22 March was the indication of problems relating to Angolan students in Cuba and President Fidel Castro's denial that Cuban teachers had any responsibility for political instruction of African students. Castro reaffirmed Havana's ties of "militant solidarity" with the Luanda regime and pledged--without referring specifically to Cuban troops--that the two countries would continue to cooperate "very closely in all fields." Dos Santos, making his first visit to Havana since assuming power last fall, did state that Cuban "internationalist forces" would remain in Angola "as long as the imperialist threat remains." The timing of the visit, following the peace settlement in Zimbabwe and amid renewed Western efforts to resolve the Namibian conflict, which directly involves Angola, suggests that the talks may have centered on the impact of those events on Angola and its military relationship with Cuba. The remarks on the students came at a rally on the 20th at a secondary school for Angolan students on the Isle of Youth, where Castro for the first time responded to Western media charges that African students in Cuba were being instructed in Cuba's revolutionary ideology. Referring to the "lies and intrigues of the imperialists," who "wonder about what sort of revolutionaries" will be returning to Africa, Castro asserted that Cuban teachers were entrusted only with instruction on science-related subjects; he said political training was the responsibility of teachers representing the political parties of the students' own countries. Dos Santos in turn expressed his government's "concern" about finding an "adequate solution" to unspecified problems of Angolan students in Cuba and remarked cryptically that "acquiring an education far from the fatherland implies the added responsibility of keeping alive one's own cultural values and identity."

MOSCOW ON "COST" OF AFGHAN INTERVENTION: Moscow has alluded for the first time to the economic burden of its intervention in Afghanistan, sharpening the image the USSR has tried to project of initial reluctance to respond to Afghan requests for military assistance. The reference came in a commentary by PRAVDA's Pavel Demchenko broadcast by Moscow radio in Dari on 22 March. Demchenko reminded his Afghan audience that President Brezhnev had declared--in his 13 January PRAVDA interview--that the troop decision was "not easy"; Demchenko went on to say that this was because of the "great financial cost" and international repercussions. Brezhnev had not explained why it was "no simple decision" to send in the Soviet troops, although he did say the Soviet leadership took into account "the entire sum of circumstances." The Demchenko commentary--largely a rehash of standard positions--has not appeared in other Soviet

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media, and Demchenko's addition appears intended to admonish Afghans that they should be grateful for assistance given at considerable financial and diplomatic cost. Such tailoring for the Afghan audience is unusual, since Moscow's domestic and foreign-language commentary on Afghanistan has taken the lead from authoritative Soviet statements. Moscow's broadcasts in Dari to Afghanistan typically consist of brief news items, which are often replays of TASS reports; standard Soviet commentaries on world and regional events; music; and reports on Afghan officials' statements, presumably to convey an impression that Afghans are running the country.

MOSCOW ON IRAN: Moscow has sought to portray the shah's move from Panama to Egypt as engineered by Washington to protect its "faithful servant" from extradition to Iran. Soviet commentary has emphasized the threats posed to Iran and the Persian Gulf by U.S. policies, at the same time offering further assurances of peaceful Soviet intentions. Moscow's effort is clearly designed to counter the latest criticism by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeyni and President Bani-Sadr of the Soviet role in Afghanistan. The most recent authoritative attack on U.S. policies in the area, a 24 March "A. Petrov" article in PRAVDA, catalogued Washington's "dangerous intrigues" in the region and obliquely criticized unnamed individuals for "yielding" to the "massive hullabaloo raised around Afghanistan." Petrov referred to the interests of "other states"--which could include the USSR as well as West Europe and Japan--in the region's energy and raw materials, but went on to reiterate Moscow's claim that it does not "covet other people's resources." Brezhnev's November 1978 warning that the USSR would regard any military interference in Iran as affecting its own security interests was recalled by TASS' Aleksandr Bokhonko in a commentary on the 25th which portrayed the Soviet Union's "measures" in Afghanistan as deterrents to U.S. military action "near Iranian shores." And TASS news analyst Sergey Kulik in an article on the 25th even implied that Afghanistan would have become a "springboard for American provocations" against Iran's security had the USSR not come to Afghanistan's aid; the "principled" Soviet stand on the Afghan issue, he maintained, had contributed to "normalizing the situation in the region as a whole." Moscow's Persian-language service responded to the Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr attacks in a broadcast on the 21st which criticized "some of the country's leaders" for statements about "the two superpowers" and a broadcast on the 25th which took Bani-Sadr to task for "another unfriendly statement" about the Soviet "threat" to Iran.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 17 - 23 MARCH 1980

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Moscow (3354 items)			Beijing (738 items)		
Afghan Situation	8%	(14%)	Afghan Situation	15%	(14%)
Nicaraguan Party-Government Delegation in USSR	7%	(—)	Foreign Minister Huang Hua in Southeast Asia	8%	(3%)
			Singapore Visit	5%	(--)
Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja in USSR	6%	(—)	Malaysia Visit	3%	(--)
			Tunisian Envoy Mohamed Naceur in PRC	5%	(--)
Brezhnev Response to American Scientists' Appeal Against Nuclear War	5%	(—)			
			PRC Foreign Ministry Protest Note to Vietnam on Border Violations	3%	(—)
Proposed Boycott of 1980 Summer Olympic Games	3%	(1%)			
			Japanese Diet Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)
			Rwandan Foreign Minister Francois Ngarukiyintwali in PRC	3%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- DPRK-ROK dialog
- Hungarian party congress
- Romanian leadership reshuffle

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  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

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  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

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KOREA

DPRK SEEKS CONTINUED DIALOG DESPITE NEW NORTH-SOUTH TENSIONS

Pyongyang appears to be trying to insulate its current drive for contacts with Seoul from the negative repercussions of a series of incidents last week in which ROK forces thwarted North Korean infiltration attempts. In commentary before and after the 1 April Panmunjom meeting Pyongyang signaled its interest in keeping the dialog on track. On the remaining unresolved substantive question of an agenda for a meeting between the premiers of the North and South, the North has kept the door open for future negotiations by playing down the differences between the agenda proposals of the two sides.

PANMUNJOM MEETING

The North made no effort to disguise the cool atmosphere of the latest meeting at Panmunjom, during which the South raised the recent infiltration incidents as the major topic for discussion. In its accounts of that session, carried by Pyongyang radio and KCNA on 1 April, the North stated that "no progress" had been made owing to the South's "insincere attitude," a charge which represents Pyongyang's most critical characterization to date of South Korea's stance at the current round of North-South contacts. Nevertheless, the North appeared intent on displaying continued interest in successfully concluding the working-level contacts and moving on to a meeting between premiers. According to the DPRK accounts, the North's delegation, after refuting the South's charges and presenting some counterclaims of its own, attempted to shift the focus of the discussion to the key question of setting an agenda for the premiers' talks.

In presenting its view on the agenda issue at the meeting, the North was careful not to portray the positions of the two sides as irreconcilable or to question the basic intent of the South's proposed three-point agenda, which had been presented at the previous meeting on 18 March. The North's delegate--objecting on technical rather than substantive grounds to the South's agenda--argued that the contents of the South's proposal were "all covered" by Pyongyang's more general, single agenda idea. He noted that the South's objections to the DPRK proposal were "hasty and extemporaneous," but he did not proceed to accuse Seoul of bad faith on the issue.

This more positive stance at the meeting on the issue of the South's agenda proposal contrasts with an article in NODONG SINMUN on 31 March that reviewed the talks to date and set the stage for the fifth contact.

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The article asserted that the South's agenda proposal was an attempt to "delay" the talks. An even more serious charge was raised in a commentary broadcast on 19 March by the clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, which argued that the South's proposed agenda was aimed at perpetuating the division of Korea.

According to Pyongyang radio, at the latest meeting the North repeated the formulation, which had first appeared in a 29 March NODONG SINMUN article on the need for unity in approaching the reunification question, that "there are many ways to expedite independent and peaceful reunifications." The implications of this formulation are not yet clear; but the context in which the formulation appeared in the NODONG SINMUN articl suggests that Pyongyang may wish to portray itself as flexible and not unalterably committed to its longstanding proposal for a North-South confederation before final unification. Curiously, Pyongyang has made an effort to confine dissemination of the new line to Korean audiences. The KCNA account of the latest meeting omitted the reference to the formulation, and KCNA did not transmit the 29 March NODONG SINMUN article to international subscribers.

INFILTRATION INCIDENTS

DPRK treatment of the South's charges of infiltration attempts on 23, 25, and 27 March seemed to reflect an effort to minimize damage to the dialog. In denying Seoul's accusations, the North stuck to routine claims that the South Koreans had fabricated the incidents to divert attention from the political and economic situation in the ROK and made only a perfunctory protest that such tactics created obstacles to the dialog.

The 29 March NODONG SINMUN article made no specific reference to the incidents; but, in what may have been an oblique reference to the previous week's charges and countercharges, it observed that an atmosphere of "national harmony" was essential for progress in the current round of North-South talks. The article contained the first extensive DPRK discussion of the reunification issue in several months. There have been few such discussions since a major 9 November NODONG SINMUN editorial set the tone for the North's approach to the South following the assassination of Pak Chong-hui.* In line with last November's editorial, the 29 March article adopted a conciliatory tone. Like the earlier piece, it seemed to highlight the prospect of North-South economic cooperation as an important reason for easing confrontation and encouraging collaboration.

The North handled the first two incidents--one along the DMZ and the other an encounter at sea off the southeast coast of the ROK--in line with past precedents: flat denials and countercharges of

* The 9 November 1979 NODONG SINMUN editorial is discussed in the 15 November 1979 TRENDS, pages 13-14.

South Korean fabrications for political purposes. A 27 March NODONG SINMUN commentary called the South's charges "groundless fabrications," asserting that Seoul's accusation represented an effort to divert attention from the "turmoil" in the South.

Pyongyang's treatment of the third incident, however, was in marked contrast to its usual approach to such events. It portrayed the 27 March DMZ incident--which the South said involved a clash when an ROK patrol discovered North Korean infiltrators in the southern half of the DMZ--as a provocative act in which ROK forces fired on a North Korean guardpost. In contrast with the earlier incidents, the North offered its version of the events before any South Korean charges were publicized--in a Pyongyang radio report broadcast six hours after the incident. Initial DPRK reports did not mention casualties on either side. But an authorized KCNA statement issued on the 29th, responding to an ROK Defense Ministry warning two days earlier to the North over the incidents, did report ROK casualties, alleging that they had resulted from an unexplained exchange of fire between South Korean forces. According to KCNA, Seoul tried to cover up that clash by opening fire across the DMZ on DPRK positions. None of the Pyongyang accounts stated the North had responded to the South's action, nor did they include the usual threat of North Korean retaliation should the South persist in such actions. In contrast with similar incidents in past years, when the North accused the South of firing across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), Pyongyang called the 27 March incident only a "military provocation," dropping the usual characterization "grave" or "heinous."

BACKGROUND The last time the North singled out an incident to charge the South with firing across the MDL for publicity--other than at the regular Military Armistice Commission meetings, where the North routinely raises such charges--was in June 1977. In June 1976 and May 1977, when the South claimed that North Korean infiltrators had fired on South Korean troops in or near the DMZ, the North responded by denying the incidents had occurred, rather than attempt to seize the initiative and portray itself as the aggrieved party. Pyongyang ignored an October 1979 incident in which South Korea alleged it had killed a North Korean infiltrator in the DMZ.

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EAST EUROPE

HUNGARIAN CONGRESS STRESSES CONTINUED REFORM, LOYALTY TO USSR

Affirmations of continued commitment to Budapest's liberal economic reform program and a newly evinced support for Soviet foreign policy were the main political features of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSZMP) Congress, which concluded on 27 March. These two themes were underscored strongly in the speech at the end of the congress by First Secretary Janos Kadar.* The Hungarian leader staunchly defended the reform program, first introduced 12 years ago, as a correct and effective instrument of communist policy. In the area of foreign policy, he stressed Hungary's dependability as a loyal ally of the USSR, while at the same time characteristically emphasizing his country's freedom of choice in foreign and domestic policy. Personnel changes announced at the congress were consistent with this balanced approach, with resultant shifts in the Politburo affecting liberal and conservative forces about equally.

KADAR In apparently informal remarks at the conclusion of the congress, Kadar stressed his party's determination to continue the economic management reform program with stepped-up efficiency to ensure a better standard of living at home and a further reduction of the country's foreign trade deficit. Manifesting relaxed confidence in the correctness of the program, he debunked alleged Western charges that Hungary was applying capitalist methods, insisting that the profit motive in communist enterprise management is legitimate, since it benefits the people rather than the bourgeoisie. He also underscored the legitimacy of wage differentiation in asserting that "wages are paid for work, not just for being present."

On relations with the USSR, Kadar stressed Hungary's "predictability," claiming that "we are loyal to our allies and want to be so." He said that the West should understand that "we are in close cooperation, loyal friendship, and fraternity with the USSR" and are "honestly meeting our obligations"

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* Speeches by Kadar and the CPSU's Kirilenko at the start of the congress on the 24th are discussed in the 26 March 1980 TRENDS, pages 3-4.

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as a member of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, the Hungarian leader reemphasized that Hungary is a "sovereign, independent" country and that in domestic and foreign policy "it is we who work out our own activity and our decisions." In this vein he asserted that Hungarians keep an open mind when attending international meetings in Moscow and the other bloc capitals, West Europe, or at the UN, and that "we listen to our partners carefully" before making a decision. In such negotiations, he added, "what we regard as reasonable and worth supporting, we will support honestly," and vice versa.

PERSONNEL CHANGES Concern for both liberal reform and ties with Moscow was evident in the changed composition of the MSZMP Politburo. Of the five figures dropped from this body, three are conservatives--Antal Apro, Bela Biszku, and Dezso Nemes--and two are proponents of the economic reform--Deputy Premier Istvan Huszar and former Premier Jeno Fock. Fock had publicly disagreed with the Soviets over economic issues in the early 1970's and lost his premiership in 1975. The replacements for the demoted figures included an economic reformer, Ferenc Havasi, and a more orthodox figure, Mihaly Korom, who is a specialist in internal security and military affairs. The careers of Havasi and Korom had been given a boost in 1978, when they were named party secretaries.

ROMANIA REAFFIRMS INDEPENDENT POLICIES, RESHUFFLES LEADERSHIP

In contrast to the more conformist positions taken by neighboring Hungary, Romania strongly reaffirmed its independent course and reshuffled its state and government leadership at the Grand National Assembly session held in Bucharest 28-29 March. In the keynote speech at that session, newly reelected state President Ceausescu on 28 March acknowledged that Romania would emphasize relations with its neighbors--implicitly including the Soviet Union--but stressed that Bucharest would continue to develop ties with "all" socialist countries and "strengthen the fatherland's independence and sovereignty.' Employing standard patriotic themes, Ceausescu urged Romanians to emulate their ancestors, who "never renounced what belonged to them" and "preserved their ancestral land and their specific characteristics." On international affairs, he obliquely criticized Moscow when he scored policies of "force and diktat," but he also called on NATO not to place new missiles in Europe and stressed the need to promote detente

The changes in the state and government leadership, approved by the assembly, seem to reflect not only Ceausescu's habitual practice of rotating his subordinates but also the increasing influence of his wife, Elena. The assembly appointed Mme. Ceausescu, who has been a member of the party's policy-making Permanent Bureau since 1977, one of Romania's first deputy premiers--a position which seems to make her

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a leading contender for the premiership whenever that position is vacated. Mme. Ceausescu's influence on personnel matters seems evident also in the appointment of more than a half dozen women to high state and ministerial positions, paralleling the promotion of several women to high party posts at last November's RCP Congress. In other personnel changes, the party's civilian defense official, Constantin Olteanu, repiaced Col. Gen. Ion Coman as defense minister.

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BRIEF

MOSCOW ON CHAD: Moscow has carefully avoided taking sides in the factional fighting now under way in Ndjamena, focusing instead on linking the strife to alleged attempts by France to safeguard its strategic interests in Chad. Soviet comment pointing to a French role in the current fighting is consistent with Moscow's longstanding view that the French military presence in Chad serves not only to strengthen the positions of pro-French Chadian factions, but also to obstruct a peaceful reconciliation between the conflicting sides and to prevent a lasting solution to the country's problems. Typifying Moscow's comment on the conflict in Chad, a PRAVDA article on 25 March characterized the fighting as "fanned from the outside" and carefully avoided mentioning that the leader of the anti-Libyan faction, Chadian Defense Minister Hissen Habre, had recently accused Chadian President Goukouni Queddei of being under Tripoli's control. PRAVDA implied that the current hostilities had been instigated by France, citing "observers" to argue that the fighting followed the demand of the Chadian Government and "certain neighboring African states" that French expeditionary forces withdraw from the country. Noting that French troops remain in Chad despite the Lagos agreement--signed last August by the Chadian factions--which provides for their replacement by "neutral forces," a Moscow broadcast beamed to Africa on the same day noted that the French Communist Party paper L'HUMANITE had linked France's continued military presence in Chad to Paris' "desire" to preserve its control over the country and take advantage of its mineral wealth, "which includes uranium and oil."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 24 - 30 MARCH 1980

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Moscow (3281 items)			Beijing (686 items)		
Hungarian Communist Party Congress Kirilenko Speech	13%	(--)	Zaire President Mobutu in PRC Hua Guofeng Banquet Speech	15%	(--)
	4%	(--)		4%	(--)
Proposed Boycott of 1980 Summer Olympic Games	3%	(3%)	Afghan Situation	14%	(15%)
			British Defense Secretary Pym in PRC	6%	(--)

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN

TREATY SANCTIONS "TEMPORARY" STATIONING OF SOVIET FORCES

In a move apparently designed to strengthen the legal basis for a continuing Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, Moscow and Kabul have announced the ratification of a treaty on "conditions for the temporary stay" of the "limited contingent of Soviet troops." The text of the treaty has not been made public. Moscow's minimal publicity for the new accord is in keeping with its continuing reticence on the activities of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. While there have been occasional references to Soviet soldiers' assistance to the Afghans in civilian projects, Moscow has neither acknowledged a combat role nor mentioned any casualties sustained in Afghanistan.

STATUS-OF-FORCES TREATY The new treaty apparently was signed during Afghan Foreign Minister Dost's 13-14 March visit to Moscow, during which the sides, according to a cryptic TASS report at the time, "discussed and agreed upon practical questions concerning the terms of the temporary stay" of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Soviet and Afghan ratification announcements, both issued on 4 April, used similar language in describing the accord on "conditions for the temporary stay" of the Soviet forces, the Kabul announcement additionally noting that the agreement "was signed" by the Afghan and Soviet governments. Neither side has revealed details or commented further on the accord.

The conclusion of the treaty, and the timing of the announcement, may be related to the following factors and developments:

+ The treaty gives the Soviet military intervention the sanction of the Karmal government, thus defusing an issue created by the deliberate obscurity surrounding the origin of Afghanistan's December "request" for Soviet military assistance--whether it came from the government of the late President Amin or from his successor, Babrak Karmal.

+ It reinforces the legal underpinning for the Soviet move repeatedly cited by Moscow and Kabul--the Soviet-Afghan friendship and cooperation treaty of December 1978 and UN Charter articles on the right to individual and collective self-defense. The accord, coming three months after the 27 December intervention, had a precedent in the status-of-forces treaty the USSR concluded with Czechoslovakia in October 1968, two months after the Soviet invasion of that country.

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That treaty similarly spelled out the terms for the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops.* The present treaty, like that of 1968, serves to regularize the continued occupation.

+ The timing of the announcement may have been calculated to strengthen the Soviet case and to counter criticism of the intervention in international discussions. It came as Afghan President Karmal rejected the British-EEC "neutrality" proposal, Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca made a second round of visits to Kabul and other capitals in the region on an ill-defined Cuban or nonalined mediation mission, and the Islamic foreign ministers were scheduled to discuss Afghanistan again in Islamabad later this month. Moscow continues to insist on the withdrawal-for-guarantees formula outlined by Brezhnev in February while offering few appraisals of other initiatives. It let Kabul take the lead in responding to the Western neutrality idea: Moscow's domestic service on 6 April cited Afghan President Karmal as having "rejected" the plan in an interview with the French L'HUMANITE, in which he insisted that only Afghans can decide their country's future.

Moscow has also been reticent on Cuba's diplomatic activities. It made no mention of Malmierca's visits last month to Moscow and Kabul, reported by Western media, although his subsequent stop in Islamabad was noted, and his latest swing through Kabul and Delhi was reported without elaboration. Havana, for its part, has tried to represent this apparently Cuban mission as one undertaken on behalf of the nonalined countries. A Havana radio account on 1 April said Malmierca had returned over the weekend to report to President Fidel Castro on responses to messages to Afghanistan and Pakistan from Castro. According to the radio, Castro, as "chairman of the nonalined movement," offered "Cuba's good offices" to try to contribute to a political solution of the "complex situation" in the region.

As regards the Islamic conference, an Afghan Government statement broadcast by Kabul radio on the 7th announced that despite the "illegal" decision to suspend Afghan membership--taken by the Islamic group in January at a conference in Islamabad which Kabul had refused to attend--Afghanistan would send a delegation headed by its foreign minister. Afghanistan, it said, would work for Islamic solidarity and explain the "plots" against the country should the "so-called Afghan question" be placed on the agenda despite Afghan opposition.

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* Moscow gave extensive publicity to the Soviet-Czech treaty, including release of the text and editorials in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR. Earlier, Moscow had signed status-of-forces treaties with Poland (1956), East Germany (1957), and Hungary (1957).

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SOVIET MILITARY ROLE The brevity of the announcement on the status-of-forces treaty is consistent with Moscow's low-key treatment of the Soviet military role in Afghanistan since the December 1979 intervention. Moscow has given sparse coverage to the Soviet presence in its international broadcasts and its domestic media, and there has been no monitored acknowledgment of Soviet involvement in the fighting there. Since the first announcement on 31 December that a "limited Soviet military contingent" was in Afghanistan at the government's request, Moscow has consistently stated that the Soviet troops would be used "exclusively" for assistance against outside aggression. Infrequent Soviet reports on the fighting depict Afghan forces as engaging "counterrevolutionaries," bandits, and terrorists. Moscow domestic service on 3 April cited Afghan President Karmal as saying the Soviet troops constitute a "reserve force," while Afghan forces are conducting military actions against "bandit formations."

Moscow has periodically denied that Soviet troops have fought rebellious Afghan army units and Afghan citizens; it has also denied Western charges that Soviet troops have used chemical warfare weapons against Afghan insurgents. There have been no monitored references to Soviet casualties; since January, several press obituaries of Soviet military officers said death came "in the performance of duties," but none mentioned combat or Afghanistan.

The closest Moscow has come to indicating that Soviet troops have been under fire was a dispatch in LITERARY GAZETTE from its Kabul correspondent Aleksandr Prokhanov on 19 March. Describing the destruction of roads and bridges by "bandits," Prokhanov said "Soviet motorized riflemen, sometimes under fire from the bandits, spent 10 hours at the controls of bulldozers clearing the obstructions." But he typically insisted that "our army does not interfere in the internal processes" in Afghanistan and that "Afghan patriots themselves" engage the "local reactionaries."

Soviet media convey the impression that the new regime is making steady progress building the economy and uniting the people; Soviet television on rare occasions has shown Soviet troops meeting Afghan troops or giving concerts for them, but no combat scenes have yet been monitored. Infrequent descriptive reporting on the life of Soviet units in Afghanistan has covered camp life, fraternization with Afghan troops, and assistance to the Afghan populace in such civilian projects as bridge and machinery repair, flood relief work, and medical aid.

ECONOMIC TIES While playing down its military role in Afghanistan, Moscow has been emphasizing Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation, directing attention to nonmilitary forms of Soviet "aid" to Afghanistan. Several Soviet-Afghan agreements have been announced

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recently. Moscow domestic radio on 7 April told listeners that Kabul media have given "great attention" to Moscow's agreement to supply Afghanistan "gratuitous aid" totaling 100 million rubles, including food, clothing, and electrical goods. On the 2d, Moscow reported a new Soviet-Afghan agreement on the delivery of Soviet manufactured and consumer goods; a communications protocol providing for Soviet assistance in the installation and operation of satellite communications has also been signed.

In exchange, Afghanistan will continue to supply the USSR with natural gas, which TASS on 31 March said would total 2.5 billion cubic meters in 1980, compared with 2.15 billion last year. Seeking to counter Iranian charges that the USSR pays unfairly low prices for the Afghan gas, Soviet media have been stressing that Soviet payments are "absolutely just" and allow Afghanistan to pay for Soviet imports. While skirting absolute figures, Moscow has claimed Afghanistan's net income from gas sales to the USSR "is higher than that of any other gas exporter in the world," as TASS put it, since transportation costs are low.

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USSR - CHINA

MOSCOW URGES BILATERAL TALKS, PRESSES AHEAD WITH POLEMICS

Now that the long-moribund Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 is about to lapse, Moscow has reiterated its desire for dialog with Beijing. A 7 April "I. Aleksandrov" article in PRAVDA professed Moscow's desire to pursue "every opportunity" for improving Sino-Soviet relations, including the long-stalemated border negotiations as well as the political talks that opened in Moscow last fall. But the article gave no indication of concrete changes in Soviet negotiating positions, and it served up a harshly critical indictment of the foreign and domestic policies ratified by the February CCP Central Committee plenum.

The pseudonymous Aleksandrov article contains Moscow's clearest affirmation of its continuing interest in bilateral talks since Beijing sharply intensified its attacks on Soviet policy in connection with the Afghanistan crisis. Aleksandrov included tantalizing suggestions that progress in resolving disputed Sino-Soviet issues was possible even now if only Beijing would exploit the available opportunities. Every "practical channel," the article asserted, should be utilized. It indicated that Moscow was ready to resume the recessed political negotiations and that their resumption depended on Beijing--without mentioning China's indefinite postponement of the next round on 20 January. The article singled out the Sino-Soviet border talks, whose last session ended in June 1978, as one channel having the potential of resolving "a number of questions" affecting bilateral relations. It gave no indication of new initiatives, however; and in illustrating Moscow's benevolent intentions it recalled three past proposals that China has more than once rejected.

The Aleksandrov article's heavy-handed attack on Chinese foreign and domestic policies in the context of assessing the Feburary CCP Central Committee plenum insures that it will be received in Beijing as something less than a conciliatory gesture. "Maoism," with its bankrupt policy of hegemonism and anti-Sovietism, the article maintained, "remains the basis of Chinese policy." Beijing's leaders, it declared, are conducting toward the USSR a policy of "provocation and incitement, blackmail and threats." Unlike the 5 March assessment of the February plenum by Central Committee official Nikolay Shishlin, the Aleksandrov article could find nothing of promise even in Beijing's internal policies. The course affirmed at the plenum, the article concluded, offers no practical hope for future improvement in the Chinese people's situation.

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The 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid will formally expire on 11 April as a consequence of Beijing's public renunciation of the pact last spring. Moscow, sharply critical of Beijing's long predictable decision when it was announced, has had little to say about it as the expiration date approaches. The I. Aleksandrov article ignored it altogether, even if its timing seemed responsive. Only Moscow radio's Mandarin service and the scholarly journal PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST have marked the end of the treaty this year.

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U S S R

SOVIET EXPERTS SEE PROBLEMS IN FUTURE OIL PRODUCTION

Soviet experts have begun to acknowledge that the Soviet Union will find it increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain its current level of oil production in the 1980's. The most striking testimony to this effect was a recent prediction by Academician Aleksandr Krylov that Soviet oil production will begin to fall in the present decade. Current problems, according to Krylov and other experts, were caused by past efforts to maximize oil production without sufficient regard to future consequences. The cure they suggest will entail a variety of severe and costly measures ranging from sharp curtailment of extraction from older wells to a greatly expanded program of exploration and exploitation in Siberia. Although the experts avoid the international implications of these trends, other Soviet commentators have begun to suggest that East and West may share common problems in seeking to cope with the world energy crisis.

In the gravest assessment of the USSR's oil industry to appear in the Soviet press to date, Academician Krylov predicted that if present policies are continued, oil production will peak in the mid 1980's and begin to decline. Krylov's article, appearing in the January issue of EKO, the journal of the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences, traced problems in the Soviet oil industry to decisions that were aimed only at the shortsighted goal of maximizing extraction without regard for their longterm impact. That policy, he pointed out, is now resulting in the premature depletion of oil fields and significant reductions in the total amount of oil that can be removed from deposits. Consequently, Krylov stated, "the efficiency of oil extraction in the past decade began to drop continuously and significantly." To overcome these mistakes, Krylov called for "reducing the volume of drilling to a minimum" in fields that are already being exploited and even raised the possibility of cutting back on current plans. To demand fulfillment of the plan "at any cost," he said, "can result in excessive expenditures" or in "leaving unjustifiably large supplies of oil in the ground."

Similar pessimism concerning the production prospects of existing Soviet oil fields seemed to be implied by Vladimir Filanovskiy, chief of Gosplan's department of petroleum and gas production, in the March issue of PLANNED ECONOMY. Like Krylov, he blamed current problems on past planning errors, but instead of concentrating on measures to limit further damage to existing oil fields, he stressed

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the importance of discovering and opening new fields. He said that exploratory drilling had been underfinanced in the eighth and ninth five-year plans and called for a 2.5-fold increase in the financing of such drilling in western Siberia in the new 11th Five-Year Plan. To be effective, Filanovskiy said, such an effort should be based on highly productive drilling teams--a condition that did not obtain in sufficient degree between 1975 and 1978.

While generally supporting these assessments and prescriptions, other experts have pointed out the difficulties involved in resolving the problems, particularly the enormous costs of opening new fields. The party secretary in charge of energy, Vladimir Dolgikh, writing in PARTY LIFE, No. 1, adduced some cold facts to dampen hopes of an easy solution of the problem. To meet the nation's demand for oil, he stated, current drilling efforts must be doubled in the next five years, and this will require hundreds of thousands of additional workers, a prospect he described as "scarcely realistic." Gosplan expert Iuriy Bokserman, writing in PLANNED ECONOMY, No. 2, drew attention to the costs of developing Siberian oil resources, noting that the climatic conditions and remoteness of the area would be complicating factors. Still another aspect of the cost problem had been pointed out by Academician Aganbegyan in the October 1979 issue of EKO. The "reallocation of capital investment to the fuel and energy branches," he wrote, will have the effect of restricting the funds available to other areas of the economy.

While the technical experts have not addressed directly the international implications of growing Soviet energy stringencies, Soviet political and international commentators have acknowledged from time to time that the world energy problem affects both East and West. A common theme in such Soviet statements since the mid-1970's has been the proposition that such international problems should engender international cooperation. In recent months, President Brezhnev has struck a new note by acknowledging the "reasonableness" of U.S. concerns over access to Middle East oil--a concession that may reflect Soviet interest in insuring world access to this oil. Such interest was suggested by Nikolay Portugalov in a 29 February TASS commentary. Citing West German Chancellor Schmidt's reference to the USSR as a "potential purchaser of Near East oil," Portugalov concluded that all European nations have a certain "parallelism of interests" in this regard.

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FODDER SHORTAGE PROMPTS PARTY-GOVERNMENT DECREE ON PRODUCTION

A new CPSU Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree aimed at increasing fodder production appears to reflect an unusual level of Soviet concern about the maintenance of livestock herds threatened by fodder shortages. No such special decree on fodder was issued last year despite short fodder supplies in the winter and spring of 1979. There is still conflicting evidence as to whether Soviet farms have had to resort to large-scale distress slaughtering of livestock because of the fodder shortage in the wake of the U.S. grain embargo and the 1979 drought. Meat production figures rose somewhat during January and February, suggesting slaughtering, but officials have been talking optimistically of bringing the livestock herds through the winter without reductions.

The Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree, published on 29 March, complains of shortfalls in fodder production and orders a variety of measures aimed at boosting fodder output in 1980. Although some of the measures were mentioned in April 1979 in the routine decree on the harvesting of grain, fodder, and other products, the new decree, dealing only only with fodder, includes new and stronger incentives, especially for farm leaders. Among the new measures are additional bonuses for sovkhoz leaders and specialists for increasing fodder output, allotment of special reserves of scarce cars and motorcycles for sale to leaders and workers who excel at fodder production, and a stipulation that in 1980 farm leaders will receive their bonuses only if they fulfill fodder plans in addition to other plans.

The latest meat production figures--in ECONOMIC GAZETTE, No. 12--show meat ouput for the country as a whole up 13 percent in January-February over the same period of 1979. But it is not clear whether this increase reflects substantial distress slaughtering, since meat output in early 1979 had been relatively low, and the latest ECONOMIC GAZETTE figures for livestock herds on 1 March 1980 show a substantial increase in the number of cattle and poultry and a decline only in pigs. Moreover, ECONOMIC GAZETTE, No. 8, reporting on January livestock results, declared that the number of animals and their productivity were being maintained successfully despite the tight fodder supplies. Central Committee Secretary Kirilenko, in his 19 February election campaign speech, called for a national struggle to "preserve the livestock herds and not to allow a decline in the production of meat, milk, and other products."

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In the northwest, where the fodder shortage is most critical, yearend figures indicate clearly that hard-pressed Belorussia had slaughtered many animals by 1 January 1980; and ECONOMIC GAZETTE figures indicate some reductions in herds in Estonia and Latvia during January and February. Local leaders in those republics have made somewhat ambiguous statements about whether slaughtering is occurring. A Latvian Agriculture Ministry official declared in the 7 February SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA that "there is every possibility of maximum preservation of the livestock herds and prevention of any lowering of productivity"; but a 14 February editorial in the same paper stated that in January sales of livestock and poultry to the state in Latvia were up 25 percent over the early period of 1979, which resulted in increased meat supplies. Estonian First Secretary Vayno, according to the 7 February SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, admitted that because of the fodder shortage "in places" it may be necessary to slaughter pigs of below-normal weight, but he stated that this would be left for individual farms to decide.

SHCHERBITSKIY EFFORT TO PROMOTE SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS FALTERS

A well-publicized campaign to spur scientific and technical progress in the Ukraine appears to have broken down, marking a setback for Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy, who had apparently hoped to use the program to enhance his image as a successful economic leader. Shcherbitskiy has complained repeatedly in recent months that the campaign was making insufficient progress, but the final admission of failure was the 5 March dismissal of Deputy Premier I. P. Kochevykh, the man Shcherbitskiy selected three years ago to direct the effort as head of a new "Commission on Questions of Scientific-Technical Progress." The failure is probably the more disappointing to Shcherbitskiy in that the program seemed calculated to serve as a model for the country in dealing with lagging industrial productivity, one of the most serious problems effecting the economy.

Initial indications of trouble concerning the scientific-technical campaign appeared at a 19 October 1979 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum, where speeches by Shcherbitskiy and Premier Lyashko extensively criticized the lack of progress on the "key task" of raising effectiveness and quality in industrial production. At an 11 December republic plenum, Shcherbitskiy criticized the unsatisfactory administration of scientific-technical progress and the slow adoption of new planning methods and pointed out, according to the 12 December RADYANSKA UKRAINA,

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that "we have the right to expect more effective participation in solving these urgent tasks" on the part of the commission on scientific-technical progress and "Comrade I. P. Kochevykh personally." On 6 March RADYANSKA UKRAINA announced that Kochevykh had been removed as deputy premier and assigned to unspecified "other work."

The campaign to boost scientific innovation began with a January 1977 Ukrainian Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree announcing measures to improve administration of scientific-technical progress. The decree ordered creation of a "Commission on Questions of Scientific-Technical Progress" under the Council of Ministers Presidium, to be headed by a deputy premier who would "lead and check" the work of ministries in speeding scientific-technical progress. Kochevykh, a Lvov production association director famed for helping develop a nationally recognized quality control system, was named to the new post on 9 February 1977.

As deputy premier, Kochevykh supervised implementation of organizational changes in Gosplan, ministries, and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences ordered by the January decree to help speed introduction of innovations. As is clear from his article in a June 1978 POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA, he also promoted creation of local scientific-technical progress commissions and new complexes of research institutes and factories, as well as other devices for improving the effectiveness of research and use of innovations in industry. Until recently, Ukrainian leaders had talked enthusiastically of the new program.

Kochevykh's successor as deputy premier is apparently Donetsk obkom industry secretary S. I. Gurenko. Named deputy premier on 26 March, he quickly demonstrated his responsibility for promoting innovations at a local meeting reported in the 29 March RADYANSKA UKRAINA. Gurenko is presumably a Shcherbitskiy protege, since he was promoted from director of a machinebuilding plant to his obkom post when Shcherbitskiy personally supervised the purge of Donetsk leaders in January 1976.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

LEADERS PROMOTE NEW ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT REFORM MEASURES

Prague regime leaders are vigorously promoting the economic management reform program adopted by the party and government in March to bring some efficiency into an orthodox management structure that has proved inadequate to cope with the country's growing economic straits. Party Secretary Vasil Bilak, leader of the hardline faction that had heretofore resisted economic reform, joined moderate CSSR President and party leader Gustav Husak in exhorting a late-March CPCZ plenum to support the new program, scheduled to take effect next year. The reforms, which center on measures to increase the responsibility of enterprise managers for economic decisions, can be compared to the modest degree of decentralization carried out in the USSR in the mid-1960's. They would apparently not go as far in decentralization as the relatively liberal management system introduced in Hungary in 1968.

BILAK Delivering the main report to the 25-26 March CPCZ plenum, nominally convened to discuss ideology, Bilak came out strongly for the new managerial reforms mandated in a CPCZ Central Committee Presidium-CSSR Government resolution released on 7 March. Taking aim at those resisting the reforms--presumably including some in his own conservative faction--Bilak stressed the need to convince the party as a whole and the public of "the correctness and necessity" of the new measures and to "assert" the reforms in the appropriate management organs so that these organs will "not start backing off when the first obstacles are encountered." Bilak displayed no ideological reservations about accepting the reforms, stressing instead the urgency of getting down to practical work to deal with the country's acute economic problems. He warned that "breaking away from habitual forms and methods of work . . . will require courage and consistency." As the most urgent targets of the management reform, Bilak cited conservation of gasoline, metals, electricity, and fodder. He also deplored the fact that "expensive, high-performance machinery--made in Czechoslovakia or imported from abroad--is standing idly about."

HUSAK Party and state leader Husak wound up the two-day plenum with his own firm endorsement of the management reforms. While the six-day delay in releasing extensive excerpts of the speech raises questions, the publicized version leaves no doubt about his strong support for the reform measures. Judging by the excerpts, Husak, like Bilak, hewed largely to generalities; they both alluded only in passing to the accountability concept, apparently leaving to

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subordinates the task of spelling out the application of the Soviet system of accounting to Czechoslovak conditions. Husak did note, however, that in working out the reforms "we are utilizing, as much as possible, the experiences of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, which are also seeking similar ways to improve management and increase the effectiveness of their economies."

Acknowledging obstacles, the CSSR leader stressed that implementation of the reforms requires overcoming "outdated views and attitudes, routine and inertia" and "will not always be popular or simple." as he had done in his speech at the last CPCZ plenum in December,* Husak scored management abuses such as "slapdash, craftiness, racketeering, passivity, fabrications, and questionable dealings." At the same time, he included a characteristically moderate note in condemning the search for scapegoats for economic failures and in emphasizing that implementation of the reforms must be "gradual."

LER ARTICLE Details of the reform not included in the party leaders' plenum speeches were provided in a 1 April article in RUDE PRAVO by Finance Minister Leopold Ler. On enterprise accountability, Ler said that implementation of the reform would "lead to greater responsibility on the part of production units and enterprises for their management efforts." He added that managers would be under increased pressure for effectiveness under this system, with "more intensive consequences for both positive and negative" aspects of their performance.

The effect of managerial performance on funds allotted to enterprise executives for material incentives was also spelled out in Ler's article. He specified that deviations from the five-year plan would result in "progressive cuts" in an enterprise's executive incentive funds and that a 15-percent deviation from the plan would result in "the disappearance of the entire incentive component" of these wages. Enterprise responsibility was also underscored in Ler's statement to the effect that while allocations from the state budget for enterprise investments would be reduced, the share of an enterprise's profits turned over to the state budget would also be curtailed.

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* See the 19 December 1979 TRENDS, pages 15-16.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 31 MARCH - 6 APRIL 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3160 items)			Beijing (589 items)		
Lenin Prize Ceremony for Brezhnev Trilogy Brezhnev Speech	9%	(--)	Afghan Situation	9%	(14%)
Hungarian 35th Liberation Anniversary	4%	(--)	Vice Premier Yu Qiuli in Japan	4%	(--)
Islamic Republic of Iran First Anniversary	5%	(--)	Vietnamese Use of Soviet-Supplied Chemical Weapons	3%	(--)
El Salvador Situation	4%	(--)	Sino-Viet Dispute	3%	(2%)
Afghan Situation	3%	(--)			
	3%	(2%)			

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on U.S. sanctions against Iran
- Soviet reaction to Iraqi-Iranian dispute
- Havana on Cubans seeking asylum
- Evidence of Kosygin's increased activity

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Moscow, Beijing Broadcast Statistics 1

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-IRAN-IRAQ

Moscow continues to curry favor with Iran over the U.S. hostage crisis even as Soviet commentary has underlined the USSR's discomfort over continuing instability in the Persian Gulf region and the radical aspects of Iranian policies. Soviet media have predictably condemned the Carter administration's new diplomatic and economic sanctions against Tehran, citing them to support a contention that it is Washington, not Moscow, that poses a threat to the nations in the area. At the same time, authoritative IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin has reiterated a characteristically more balanced view of U.S. interests in the region--expressing opposition to the holding of diplomatic hostages and acknowledging the legitimacy of Western concerns over the security of Middle East oil supplies. Moscow's anxiety over Tehran's desire to export its revolution to neighboring Islamic populations has been reflected in its guarded position on the growing and unpredictable dispute between Iran and Iraq.

USSR ASSAILS SANCTIONS, ACKNOWLEDGES WEST'S INTERESTS IN GULF

Moscow's initial reaction to President Carter's 7 April announcement of the break in U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations and the tightening of the U.S. trade embargo against Iran came in an unsigned TASS article on the 8th, subsequently carried in all Soviet central newspapers and quoted in Persian-language commentaries beamed to Iran. The hostage question, TASS said, stands on a plane "utterly different" from that on which President Carter placed it in his announcement of the break with Iran. The assertion that the Iranians refuse to release the hostages is "wrong," TASS declared, since the "Iranian leadership"--not further identified--has repeatedly reaffirmed its readiness to resolve the question when the United States exhibits a "constructive approach" to Iran's "legitimate wishes." U.S. actions, it said, are guided by "undisguised imperialist interests," not by concern for the hostages. Further criticizing the U.S. stance, TASS Director General Sergey Losev, in an English-language commentary broadcast to North America on 10 April, replayed a theme appearing in Soviet commentaries for some weeks: The administration, Losev charged, "masterminded" the crisis, and Washington is now attempting to "blackmail" its closest allies into supporting its steps against Iran.

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Along with standard Soviet rhetoric about U.S. use of the hostage problem both for electoral purposes and for furthering Washington's designs against Tehran, Moscow, for the first time in months, has again avowed Soviet support for the principle of diplomatic immunity. IZVESTIYA authoritative political observer Aleksandr Bovin, in a 12 April article, restated the USSR's "principled stand" on the question, declaring that the "norms of international law must be strictly observed." As in earlier comment, Bovin made no direct call for the hostages' release and went on to accuse the United States of using the hostage question to build up its military presence in the region.

An unusual, if not unique, reference to Soviet approval of international calls for the release of the hostages came in an otherwise routine article by Viktor Vladimirov in the 10 April SOVIET RUSSIA. Apparently alluding to the Soviet Union's affirmative vote on the 4 December 1979 UN Security Council resolution, which called on Iran to release the hostages, Vladimirov said the seizure of the hostages was "illegal" from the viewpoint of international law, adding that the international community, "including the Soviet Union, has advocated their release."

Moscow has continued to reiterate support for Iran's "anti-imperialist" struggle in broadcasts for Iranian audiences, which, like other Soviet comment, periodically indicate approval of Iran's demands for the return of the Shah and his "plundered" wealth. Moscow radio's veteran Persian-service commentator Vera Lebedeva, in a formulation reminisicent of her 6 November 1979 talk--which characterized the "anger of the Iranian nation and its youth" against the United States as "totally understandable and logical"--declared in an 8 April commentary that it was natural under present circumstances for the USSR to support Iran's "just acts."

GULF SECURITY, OIL ISSUES In emphasizing the alleged danger of a U.S.-instigated military confrontation in the region, and the U.S. allies' hesitation in coming to Washington's support, Moscow has again offered assurance that it understands Western concerns regarding access to Persian Gulf oil. PRAVDA's Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, in a 10 April article, charged Washington with using the threat of military action to "blackmail" both Iran and U.S. allies "dependent on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf." IZVESTIYA's Bovin was more explicit. In effect echoing Brezhnev's February election speech remark, Bovin said in his 12 April article that the Soviet Union does not need Middle East oil and "will not go to war over it," and at the same time it understands "what the

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oil means for the Western states' economies" and is "prepared to allow for that."* Despite his disavowal of Soviet interest in Gulf oil, Bovin did make a cryptic connection in a remark the next day on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program: "The interests of many parties" are affected by the U.S.-Iranian problem, he said--"those who are interested in Middle East oil, those who border on the region." Soviet interest in regional developments was pointed up in an Arabic-language commentary on the 13th, which remarked that the Middle East lies close to the Soviet Union, and Soviet citizens "do not adopt an indifferent attitude toward the currents that have been raging in this area."

BILATERAL FRICTIONS EVIDENT AS USSR HEDGES ON IRAQ-IRAN TENSION

Trying to avoid siding with or offending either party in the Iranian-Iraqi dispute, Moscow has dealt cautiously with reports of border clashes and the escalating war of words between Baghdad and Tehran. Brief, selective TASS reporting has contained suggestions of both pro-Iranian and pro-Iraqi tilts, depending on which side's version was being cited. Moscow has suggested that both sides are at fault and that neither would be the victor in any conflict.

Moscow's only comment on the situation thus far came in the weekly roundtable program on Moscow radio's domestic service on the 13th, on which panelists discussed the "big tangle" of ideological, political, religious, and nationalistic aspects of the dispute. On the one hand, they speculated on possible Iraqi territorial claims on the Iranian province of Khuzestan, noting that it is populated by Arabs and is Iran's most important oil-producing province. On the other hand, they found it "disconcerting" that Iran was inclined toward exporting its ideas of Islamic revolution to "surrounding countries"--perhaps an oblique reference to Iranian leaders' statements about the Muslims of the Soviet Union--and especially disconcerting for Iraq because of direct Iranian appeals to the Iraqi people to overthrow their regime. IZVESTIYA's Bovin raised the possibility of a wider Arab-versus-Iranian aspect of the conflict, observing that Arab countries were generally moving toward support of Iraq and that Tehran was beginning to say that "Arabism is opposed to Islamism." The panelists indicated distaste for the "mutual accusations" leveled by Baghdad and Tehran, and agreed that neither side "needs this conflict."

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* Brezhnev's remark and a subsequent TASS commentator's proposal for an "all-European" conference on oil issues are discussed in the TRENDS of 27 February 1980, pages 1-2, and 5 March 1980, pages 1-4.

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SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS Moscow's relations with Tehran, strained by Iranian criticism of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and by Ayatollah Khomeyni's and Iranian President Bani-Sadr's frequent denunciations of the "two superpowers," were further aggravated by the recent breakdown of bilateral talks on the price of Iranian gas exported to the USSR. Iranian Ambassador to the USSR Mokri apparently compounded Moscow's difficulties with the Khomeyni regime when he declared in a recent Moscow press conference, according to Tehran radio, that Iran expected the USSR to stop exporting weapons to Iraq. TASS on the 11th, reporting the press conference, cited Mokri as saying that Iran and the Soviet Union have friendly, good neighborly relations regardless of their differences of opinion in the economic field and on "a number of political problems." But it evaded his remarks on Iraq, noting only that the ambassador "dwelled at length" on the state of Iranian-Iraqi relations, presenting "the position of the Iranian side."

Moscow has also failed to acknowledge the Iranian Revolution Council's November 1979 abrogation of the two clauses of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty stipulating the conditions under which the parties may enter each other's territory. However, a 13 April commentary broadcast in Arabic suggested that Moscow still regards the treaty as valid. The treaty with Iran, the radio declared, along with the Soviet Union's other 1921 treaties, with Turkey and Afghanistan, are "to this day" a "brillant example of agreements of friendship and equality of rights among states."

SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS Moscow's observance of the anniversary of the April 1972 Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty again points to the tension in bilateral relations evident last year, when the USSR first downgraded the ritualistic message of congratulations.* This year's message, like last year's, was sent by the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers, rather than by Brezhnev personally, as had been the practice earlier. Last year TASS reported that the treaty anniversary was observed at a meeting at Moscow's Friendship House, during which the Iraqi Ambassador characterized Iraqi-Soviet relations as "on an upward trend." No such meeting was reported this year, and the absence seemed to be pointed up by PRAVDA's brief report on the 8th that the Iraqi charge d'affaires ad interim in Moscow had held a reception the previous day to mark the 33d anniversary of the establishment of the Ba'th Party.

Judging by recent comments from Moscow and Baghdad, the Ba'thist regime's treatment of Iraqi communists and Moscow's parsimony in

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* For a discussion of last year's and earlier messages, see TRENDS, 25 April 1979, pages 7-9.

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supplying Iraq with arms continue to strain bilateral relations. A commentary broadcast in Arabic on Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress (RPP) in early March criticized "some reactionary leaders in Iraq" for allegedly distorting the history of the Iraqi Communist Party and labeling Iraqi communists "agents and traitors and accusing them of having foreign connections, and other such lies." The RPP commentator, Sa'di al-Malih, assailed "these leaders," whose hands were "stained with the blood of scores of martyrs recently," for their hostility to communism and the Soviet Union and "everything progressive in Iraq." Iraqi communists, al-Malih declared, see "no conflict" between deepening friendship with the USSR and their "national struggle" and will continue to pursue these aims "in spite of the shrieks of reactionaries." Quoting an unnamed "poet," al-Malih observed rhetorically that it was impossible for a "monkey" to destroy the party.

Saddam Husayn, for his part, hinted at Iraq's dissatisfaction with past Soviet arms deliveries in a 27 March speech at a pan-Arab conference in Baghdad. Referring to earlier Iraqi-Iranian hostilities--ended with the help of Algerian mediation in 1975--Husayn recalled that "all our arms" at the time had come from the USSR. However, suggesting that Moscow had held back on arms deliveries at a critical time in the fighting, he added: "Had we got enough ammunition, we would have continued fighting the shah up to today."

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CUBA

HAVANA ALLOWS EXIT OF "CRIMINALS" IN ROW WITH LIMA, CARACAS

Cuba has tried to turn the embarrassment of a mass exodus of disaffected citizens to its own political advantage by accusing Peru and Venezuela, as well as the United States, of encouraging Cuban malcontents and then refusing to accept responsibility for the would-be emigrants. The government's offer to permit a mass departure was triggered ostensibly by the death of a Cuban guard while attempting to prevent a group of Cuban asylum-seekers from forcibly entering the Peruvian Embassy grounds. Announcement of the removal of the guards and permission for the emigration of "despicable elements" spurred an estimated 10,000 would-be emigres to take refuge at the Peruvian Embassy. Havana's departure from its customary restrictive stands on political asylum and emigration seems prompted by a desire to relieve pressures stemming from the deteriorating economic situation and attendant social problems.

Moscow thus far has ignored the current imbroglio except for a TASS dispatch replaying Havana's version of the dispute with Peru and Venezuela. And IZVESTIYA, in an otherwise innocuous report on Cuba's socialist advances, briefly conceded on the 8th that there are some problems with food and other shortages.

STATEMENTS ON EMIGRATION

The surge of Cuban citizens to the Peruvian Embassy began after the Cuban Government in a 4 April statement announced the removal of police protection at the mission and Havana's "preparedness" to withdraw Cuban guards from "any other embassy that does not collaborate in its own protection." In its statement the government did not appear to extend an outright offer to allow a wholesale departure of disenchanted Cubans; it merely noted that it was "not opposed" to Cubans' emigrating to Peru or Venezuela "through regular channels if they want to do so, regardless of their criminal record." But Cuba expanded the offer the next day in a Foreign Ministry "clarification," which, according to PRENSA LATINA, authorized "any Cuban who so desires to emigrate to Peru, Venezuela, or any country that will give them a visa." The government and Foreign Ministry statements specifically withheld safe passage out of Cuba for those who had entered the Peruvian Embassy by force--crashing the embassy gates--"while Cuban guards were posted there."

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The government statement and a subsequent GRANMA editorial on the 7th defended Cuba's narrow interpretation of political asylum, asserting that "at no time" were the Cubans who had forcibly entered the Peruvian and Venezuelan embassies and those taking advantage of the emigration offer involved in political difficulties or in need of the "sacrosanct" right to asylum. Havana predictably has avoided trying to explain why Cubans would want to avail themselves of the opportunity to leave. But the GRANMA editorial, broadcast on Havana's domestic service, attempted to offer a rationale when it branded the thousands of Cubans assembled at the Peruvian Embassy "common criminals, miscreants, and antisocial elements," who were not attuned to the "discipline and rigors" of the revolution. Declaring that participation in building a socialist society is "absolutely voluntary and spontaneous," GRANMA recalled past occasions when large groups of Cubans had been permitted to leave the country and maintained that Cuba, "as always," was allowing "all riffraff opposing socialism" to depart.

CHARGES AGAINST LIMA, CARACAS, WASHINGTON

Recalling past disputes which have strained Havana's relations with Lima and Caracas, Cuba has made clear its view that the crisis surrounding Cuba's restrictive policy of asylum was created by Peru and Venezuela, not by other Latin American governments. A GRANMA editorial on 14 April asked rhetorically why Cubans seeking asylum have "always" chosen the Peruvian and Venezuelan embassies "and not, for example, those of Mexico, Grenada, Nicaragua, Jamaica, or Panama." The answer, GRANMA said, is that, unlike Peru and Venezuela, whose embassies have been involved in "numerous irregular events" in the past, those countries have followed a policy of "sincere friendship and respect" toward Cuba.

GRANMA characteristically linked the United States to the embassy crisis, claiming that "in recent weeks" Washington had "shamelessly encouraged" illegal departures from Cuba and the hijacking of Cuban vessels "whose crew members were taken as hostages to Florida." Pointing to Havana's "generous" policy of emigration, GRANMA said the protection and asylum granted "a bunch of proved criminals" by the governments of Peru and Venezuela could be explained only in light of these countries' support of Washington's "policy of subversion and dirty propaganda" toward Cuba.

GRANMA criticized the 9 April Andean Pact meeting on the refugee problem as a "show of political demagogy and political chicanery" and assailed the member-countries for their failure to make any commitments to accept the would-be emigres. Singling out Caracas, GRANMA argued that Venezuela, whose oil wealth had been acquired "in part at the expense of Third World countries," could "very well accept a large number of these individuals." GRANMA insisted that the issue of political asylum would not be resolved by allowing

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the "despicable individuals" to emigrate, and, with an eye to possible future incidents, it stressed that the problem of forced entry into embassies and the matter of Cuban protection at the missions remained to be resolved.

BACKGROUND The Cuban Government's offer to allow a mass exodus of disenchanted Cubans is not without precedent. In 1965 Fidel Castro opened the Port of Camarioca to anyone wishing to leave. This proposal and a subsequent agreement with the United States resulted in the departure of some 300,000 Cubans between 1965 and 1973. A decision announced in September 1978 limited emigration largely to beneficiaries of amnesty accorded some 3,000 political prisoners and their families, as well as to relatives of Cubans already living abroad. This policy was adopted following talks between Fidel Castro and members of the "Cuban community abroad."*

* Havana's decision on the release of political prisoners is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 September 1978, pages 6-9, and 29 November 1978, pages 17-19.

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USSR

KOSYGIN APPEARS TO BE GRADUALLY RESUMING FULLER WORK SCHEDULE

Soviet Premier Kosygin appears to have begun to resume a limited work schedule since his reappearance in February following a four-month absence. His renewed participation in policy deliberations will alter the composition of the leadership group that has existed since last fall and was responsible for such key decisions as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the exile of Sakharov.

Kosygin disappeared from public view after 17 October, amidst rumors of a heart attack or other serious ailment, and did not reappear until he delivered his supreme soviet election speech on 21 February. Subsequent Kosygin appearances have been largely undemanding and ceremonial: He was present for Brezhnev's 22 February election speech, cast his ballot on 24 February, received a Mongolian award on 7 March, met with an Ethiopian delegation on 11 March, attended a Brezhnev award ceremony on 31 March, and appeared at a funeral on 2 April. However, on 4 April Kosygin appeared to be moving into a more active role when he was reported to have visited the Agriculture Ministry to inspect testing of plant varieties.

It seems unlikely that Kosygin will resume full activity because of his age and infirmity. His deputy, First Deputy Premier Tikhonov, has continued to substitute for him in recent weeks--for example, in reporting on government activities to a 24 March Supreme Soviet Presidium session--and will probably retain some of the functions delegated to him during the premier's incapacitation.

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BRIEFS

NEW EDITOR FOR SOVIET JOURNAL "USA": Nikolay Demyanovich Turkatenko has been named chief editor of the USA and Canada Institute's journal, USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY. Turkatenko, whose promotion was reported in the March 1980 issue of JOURNALIST, became acting chief editor of the journal with its November 1978 issue, after having served as deputy chief editor since late 1973. He is only the second chief editor of this journal since its founding in 1970. Like his predecessor, V. M. Berezhkov, Turkatenko is a journalist with no special academic credentials for his new post. He spent 20 years as a TASS correspondent in various locations, including London and New York. His last position with TASS, in the early 1970's,was as deputy editor to the Main Editorial Board for Foreign Information. He has contributed a dozen journalistic articles on the United States and its foreign and economic policy to USA since 1974.

KREISKY VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA: Belgrade's publicity for Austrian Chancellor Kreisky's visit to Yugoslavia on 8-10 April reflects the improvement of relations between the two countries, which have long been troubled by recriminations over Austria's alleged mistreatment of its Slovene and Croatian minorities. Signs of Austrian accommodation on this issue, apparent last October in the communique on the Yugoslav foreign secretary's visit to Vienna, were again evident in the communique on the latest visit. In the communique Austria pledged to "insure the existence and successful development" of these minorities and to meet all its legal obligations to them. Several Yugoslav commentators also noted favorably the assertion by Kreisky at a press conference, reported by TANJUG on 10 April, that Belgrade's concern for these minorities does not represent interference in Austria's internal affairs. The apparent removal of the minorities issues as a bone of contention between Yugoslavia and Austria leaves Belgrade with only two neighboring countries--Bulgaria and Albania--that it continues to charge with oppression of Yugoslav minorities or irredentism.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 7 - 13 APRIL 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3206 items)		
U.S.-Iran Situation	7%	(--)
Afghan Situation	6%	(3%)
European Communist Party Conference for Peace and Disarmament	5%	(2%)
Soyuz 35 - Salyut 6 Space Mission	5%	(--)
Gromyko Letter on Disarmament to UN Secretary General Waldheim	4%	(--)
Middle East Situation	3%	(2%)
Soviet Cosmonaut's Day	3%	(--)

Beijing (824 items)		
Zambian President Kaunda in PRC	15%	(--)
Afghan Situation	6%	(9%)
Fifth National People's Congress Standing Committee 14th Session	4%	(--)
Vice Premier Yu Qiuli in Japan	3%	(4%)
Sino-Vietnamese Dispute	3%	(3%)
Australian Friendship Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on U.S.-Iranian tension
- Ponomarev defense of Soviet policies
- Eclipse of Kampuchean leader
- Sharper DPRK criticism of ROK
- Kazakh leadership turnover
- Soviet novel on Stalin
- Yugoslav leadership debate

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23 APRIL 1980
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-IRAN

MOSCOW OFFERS TEHRAN LOW-LEVEL SUPPORT AGAINST U.S. PRESSURE

Moscow appears to be positioning itself to make political capital in the event the United States takes any military measures against Iran. At the same time, the Soviets have avoided any warning of counteraction. Low-level comment has suggested that the "much more resolute" military action being contemplated in Washington could escalate into "a wide international conflict," but Moscow has yet to respond authoritatively to the heightened U.S.-Iranian tension. Soviet media continue to proclaim the USSR's support for Iran in its struggle with "U.S. imperialism," and, against the background of increased speculation over Western economic sanctions, Moscow has reported the signing of a Soviet-Iranian protocol expressing the two sides' readiness to "expand joint economic relations."

MILITARY MEASURES, HOSTAGE QUESTION

Moscow registered its concern over a possible escalation of the U.S.-Iran crisis in a 21 April Yuriy Soltan commentary--broadcast in English, Persian and several other languages--which accused the United States of "pushing the world into war." Like another low-level talk, broadcast to the Arab world on 9 April, the Soltan commentary chided the Administration for "playing a risky game with fire." In a 22 April dispatch, IZVESTIYA New York correspondent Melor Sturua, building upon Soltan's comments, reported that in Washington "practically everybody is saber-rattling." As in several other recent Soviet reports, Sturua went on to speculate on specific scenarios for U.S. military action. A 16 April commentary broadcast in Persian asserted that the USSR's "serious warning" last year had "neutralized" the imperialists' plans for intervention at that time. The fact that Iran "has not been attacked yet," it claimed, is "largely due to Soviet policy."

On the hostage question, Sturua asserted that imperialist propaganda is manipulating "the personal tragedy of the hostages" and Americans' sense of national honor, "wrongly interpreted," to kindle what he referred to as a "chauvinistic hysteria." Recalling a theme of previous Soviet commentaries, he went on to assert that the "hostage incident" was not the cause of the present crisis but a "pretext" that Washington had long sought to implement its global claims. On the other hand, in a rare, if not unprecedented, intimation to the Iranian audience of disapproval of the embassy takeover, a newscast item broadcast by Moscow radio's Persian-language service on 18 April replayed a statement by an obscure British union official opposing "the holding of American hostages in Tehran."

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SOVIET SUPPORT, ECONOMIC PROTOCOL

Soviet media have continued to reiterate the USSR's general support for Iran against U.S. pressure but so far have provided few specifics on the type and scope of prospective assistance to the Tehran regime. For example, PRAVDA on the 17th cited the Swedish foreign minister as saying that joint measures by the United States and its allies against Iran will not hurt that country's economy, since Iran can obtain the goods it needs from other countries, "especially the socialist countries." A more direct signal of Soviet intentions in the event of an expanded Western embargo came in a 23 April Persian-language newscast announcing the conclusion of a Soviet-Iranian protocol on economic and technical cooperation. The announcement, which provided no details on the scope or type of any future Soviet assistance to Iran, appeared to outline the agenda for future Soviet-Iranian talks in late May. According to the radio account, the protocol records the intent of both sides to expand economic cooperation in the future. A report in an English-language broadcast later on the 23d quoted the Iranian minister of economy and finance as saying that Iran and the Soviet Union had reached agreement on transporting Iranian imports through the USSR "in case of necessity." The minister also announced, the radio reported, that the two countries will soon "resume talks" on shipping Iranian gas to the Soviet Union.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

PONOMAREV CITES "HISTORICAL OPTIMISM" DESPITE U.S. POLICY TURN

CPSU Secretary Boris Ponomarev's 21 April speech in Moscow marking Lenin Day was a vigorous defense of current Soviet policies in the face of what he called a "massive anticommunist campaign" in the West. Ponomarev presented a boldly confident picture of the USSR's domestic and international positions and a grim view of the forces and philosophies now guiding policy in Western capitals. Ponomarev's approach seemed calculated to argue that neither internal economic trends nor international opprobrium require any changes in Moscow's unyielding posture at present on its presence in Afghanistan as well as on East-West security issues.

Ponomarev, a Politburo candidate member who heads the Central Committee's International Department, offered an interpretation of policy trends in the West and social trends in the world at large strongly supportive of his attitude of "historical optimism." The 1970's, he asserted, brought significant advances by the "anti-imperialist movement" across the world and a "noticeable" growth in the communist movement as well. He claimed to see increasing crisis in the West and an "upsurge" in the world revolutionary movement.

Ponomarev's exploration of the causes for recent Western policy trends would clearly discourage those who hoped for an early return to the era of detente. Behind the "sharp and dangerous turn" in the West's foreign policy, he maintained, is its concern over the advance of socialism and national liberation in the world. Western policy, he concluded, is increasingly under the control of the military-industrial complex and the forces of "extreme reaction." Ponomarev did express willingness to cooperate with those in the West who "take into account the realities of our time."

ALTERNATIVE VIEWS Statements by Moscow's foreign policy spokesmen since the beginning of the Afghanistan crisis have varied in their interpretation of U.S. and Western policy and, less explicitly, in their recommendations for Soviet policy. A markedly different view of U.S. policy was offered by USA and Canada Institute director Georgiy Arbatov in his 3 March PRAVDA article. Arbatov's interpretation of U.S. politics and the factors behind recent U.S. policy seemed supportive of renewed dialogue, even in the relatively near term. He linked troublesome aspects of recent U.S.

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policy to Washington's psychological difficulty in adjusting to strategic parity after a long era of superiority and to other potentially changing factors such as this year's Presidential elections. The struggle over basic foreign policy trends in the United States is not over, he contended, but only "flaring up with new force." He predicted that a sense of "true proportions" will emerge in Washington when the dust of Afghanistan settles.

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KAMPUCHEA

LEADERSHIP ANOMALIES SIGNAL HENG SAMRIN'S POLITICAL DECLINE

Heng Samrin, who became president of Kampuchea 16 months ago on the heels of the Vietnamese invasion, appears to be slipping from power. Although he is still described as KPRC president in reports on routine foreign greeting messages, Heng Samrin has not appeared in public since 5 April, missing both national day and new year celebrations, and a report on a recently drafted PRK constitution made no mention of the office of the presidency. Vice President Pen Sovan, who also serves as minister of defense and commander in chief of the army, has taken over many of Heng Samrin's functions in his absence. There have been scattered indications that Hanoi has been displeased with Heng Samrin and may favor Pen Sovan to lead the Phnom Penh regime.

Heng Samrin's failure to attend an 11 April KPRC meeting, which adopted a draft constitution for Kampuchea, capped earlier evidence suggesting that a realignment of power between the president and Pen Sovan was under way. According to the inexplicably belated 22 April Phnom Penh radio report on the meeting, Pen Sovan headed the list of participants, which included Foreign Minister Hun Sen, the minister in charge of drafting the constitution, Ros Samay, as well as Organization Commission Chairman Say Phuthang, and Propaganda and Education Commission Chairman Bou Thang. Closely resembling the Vietnamese draft constitution in format, the PRK draft constitutio.., according to the radio report, calls for a National Assembly and a Supreme Council of Ministers but contains no provision for a presidency thus casting an additional cloud over the scope of Heng Samrin's role in the regime.

Earlier this month, Heng Samrin's political trouble seemed to be reflected in Phnom Penh's description of the customary KPRC National Day banquet, a function he hosted last year. According to Phnom Penh radio this year's 15 April banquet was hosted "on behalf of the KPRC" by Vice President Pen Sovan for the "inner circle of the revolutionary family." This is the first time such a formulation

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is known to have been used. Only two members of the KPRC--Health Minister Nu Beng, who was in Laos, and Heng Samrin--were not reported among the participants,* and Vice President Pen Sovan's banquet remarks made no mention of Heng Samrin.

Other anomalies in Phnom Penh's treatment of Heng Samrin and Pen Sovan during the recent new year and national day celebrations point to the president's political decline. For example, a KPRC directive carried by Phnom Penh radio on 8 April indicated that Heng Samrin would deliver the national day rally speech, and a program preview broadcast on the radio on the 12th declared that he would send the new year's message. However, when both these events were actually reported by Phnom Penh, it was Pen Sovan, not Heng Samrin, who performed these functions.

Signs of Heng Samrin's political erosion have been apparent also in Phnom Penh's treatment of recent KPRC directives. For example, on 2 April--the day both leaders left for Hanoi to attend the funeral service for SRV President Ton Duc Thang--Pen Sovan was reported, for the first time, signing a KPRC directive, on economic transactions, "for the KPRC President." On 12 April, one day after the meeting to adopt the PRK draft constitution, Pen Sovan signed a 12 April KPRC circular, on celebrating Lenin's birthday, "for the KPRC." In the past, KPRC directives and documents have been signed only by Heng Samrin, either as "KPRC president," or "for the KPRC," or simply by the "Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council."

HANOI COMMENT Vietnamese discontent with the leadership of Heng Samrin may have prompted the low-key treatment Hanoi accorded this year's fifth anniversary of Kampuchean National Day. Hanoi marked the anniversary last year with a high-level VCP Politburo turnout at the PRK ambassador's reception and with a radio statement by the PRK ambassador, but this year it observed the quinquennial anniversary with only the customary greetings messages, press editorials, and a mass rally attended by low-ranking Politburo member Vo Chi Cong.

Sensitivity to Heng Samrin's current status seemed to be reflected in Hanoi's handling of a 16 April message from the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) to the KNUFNS, the Kampuchean front group. Vietnamese media the next day carried the VFF message only in excerpts, omitting the reference to the "clear-sighted leadership of the KNUFNS, headed by comrade President Heng Samrin," which was included in the Phnom Penh version of the VFF message. Earlier, on the 15th, Hanoi broadcasts in Cambodian and Thai appeared to reflect initial confusion over how to handle Heng Samrin's apparent political problems. Both

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* Non-KPRC leaders Bou Thang and Say Phuthang were also at the banquet.

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broadcasts incorrectly cited a 13 April SPK item as having reported Heng Samrin's name among the Kampuchean leaders making new year's visits. Several hours later, VNA appeared to obscure the entire question of Heng Samrin's absence from public view by citing the same SPK item without mentioning any of the names of the Kampuchean leaders making new year's visits.

There was evidence prior to Kampuchean National Day that Hanoi's confidence in Heng Samrin might be shifting to Pen Sovan. Pen Sovan was given lavish attention during his October stopover in Hanoi, on the return leg of a trip to the GDR. During the stopover, he was received by VCP General Secretary Le Duan, National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh SRV Premier Pham Van Dong, and he held talks with Senior General Van Tien Dung. By contrast, when Heng Samrin stopped over in Hanoi last month on his return from the GDR, he was received only by VCP Politburo alternate member Do Muoi.

Heng Samrin's current withdrawal from public view also casts new light on the failure of the joint communique marking his official visit to Vietnam last August to repeat the claim, made during Pham Van Dong's February 1979 visit to Phnom Penh, that a "complete identity of views" was reached during talks. It did not, in fact, contain any characterization of the atmospherics during the talks, an omission that could be taken to indicate the existence of tensions between the two sides.*

* See the 29 August 1979 TRENDS, page 8.

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KOREA

PYONGYANG SHARPENS CRITICISM OF SOUTH, REMAINS OPEN TO TALKS

Pyongyang has begun to sharpen its criticism of South Korea, which raises the possibility that the North may be reexamining its six-month-old policy of trying to reach a measure of accommodation with the post-Pak Chong-hui leadership in Seoul. Recent Pyongyang comment questioning Seoul's basic commitment to the North-South talks and, tentatively, even its fundamental approach to the reunification question may reflect growing DPRK doubts that the interim ROK Government has the political strength and motivation to move the dialogue forward.

The signals from North Korea are mixed. Recent Pyongyang comment, particularly on the 20th anniversary of the 19 April uprising in South Korea, has contained the sharpest criticism of the interim ROK Government since it assumed power following President Pak Chong-hui's assassination last October. At the same time, Pyongyang continues to indicate that it favors a meeting between the two countries' premiers and to portray differences at the current working-level North-South talks as negotiable.

NORTH-SOUTH CONTACTS Pyongyang accounts of the 18 April working-level meeting at Panmunjom, the sixth North-South contact in the current round of talks, continued to portray the remaining obstacle to a meeting of premiers of the two sides--the agenda--as an issue on which accommodation could still be reached. According to a Pyongyang radio account of the meeting, the North twice repeated the position it had espoused at the last session, namely that issues raised in the South's more detailed agenda proposal could be discussed under the North's general, single-item agenda. The report routinely treated differences between the two sides on the agenda issue more as a matter of emphasis than one of substance. Nevertheless, it did go beyond Pyongyang's previous, narrow criticism--that the ROK proposal lacked focus and clarity--to claim that weaknesses in the South's agenda position stemmed from a "wrong stance" on the reunification question. While such an accusation stops short of some of the charges leveled against the previous ROK Government, it does appear potentially more serious than the North's earlier complaint that there are just "differences" between the two sides' approaches to the dialogue.

The North also seemed to be raising questions about Seoul's basic position on reunification when it criticized the South for advocating a "step-by-step" approach on the issue. The Pyongyang account of the

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18 April meeting claimed without comment that the ROK side had advocated such an approach in calling for the two premiers to discuss "conditions" for reunification. However, a NODONG SINMUN commentary on the 20th, pegged to the meeting, denounced the South's approach as "absurd," arguing that discussion of conditions for unification would preclude discussion of the question of reunification itself. The commentary went on to label Seoul's agenda plan a repeat of Pak Chong-hui's discredited gradual approach to reunification.

UPRISING ANNIVERSARY

Both the major DPRK speech and the NODONG SINMUN editorial on the 19 April uprising anniversary were more critical of the South than, for example, comment on the comparable anniversary of the 1 March anti-Japanese uprising, and both omitted conciliatory formulations voiced on the occasion of the earlier anniversary. On the question of Seoul's approach to the dialogue, the 19 April editorial flatly stated that the South has "no interest" in contacts for reunification, a charge that first appeared in a 9 April NODONG SINMUN commentary responding to anticommunist rallies in the South. Before that commentary, the routine Pyongyang charge had been that the South's actions made people "suspect" its stance toward dialogue. Suggesting that the harsher line has not yet become the dominant one, the 19 April anniversary speech, delivered by Political Committee member Kim Man-kum, was less categorical than the NODONG SINMUN editorial, claiming only that the South's actions aroused "suspicions" about Seoul's intent. Kim had taken a similar line in an address on the 1 March anniversary.

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USSR

KAZAKHSTAN LEADERSHIP SHAKEUP HIGHLIGHTS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

In one of the most sweeping leadership changes in a Soviet republic in recent years, more than half the members of the Central Committee Bureau of Kazakhstan have been replaced over the past 16 months. The shakeup, carried out under the aegis of Kazakhstan First Secretary Kunayev, has had the effect both of distancing him from responsibility for the poor performance of the Kazakh economy and of reinforcing his image as a tough administator, willing and able to apply the strict standards of accountability called for by Brezhnev at the 28 November CPSU plenum. Among the sectors of the Kazakh economy that have declined are coal and nonferrous metals, both of which are of increasing concern at the national level as well.

Kunayev's overhaul of the top Kazakh leadership was accomplished in several stages. It began at the December 1978 Kazakh party plenum, where serious shortcomings in several areas of the economy were criticized and three members of the Bureau were removed; another was forced into retirement a month later. At the December 1979 Kazakh plenum, Kunayev echoed Brezhnev's call for resolutely replacing those who do not deserve the party's trust, and he followed through the same day by dropping two Bureau members: the second secretary, an industrial specialist who had been demoted in August, and the Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman. At the 25 March Kazakh plenum, the secretary in charge of industry was retired. Thus, of the 10 members of the Bureau in 1978, seven have been removed over the past 16 months. The changes in the party Bureau have been paralleled by an unusually high turnover of leadership personnel on the ministerial and oblast levels.

The extremely disappointing performance of the Kazakh economy during the current five-year plan appears to be the driving force behind much of the recent turnover. Despite the goal of a 40-percent industrial growth for the five-year period 1976-1980, Kazakh Gosplan Chairman Takezhanov reported in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA on 14 December that growth would reach only 16 percent for the four-year period 1976-1979. This performance was poorer than that of any other republic with the exception of Turkmenia. Kunayev himself has recently had to lower his expectations for growth in the coming year. Although an official growth rate of 5.7 percent was adopted in December, Kunayev expressed the hope at the plenum that month that growth would reach 6 percent. In his February election speech, however, he cited the lower figure of 5.7 percent.

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Coal production has been among the most disappointing sectors of the Kazakh economy. Difficulties in Karaganda, Kazakhstan's largest coal producing region, appear to have prompted some of the recent personnel changes. When Kunayev visited Karaganda in August, according to KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA on 7 August, he was critical of the coal industry and personally oversaw the appointment of Kazakh Second Secretary Korkin to the position of Karaganda first secretary and the pensioning of the incumbent, Akulintsev. At the December republic plenum, where Korkin's demotion was confirmed, Karaganda Second Secretary Nazarbaev was promoted to Kazakh party secretary for industry. Another major Kazakhstan coal producing region came under attack on 30 March, when PRAVDA published a CPSU Central Committee resolution criticizing the inadequacy of fuel production and conservation in Pavlodar.

Production of nonferrous metals is another major area in which Kazakh problems appear to be affecting the national economy. Kazakhstan is the major Soviet source of lead, zinc, and copper; and the production of these metals has become a subject of growing concern to authorities, according to Kazakh Second Secretary Miroshkhin in PARTY LIFE No. 6. Efforts in Moscow and Kazakhstan to deal with the problems have included the promotion of Kazakh Minister of Nonferrous Metallurgy Grebenyuk to First Deputy Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers and Bureau member at the beginning of 1979 and, more recently, various measures to focus government and scientific attention on the problem. A central role in these efforts has been played by the CPSU secretary in charge of industry, Dolgikh, who addressed a special session of the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy in Moscow on 10 January, as well as a special meeting on nonferrous metallurgy in Alma-Ata on 15 January, and subsequently visited various enterprises of the industry in Kazakhstan.

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STALIN ATTITUDE TOWARD PERSONALITY CULT ANALYZED IN NOVEL

An unusually frank discussion of Stalin's attitude toward the glorification of his personality has appeared in the latest installment--February 1980--of a historical novel that has been appearing episodically since 1978 in the journal ZNAMYA. "The Victory," a novel by LITERARY GAZETTE editor Chakovskiy, deals with the 1945 Potsdam conference and Stalin's role as world leader after the war. The novel appears to aim at presenting a more convincing and defensible portrait of Stalin than official formulations have heretofore provided. While the resultant image shows new tones of light and shade, it does not change essentially the official view, prevailing since early in the Brezhnev regime, that Stalin's contribution to history combined good and bad elements, with the good somewhat outweighing the bad.

In assessing Stalin's attitude toward his own glorification, Chakovskiy takes into account the well-documented inconsistencies in Stalin's character. Posing the question of Stalin's responsibility for the public flattery, Chakovskiy concludes that Stalin "undoubtedly" encouraged it. While his "esthetic, puritanical character" may have been offended by this flattery, Chakovskiy says, he would have reacted with the darkest suspicions to any diminution of the public flattery: "If the paeans of praise had begun to slacken or if his name had not appeared on virtually every newspaper page, Stalin probably would have attributed this to intrigues of his political enemies."

As for the assessment of Stalin's place in history, Chakovskiy does not alter the official view that Stalin's "positive" achievements at least balanced, if they did not outweigh, his "negative" traits. Seemingly addressing the challenge raised by dissident historian Roy Medvedev's book "Let History Judge," Chakovskiy declares that the "court of history" will balance Stalin's negative aspects against his achievements in the war, in industrialization and collectivization, and in fighting against deviations in the party. Although "millions of people condemn Stalin for his cruelty, willfulness, and arrogance," millions of others "will give him his due" for wisdom and perserverance, Chakovskiy argues. The regime's satisfaction with the novel's general appraisal of Stalin was indicated by a favorable review of the initial installments by political observer Yuriy Zhukov, published in PRAVDA on 24 December 1978.

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YUGOSLAVIA

DOLANC SPEECH OPENS NEW STAGE IN SUCCESSION CONTEST

LCY Presidium member Stane Dolanc has cracked the facade of Yugoslav leadership unity prevailing during Tito's illness with what may be the first move in an increasingly open succession struggle. Presenting himself as a defender of the party's "democratic" traditions, Dolanc has issued an unusually sharp warning to some party members who he charged were deliberately trying to undermine minority rights with a call for greater centralism. Dolanc's remarks, included in a major theoretical speech given at Edvard Kardelj University in Ljubljana on 14 April and carried by Ljubljana DELO the next day, should also serve to boost his standing in his native Slovenia and his efforts to carry on the late Kardelj's theoretical work.

Dolanc's comments came in the course of a lengthy dissertation on democratic centralism, a doctrine that has lent itself to both centralizing and decentralizing interpretations in LCY tradition. While acknowledging that democratic centralism implies the need for "appropriate order and discipline" in the Yugoslav party, Dolanc placed much greater stress on the concept's "democratic" implications, referring in this regard to LCY statutes and statements by Tito, Kardelj, and others. Dolanc then appeared to use the question of minority rights under democratic centralism to argue for the legitimacy of organized factions within the LCY. While "organizational minorities in the party" are sometimes harmful, he said, they can also "contribute to the revolutionary movement" when they follow the general party line and reflect real conditions. In the same vein, Dolanc attacked "bureaucratic-dogmatic" interpretations of democratic centralism, which, he said, are advocated by some party members who want to change the principle into a "tool of centralism, unitarism, and statism."

Dolanc's defense of organizational minorities will undoubtedly be welcomed by Slovene leaders, who have differed with Belgrade in recent months over such policies as leadership collectivity and economic stabilization. Dolanc's discussion of theoretical topics may be intended also to counter efforts by other leaders, like his rival Branko Mikulic, to fill the vacuum left by Kardelj as the party's leading ideologist.

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BRIEFS

MOSCOW ON PDRY: Moscow has reacted cautiously to the 20-21 April leadership changes in South Yemen, reporting without comment the "resignation" on "health grounds" of PDRY party leader and President 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and his "appointment" to the apparently titular post of Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) chairman. A 21 April TASS dispatch, drawing on the Aden radio account of the YSP Central Committee meeting, also noted that the Central Committee elected current Prime Minister 'Ali Nasir Muhammad the new party general secretary and "asked him to attend to the duties" of state president until the "next session" of the governmental Supreme People's Council, which is scheduled to meet, according to Aden radio, on 26 April. Brezhnev's congratulations to Muhammad, available only from a brief 22 April TASS report, pledged Soviet support, "as before," and expressed the "certainty" that relations between the two countries would continue to develop and strengthen, based on the October 1979 Soviet-PDRY friendship treaty. The message appears less enthusiastic than Brezhnev's congratulations to Isma'il following the latter's assumption of the reorganized PDRY presidency from Muhammad in December 1978. At that time the Soviet leader offered Isma'il his "heartfelt congratulations and best wishes for success," a formulation missing in the TASS account of the current message. Typically reticent on diplomatic contacts, Moscow has not acknowledged Muhammad's 21 April meeting with the Soviet ambassador in the PDRY, reported by Aden radio the following day. At this meeting, according to Aden, the two officials discussed a number of issues "relating to the development of bilateral relations between the YSP and the CPSU" and between their two governments. Moscow's coverage of the PDRY's June 1978 leadership upheaval--the "resignation" and subsequent execution of former President Rubayyi'--had been initially circumspect; following a brief interval, however, Soviet media charged Saudi Arabia with meddling in the area.

MOSCOW ON LIBERIAN COUP: Low-level Soviet comment on the 12 April assassination of Liberian President William Tolbert at the hands of disgruntled army troops has alleged that Liberia's past ties to the United States fueled the corruption that felled the regime. For example, Moscow Radio Peace and Progress on 14 April charged that Tolbert had increased his own wealth by allowing the "unbridled plunder" of natural resources by U.S. monopolies operating in Liberia, which became known "as the country of Firestone, an American company which owned huge rubber plantations." The Soviet charge that the Tolbert regime promoted U.S. policy objectives in Africa was also reflected in a Moscow radio broadcast to Africa on the 15th. It argued that the coup demonstrated

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the severe social and economic shortcomings of Liberia, which was once considered the "showcase" of the United States and a "model" of the "so-called moderate states" in Africa. The broadcast contained a reference to last April's demonstrations against the Tolbert government, a development that Liberian officials at the time claimed had been incited by Soviet diplomatic personnel in Monrovia. Citing the Senegalese press, the broadcast endorsed the view that the unrest preceding Tolbert's ouster reflected local discontent and demand for "radical" change in Liberia's domestic policy "and not the work of outside subversive groups, as Liberian officials in the past have tried to suggest." Soviet commentators generally have reserved judgment on the country's new military government; a panelist on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program on the 20th called it "too early to draw any conclusions" regarding what direction the new leaders might take. The broadcast on the 15th, however, did link the new leaders' prospects for success to their ability to win the support of indigenous Liberians, and it indicated that the new leadership's decision to release from prison members of the leftist Progressive People's Party appears to signal its intention to seek broadly based popular support.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 14 - 20 APRIL 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3304 items)			Beijing (808 items)		
U.S.-Iran Situation	9%	(7%)	Italian Communist Party Leader Berlinguer in PRC	13%	(--)
Zimbabwe Independence	5%	(--)	Zimbabwe Independence	13%	(--)
Olympic Boycott	4%	(1%)	Democratic Kampuchean National Day	4%	(--)
People's Republic of Kampuchea National Day	3%	(--)	Fifth National People's Congress Standing Committee 14th Session	3%	(4%)
Middle East Situation	3%	(3%)	Afghan Situation	3%	(6%)

Moscow coverage on Afghanistan has been declining from a high of 16% in January to 1% this week.

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- •USSR, PRC on U.S. hostage rescue attempt
- •Gromyko visit to Paris
- •Political impact of sanctions in USSR
- •DPRK disarray on reunification policy
- •Pyongyang attitudes on Afghanistan, USSR
- •Italian communist visit to China
- •Cuba on refugees

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

[redacted]

USSR-IRAN-PRC

Moscow responded to the U.S. hostage rescue attempt on 24 April just as it had dealt with speculation in the weeks before that Washington was contemplating military action--offering sharp propaganda criticism and derision and virtually no official comment. Routine-level commentary has assailed the rescue effort as a reckless action in violation of international law and charged Washington with exploiting the hostage issue for domestic political considerations as well as to enhance the U.S. political and military position in the Middle East. The only official reaction thus far came in remarks by Foreign Minister Gromyko--elicited in reply to questions at his Paris news conference--expressing opposition to any military action against Iran. Despite recent Soviet-Iranian talks on economic and technical cooperation, Moscow's reluctance to crowd Tehran with concrete expressions of support suggests continuing uncertainty over future Soviet-Iranian relations.

Beijing has expressed concern that the attempt to rescue the hostages has further complicated the U.S.-Iranian crisis and provided Moscow with opportunities both to divert attention from its intervention in Afghanistan and to make inroads into Iran. Beijing accordingly has called on both sides to act with restraint and resolve the crisis peacefully.

USSR CAUSTIC ON RESCUE MISSION, DISCREET ON SUPPORT FOR IRAN

Soviet comment has characterized the rescue attempt in blunt language as a "reckless action," a "shameful fiasco," and a violation of "all international laws and regulations." A Persian-language talk broadcast on the 29th, echoing unattributed allegations carried earlier by TASS and Moscow radio, noted Ayatollah Khalkhali's charges that the real objective of the rescue operation was "to overthrow the present regime and to take Ayatollah Khomeyni hostage." The bulk of the comment, however, has merely reiterated ongoing themes.* Moscow has again decried President Carter's alleged personal disregard for the hostages' fate and his supposedly paramount interest in securing

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* The hostage rescue attempt prompted no increase in the number of Soviet broadcast commentary items on the U.S.-Iranian crisis, which for the past three weeks has ranged from 7 to 9 percent of the total number of commentary items monitored by FBIS.

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reelection and has continued to point out that the United States has ignored Iranian demands. Moscow also has tried to exploit the situation to stress allied dissatisfaction with U.S. actions.

GROMYKO REMARKS Gromyko was cautious in his Paris press conference remarks on 25 April, the day President Carter announced the abortive rescue mission. As reported in PRAVDA the following day, Gromyko responded to a question on the rescue operation by saying that the USSR opposed all military or "forcible" measures against Iran on the part of the United States "or anyone else"--a possible allusion to Iraq. The "only possible" path to a solution is a peaceful one, he said. Asked if the Soviet Union could be of assistance in freeing the hostages, Gromyko said that "no one is asking for this." Regarding the Soviet position on the hostage issue, he said it had been set forth earlier and there "is no need to repeat it." Gromyko dodged a question on a possible Iranian request for Soviet assistance should the United States interfere in Iran's affairs, saying that this was a "hypothetical situation," which he had no need to consider," and adding: "At any rate, I would prefer not to do so."*

Earlier, the first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department, Valentin Falin, had been somewhat more forthcoming on similar questions. In a Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG interview, published on 19/20 April--not publicized in Soviet media--Falin said that "for now one cannot make any recommendation" on how the hostage issue could be resolved, and he conceded that "I do not envy" the United States in this situation. He reiterated that the Soviet Union did not approve of the holding of the American diplomats, an action "grossly at odds with international law." Asked if Moscow could use its influence on behalf of the hostages, Falin said "we have tried to be helpful" by informing the Tehran government that international law must be respected, and "the Americans have been informed about our steps." Repeating standard criticism of past U.S. policy in "imposing the shah on Iran," Falin said this did not mean that the Soviet Union regarded the taking of hostages as excusable.

OTHER COMMENT Aside from Gromyko's remarks, the closest Moscow has come to even a quasi-official statement on the rescue attempt was an unsigned TASS article on the 25th entitled "Stop This Recklessness," which was broadcast widely in Moscow radio's European

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* Iranian President Bani-Sadr, in a news conference reported by Tehran radio on the 26th, responded to a question about the applicability of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty in the event of an invasion of Iran by saying that the relevant articles of that agreement had been unilaterally repudiated by Iran. "We depend on ourselves and we will not agree to Soviet interference in this issue," he said.

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beams as well as to Iran, North America, and other areas. The 25 April article resembled another widely disseminated--and also unsigned--TASS article, of 8 April, which appeared to represent Moscow's semiofficial reaction to the U.S. announcement of the break in U.S.-Iranian relations on 7 April.* In the vein of the earlier TASS piece, the later one argued that if it were only a question of the hostages, the problem could have been resolved long ago on the basis of Iranian proposals. The earlier TASS article had maintained that U.S. actions were guided by "imperialist interests," not by concern for the U.S. Embassy personnel. The more recent one called the hostage issue a pretext for implementing an "aggressive and hegemonistic policy" aimed at forcing Iran to submit to imperialist diktat and at strengthening the U.S. presence in the region. And with an eye to the recent West European decisions on political and economic sanctions, TASS took a swipe at Washington's NATO allies for failing to try to stop the Americans' "reckless actions" and supporting instead the U.S. line of "blackmail, threats, and economic pressure" against Iran. The issue of the rescue mission was brushed aside in effect by Vitaliy Sobolev, a panelist on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program on the 27th, who said the "military significance" of the action "is indeed not very great," the more so since it "resulted in failure." The losses were inconsiderable and were suffered, he noted unsympathetically, "by the aggressors themselves."

Playing to the Iranian audience, a Persian-language commentary by Igor Savchenko on the 26th struck the shrillest note. Expanding on an earlier TASS charge, Savchenko asserted that President Carter had "prepared death for tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of Iranians." And he called the "flood of rage" resulting from Washington's action "completely logical and legitimate." But he did not directly offer Soviet support to Iran, noting only that the country was supported by "all the world's progressive forces" and that Iran was "prepared to give a strong and silencing reply to imperialism's offenses." Other comment has also been cautious in extending Soviet sympathy: A 27 April RED STAR article merely observed, for example, that "all honest people in the world" support the Iranian people.

BEIJING REGRETS RESCUE ATTEMPT, FEARS SOVIET GAINS IN IRAN

Chinese concern over the impact of the rescue mission initially was conveyed authoritatively in a Foreign Ministry Information Department spokesman statement on 27 April, two days after President Carter's announcement of the aborted rescue operation. The seriousness with which Beijing views the potential for Soviet involvement in the

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* See TRENDS, 16 April 1980, page 1.

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situation was indicated by RENMIN RIBAO's subsequent publication of two Commentator articles, one on the 28th and the other on the 30th. XINHUA has also drawn heavily from international reaction to underscore its concern that the crisis be ended peacefully and without further advantage to the Soviet Union.

The statement by the Foreign Ministry Information Department spokesman charged that the rescue operation and U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran were violations of Iranian territorial integrity and sovereignty and "not helpful toward a solution" of the crisis. The statement at the same time expressed Beijing's hope that Tehran will release the U.S. hostages "as soon as possible," and, conveying Beijing's belief that Moscow seeks to profit from the situation, enjoined both sides to act with "restraint and prudence" and resolve the crisis through peaceful consultations "so that no opportunity will be given to people who have ulterior motives."

The 28 April RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article amplified Beijing's concern about the potential for increased Soviet involvement in the region. Expressing "regret" at the U.S. sanctions and violation of Iranian territory but calling the American people's consternation at Iran's continued retention of the hostages "understandable," Commentator urged both Washington and Tehran nevertheless to "take the whole situation into account." Noting that the independence and security of all the states on the Persian Gulf have been "seriously threatened" by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the article stated that "it is very clear who will benefit from the worsening of U.S.-Iranian relations" and suggested that a negotiated solution to the crisis and a gradual improvement in relations between Washington and Tehran not only conforms to the interest of both sides but also will "help stabilize the world situation."

The second RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article dwelled specifically on Soviet attempts to "pour oil on the fire" of the Iranian-American situation in the wake of the rescue attempt, taking note of alleged Soviet efforts to build up its forces on the Iranian border and to "make known its readiness to support Iran in military and other fields" in the face of U.S. "pressure." In the context of Soviet readiness to use U.S. pressure on Iran as a pretext for direct intervention, Commentator warned, all countries share a responsibility in appealing to both Washington and Tehran to "exercise great restraint" and resolve the hostage issue "in a proper way." A 28 April commentary by XINHUA correspondent Guo Ping, a frequent commentator on South and Southeast Asian affairs, had similarly elaborated Beijing's concerns over Soviet ambitions in the region, pointing out that the U.S. rescue operation has provided Moscow with a pretext to act as Iran's "protector," build up its forces on Iran's borders, and even intervene directly in Iran.

Since the beginning of the Iranian crisis, Beijing has maintained a balanced approach, mildly criticizing both U.S. actions toward

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Iran and Tehran's failure to observe international conventions and warning of the potential for new Soviet involvement in the region. A 26 November Foreign Ministry Information Department spokesman statement--Beijing's earliest authoritative reaction to the crisis--urged that all conventions of international behavior be observed universally, while condemning all interference in one country's internal affairs by other countries, and called for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Accompanying XINHUA comment had warned about the potential for Soviet advances in the region as a result of the deterioration of U.S.-Iran relations, concerns which heightened in the wake of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan.

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EAST - WEST RELATIONS

GROMYKO UNYIELDING ON EAST-WEST ISSUES DURING PARIS VISIT

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's 23-25 April visit to Paris--his first official consultation with a major Western power since Moscow intervened in Afghanistan last December--revealed no give in the uncompromising Soviet position in the current East-West impasse. Gromyko pointedly rebuffed his French host's call for some positive Soviet steps on Afghanistan to improve the East-West climate, reaffirming Moscow's position that Soviet troops would be withdrawn only after "aggression" against that country had ceased. The results of Gromyko's visit complement other signs of continuing Soviet inflexibility on East-West matters, most recently its harsh assessment of the West's latest proposals at the just-concluded round of MBFR talks in Vienna.

Gromyko's public statements during the Paris visit left no doubt that, in the Soviet view, it is up to the West to take the first move toward resuming substantive East-West negotiations. Following his luncheon with President Giscard d'Estaing on the 24th, Gromyko reiterated Moscow's interest in detente and desire to overcome the "difficulties" in the international situation. But nothing new in the Soviet position emerged from his visit. He repeated Moscow's position on the causes of the current impasse and of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan without nuance in his 25 April press conference. He dismissed Western statements on the Afghanistan situation as "artificially inflated." Gromyko explicitly rejected France's views on the Afghan issue, maintaining that any talk of withdrawing Soviet troops first and then discussing other questions--the French position--was a "mirage . . . a waste of time . . . simply unrealistic."

Gromyko's remarks during the visit served to reconfirm Moscow's inflexible public posture on East-West arms control discussions since NATO decided to modernize its theater forces in December. In his press conference Gromyko addressed SALT only in the context of accusing the Carter Administration of arranging its "funeral," and he failed altogether to mention the MBFR talks, whose 20th round concluded in Vienna earlier this month. Gromyko stated during his press conference that he had reached a "certain understanding" with the French on the holding of a European conference on military detente, an idea on which Moscow and Paris have differed in the past. The final communique on the visit, however, showed little evidence of progress, merely recording the two sides' expectation that the

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November Madrid CSCE review conference would work out the modalities for such a meeting.

MBFR Since the first of the year, Soviet commentators have been offering pessimistic forecasts for the MBFR negotiations and suggesting that any change is dependent on revision of the NATO Council's decision to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and even on U.S. ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Soviet statements during the recently concluded 20th MBFR session took a correspondingly dim view of the new MBFR proposals approved by the NATO Council session. Soviet chief delegate Tarasov, in a summary of the results of the 20th round carried in the 4 April PRAVDA, dismissed the Western proposals as a step backward. The proposals cancel the results of six years of work, Tarasov said, and return the talks to the point at which they started in 1973. NOVOSTI political observer Beglov, writing in PRAVDA on 23 April, derided the NATO MBFR proposal in similarly uncompromising terms, suggesting that NATO, in offering the plan, apparently hoped that no one would notice that the line had been crossed from dialogue to "blackmail."

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U.S. SANCTIONS EVOKE NEW STRESS ON AUTARKY IN MOSCOW

The economic sanctions announced by President Carter last January have apparently given new respectability to Soviet advocates of economic autarky. The latest and most dramatic evidence of this development came in an 18 April speech by Anatoliy Aleksandrov, president of the Academy of Sciences, calling on Soviet scientists to make the USSR "completely independent" of foreign trade. It remains to be seen what practical effect this new public stress on self-sufficiency will have on Soviet foreign economic policy. Leading economists in the Academy of Sciences itself have made it clear that they see no alternative to the USSR's expanding involvement in the global economy.

Aleksandrov's remarks came at a meeting in Moscow commemorating Soviet Science Day. According to the Moscow domestic radio recorded account of his address, Aleksandrov made an impassioned appeal for Soviet autarky while confirming that he was drawing lessons from recent international events:

> At present our science and technology are developed to such an extent that there is nothing we could not do at home by our own effort. Naturally it is often simpler to order a purchase or two abroad, but the present situation shows that it is necessary for us to concentrate our energies on making our country completely independent of any and all foreign deliveries, especially when this concerns questions of vital importance for the country . . . . Our duty and our conscience demand that we expend our efforts to make it impossible for methods of force from abroad to impede or weaken our development.

The Soviet central press did not report on the substance of Aleksandrov's address at the session, but the Academy's monthly organ, BULLETIN OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, may carry the text in a forthcoming issue.

That Soviet economists see little alternative to a continuing expansion of Soviet involvement in the world economy was reaffirmed in an article by Oleg Bogomolov, head of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economy of the World Socialist System, in the March issue of WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Taking into account the lessons of recent international events, Bogomolov conceded that the socialist states must avoid making themselves "strategically vulnerable." At the same time, he made it clear that he thought this was a manageable problem within the context of continuing expansion of East-West economic ties. The socialist states, he maintained, "are opponents

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of economic isolation." Bogomolov maintained that broadened economic ties were not a matter of political choice but the inevitable result of economic development:

> Economic cooperation of states, including those belonging to different social systems, is an objective law of our era. The demands of economic life presuppose an ever-expanding division of labor on a universal scale. The scientific-technical revolution has added to traditional factors of this division of labor new factors conditioned by the high concentration and technical equipment of modern production. The scope of the industrial output, its technical complexity--especially in mechanical engineering, electronics, and chemistry--is so great that even the largest and most developed states cannot effectively manufacture this entire product.

BACKGROUND A central element of the Brezhnev regime's detente policy, as it unfolded in the early 1970's, was the pursuit of national economic modernization through expanded cooperation with the industrially advanced capitalist world. Brezhnev--amid signs of entrenched internal resistance to the broader political and ideological overtones of such cooperation--launched a major campaign to justify this pursuit with a public renunciation of "autarky" in May 1973. The leaders of the three main Soviet foreign affairs "think tanks"--Bogomolov, Nikolay Inozemstev, and Georgiy Arbatov--were prominent in a subsequent media publicity effort to explain the practical benefits of international cooperation for the Soviet economy as well as its professed beneficial effects on East-West relations.* The full program apparently envisaged by Brezhnev in 1973 has never been fully implemented. It has been frustrated by continuing political restraints on trade in the West and by bureaucratic obstruction of associated institutional reforms in the USSR.

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* The public evidence of Soviet debate over this issue in 1973 and 1974 is discussed in the FBIS Special Report of 5 April 1974, "Pressures for Change in Soviet Foreign Economic Policy."

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KOREA

DPRK LEADERSHIP APPEARS DIVIDED ON NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE POLICY

There is mounting evidence of a debate in North Korea over Pyongyang's policy on reunification with South Korea. For the first time it appears that a faction, perhaps centered in the DPRK army, may oppose Pyongyang's initiatives in the past six months to reach a measure of accommodation with Seoul. The indications of such disagreement are faint; but, given the strong united front the DPRK leadership normally shows to the world, any public evidence of disagreement is unusual and thus highly significant.

The impression that Pyongyang might be debating its policy toward the South first emerged this month as North Korean media began to send mixed signals on the issue--increasing criticism of Seoul together with reinforcement of the DPRK's commitment to the North-South talks initiated earlier this year.* Possible evidence of the lines of conflict on the issue appeared in a speech by North Korean army Chief of Staff O Kuk-yol at a 24 April meeting on the army anniversary.

A departure from traditional practice in O Kuk-yol's speech suggested that he had reservations about Pyongyang's efforts to move toward accommodation with South Korea in the wake of the assassination last October of ROK President Pak Chong-hui. O Kuk-yol broke with nine years of practice and omitted the usual injunction to take Kim Il-song's annual New Year address as a source of guidance. That the issue of policy toward the South prompted this omission is suggested by the fact that Kim's address had played down the question of reunification to a remarkable extent and seemed intended to lay the groundwork for the DPRK call later in January for talks between the premiers of North and South Korea. The Kim New Year address had been regularly cited in the major army day speech since 1971, when Kim resumed offering his New Year guidance after a hiatus of five years.

O Kuk-yol's silence on Kim's address does not appear to indicate that a reversal of DPRK policy has already occurred. Despite Pyongyang's sharpened criticism of Seoul in recent weeks, it has continued to offer a positive view of the North-South working-level meetings

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* Pyongyang's recent treatment of South Korea is discussed in the 23 April 1980 TRENDS, pages 8-9.

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in Panmunjon. Similarly, Kim's low-keyed handling of reunification has not been abandoned; the 15 April NODONG SINMUN editorial on his birthday broke with recent precedent and failed even to refer to reunification. Moreover, the line of accommodation was pushed forward in an unusual interview with Political Committee member Kim Yong-nam, carried by DPRK media on 25 April. After reiterating the standard DPRK position on reunification through North-South confederation, Kim said that after reunification "all concessions of foreign capital" in South Korea would be "firmly guaranteed" and the country would promote economic cooperation with "all countries" if they helped in constructing a "new fatherland." This offer of moderation on economic issues had not previously been promoted in DPRK media and contrasts sharply with usual Pyongyang line that foreign economic activity in the South is an insult to Korea and a burden on the people.

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DPRK ISOLATES AFGHAN ISSUE FROM EFFORTS TO MEND TIES WITH USSR

Pyongyang has continued to signal its reservation about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan without commenting directly on the issue. At the same time, North Korea seems intent on preventing the Afghan crisis from derailing its year-long effort to improve its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

North Korean opposition to the Soviet move into Afghanistan was suggested initially by Pyongyang's failure to congratulate the new Afghan Government headed by Babrak Karmal. In February, two months after Karmal took power, Kabul reported that Kim Il-song had sent a message of congratulations, but no such message was ever monitored from DPRK media. Pyongyang media did not even mention Karmal until 26 April, when it publicized Kim Il-song's low-key message to him on the second anniversary of the Afghan revolution. Reflecting Pyongyang's wariness, the message omitted optimistic praise for the Afghan revolution that had characterized Kim's greetings on the 1979 anniversary; instead it focused tersely on the need for Afghanistan to overcome difficulties, safeguard the gains of its revolution, and safeguard its independence. Pyongyang media have also played down contacts with Afghanistan; thus Kabul, but not Pyongyang, media reported the signing of a DPRK-Afghan radio and television agreement last month.

Despite these indications of North Korean misgivings about developments in Afghanistan, Pyongyang has been portraying the state of Soviet-DPRK relations more positively than it did from 1974 to 1978. In February, for example, Pyongyang's celebration of Soviet Army Day included toasts to the "militant friendship" of the two armies. Similarly, toasts at the mid-March anniversary of a DPRK-USSR economic and cultural agreement hailed the "unbreakable" friendship of the two countries, a more positive characterization than last year's toasts to the "fraternal" friendship between them. Nevertheless, tensions created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan appeared to be reflected in DPRK reports on the anniversaries, which omitted characterizations of the atmospherics of the festivities included in reports in 1979.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

Italian Communist Party (PCI) leader Enrico Berlinguer's recent visit to China capped a process begun a year ago of restoring relations between the Italian and Chinese communist parties. The reestablishment of party ties, broken in 1966, is a dramatic example of Beijing's efforts in recent years to align its policies toward foreign communist parties with the priorities of PRC foreign policy. For the PCI, the restoration of ties with the CCP and Berlinguer's visit, coming in the context of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan, mark the beginning of a more assertively independent foreign policy.

CCP WELCOMES RESTORED PCI TIES DESPITE CONTINUING DIFFERENCES

Chinese satisfaction in the formal resumption of party ties with the PCI was evident throughout Berlinguer's 14-23 April visit, although Beijing frankly acknowledged that the two parties continue to differ on fundamental issues. XINHUA explicitly laid out the substance of the differences in a long background report on the Italian party at the outset of the visit, noting CCP-PCI divergences principally over the question of the inevitability of war, the characterization of the USSR as "social-imperialist," and the nature of the Soviet role in world affairs.

During the visit Chinese party leaders repeatedly stressed the two parties' solidarity despite their basic differences. CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng, feting the delegation on the 15th, welcomed the opportunity for the two parties to hold "comradely talks on issues of common concern, share experiences and exchange views." Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, meeting with Italian journalists accompanying the delegation on the 17th, praised the two parties' readiness to "put differences aside" and brushed aside a question on Beijing's response to the PCI's criticism of the PRC's punitive attack on Vietnam last year with the remark, "That is all right." CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang, speaking at the farewell banquet on the 22d, said that the two parties' commitment to common goals and ideals forms the "ideological basis of our longterm unity and cooperation," despite continuing "divergences and differences" on "some problems," and praised the PCI's "workstyle of strictness, seriousness, and treating others on an equal footing."

Chinese readiness to resume party relations was evident last October when the party paper RENMIN RIBAO printed a PCI Central Committee greeting to the CCP on PRC National Day. That the CCP may retain

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ties to Italian "Marxist-Leninist" organizations was indicated at the same time in RENMIN RIBAO's acknowledgment of greetings from three such parties. Also in the latter half of last year, the CCP and the PCI exchanged press delegations, and a long report by the RENMIN RIBAO delegation on its Italian tour, appearing in the party paper last November, took particular note of the "friendship" the PCI displayed for the Chinese people.

Earlier last year China's increasingly flexible attitude toward the Italian party had been signaled when Beijing media began to report on the PCI's positions on foreign and domestic policy issues. In April last year, for example, XINHUA reported briefly and without comment on the PCI's 15th party congress, but at the same time noted that the PCI had "openly defended Soviet-supported Vietnamese aggression in Indochina, a position which XINHUA observed had "aroused wide attention in Italian public opinion" in the context of increasing concern over a growing Soviet "threat" to West Europe itself. While Beijing had strongly encouraged the NATO decision to proceed with its modernization program last fall, XINHUA reported, without explicit comment, the PCI's opposition to the plan and Berlinguer's proposal to postpone the decision. Chinese media reported with evident favor the PCI's condemnation last January of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its decision not to attend the recent Paris meeting of communist parties. The more explicit and balanced reporting on the PCI's views reversed a long pattern of generally negative allusions to the PCI in the Chinese press as a "pro-Soviet force" in Italy, although in 1976 Chinese media had referred favorably to PCI resistance to Soviet pressures for conformity in the international communist movement.

IMPETUS FOR RESUMPTION — Chinese willingness to restore party ties with the PCI, despite continuing differences over issues that were once held to be paramount, exemplifies the CCP's more flexible approach to its relations with foreign parties since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. This flexibility was manifested first in 1977 by the resumption of CCP ties with the Yugoslav League of Communists and thereafter by the CCP's expansion of ties with a wide variety of Third World "progressive" and leftwing organizations.

The expansion of CCP ties with other parties appears to have resulted from Beijing's effort to weld the criteria for such relations to the priorities of Chinese foreign policy that have emerged since the early 1970's, divorcing them from the ideological and geopolitical considerations that had dominated during the Cultural Revolution. Now coinciding with the fundamental principles guiding PRC foreign policy, the touchstone to distinguish between orthodoxy and revisionism appears to be opposition to "hegemonism."

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Hu Yaobang explicitly enunciated this new basis for the CCP's foreign relationships for the first time in his remarks to Italian journalists on the 15th. The CCP, he stated, is "willing to establish, restore, and develop relations with all working class parties that uphold independence and a correct position." The CCP will oppose all self-proclaimed communist parties, he went on to say, which "bully other parties, interfere with other countries' internal affairs, and even invade and occupy other countries' territories by force." Hu's formulation of the basis for Chinese party ties with foreign parties appears to build on the new definition of revisionism put forward in a highly authoritative speech by Vice Chairman Ye Jianying on PRC National Day last year, in which "revisionism" was characterized as "oppression of the people at home and pursuit of hegemony abroad."

On that basis Hu specifically ruled out the possibility of a resumption of CCP ties with the CPSU. A bitter Beijing radio commentary on 22 April--the 110th anniversary of Lenin's birth--in that regard appeared to apply the new definition of revisionism specifically to the Soviet Union without actually branding the CPSU "revisionist." Outlining at length Lenin's enunciation of the Soviet Union's foreign policy on the basis of peace and mutual international respect, the commentary cited the "Brezhnev clique's" "nibbling at Chinese territory and provocation of border disputes" and its "annexation" of Afghanistan as a ruthless betrayal of Lenin's foreign policy principles.

With respect to the PCI, the CCP's resumption of ties is accordingly based on the recognition that the Italian party has taken positions independent of Moscow and, with the newly restored ties, can be encouraged to do so again. In toasting Berlinguer on the 15th, for example, Hua Guofeng voiced the CCP's "appreciation and admiration" for the PCI's "upholding its independence and its exploration of the road to socialism." XINHUA's background introduction to the PCI pointed out similarly that while the PCI and CCP hold different views on the question of the inevitability of war and the characterization of the Soviet Union as "social-imperialist," the PCI nevertheless opposes "hegemony in any form" and strongly denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as well as Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan.

BERLINGUER CHINA VISIT MARKS NEW PCI FOREIGN POLICY POSTURE

Italian Communist Party Secretary General Berlinguer's visit to China serves to affirm dramatically the PCI's commitment to an autonomous line in foreign policy even at the risk of offending Moscow. Coming in the wake of sharp Soviet-PCI polemics over Afghanistan, it appears to mark an end to the Italian party's

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long-standing preoccupation with avoiding actions that Moscow might construe as overtly anti-Soviet. The Berlinguer visit establishes a counterpoint to French party chief Marchais' current efforts to mobilize West European communist support for Moscow's Afghan policies and as such underscores the divisive impact of Moscow's intervention on the West European communist movement.*

Despite the sharp break with the Soviet bloc on foreign policy symbolized by the Berlinguer visit, Moscow has so far been slow to take public umbrage. Soviet media have acknowledged the visit but they have not yet offered any significant commentary. In his departure remarks in Rome as well as in his subsequent statements in China, Berlinguer himself asserted that his visit was not directed against any third party--meaning Moscow--but stemmed from the PCI's belief in the need for dialogue among all forces interested in preserving peace. At a 22 April press conference in Beijing, reported by XINHUA, Berlinguer noted that his talks with the Chinese leaders proved that the existence of differing views was no obstacle to dialogue between the two parties. He noted that the two sides differed on the Soviet Union, saying that the PCI "did not agree to regard the Soviet Union as an enemy," and adding that "neither do we regard China as an enemy."

The PCI has long avowed its interest in restoring interparty ties--severed by the CCP in 1966 during the Cultural Revolution--despite continuing ideological differences. The Italian party's policy in this regard runs historically from former party leader Togliatti's 1964 "Yalta Memorandum," which counseled against excommunicating the CCP from the international communist movement, through Berlinguer's speech at the 1969 Moscow World Communist Conference, where the PCI delegation took strong exception to the criticism voiced at the conclave against the absent Chinese party. Before Berlinguer's visit, attempts by the Italians to repair relations with the CCP had not met with equal enthusiasm from the Chinese. Spanish party leader Carrillo, during his visit to China in 1971, carried a message from the PCI that proposed resuming contacts, but PCI foreign affairs spokesman Pajetta subsequently revealed that the offer had evoked no interest on the Chinese side. Reports in the West on Berlinguer's meeting with visiting CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng in Rome last November had suggested that normalization of CCP-PCI ties was imminent, though Pajetta later tempered such speculation by intimating that the process was likely to take a long time.

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* CPSU-PCI differences over Afghanistan are discussed in the TRENDS of 16 January 1980, pages 15-18, and 23 January 1980, pages 6-8.

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CUBA

CUBA CLAIMS U.S. STAND ON REFUGEES BELIES "RIGHTS" POLICY

Havana has seized on the negative U.S. reaction to Cuba's recent approval of an exodus of disaffected Cubans from the port of Mariel to Florida to press its charge that the U.S. stand on immigration belies Washington's human rights policy. Cuba's move may have been designed at least in part to pressure Washington into negotiating directly with the Castro regime on the Cuban refugee problem, which Havana contends was created by the United States. Havana had earlier insisted on the principle of negotiations on refugees in a Foreign Ministry statement that rejected the use of Costa Rica as a way station for Cuban refugees before their acceptance by the United States and other countries.

The Cuban approval of the sealift--a tactic similar to that used by Fidel Castro in 1965, when thousands of Cubans were permitted to depart for the United States from the port of Camarioca--was the latest Cuban maneuver in the dispute over the mass exodus which erupted early this month. The Cuban Government on 4 April had offered to permit a mass departure following the death of a Cuban guard, who was attempting to prevent a group of Cuban asylum-seekers from forcibly entering the Peruvian Embassy grounds. The resulting flood of would-be emigres in the Peruvian Embassy led to an arrangement whereby the refugees would be airlifted to Costa Rica, where they would be cleared before obtaining permanent asylum in other countries.

Cuba appeared to be hinting that it intended to increase pressure on the United States to accept the refugees in a Foreign Ministry statement on the 19th, which announced a halt to the airlift to Costa Rica, declaring that there was no need for a "distribution center." The statement pointedly added that "to travel to the United States," there was no need to set up a camp in Costa Rica since it was faster and cheaper to fly directly to Key West. A second Foreign Ministry statement, on the 24th, reiterated rejection of Costa Rica as a way station and insisted that there must be Cuban-Costa Rican "discussions" before any Cubans departed for residence in Costa Rica--in effect establishing the principle of prior negotiations with any potential host country.

Cuban approval of the sealift of refugees to the United States was signaled in a 21 April GRANMA article, which said the Cuban Government was "not opposed" to vessels "coming from Florida to pick up

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antisocial elements." Defending Havana's action, GRANMA on the 25th labeled as "a shameless lie" a State Department statement that the sealift had been initiated unilaterally by Cuba. The paper described the sea operation as "no more than an intelligent response" of Florida-based Cuban exiles to Washington's "hypocritical" refugee policy. Putting the onus on the United States for obstructing emigration, PRENSA LATINA on the same day contrasted U.S. "threats" to take legal action against those responsible for bringing illegal aliens into the country with Cuba's efforts to expedite the departure of refugees from Mariel.

GRANMA on the 28th rejected a U.S. charge that Fidel Castro had reneged on an "alleged" agreement with Costa Rica and Peru on the evacuation of Cuban refugees from the Peruvian Embassy to Costa Rica, saying Havana had "never agreed" that Costa Rica could serve as a redistribution center for Cuban "antisocial elements." Dismissing this evacuation program as a "yankee-made hook carrying Costa Rican bait," the paper, in an attempt to justify the abrupt suspension of the operation, said San Jose, Lima, and Washington "wanted to select the antisocial elements they were going to receive." GRANMA made clear that the decision to open the port of Mariel was at least partially motivated by a desire to seek retribution for perceived U.S. misdeeds against Cuba. The paper stated that "just as our response to the provocations" at the Peruvian Embassy "was to remove the guards," Cuba's response to U.S. "instigation of illegal departures" from the country "was our Mariel policy."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21 - 27 APRIL 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3459 items)			Beijing (746 items)		
Lenin 110th Birth Anniversary	11%	(1%)	Italian Communist Party Leader Berlinguer in PRC	7%	(13%)
Ponomarev Speech	7%	(—)			
U.S.-Iran Situation	9%	(9%)	Japanese Journalists Delegation in PRC	4%	(—)
Hostage Rescue Attempt	3%	(—)			
Afghan Second Revolution Anniversary	8%	(—)	Bandung Conference 25th Anniversary	3%	(—)
Gromyko Paris Press Conference	6%	(—)	Algerian National Liberation Front in PRC	3%	(1%)
Olympic Boycott	3%	(4%)			
Soviet-Polish Friendship Treaty Anniversary	3%	(—)			

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Death of Tito
- Sino-Soviet relations
- European communist Paris meeting
- Cuba on refugees
- Moscow on Afghanistan

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7 MAY 1980
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 -- 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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TITO'S DEATH

The death of Josip Broz Tito on 4 May has been followed by a smooth transition of power in Yugoslavia and an outpouring of world sympathy, reflecting not only Tito's unique historical stature but the intensity of international interest in the country's future stability and course in world affairs. The new leadership, in a spate of formal announcements, leadership statements, and media articles, has proclaimed its commitment to Tito's policies, its confidence in the durability of the country's institutions, and its determination to reject any outside interference. The Soviet Union has taken pains to act with great propriety regarding the obsequies and to reassure the Yugoslav leadership of its respectful intentions.

BELGRADE DEMONSTRATES CONTINUITY, CONFIDENCE ON TITO DEATH

The announcement of Tito's death and the formal transfer of power came in quick order on 4 May, reinforcing the impression of self-assurance and continuity that the leadership has sought to demonstrate since the onset of Tito's illness. Tito's death was announced in a lengthy "proclamation" issued jointly by the party Presidium and state Presidency. Several hours later, a meeting of the state Presidency announced that Vice President Lazar Kolisevski had been named the "president of the SFRY Presidency" and Cvijetin Mijatovic the new vice president. Subsequent funeral ceremonies also were orchestrated to convey a smooth transition to a collective leadership; they were presided over by Kolisevski and party Chairman Stevan Doronjski and attended by the state Presidency, party Presidium, and other leading bodies.

The party-state proclamation and other comment released on Tito's death seemed calculated to show the new leadership's commitment to policy continuity. The proclamation touched on all the key features of Tito's policy legacy, announcing Yugoslavia's determination to defend national equality, "socialist self-management," "nonalignment," "our independence," and the country's defense capability. It recalled Tito's opposition to "domination and hegemony of any kind" and his rejection of the view that a communist party can be managed from "any international center." It also stressed the need for "intensified collective work" and Belgrade's differences with Soviet-style "bureaucratic-statist" socialism. A "profile" of Tito's life, released by TANJUG just hours after his death, recalled Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 and his long fight for communist party independence and expressed confidence that Tito's system will "outlive both himself and present and future generations."

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Loyalty to Tito and commitment to carry on his work were major themes of the statements by Yugoslav leaders in the subseqeunt commemorative ceremonies. Veteran Croatian leader and Tito confidant Vladimir Bakaric, who delivered a major speech on Edvard Kardelj's death last year, stressed these themes in a ceremony for Tito on 6 May. Bakaric declared that "nothing can any longer shake" Yugoslav unity and that Tito's international policy is "the only possible choice for us," and "we shall resolutely defend" it with all available means. LCY Presidium member Branko Mikulic, in a statement reported by TANJUG the same day, similarly asserted that "we are both resolute and united" in the determination to continue Tito's policy and work. Major regional leaders paid obeisance to Tito's memory in local gatherings.

As a somber counterpoint to these memorials, spokesmen for the new leadership made plain the country's determination to resist any outside interference. In a statement that virtually bristled with resolution, TANJUG on 4 May warned that anyone who might contemplate a blitzkrieg against Yugoslavia would face the certainty of a peoples' uprising against them. Similarly TANJUG in a not-so-subtle warning on the 5th, outlined constitutional provisions forbidding any Yugoslav to surrender the country to an enemy or interfere with a resistance struggle. LCY Presidium member Milos Minic, in an article reported by TANJUG on the 5th, issued a stern warning to "enemies" of Yugoslavia at home and abroad who might attempt to "inflict any kind of trouble on our country." And Defense Secretary Ljubicic and Internal Affairs Secretary Herljevic, in speeches at their respective ministries, stressed the country's defense preparedness and readiness to fight against any enemies of the system.

MOSCOW LAUDS TITO'S WORK, DOWNPLAYS INDEPENDENT POLICIES

Moscow's treatment of Tito's death has featured a display of respect for the deceased leader, a strong show of interest in cultivating bilateral relations, and a renewed pledge to respect Yugoslavia's independence. While paying deference to Tito's role as a world communist leader, Moscow has avoided mentioning those aspects of his policies that brought him into confrontation with the CPSU and made him a leader of independent communism in the world movement.

Moscow's full-dress treatment of Tito's obsequies was underscored by the announcement that President Brezhnev would head the Soviet delegation to the funeral in Belgrade on 8 May. Brezhnev last visited Belgrade in 1976. Conspicuous courtesy was also demonstrated by a virtually full turnout of the Soviet leadership to sign the

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book of condolences at the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow. The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow was received promptly after the death not only by Foreign Minister Gromyko but, in an apparent show of special deference, by senior Politburo member Suslov. The meeting was Suslov's first public contact with a Yugoslav official since 1972.

Soviet commentary on Tito's death has been laudatory but tendentious, clearly calculated to cast the prospects for Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the most favorable light. The condolence message published in PRAVDA on 6 May ticked off the principles said to constitute the building blocks of a strong relationship: noninterference in internal affairs, equality, strict respect for sovereign rights, and mutual understanding and trust. The message also lauded Tito as an "eminent activist" in the international communist movement and a founder of the nonaligned movement. In this connection, however, it blandly cited only Tito's work for peace, relaxation of tensions, and social progress and against "forces of reaction." Similarly, an obituary carried by PRAVDA on 6 May stressed Tito's support for the "extensive development" of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and his fight against "imperialism and colonialism." It also praised him for "implementing joint actions" with the Red Army in World War II to liberate Yugoslavia from the Nazis.

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CHINA-USSR

BEIJING RULES OUT IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW

> Beijing has gone to unusual lengths recently to stress to international audiences that it has no intention of seeking improved relations with the USSR. The Chinese effort appears intended to insure that small steps taken by Beijing to maintain existing relations with Moscow, as well as other events in Chinese foreign policy and domestic debate, not be misunderstood abroad as responses to recent Soviet initiatives inviting improved relations between the two countries.

Beijing's campaign to dismiss any notion of the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement under present circumstances was taken to the highest level, with unusual publicity for anti-Soviet statements by top PRC leaders. For example:

+ On 17 April XINHUA reported party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping's press conference statement, after receiving Italian Communist Party (PCI) General Secretary Berlinguer, that Moscow's stationing of "one million troops" along China's borders and its "troublemaking" in Indochina constitute a "serious threat" to China.

+ On 21 April XINHUA reported CCP Chairman and Premier Hua Guofeng reiterating Deng's statements to the Japanese press corps in Beijing and adding that "so long as Soviet hegemonistic policy remains unchanged, Sino-Soviet relations will not improve."

+ On 30 April XINHUA reported Hua's comments to a Japanese visitor that Beijing "will not change its position of opposing hegemonism" as long as Moscow does not change its policies.

Regarding Beijing's ideological differences with Moscow, XINHUA has similarly cited leadership statements to make it plain that Beijing sees no potential at present for a restoration of the CCP's ties with the CPSU:

+ On 15 April XINHUA cited CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang's statement to the Italian press corps accompanying the Berlinguer delegation that a resumption of CCP-CPSU ties is out of the question.

+ On 22 April PRC foreign friendship association leader Wang Bingnan, according to XINHUA, stated at a reception marking the 110th anniversary of Lenin's birth that China will "intensify the struggle" against the "Brezhnev clique," which has "completely betrayed Leninism."

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+ On 5 May XINHUA cited Deng Xiaoping's comment to a visiting African leader that the USSR is "not a socialist country but a social-imperialist country."

While leaders such as Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping frequently make anti-Soviet statements in conversations with visiting foreign leaders and delegations, according to Western media accounts, Chinese media do not report them as a matter of course. XINHUA last reported such statements by Chinese leaders in January, when the news agency cited a series of strong denunciations of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan by Hua and Deng in talks with foreign guests, at a time when Beijing began to call for international unity against Moscow for its actions.

In addition to going out of its way to publicize strongly anti-Soviet statements by authoritative leaders, XINHUA also reported a rally on 30 April in Xinjiang protesting an incident that occurred along the border with the Soviet Union there last year and was protested by Beijing at that time. The characterization of the incident and its consequences in XINHUA's report of the new "accusation rally" are identical to those in XINHUA's report of a PRC Foreign Ministry note and of a protest rally in Xinjiang on the incident last summer. XINHUA gave no reason for the new publicity for the incident, except to note that a veterinarian captured in the clash last summer was returned by the Soviet Union in February of this year "only after repeated negotiations and struggle by our government."

MOTIVATIONS Beijing's efforts to make explicit its intentions regarding its relations with Moscow appear designed to allay foreign concern that China might be seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Beijing evidently fears that speculation on a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement has been fueled by recent Soviet overtures inviting Beijing to improve relations between the two countries. In that context Beijing is concerned that recent steps which it considers part of normal intercourse in existing relations with Moscow, as well as other aspects of Chinese foreign policy and domestic debate, will be misunderstood abroad as responses to the Soviet overtures.

Beijing undoubtedly wants its attitude toward the Soviet Union to be clearly understood at this time because doubts about the firmness of Chinese opposition to Moscow might undermine its efforts to rally international pressure against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Beijing had made explicit the linkage between its own bilateral relations with Moscow and the Afghanistan situation early on; when XINHUA announced Beijing's decision to suspend future sessions of the bilateral political talks with Moscow last January, it maintained that they would be "inappropriate" in the context of Moscow's Afghan intervention.

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Among recent Soviet gestures inviting improved relations that may have caused Beijing concern was a call for renewed efforts to that end in an authoritative "I. Aleksandrov" article published in PRAVDA on 7 April--four days before the expiration of the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance. While harshly criticizing Chinese foreign and domestic policies, the PRAVDA article called for joint efforts to pursue "every opportunity" to improve relations, including the long-stalemated border negotiations and the bilateral political talks that opened last fall. Earlier, from 20 to 28 March, according to Western media reports, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's leading Sinologist, Mikhail Kapitsa, made an unofficial visit to Beijing, which both Soviet and Chinese media ignored. Moscow also seemed to be signaling good intentions when it released the veterinarian, captured in the border incident last summer, on 14 February--the anniversary of the signing of the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty and a date celebrated until 1967 as "Sino-Soviet friendship day."

Probably of particular concern to Beijing as sources of foreign misunderstanding regarding Beijing's intentions toward Moscow in the context of the Soviet overtures are several recent events which Beijing regards as in keeping with its minimal ties with the Soviet Union. The new PRC Ambassador to the USSR, Yang Shouzheng, for example, departed for Moscow on 20 April, filling a post which has been vacant since last fall. On 25 April Western media reported the opening of the annual Sino-Soviet trade talks. Earlier this year, XINHUA reported other events in the normal intercourse of Sino-Soviet relations carefully along the lines of reporting similar events in recent years, including the annual wreathlaying ceremonies in several Chinese provinces last February honoring Soviet war dead in China on Soviet army day and the conclusion of the bilateral border river navigation talks in March.

The current Chinese campaign to provide reassurance over the endurance of Beijing's hardline policies toward Moscow also seems designed to insure that other recent events in Chinese foreign policy and domestic debate are correctly understood. Such events include the CCP's restoration of ties with the PCI last month, dramatizing a new Chinese flexibility in resuming ties with foreign communist and progressive parties that Beijing once denounced as "revisionist." Similarly, a two-year Chinese debate on the meaning of the term "revisionism," while primarily having domestic origins and implications, has clearcut significance for the roots of Beijing's dispute over ideological principles with the Soviet Union, as is evident from a recently available account in a Heilongjiang literary journal of an academic discussion of the issue of whether or not the USSR is a socialist country.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

The 28-29 April Paris meeting of East and West European communist parties accentuated rather than ameliorated the impression of disunity among Europe's communists on Moscow's current foreign policies. In spite of its nominal theme of "detente and disarmament," the conference was more important for the message it sent to the communist movement about Moscow's mood in the wake of the Afghanistan crisis than for its strictly proforma pronouncements on disarmament. By pressing ahead with the gathering despite the strong objections of the Yugoslavs and Romanians, in the East, and the Italian and other independent-minded parties, in the West, Moscow left no doubt that its uncompromising posture extends to the communist movement as well as to relations with the Western world.

PARIS MEETING UNDERSCORES SPLIT IN WESTERN COMMUNIST RANKS

Ostensibly convened by the French and Polish parties to rally European support for detente, the Paris meeting instead demonstrated the vastly differing views on ways to ease East-West tensions among West Europe's leading communist parties. For Moscow, the meeting provided an opportunity to insist on orthodoxy in foreign affairs, a concern that it had softpedaled at the 1976 Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties. From a West European perspective, the meeting served to formalize the split between the two groups of Western communists, led by French party chief Marchais and Italian party chief Berlinguer, which are pursuing fundamentally opposed strategies toward a resumption of detente. The meeting further demonstrated Marchais' return to an unabashedly pro-Soviet orientation on foreign affairs. The Italian party's boycott of the meeting signaled the PCI's willingness to risk isolation from other West European communists to pursue a more autonomous course.

MOSCOW Moscow used the occasion of the conference to press for a show of support for its views on Western responsibility for current East-West tensions, even though the Soviet delegation failed to insist on a direct endorsement of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In his 28 April speech, chief Soviet delegate and CPSU Central Committee Secretary Boris Ponomarev reiterated Moscow's contention that the issue of the day is not Afghanistan but U.S. and NATO defense policies. Ponomarev maintained that in the face of the threat to detente posed by the "unpredictable behavior" of the United States and by NATO's decision to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles in West Europe, European communists had a "duty" not just to speak of the threat but to "act enterprisingly, energetically, and purposefully."

In pointed remarks directed at the parties that boycotted the meeting, Ponomarev asked whether it was legitimate, in view of the gravity of the threat to detente, to cite the existence of "disagreements" to justify not participating in joint discussions and actions. Ponomarev

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reemphasized the theme of loyalty that had been introduced before the meeting in a NEW TIMES article (No. 17, 25 April) by Boris Vesnin and a 25 April PRAVDA editorial article. Declaring that the only choice in the current dispute was either for or against detente, he asserted that "for representatives of the working movement, for genuinely antiwar forces, there is no third way." Underscoring Moscow's emphasis on loyalty in the present situation, Ponomarev stated that the CPSU regarded the meeting's "appeal"--the prepackaged document that was responsible for much of the resistance to the meeting--as a reflection of the positions of "all" communist parties, including those not present.

WESTERN COMMUNISTS The Paris meeting represented the orthodox answer to the Italian party's current efforts to forge a more broadly based European approach to preserving detente and established PCF leader Marchais as the chief Western communist protagonist of orthodoxy. The "appeal" issued by the meeting professed willingness to join with other "peace-loving" forces to promote disarmament, but the uncompromising anti-NATO thrust of the document suggests that its authors were prepared for such cooperation only on their own terms.

Increasingly skeptical about any contact with European socialists since the breakup of France's "union" of the left in 1978, Marchais has demonstrated this attitude forcefully since he assumed the role of Moscow's defender in January. He has publicly opposed recent moves by the Italian communists to strengthen their ties with West Europe's socialists, denounced Berlinguer's meetings with French and West German socialist leaders Mitterand and Brandt, and made clear that the French party wants no part of any so-called Euroleft movement uniting socialists and communists on common issues. Speaking to a PCF rally on 27 March, Marchais declared that to replace Eurocommunism by the Euroleft would be to push the workers' movement into the "quagmire of social democratic collaboration" with the bourgeoise, and that his party firmly rejected this "blind alley."

Through its boycott of the Paris meeting, the PCI has reaffirmed its intention to seek common ground with Europe's socialist parties in an effort to reduce East-West tensions. Explaining the party's decision not to attend the Paris conference at a 2 April meeting of the PCI National Council, Directorate member Pajetta outlined the party's objections to the way the meeting was organized and the effect this would have on the PCI's efforts to broaden its ties with other left-wing forces. What was the use of a meeting only of communists, Pajetta said, that would issue a counterproductive "propaganda document" and complicate discussions with the very forces to whom we intend to appeal. Pajetta acknowledged that there was a "polemic" under way with the PCF but went on to defend the PCI's moves to hold consultations with the French and West German socialists. We are not seeking new traveling companions so that we might abandon our old ones, he asserted, but are seeking new opportunities for dialogue to foster detente, "far beyond any publicity or propaganda effects."

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EAST EUROPE: YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA BOYCOTT PARIS CP MEETING

The East European parties split along traditional lines in their reactions to the Paris meeting, with the Yugoslavs and Romanians digging in their heels against what they interpreted as a Moscow-backed effort to line up support for the Soviet Union's international policies. The two communist independents justified their refusal to attend with the complaints that the meeting was too narrow in scope, too hurriedly organized, and not preceded by preparatory conferences in the manner of the 1976 Berlin conference, a meeting which both attended.

YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade's prompt rejection of the bid to attend the Paris meeting was announced by LCY Presidium member Grlickov in an interview carried by BORBA on 5 April. Objecting to the composition of the Paris meeting, Grlickov stressed that the international situation had "deteriorated" to such a degree that "all progressive forces" in Europe, not just the communists, should take part in a discussion of peace and disarmament. He maintained that the 1976 Berlin conference had appealed for such a rallying of all peace forces, adding that the Yugoslavs would be willing to take part in such a "broader and freer" discussion. A meeting involving only the European communist parties, he observed, would merely exacerbate the current "significant differences" between them. Grlickov portrayed Belgrade's boycott as a decision of the late Tito himself, saying that the Presidium, "following its consultations with Comrade Tito at the beginning of January," had decided that the scheduled meeting "would not yield positive results."

Outspoken Zagreb radio commentator Sundic, also on 5 April, condemned the abrupt convening of the Paris meeting. He charged that, unlike the "nearly two years" of preparations for the Berlin meeting, the way in which the Paris meeting was arranged, with fixed dates and a draft final document accompanying the invitations, amounted to a demand by Moscow that the recipients "come out for or against." Sundic further condemned this notion of a Soviet ultimatum on the 25th, in a rebuttal to the Boris Vesnin NEW TIMES article "No Third Choice," carried by TASS two days earlier. He charged that NEW TIMES had reduced participation or nonparticipation in the Paris conclave to the issue of favoring peace or war, of being for or against the policies of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Such a choice, he added, violates "the right of every party to decide autonomously" its foreign and domestic policies.

ROMANIA Bucharest waited until shortly before the Paris meeting to announce its boycott of the meeting. The RCP Central Committee's letter of rejection to the Polish cosponsors of the conference, carried by AGERPRES on 23 April, echoed in less strident terms the Yugoslav objections to the gathering. The letter stressed the need for collaboration with socialist and social-democratic, as

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well as with communist, parties in the interest of peace and security "in Europe and throughout the world." While the letter refrained from directly recalling the 1976 Berlin conference, which Ceausescu had attended, it deplored the absence of interparty preparatory discussions for the present meeting, charging that it was being convened for the purpose of "adopting a document that has not been prepared in common." The Paris meeting, the Romanian letter said, should thus be postponed or changed to a preparatory meeting for a future conference of European communist parties, a change that it said would make it possible for the RCP to attend.

Romania has failed to attend other major Soviet-sponsored meetings--the "Warsaw Five" meeting on the Czechoslovak liberalization, in July 1968, and the first Crimea conference of bloc leaders with Brezhnev, in the summer of 1971.

ORTHODOX PARTIES Moscow's orthodox East European allies, led as usual by the hardline Czechoslovaks, have disputed the boycotters' objections to the Paris conference. RUDE PRAVO on the 15th said the international situation made the scheduled meeting "unpostponable" and stressed its "extraordinary importance," even though "certain European communist parties will not participate." Regarding the objection that the meeting had not been prepared adequately, CPCZ delegate Bilak declared in his Paris speech that the theme of peace and disarmament is "so topical and so clear" that the meeting did not require "any long preparations or agreements concerning its procedure." Following the meeting, an article in RUDE PRAVO on the 30th argued that, just as the sponsors could not "force" any party to attend the meeting, no party could expect the other European communist parties to desist from holding a consultation on peace and disarmament.

Another hardline speaker, Bulgaria's Lilov, in effect served notice that the absent parties were obligated to accept the key role of Moscow in the quest for peace. He asserted that "whoever conceives of the struggle for peace and detente without unity with the USSR and the socialist countries is actually disarming ideologically and politically" the working class and progressive forces everywhere in the world.

Poland and Hungary, as usual, occupied a moderate position in the spectrum of East European attitudes. The spokesman for the cosponsoring Polish party, Werblan, expressed "regret that our intentions have not been understood properly" by the parties boycotting the Paris meeting. He voiced the hope that the conclusions of the meeting would enjoy the "support and cooperation of those parties." Less optimistically, the Hungarian delegate, Gyenes, merely said he hoped that the absence of some parties would "not have a harmful effect on the fruitful development of relations between the communist parties."

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CUBA

CASTRO BLAMES U.S. FOR REFUGEE CRISIS, DEFENDS "MARIEL" POLICY

Havana continues to project an intransigent stand on the mass departure of Cubans to the United States and, in an effort to negate the domestic effect of the exodus, to arouse the citizenry in common cause against Cuba's "Yankee enemy." In his first public comment on the month-old problem of the exodus of Cuban refugees, President Fidel Castro has strongly reiterated Havana's contention that the crisis was provoked by the United States and has implied that Cuba will not cut off the flood of refugees arriving in Florida from the port of Mariel. Castro's attack on U.S. policies, in his May Day speech, was followed by new pressure on Washington on the 4th, when Havana demanded the renegotiation of the status of 300 males, some holding Cuban exit permits, who had taken refuge in the U.S. Interests Section two days earlier following a melee with Castro supporters. Havana's aim seems to be to force Washington into negotiations in an effort to make the United States honor a previous commitment to accept former political prisoners.

CASTRO SPEECH In his May Day speech--his first since 1973--Fidel Castro castigated Peru and Venezuela for their alleged roles in encouraging "illegal departures" of Cubans but assigned the role of chief culprit to the United States.* He accused Washington of orchestrating the "provocations" in an effort to cause "disillusionment" among the Cuban people and to "affect" Havana's relations with Lima and Caracas. Defending Cuba's decision to open the port of Mariel for the departure of Cuban malcontents, Castro pointedly noted that Havana had repeatedly warned Washington, "both publicly and through diplomatic channels," that Cuba once again would allow a mass exodus of Cubans to the United States as a consequence of continued U.S. "encouragement" of illegal departures. Depicting Cuba as the aggrieved party, Castro said the decision to allow an exodus from Mariel was "not made capriciously," but as a natural act in defense against "violations and blackmail." He stressed that in a formal sense, Cuba was not the one that opened the port, and he argued that Cuba had deported no one--a reference to Havana's claim that the sealift was initiated by Florida-based Cuban exiles. At the

* See the TRENDS of 16 April 1980, pages 6-8, and 30 April 1980, pages 17-18, for Cuban treatment of the refugee issue since Havana's offer to allow the departure of disaffected citizens prompted would-be emigrants to flood the Peruvian Embassy.

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same time, Castro defended his government's absolute right to authorize the departure of "antisocial individuals" and added that the defense of U.S. shores "is not our affair."

Castro described the scale of the massive 1965 sealift of disenchanted Cubans from the port of Camarioca as "nothing compared to Mariel," implying that Havana would not move unilaterally to stem the flow of refugees. But in a cryptic remark suggesting that he had not foreclosed any options and might be amenable to an accommodation with Washington, he said: "Now we are going to see how we end it."

Implying that U.S. maneuvers scheduled to begin at Guantanamo on the 8th--designed as a "rehearsal to invade Cuba"--had been called off as a result of pressure on the United States, Castro called this development "a notable success for Cuba" and "international solidarity." He failed to acknowledge that the U.S. ships that were to take part in the exercise had been diverted to help the Coast Guard monitor the boats transporting Cuban refugees in the Florida straits. In response to the U.S. move, Castro called off the mobilization of Cuba's Eastern Army, but he announced that the "militant march of the people"--in protest against the continued U.S. "blockade" of Cuba, the U.S. military presence at Guantanamo, and the "illegal" espionage flights over Cuba--would be held on 17 May, as scheduled. Warning that the "enemy still exists" and "is still strong," Castro also announced the formation of a new paramilitary defense force, made up of workers and peasants, in preparation for a "peoples' war" against the United States.

INCIDENT AT U.S. MISSION Havana promptly and emphatically denied any responsibility for the 2 May attack on a group of would-be emigrants at the U.S. Interests Section and labeled it a "new publicity and propaganda show against Cuba," which was "obviously organized" by the United States. GRANMA, according to PRENSA LATINA on 3 May, claimed that the melee erupted when a group of former political prisoners, protesting the slow pace of U.S. processing procedures, provoked a group of "revolutionary citizens" following a "false and deceitful assertion" by U.S. mission officials that the Cuban Government was blocking their departure from the country. GRANMA countercharged that it was in fact the United States that had deliberately delayed the former political prisoners' departure "despite Washington's public and solemn commitments" to receive them.

GRANMA indicated Havana's "readiness" to allow former political prisoners not involved in the 2 May melee and their families to depart for the United States through the port of Mariel--a privilege previously denied this group of Cubans. As for the Cubans who took refuge in the U.S. mission, GRANMA on the 4th said the Cuban Government was willing to grant safe-conduct to the "few children and women" inside the building, "but not to the rest." The paper claimed the U.S. was "obligated" to

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return the Cuban males inside the U.S. mission, first "because they had provoked and attacked the people in complicity with a foreign government," and second because the U.S. Interests Section is "not empowered under international law to grant asylum to anyone." GRANMA on the 6th rejected as a "cynical and deceitful lie" the U.S. charge that the group assembled at the U.S. mission had been attacked by Cuban security agents. Denouncing President Carter, personally, the paper charged that he had failed to acknowledge that Cuban police had protected the "vagrants" and the U.S. Interests Section.

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW LAYS STRESS ON PARTY UNITY ON REVOLUTION ANNIVERSARY

Soviet treatment of the second anniversary of Afghanistan's 27 April revolution underlined both Moscow's commitment to its role in the neighboring country and its concern about domestic Afghan developments. Moscow has shown no sign of moderating its position that removal of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan can come only after "outside aggression" against that country has ended. While Moscow's ties with Kabul were underlined by the dispatch of a Soviet delegation to this year's anniversary celebrations, Soviet statements on the occasion reflected lower expectations for progress in Afghan domestic reforms and clear dissatisfaction with problems within the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS This year's message from Brezhnev and Kosygin to Afghan President Karmal appeared to retreat from last year's reference to Afghan implementation of "extensive" revolutionary-democratic transformations, speaking more modestly of "building a society on the principles of social progress and justice" and adding wishes for further success in the struggle for independence, revolutionary socioeconomic transformations, and peaceful life. Occasionally, since its intervention last December, Moscow by implication has criticized Afghan revolutionaries for overzealous reforms, and it has conceded that the people lacked faith in the leadership, that "central power" was difficult to exercise because of a variety of problems, and that "deep rifts" existed even within the PDPA.

One of the most pressing problems in Moscow's view appears to be the chronic friction within the party, an issue stressed by the head of the Soviet delegation in his anniversary speech in Kabul. The choice of CPSU Central Committee Secretary M. Zimyanin to head the party-government delegation--Moscow has generally subordinated party ties to state-to-state relations--also seems to suggest high concern over party cohesion and authority. Zimyanin, as reported by TASS on 26 April, referred to "quite a few difficulties" facing Afghanistan, such as overcoming resistance of "exploiter classes" and implementing progressive socioeconomic reforms. But he particularly stressed that the "monolithic unity of the revolutionary party" significantly affected the fate of the revolution itself and urged that the PDPA "be unified" and its links with the people "grow and develop."

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For his part, President Karmal in his anniversary address appeared more optimistic about the PDPA. According to a TASS account, he said that all the necessary conditions have been created for full restoration of "trust and amicable revolutionary work" in the party and for consolidation of PDPA "organizational and ideological unity." But he acknowledged other major difficulties facing the revolution: the lack of a large, experienced working class, the high illiteracy rate, the lack of managers and specialists who were both dedicated to the revolution and had vocational and "theoretical" training, and the lack of "sufficiently firm traditions and collective leadership and democratic centralism."

Concerning the revolution's goals, Karmal, in an anniversary appearance on Soviet television on 27 April, placed Afghanistan on "the path of progress and socialism," in accord with the basic principles adopted at a PDPA plenum in mid-April, and pledged that Afghanistan would accompany the Soviet Union in a "single rank" on the road of "democracy and socialism."* Moscow itself has generally avoided saying that Afghanistan is proceeding toward socialism, using instead circumlocutions like "social progress" and "new society"; although PRAVDA on last year's anniversary did hail Afghanistan's "socialist choice," and an Umnov article in WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (No. 4, 1979) observed that with the April revolution, Afghanistan entered the path of "building socialism."

TROOP ISSUE Moscow remains inflexible on its conditions for withdrawal of its troops. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, for example, insisted in his 25 April Paris press conference that "external interference" in Afghan affairs must cease before withdrawal can be considered. Moscow has also been unreceptive to proposals for negotiations on the Afghan problem. Gromyko in effect brushed aside British-EEC suggestions for talks on a "neutral Afghanistan, insisting that the country is "nonaligned." He called it a "waste of time" first to talk about withdrawing Soviet troops and then to discuss "other questions." Moscow has also given scant attention to Kabul's ostensibly conciliatory proposal to its neighbors for bilateral and regional talks to resolve differences, which came in the preanniversary theses adopted in mid-April by the PDPA. According to TASS' account of Karmal's anniversary address, the Afghan president recalled the "positive new initiatives," but they were not mentioned by Zimyanin or Gromyko.

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* The PDPA "theses," broadcast by Kabul radio on 17 April 1980, mention socialism in describing the Afghan revolution as "an inalienable part of the great revolutionary process of present-day world socialist revolutions." However, the theses characterized Afghanistan's goals only as "democracy and social progress, the noncapitalist mode of development, and construction of a new society of social justice."

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On the issue of Soviet troops, Zimyanin, in keeping with Soviet practice, did not acknowledge Soviet combat action or casualties. In an elliptical reference to the Soviet-Afghan status of forces accord, he said that the Soviet forces' "functions" were determined by "agreement between the sides" and that the troops operated in "full contact" with Afghan troops but were not fighting the Afghan people. As for withdrawal, he recalled Brezhnev's February formulation that this would occur once the reasons for the Soviet military presence were removed and the Afghan Government no longer deemed this presence indispensable. Echoing previous Soviet assertions, Zimyanin denied that the Soviet Union had "annexationist" aims in the area, "aggressive intentions" against Iran and Pakistan, or designs on Persian Gulf oil resources and aspirations for access to southern seas.

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BRIEFS

MOSCOW ON IRAN: Continuing to accuse the United States of planning "further military action" against Iran in the wake of the abortive U.S. hostage rescue mission last month, Moscow has been replaying Iranian charges that the mission was aimed at overthrowing the Iranian Government. Comment has focused on the U.S. military buildup around Iran and the threat it allegedly poses to all states in the region. Moscow is still cautious, however, in offering its support to Tehran. Brezhnev's November 1978 warning against foreign intervention in Iran's affairs has been recalled, for the first time since 25 March, but only in a routine May Day talk by Moscow radio Persian-service commentator Vera Lebedeva, who credited the Brezhnev statement with "halting a military intervention." There has been no original Soviet comment on the six-day occupation of the Iranian Embassy in London by Iranian Arab dissidents. Limited TASS coverage of the incident, citing foreign media reports, in at least one case insinuated a possible U.S. role in the takeover, but this suggestion was not picked up in PRAVDA. In its version of a 3 May TASS dispatch on the London incident, the paper deleted the news agency's observation that the "possibility of a close connection" between the U.S. rescue mission and the London takeover had been "noted" in the British capital. But for Persian audiences, Moscow radio in a 3 May newscast replayed an accusation, attributed to Tehran radio, that the London Embassy seizure had been engineered by U.S. and British intelligence organizations. In contrast to Moscow's carefully phrased expressions of support for the appropriate international convention concerning the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, TASS, at the outset of the London incident, forthrightly declared that such a "provocation" was a violation of "the sovereign rights and extraterritoriality of the embassy of any state," running "counter to the international convention on this score." With an eye to Iraqi and other Arab sensitivities, Soviet reportage on the 30 April - 5 May London episode conspicuously avoided identifying the hostage-takers as Arabs, referring to them only as "Iranians of Khuzestan descent," who demanded that their unidentified "supporters" imprisoned in Iran be flown to London.

NVOI ON RESCUE ATTEMPT: The Baku-based clandestine radio National Voice of Iran (NVOI) has generally echoed the line taken by official Soviet media on the unsuccessful U.S. hostage rescue attempt, condemning the mission as an act of "obvious banditry" and warning that the United States will attempt similar operations in the future, "most probably on a wider scale and with more preparations." Like Moscow central press and radio reportage, a 30 April NVOI commentary, for example, replayed charges by Ayatollah

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Khalkhali that the operation was aimed not at releasing the U.S. Embassy hostages but at seizing Ayatollah Khomeyni. And in the vein of speculation in Soviet media, NVOI on 5 May questioned the purpose of recent Administration consultations at Camp David and portrayed President Carter as eager to "carry out his plans against Iran." Several talks have pointedly reminded listeners of Iran's military and security shortcomings: NVOI said the fact that U.S. aircraft landed unmolested should "not be passed over lightly," and it professed concern for Khomeyni's safety in connection with the alleged U.S. intention to kidnap him. Commentaries have linked the rescue attempt with the unrest in Iranian universities and the "fratricide" in Kordestan--both standard topics of comment by NVOI but seldom addressed by official Soviet media. The United States, the radio asserted on 28 April, is using a "fifth column" in Iran to aggravate the country's "convulsive situation" and to facilitate its "aggression" against Iran. NVOI predictably cited the alleged threat posed by the rescue attempt as proof of the need for "unity of word and action" by Iran's "progressive" forces.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 28 APRIL - 4 MAY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (2765 items)			Beijing (707 items)		
May Day	12%	(--)	Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq in PRC	10%	(--)
Paris Conference on Peace and Disarmament	10%	(2%)			
Ponomarev Speech	5%	(--)	Japanese Political Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)
U.S.-Iran Situation	9%	(9%)	OAU Economic Summit	3%	(--)
Hostage Rescue Attempt	8%	(3%)	Guinean President Sekou Toure in PRC	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on Secretary Muskie
- Communist world on Tito funeral
- Soviet scholar on consumer goods
- Ukrainian meat shortage

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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U. S. - U S S R

MOSCOW ADOPTS POSTURE OF CAUTIOUS SKEPTICISM ON MUSKIE

On the eve of Secretary Edmund Muskie's 16 May meeting in Vienna with Foreign Minister Gromyko, Moscow has adopted a correct but skeptical posture toward the new secretary of state's influence and intentions. Soviet commentary has so far spared Secretary Muskie all but the mildest criticism, in contrast with the caustic treatment it is now according President Carter and national security adviser Brzezinski. But occasional references to the secretary's "moderate" political views have been counterbalanced by expressions of doubt whether he will be able to stand up to the "aggressive" policies advocated by Dr. Brzezinski. That Secretary Muskie's appointment has had little effect so far on Moscow's view of the Carter Administration's intentions was confirmed in its sharply critical reaction to the President's 9 May address before the World Affairs Council in Philadelphia.

Moscow has tempered initial expressions of skepticism about the impact of the Muskie appointment with suggestions of faint hope as the Vienna meeting with Gromyko approaches. A signed commentary in the 4 May PRAVDA asserted that Secretary Muskie, although a political moderate, had in the past repeatedly joined forces with proponents of a hard line. As a senator, the article claimed, he supported the "dirty" war in Vietnam and, more recently, he has expressed support for an "aggressive" U.S. foreign policy. Well-informed figures abroad, the article concluded, doubt whether the new secretary will be able to hold his own against presidential adviser Brzezinski. A PRAVDA article on the 6th was more cautious in its expressions of skepticism. The paper's New York correspondent wondered whether Secretary Muskie will "cloak with his authority the dangerous foreign policy adventurism of the White House" or will try, "as far as he is able," to oppose that course as his predecessor did. A third commentary, in the 11 May PRAVDA, three days after the announcement of the Muskie-Gromyko meeting, took a still more positive approach. "Many commentators," the paper observed, were awaiting the secretary's first steps--hoping that, as an experienced politician, he would "introduce some elements of soberness into White House foreign policy."

Two TASS dispatches published together in the 13 May Moscow newspapers graphically illustrated the contrast between Moscow's correct treatment of Secretary Muskie and its caustic portrayal of Dr. Brzezinski. One report gave a straightforward account of recent statements by Secretary Muskie concerning his understanding of the role of the U.S. secretary of state, including his place as "chief adviser to the President on

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foreign policy questions." The other dispatch, summarizing a recent NEWSDAY article on Dr. Brzezinski, portrayed the latter as a "Washington warmonger" who has "inflicted great damage on U.S.-Soviet relations" and is responsible for first slowing and then blocking the SALT II process.

REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

Moscow's grimly critical review of President Carter's Philadelphia address suggests that the Soviets are continuing to concentrate on scoring propaganda points rather than seeking an opening for diplomatic initiatives. A lengthy TASS report, published in PRAVDA on 11 May, described the speech as "crammed full of attacks and rhetoric hostile to the Soviet Union." TASS characterized the speech as making "barely concealed claims to hegemony in world affairs." It dismissed as insincere the President's assurances that detente with the Soviet Union remains a goal of U.S. policy. What is needed for normal U.S.-Soviet relations, the report concluded, is "not demagogic devices," but "a sober approach and an open and honorable dialogue."

TREATMENT OF SECRETARY VANCE

While preserving a relatively correct atmosphere toward Secretary Muskie, Moscow has used former Secretary Vance's resignation to reassert its thesis that the forces favoring confrontation over negotiation with the USSR have gained the upper hand in the Carter Administration. Vishnevskiy, in his 4 May PRAVDA article, for example, declared that the advocates of a more moderate foreign policy approach "are being driven" from power in Washington, and "even such a very experienced and patient politician as U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance has been forced to quit the ship of state." Vance's resignation, Vishnevskiy continued, represents "a success, albeit, perhaps, a temporary one," for the aggressive line in U.S. policy over those advocating a "balanced, well-thought-out" approach. The complimentary description of the former secretary in such commentaries is consistent with Moscow's portrayal of policy debate within the Administration for most of its tenure but sharply divergent from a more critical portrayal of Vance that emerged in the Afghanistan crisis. A TASS commentary carried by PRAVDA on 30 March, for example, had found cause in a statement by Secretary Vance to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to reject the notion that there were differences between the "sober" policy of the Department of State and that of Dr. Brzezinski.

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YUGOSLAVIA

As the world community paid its last respects to Tito, the new Yugoslav leadership continued its efforts to project confidence, unity, and a determination to carry forward Tito's independent policies. Moscow has taken pains to show respect for the deceased leader, and its East European allies have followed a similar course, although Belgrade responded indignantly to a Hungarian commentary it deemed presumptuous. Once bitter enemies of Tito's, the Chinese and North Koreans underlined their present close ties with Belgrade in an outpouring of eulogies on his death. Albania, Cuba, and Vietnam, all for different reasons at odds with Yugoslavia, were restrained in their observances.

BELGRADE REAFFIRMS INDEPENDENCE; MOSCOW EXPRESSES FRIENDSHIP

The new Yugoslav leadership used the 8 May funeral ceremonies to reaffirm the country's dedication to Tito's independent course. The two main funeral speeches were delivered by party Chairman Stevan Doronjski, at the start of the funeral procession, and by state President Lazar Kolisevski, at a graveside ceremony. Tracing the highlights of Tito's career, Doronjski referred to Tito's break with the Cominform in 1948 as a key event in the struggle for an "independent path in developing socialism," and he rejected the notion that Yugoslavia would ever "tie itself to any bloc." Doronjski also declared that Belgrade would continue to develop with determination such policies as nonalignment, self-management, and "brotherhood and unity" of the country's nationalities. In the same vein, Kolisevski asserted that Yugoslavia is ready to defend its independence and "every foot of our soil" against "anyone who might impinge on it." He added that the country's domestic policies have produced a self-reliance and firmness that "no force can break."

Belgrade took note of President Carter's absence from the funeral in a 10 May Belgrade POLITIKA report from New York correspondent Gustincic. Gustincic said that this was "not the first time an American President has shown a lack of 'feeling for the significance of the moment' that is expected in Europe," citing in this connection President Johnson's absence from Winston Churchill's funeral. At the same time, he emphasized that President Carter through his statements had strongly expressed admiration for Tito and "devotion to the present U.S. policy of friendship with Yugoslavia." He also said that the presence at the funeral of Vice President Mondale, who had taken "an important step" toward promoting U.S.-Yugoslav relations during a prior visit, has "confirmed the true feelings of the Americans."

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President Brezhnev, heading the Soviet delegation to the rites, used every opportunity to demonstrate the reassuring stance the USSR has sought to project since the beginning of Tito's illness. He held a meeting with top Yugoslav leaders the day before the funeral. According to TASS that day, Brezhnev expressed confidence in the durability of past Soviet-Yugoslav agreements and maintained that "many years of cooperation show that the Soviet Union is a true and reliable friend of Yugoslavia's peoples." Brezhnev also endorsed the development of Yugoslavia as a "united, rallied, flourishing country, which is building socialism successfully." According to TANJUG, the Soviet leader wrote in the condolence book that Tito was an "outstanding" Yugoslav leader, a "prominent figure" in the international communist movement, and a "friend of our country, who exerted much effort for the consolidation of Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation." Soviet comment, meanwhile, has dismissed Western allegations about a Soviet threat to Yugoslavia and has tried to turn the tables on the West by charging it with harboring Yugoslav emigre terrorists.

EAST EUROPEAN TREATMENT VARIES, PROMPTS BELGRADE REJOINDER

While Moscow's East European allies have largely emulated Moscow's treatment of Tito's demise, comments by the Hungarians on the problems and tasks facing the Yugoslav leaders prompted a sharp rejoinder from Belgrade--the only criticism it has voiced thus far of Soviet bloc comment on the occasion. All the East European allies sent their top party leaders to the funeral, including Bulgaria's Zhivkov, who had not visited Yugoslavia since 1967. Romania was unique in lauding Tito's contribution to promoting party independence. Albania--which maintains state but not party ties with Yugoslavia--accorded the occasion only minimal observances.

Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG struck a discordant note on the 11th in gratuitously undertaking to speak for the Yugoslavs on the issue of President Carter's absence from the funeral. Dismissing the issue as being of little consequence, it went on to editorialize, in what the Yugoslavs apparently interpreted as an unduly patronizing tone, that Yugoslavia was one of the "firm constituents of the socialist world" and that it was up to Tito's heirs not to "squander" his legacy. Yugoslav radio commentators Sundic and Milenkovic took the NEPSZABADSAG article to task two days later. The former assailed the article for casting doubt on the capacity of Tito's successors to carry on his legacy; the latter criticized the article for portraying Yugoslavia as a member of "the socialist world" rather than as independent and sovereign.

From available comment, only the Hungarians brought up the sensitive issue of the 1948 Yugoslav-Cominform rupture. The 5 May NEPSZABADSAG obituary treated the break as an unfortunate episode in which

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"principled debate was soon overtaken by accusations"--a situation which it noted was "settled with the help of the CPSU in 1955," the year of Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade. The other bloc moderate, Poland, emphasized in its TRYBUNA LUDU obituary, also on the 5th, that common socialist ideals have brought Poland and Yugoslavia closer together, "despite differences in the choice of methods and ways of putting them into practice." Warsaw comment also highlighted Tito's introduction of workers' self-management, the counterpart of a system also in use in Poland.

BEIJING, PYONGYANG LAUD TITO; HAVANA, HANOI REFLECT TENSIONS

Beijing and Pyongyang, having found common ground with Yugoslavia's independent stance in recent years, paid the fullest possible tributes to Tito, underlining the dramatic change in relations following their bitter attacks on the Yugoslav leader two decades ago. By contrast, Havana and Hanoi both gave minimal attention to Tito's death, each clearly reflecting differences with Belgrade on international issues.

CHINA Tito's death prompted an enormous outpouring of Chinese statements of sympathy and comment, rivaling the massive Chinese observances of Ho Chi Minh's death in 1969. Beijing eulogized Tito's contributions to the international communist and nonaligned movements and honored his memory with a party and state delegation to the funeral in Belgrade led by Premier and CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng. A condolence message on 5 May from Hua and National People's Congress Chairman Ye Jianying conveyed the Beijing leadership's "immense grief, deepest condolences, and sincere sympathy" to Yugoslavia, and several other Chinese leaders, representing various CCP and PRC organs, also sent messages. On the 5th most of the active capital-based CCP Politburo and the entire Central Committee Secretariat paid respects at the Yugoslav Embassy in Beijing, and the party daily, RENMIN RIBAO, carried an editorial eulogizing Tito.

NORTH KOREA In keeping with the importance the DPRK has placed on its ties with Yugoslavia since it joined the nonaligned movement five years ago, Pyongyang honored Tito's passing with attention similar to that given the death of Mao Zedong. Party General Secretary and President Kim Il-song headed the delegation attending the funeral in Belgrade, making his first trip outside the DPRK since he visited East Europe and North Africa in May-June 1975. The DPRK press eulogized Tito as the founder of the SFRY, an organizer of the nonaligned movement, and a "prominent" figure in the international communist movement--one who made a "great contribution" to safeguarding world peace and achieving "equitable" international relations.

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CUBA Havana devoted scant attention to Tito's death, focusing on his role as leader of Yugoslavia and treating with restraint his role in the nonaligned movement--a reflection of the rivalry between Cuba and Yugoslavia for leadership in that organization. Cuban reaction was confined to two 5 May condolence messages from Fidel Castro. The one, issued in his role as Cuban head of state, briefly noted Tito's role as a founder of the nonaligned movement; the other, issued in his capacity as chairman of the nonaligned movement, observed only in passing Tito's contribution to the movement's struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism. GRANMA is not known to have commented on Tito's death. In what appeared to be a further reflection of Cuban-Yugoslav tensions, Havana sent a second-ranking delegation to the funeral, headed by Politburo member and Council of State Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.

VIETNAM Hanoi's quarrels with Belgrade over Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and the direction of the nonaligned movement were reflected in its low-key treatment of Tito's death. There was no press commentary on Tito's passing, and the entourage calling on the Yugoslav Embassy was dominated by second-echelon state officials, which called attention to the lack of party ties between Hanoi and Belgrade.* Similarly, the SRV delegation to the funeral was headed by the only nonparty vice premier. The strain in bilateral relations was reflected also in the terse condolence message sent by Vietnamese state leaders. It made no mention of Tito's party position or his role in the international communist movement, noting instead only his historic contributions as an "antifascist fighter, veteran leader of the Yugoslav people, and one of the founders of the nonaligned movement."

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* Hanoi and Belgrade established diplomatic relations in 1957, but attempts to establish party ties have been derailed by divergent views on the building of socialism and the international communist movement and, more recently, by their conflicting positions on the Soviet Union's relationship to the nonaligned movement and the invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan.

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USSR

SOCIOLOGIST SAYS CONSUMER GOODS ESSENTIAL FOR PRODUCTIVITY

In what amounts to a challenge to present policy on economic priorities, a prominent Soviet sociologist has argued that big investments in new technology will not revive Soviet economic growth unless workers can be motivated to work harder by the provision of more and better consumer goods. Writing in the March issue of EKO, Academician Tatyana Zaslavskaya of the Novosibirsk Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production indicated that failure to invest more in consumer goods is killing material incentive since workers have nothing to buy and hence lose interest in higher paying and more responsible and productive jobs. Zaslavskaya's arguments highlight potentially serious flaws in the current Soviet strategy, which aims at making the economy more productive by using science and technology to modernize industry.

Zaslavskaya, a specialist on economic problems, argued that equipping industry and agriculture with new, more productive machinery will not increase productivity unless ways can be found to better motivate the workers and farmers. Modern production depends more heavily than before on the "human factor," she stated, since better educated, creative workers are needed to properly utilize new technology to its full potential. But Soviet workers and farmers presently have no incentive to work harder and more responsibly because consumer goods and services have not been developed sufficiently to create "strong 'temptations' for consumers." The disparity between disposable income and available goods has become so great, argued Zaslavskaya, that workers could stop work and it would take a half year before they could spend their accumulated savings on consumer goods. Hence, she said, "the levers of material incentive often turn out to be powerless." She stated that it was "not accidental" that the current decline in labor productivity has taken place against a background of shortages of food and consumer goods.

Zaslavskaya pointed out other serious defects in the economic system, including widespread illicit economic dealings spawned by failures of the planning system. She warned that these dealings, which constitute a "shadow" economy, are undermining central planning by "secret redistribution" of resources, often in a way harmful to state interests. She declared that in West Siberia, for example, 80 percent of all rural construction work is done with material and equipment obtained outside the planning system. She stated that such practices are too deeply rooted to be suppressed and can be corrected only by improving the planning system.

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UKRAINIAN MEAT SUPPLIES DECLINE IN FODDER SHORTAGE

The combination of a serious fodder shortage in the USSR this year and the U.S. grain embargo appears to be producing contrasting results in different parts of the country. Although nationwide meat production was up substantially (13 percent) in January and February, as a result of the slaughter of considerable numbers of pigs and sheep, at least one area--the Ukraine--is suffering a decline in meat production. The drop in meat supplies for the public was substantial enough to prompt Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy to comment on it at a 15 April republic Central Committee plenum.

According to the 17 April RADYANSKA UKRAINA account of his speech, Shcherbitskiy said the Ukraine was managing to bring its cattle herds through the winter intact but acknowledged that "we were not able to maintain the previous level of productivity." Hence, production of both meat and milk dropped in the first quarter of 1980 as against the first quarter of 1979, and "all this" has affected the food supplies for the public. Complaining about the fodder shortage, he stated that "if we really want" to solve the problem, investments in fodder production "should be at least doubled."

The extent of the Ukrainian meat decline was revealed in the first quarter figures, which were published in the 24 April RADYANSKA UKRAINA. Ukrainian meat output was down 5 percent compared with last January-March, and while the 535,000 tons produced this quarter was not low--down from the relatively high 563,000 tons in 1979 but higher than in other recent years--it nevertheless marked a notable reversal of steadily rising meat output and apparently disturbed Shcherbitskiy. Several hundred thousand pigs were slaughtered in late 1979, judging from yearend figures, but overall 1979 meat output was not up substantially, suggesting that some animals were underweight when slaughtered.

The present lack of any short-term glut of meat in the Ukraine during the fodder shortage repeats the pattern of 1975-76. In 1975 Ukrainian grain production fell by the same amount it did in 1979. As with the present fodder shortage, cattle were maintained but the number of pigs was reduced sharply to conserve feed. Then, as now, there was no big short-term rise in meat output--annual meat production in 1975 was the same as it was in 1974--but a sharp decline (14 percent) occurred later, during 1976.

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BRIEFS

PRC PROTEST TO JAPAN: A 7 May PRC Government statement strongly protested to Tokyo the start of joint Japanese-ROK oil drilling and test exploitation in a disputed zone of the continental shelf in the East China Sea. The statement and accompanying authoritative press commentary conveyed Beijing's irritation at Tokyo's efforts to develop the shelf unilaterally despite past Chinese protests and its concern that Tokyo's persistence in that regard will allow a territorial question to complicate China's expanding relations with Japan. The Chinese Government statement, while higher in authority than previous Chinese official statements denouncing earlier Japanese steps to exploit the disputed zone, did not exceed the language of the earlier protests in describing the Japanese actions or their consequences. Beijing first protested the signing of the Japanese-ROK agreement to develop the continental shelf in 1974 with a Foreign Ministry spokesman statement; thereafter it issued Foreign Ministry statements to protest the Japanese Diet's ratification of the agreement in 1977 and the exchange of instruments of ratification in 1978. Echoing the language of the previous protests, the 7 May government statement called the start of joint Japanese-ROK drilling efforts "an infringement on China's sovereignty" and declared the Japanese-ROK agreement "illegal, null and void." As the previous Chinese statements had done, the statement warned that Beijing cannot "ignore actions which infringe on China's sovereignty and major interests" and that "any countries or private persons" unilaterally developing the area must "bear responsiblity for all consequences arising therefrom." A RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article on 8 May expanded upon the government statement's charges and appealed to Tokyo to consult with Beijing and not allow an issue of disputed territorial sovereignty to harm Sino-Japanese relations. The 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship has paved the way for broad Sino-Japanese cooperation, the Commentator article noted, and in that context "there is every reason to expect the Japanese Government to consult China fully instead of acting unilaterally" on the continental shelf issue. The article urged Tokyo and "other quarters concerned" to take the PRC Government statement "into serious consideration" and "refrain from doing anything detrimental" to friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

USSR-POLAND ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES: A courtesy visit by newly appointed Polish Premier Edward Babiuch to Moscow from 6 to 8 May was used by his host, Premier Kosygin, as an occasion to remind the Poles that they cannot count on unlimited help from the USSR in solving their acute economic problems. Speaking at a dinner for Babiuch on the 6th, Kosygin observed that economic cooperation between the two countries "is no simple matter" but requires "an intensive search" for solutions that accord equally with the interests of "both" countries. Warning

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against expectations of sizeable increases in Soviet aid, he stated that bilateral economic ties should not be viewed only as a "quantitative" issue. On energy, Kosygin noted that the USSR was better endowed with resources than "many other countries," but it expected the East Europeans to do more for themselves in this area through "broader" reliance on the international division of labor and joint efforts. In his responding speech, Babiuch, who had succeeded Jaroszewicz as Polish premier in February, was noncommittal on the issues raised by Kosygin, noting only that he would be governed by whatever was agreed on by the two party chiefs, Brezhnev and Gierek.

PYONGYANG ON INVASION RUMORS: Pyongyang has authoritatively denied reports in ROK and Western media that a DPRK invasion is imminent, and it has reaffirmed its call for "peace and peaceful reunification." A 14 May "authorized" KCNA statement--a format typically used to deny foreign accusations against the DPRK--maintained that Seoul had fabricated stories about a North Korean attack to justify the use of its army against a "massive" struggle of South Korean students and workers. In an apparent attempt to negate any speculation that Pyongyang might seek to take advantage of the current turmoil in the South, the statement said that the North continues to pursue the course of "collaboration and unity" it has adhered to since Pak Chong-hui's assassination last year, when the South was in "utter confusion." The statement was critical of the South Korean "authorities" but eschewed the harsher rhetoric that recently crept into lower level DPRK comment on the South. Pyongyang has been consistently sensitive to charges that it is preparing for military action against the South, and twice before, in May 1975 and April 1971, it has used the vehicle of an authorized KCNA statement to deny them.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 5 - 11 MAY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3382 items)			Beijing (1109 items)		
VE Day 35 Anniversary	17%	(2%)	Yugoslav President Tito's Death	35%	(--)
Yugoslav President Tito's Death	8%	(--)	Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq in PRC	4%	(10%)
Polish Premier Babiuch in USSR	8%	(--)	PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua in Thailand	4%	(--)
U.S.-Iran Situation	6%	(9%)			
Rescue Attempt	3%	(8%)	Guinea President Sekou Toure in PRC	4%	(3%)
Paris Conference on Peace and Disarmament	4%	(10%)	PRC Vice Premier Li Xiannian in Australia	4%	(1%)
			PRC Government Statement on Japanese-ROK Drilling in East China Sea	2%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Warsaw Pact, East-West meetings
- Bovin on Soviet policy errors
- Havana on crisis with U.S.
- Chinese support for Pakistan
- PRC leadership debate on modernization
- Yugoslav leadership, independence

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Moscow's recent high-level consultations with its Warsaw Pact allies as well as the major Western powers have left the USSR's posture on current East-West tensions basically unchanged. Moscow continues to underscore its desire for reduced tension but to refrain from making concrete policy concessions to encourage that result. The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee's major policy pronouncements at its 14-15 May meeting in Poland were conciliatory in tone but failed to produce any signs of flexibility on either the USSR's military presence in Afghanistan or the stalemated European security negotiations. The meeting's proposals for a world summit conference and the accelerated preparation of a Europe-wide conference on "military detente" confirmed that Moscow's interest in East-West dialogue remains focused for the present on such broader political forums.

President Brezhnev's Warsaw summit with French President Giscard and Foreign Minister Gromyko's Vienna meeting with new U.S. Secretary of State Muskie, in the immediate wake of the Warsaw Pact session, produced further expressions of interest in dialogue and a similar absence of concrete results. Moscow's contrasting public handling of the two meetings served to underscore its continuing hard line toward the Carter Administration and its efforts to portray the European allies as more reasonable.

PACT MEETING ASSERTS FOREIGN POLICY ROLE, STRESSES UNANIMITY

A show of diplomatic movement, capped by a proposal for a world summit meeting, was the main result of the Warsaw Pact's 25th anniversary session, held in Warsaw on 14-15 May. The proceedings were dramatized by the presence of the bloc defense ministers, who joined the leaders and foreign ministers who normally attend such meetings. In addition to the usual communique and declaration, there was a separate paper proposing the world summit meeting. Moscow was clearly determined to insure a show of unanimity behind its policies by not raising issues that could irritate the more sensitive of its allies, such as Romania.

The final communique reported that the Warsaw Pact summit session was marked by "a friendly atmosphere with complete mutual understanding," and "confirmed an identity of views" on the topics discussed. The warmth of this characterization--unusual in the communiques on the

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biennial Pact summit sessions during the past 10 years--contrasts sharply with the restrained formulation--"fraternal friendship and comradely cooperation"--used for the acrimonious November 1978 meeting in Moscow. At that session Romania's defiance of its allies was put on public display by the issuance of a statement on the Middle East over the signatures of all the top leaders except Ceausescu. The latter, on his return home, promptly served notice publicly that he would not be bound by moves made at the Moscow session to tighten the Pact command structure and to demand increased defense expenditures by the Pact member states. As if to underscore the amicable atmosphere at the present meeting, the declaration of 15 May pointedly lists all the Pact members including Romania as agreeing on a series of foreign policy issues, beginning with the Middle East.

The stress on unanimity in the latest communique was emphasized by Polish leader Gierek and Brezhnev in their speeches at a reception at the close of the two-day Warsaw session. Gierek asserted in his speech that the socialist community states had demonstrated at the Pact conference "their ideological unity and fraternity and their desire for close cooperation in foreign policy." In reply, according to the TASS report, Brezhnev similarly underscored "the fraternal unity of our countries, parties, and people," as well as the member countries' fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and "proletarian internationalism." PRAVDA on the 16th quoted Brezhnev as using the term "socialist internationalism"--a formulation denoting firm unity of the bloc states with the USSR--rather than the more general concept of "proletarian internationalism," which applies to relations between parties of the world communist movement.

EAST UNYIELDING ON SECURITY ISSUES, EYES AUTUMN CSCE FORUM

The results of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee meeting suggest that the East is looking well ahead, to the Madrid CSCE review meeting in the fall, as it assesses the prospect of resuming dialogue with the West on detente and European security issues. Though generally conciliatory in tone and stressing the importance of pursuing detente, the meeting's lengthy policy "declaration" was unyielding on specific points that could hasten a resumption of dialogue.

WORLD SUMMIT It seems unlikely that the Committee's proposal for the convocation of a world summit to discuss the elimination of seats of international tension was designed to have a serious, immediate impact. While the Committee's statement on the proposal asserted that summit-level meetings were the "most reliable road" to mutual understanding, the initiative has received only halfhearted attention in Soviet and East European followup commentary.

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Speaking on an 18 May domestic radio program, two well-connected Soviet commentators--IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin and Central Committee consultant Nikolay Shishlin--gave barely passing attention to the world summit proposal in their discussion of the Pact meeting, U.S.-Soviet relations, and East-West differences over Afghanistan. Bovin gave the impression in his remarks that the idea was largely symbolic--an indication that "not a single door has been shut by the socialist countries in their attempt to resolve international disputes."

CSCE REVIEW MEETING As presaged in the communique issued by the Pact foreign ministers meeting in Berlin last December, the upcoming CSCE review conference in Madrid is assuming particular importance in the East's five-year-old campaign to engender movement on European "military detente." According to the declaration of the Political Consultative Committee, the Pact believes there are "opportunities" for achieving at Madrid a "coordination of practical steps as regards the military and political aspects of European security." The East wants the Madrid meeting to adopt "practical decisions" on convening a conference on military detente and disarmament, including the date, place, and procedure of the meeting, with an agenda focusing initially on confidence-building measures. Such a "concrete positive result" from Madrid, the Pact declared, would have a "salutary effect on the general international atmosphere." Unlike the December foreign ministers meeting, the Warsaw gathering exhibited sensitivity to Western complaints that Moscow was hoping to monopolize the Madrid agenda and prevent discussion on issues not related to security. The new declaration implies that Moscow and its allies would be amenable to treating other topics if there were a fair hearing for security issues, which the bloc claims were slighted at the previous CSCE review meeting in Belgrade two years ago.

THEATER ARMS TALKS The Committee's declaration reaffirmed interest in negotiating force reductions in central Europe through the Vienna MBFR forum, as well as in limiting medium-range strategic systems, but it repeated Moscow's contention that progress in both areas is contingent on the West's altering its current positions. Regarding strategic systems in particular, the Pact advocated the "earliest opening and successful holding" of negotiations on medium-range missiles. But it reiterated that the "only" thing required to get such talks started was for NATO to cancel its December decision on deploying new U.S. missiles in West Europe, or "at least halt its implementation." If the NATO decision is implemented, the declaration warned, the "situation in Europe will sharply worsen." As long as NATO desires to gain "military superiority" and continues to build up its military potential, the document noted, the Warsaw Pact members will take "all necessary steps to maintain their defense potential at the proper level." The declaration's relatively

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bland language regarding the Pact's military response to recent NATO modernization decisions could reflect the influence of the resistant Romanians. The Soviet party-government statement on the meeting, released subsequently on 16 May, maintained that Pact members were forced by the NATO decisions to "strengthen" their defense capability.

VIENNA MEETING BRINGS NO CHANGE IN SOVIET VIEW OF RELATIONS

The 16 May meeting in Vienna between Secretary of State Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko appears to have had little effect on Moscow's view of the Carter Administration. Soviet media gave the meeting minimal coverage and eschewed any suggestion that it had produced an improvement in bilateral relations. No substantive commentary on the meeting has yet appeared. The strictly limited coverage of the Muskie-Gromyko exchange contrasts markedly with the more forthcoming reporting and commentary that typically has greeted such meetings between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state in recent years.

The TASS report on the Vienna meeting, published in the 17 May PRAVDA, was straightforward and nonpolemical but clearly conveyed a sense of unresolved disagreement. TASS said the two sides had a "frank" exchange in presenting "their respective assessments and views" on ways of reducing international tension and overcoming the impasse in U.S.-Soviet relations. The TASS report did record both sides' interest in further discussion.

Soviet reporting on Foreign Minister Gromyko's meetings on May 16-17 with his West European counterparts, by portraying a more fruitful exchange, underscored the cool if correct nature of the Gromyko-Muskie discussions. TASS described the atmosphere of the meeting with the French foreign minister as "constructive" and with the German foreign minister and British foreign secretary as "businesslike" as well as frank. The report of the Soviet-British meeting--despite Soviet charges in recent months of British subservience to U.S. policy--seemed to emphasize the existence of mutual concerns and a common readiness "to maintain and develop the dialogue . . . in the interests of the containment of the arms race and of solving conflict situations in the world through negotiations."

MOSCOW CONTRASTS BREZHNEV-GISCARD TALKS TO U.S. DETENTE STANCE

Moscow has pointed to the 19 May summit talks between Soviet President Brezhnev and French President Giscard d'Estaing as fresh proof of its claim East-West detente remains viable in Europe despite U.S. efforts to shift direction since Afghanistan. Soviet followup commentary on

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the summit in Poland has been sparse. It has characterized the meeting as "necessary" and "useful" for maintaining the East-West dialogue under the present tense international climate but has not attempted to gloss over Soviet-French differences or to suggest that any headway was made on reconciling outstanding East-West disagreements.

Moscow seems intent on using the event to support its complaints against Washington's current stance on East-West ties. Moscow radio on the 19th reported that French editorial opinion was stressing the importance of the talks being held at a time when Washington "to all intents and purposes had challenged detente" and was pressuring the West Europeans, particularly France, to replace detente with the "cold war." In a similar spirit, Moscow has quickly picked up on U.S.-French frictions over the meeting. Domestic radio commentator Andrianov observed on the 20th that in contrast to the reaction elsewhere, the meeting had caused "unconcealed irritation" in Washington. Secretary Muskie "in effect attacked France", Andrianov said, by claiming that the summit undermines "confidence and Atlantic solidarity."

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USSR

BOVIN ARTICLE URGES POLITICAL LEADERS TO ADMIT MISTAKES

An unusual article in IZVESTIYA last month by outspoken Soviet journalist Aleksandr Bovin raises the possibility that elements in the Soviet elite are pressing for a significant policy review. Bovin, in an article devoted ostensibly to the celebration of Lenin's 110th birth anniversary, presented what amounted to a doctrinal justification for questioning or revising past decisions and traditional doctrines. He invoked Lenin to castigate those who are unwilling to admit and correct mistakes, attacked those who adhere doggedly to past decisions regardless of "changed circumstances," and admonished political leaders to "take risks" when the situation requires it. There are few indications in his article concerning Bovin's specific target, but--in light of the rigidity Moscow has shown in responding to the Afghanistan crisis--it could be a critique of current regime foreign policy.

Bovin is a well-connected Soviet social scientist and journalist with a long history of intervention on the liberal side of disputed issues, both foreign and domestic. His relatively realistic descriptions in the Soviet press of Western policies and politics have often appeared to counsel moderation. Nonetheless, in his public discussions of the Afghanistan crisis to date, Bovin has been a good soldier and has adapted his commentary to the prescriptions of official propaganda.

The central theme of the Bovin article, which appeared in IZVESTIYA on 19 April, was that policies should be changed when they no longer accord with reality. Although tailored to the formalities of an anniversary piece, it was unusually polemical. Bovin's choice of argument and vocabulary underscored the impression that his admonitions were not intended as moral platitudes but as practical guides to action on real policy issues:

+ He said Lenin believed "self-criticism and the ability and courage to acknowledge and correct errors openly" were "the decisive features of mature political action." By analyzing "yesterday's errors," Bovin said, we learn to avoid today's and tomorrow's.

+ Responding to concern that self-criticism could be exploited by the "class enemy," Bovin reassured readers that the harm caused by "a specious lie for good reasons" is more dangerous "than the inescapable cost of open self-criticism."

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+ Although a scientific approach can reduce surprises to an acceptable minimum, said Bovin, "history may present us with turns of events that are practically unpredictable." Lenin wrote, Bovin said, that "ignoring changed circumstances" and supporting "old" decisions means being true to the letter rather than to the spirit of doctrine.

+ Politics, Bovin concluded, is both a science and an art. On the one hand, policies must be based on "an objective and impartial assessment of the facts." Subjectivism, he cautioned, arises from an unwillingness to consider the "totality of facts," the classification of facts into "pleasant" and "unpleasant." On the other hand, Bovin maintained, a politician is like a chess player. To be successful, he must combine facts with creative imagination, intuition, "and the ability to take risks if circumstances so require."

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CUBA

HAVANA OFFERS TALKS WITH U.S. ON REFUGEES AND OTHER PROBLEMS

In its latest maneuver on the refugee crisis, Havana has offered negotiations with Washington on U.S.-Cuban differences as a condition for cooperation on the emigration issue. It has indicated that its own international policies, specifically the Cuban presence in Angola and Ethiopia, are not open to discussion, and instead stressed longstanding grievances over bilateral questions. Foreshadowing this stand, President Fidel Castro in his May Day speech had renewed Havana's demands that the United States abandon the Guantanamo naval base, lift the trade embargo, and cease surveillance flights--demands reiterated in a 19 May GRANMA editorial setting forth Cuba's readiness for discussions. Cuba's move to use the refugee issue as a bargaining point came in response to President Carter's 14 May announcement calling for a halt to the exodus of Cubans from the port of Mariel on private U.S. boats coupled with an offer to provide U.S. Government-sponsored transportation for specific categories of Cubans seeking to emigrate to the United States.

Moscow, trying to obscure the problem of Cubans fleeing from the "first socialist society in Latin America," has complained about U.S. military maneuvers in the Caribbean designed to intimidate Cuba and "destabilize" the Caribbean. A 13 May PRAVDA article, broadcast by Moscow in Spanish, did acknowledge U.S. media reports of the arrival of "several thousand" Cubans in Florida and, like Havana, depicted the refugees as the "dregs" of Cuban society. And Soviet readers got a suggestion of Cuba's "serious difficulties" in a 7 May PRAVDA interview with a Cuban planning official, who offered assurance that there was no "crisis situation" in the country but conceded problems due to various factors including Cuba's "own deficiences and mistakes."

NEGOTIATIONS OFFER Havana prepared the way for the conditional proposal for discussions by staging mammoth anti-American demonstrations on the 17th in an apparent effort to offset some of the embarrassment caused by the mass exodus and to portray Cuban solidarity with the regime. Two days later, GRANMA carried what were presumably two separate editorials, one--reported by Havana radio--praising the demonstrations and another--carried textually by PRENSA LATINA--trying to explain the mass emigration and stating Cuban readiness for negotiations. The latter editorial, defending the efforts of the Cuban revolution to provide socioeconomic benefits for the people, acknowledged that Cuba

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was still an underdeveloped country and placed the blame for economic and social ills on U.S. policies toward Cuba. GRANMA indicated that Cuba would no longer be amenable to "partial solutions" of U.S.-Cuban differences such as those on the previous emigration from Camarioca port and on airplane hijackings. GRANMA declared:

> We are ready to discuss and negotiate our problems and global relations with the United States, but not isolated and partial problems that interest only them and their strategy toward Cuba.

This editorial focused on Havana's complaints about U.S. policies toward Cuba and did not define the "global" issues which might be tabled for discussion. But the other GRANMA editorial, as reviewed by Havana radio, appeared to rule out Cuba's African involvement as a subject for discussion. The radio said:

> GRANMA reiterates that if through their aggressiveness and direct threats imperialists were trying to pressure us into pulling our heroic troops out of Angola and Ethiopia, we would not withdraw a single soldier from those fraternal nations while we have a commitment to fulfill and while the revolutionary governments of those two peoples and the Cuban Government consider it necessary. We can say, GRANMA notes, that we will not make any concession to imperialism as far as our internationalist policy is concerned, and we will never negotiate with them on matters pertaining to the sovereignty of other nations.

The editorial that suggested negotiations portrayed Havana as willing to be "flexible" and to consider "the important matter of the implications of U.S. foreign policy in the current election period." Havana may have been trying to leave the impression that it might be accommodating on the refugee question without simultaneously addressing its other demands in an election year. But GRANMA, contradictorily, seemed to discount this notion when it went on to stress that Cuba would "not bend or give up" its just demands on the U.S. trade embargo, Guantanamo, or the surveillance flights "in the hope of more commonsense or better times." (Cuba had insisted on the principle of negotiations on the refugee issue in an earlier stage of the current exodus, when it rejected the use of Costa Rica as a way station for Cuban refugees. But Havana had set no conditions at that time for discussion of Cuban cooperation with any potential host country.)

REFUGEE ISSUE Cuba's initial response to President Carter's 14 May offer to provide transportation for Cubans who qualify for entry into the United States came in a 15 May GRANMA editorial that focused on the President's announced halt of the Mariel

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boatlift and skeptically remarked, "We'll see how he manages it." GRANMA implied that President Carter's specifications on categories of refugees acceptable to the United States--those with relatives in the United States, former political prisoners, and Cubans who had taken refuge in the U.S. Interests Section and the Peruvian Embassy--were already being met at least partially. It observed that many boats had left Mariel with relatives of U.S. residents and "other passengers, many of whom were so-called refugees at the Peruvian Embassy and former political prisoners with their relatives."

The subsequent 19 May GRANMA editorial, which professed readiness for discussions, did not spell out the President's categories; it merely noted that Washington had set a number of conditions with a view to "picking and choosing" among the "more agreeable sociopaths." While GRANMA did not appear to reject the U.S. offer, it argued that the "key issue" was not to determine the "route" by which disaffected Cubans emigrate to the United States but "to analyze and put an end to those things that cause these elements to emerge." Recalling that the U.S.-Cuban negotiations in 1965 on the exodus of Cubans from the port of Camarioca had resulted in a "partial solution," GRANMA complained that after those talks the United States not only continued its "destabilization and counterrevolutionary policy" toward Cuba but also resumed restriction on immigration of Cubans and, "much worse," promoted "illegal departures" from the country." The paper in effect discounted President Carter's expressed concern for the safety of Cubans in the Mariel-Florida boatlift and appeared to underscore Havana's resolve to take no steps to close the port. While the United States can impose its laws in Florida, GRANMA said, in Mariel "it can do absolutely nothing."

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PRC-PAKISTAN

ANTI-SOVIET SOLIDARITY HIGHLIGHTS ZIAUL HAQ BEIJING VISIT

Strong expressions of Sino-Pakistani solidarity against a threat from the Soviet Union in the wake of its intervention in Afghanistan highlighted Beijing's warm welcome for Pakistani President Ziaul Haq. The strength of such expressions of anti-Soviet unity during the visit contrasted with more reserved Chinese statements of support for Pakistan last January, at a time when Islamabad was cautiously reviewing its foreign policy relationships in the wake of the Soviet invasion.

During his 2-6 May Beijing visit, Ziaul Haq held talks with PRC Premier Hua Guofeng and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping. The visit was cut short to allow the Pakistani leader to attend funeral ceremonies for Yugoslav President Tito in Belgrade, and no formal cooperation or assistance agreements were reported to have been signed. However, XINHUA on 6 May, in an unusual acknowledgment of Chinese military aid to a foreign government, cited Ziaul Haq's statement after the visit that his trip would result in "more Chinese help" to Pakistan in both the economic and defense fields.

Strong Chinese expressions of support for Pakistan against the Soviet Union were sounded early in the visit and continued throughout. After observing in his 2 May welcoming banquet toast that Pakistan faces "grave new military threats" in the context of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Hua Guofeng declared that the PRC Government and the Chinese people "will, as always, firmly support you in your just struggle in defense of national independence and state sovereignty and will stand together with you against foreign aggression and interference." According to XINHUA on the 3d, Deng Yingchao, a CCP Politburo member and widow of Zhou Enlai, stated in talks with Haq that day that Sino-Pakistani friendship is "cemented on the basis of mutual support, understanding, help, and concern" and has been "able to weather all storms."

A 6 May XINHUA correspondent's review of the achievements of the visit observed that China's and Pakistan's "pledge to stand still more closely together to oppose whatever form of aggression, interference, and hegemonism" was an "important result" of the visit. In view of the "serious military threats" that China and Pakistan both face from Moscow's deployment of troops along their borders, the XINHUA correspondent noted, the leaders of the two countries "naturally focused their attention on the common objective of strengthening cooperation and mutual assistance."

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Ziaul Haq, on his part, stressed Sino-Pakistani solidarity and strongly reaffirmed positions on Afghanistan which are compatible with Beijing's views and which Chinese media highlighted. In his toast at the 2 May banquet, Ziaul Haq claimed that Pakistan and China enjoy "a complete identity of views" on longterm international goals and that the two countries "stand together in opposition to all forms of aggression, intervention, and hegemony." In reporting the Pakistan president's conversations with Deng Xiaoping on the 3d, XINHUA highlighted Ziaul Haq's reiteration of Islamabad's call for a "complete and immediate withdrawal" of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and his pledge that Islamabad will not recognize the Karmal regime in Kabul until a Soviet withdrawal is complete. XINHUA on 6 May called attention to the Pakistani president's assessment of his Beijing visit as "very successful" and his view that he and China's leaders had arrived at a "complete understanding" on "all matters discussed."

The effusive expressions of mutual support by both sides during the Ziaul Haq visit cap a trend toward increasing solidarity between the two countries following a brief period of uncertainty as Pakistan reassessed its foreign relationships immediately in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. While Chinese commentary at the time of the Soviet intervention had identified Pakistan as particularly threatened by the Soviet action, Chinese statements of support for Islamabad initially were notably muted. Perhaps in deference to Pakistani sensitivities over the situation in the region, for example, Chinese media gave PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua's January visit to Islamabad unusually low-key treatment.* The only clear statement of support for Pakistan by Huang that Beijing reported was his declaration in a press conference at the end of the visit that China would "firmly stand by the Pakistani people" in the face of the "external threat." Subsequently Chinese expressions of solidarity with Pakistan against Moscow increased, most notably during the Pakistan visit last March by a PLA delegation led by Vice Minister of National Defense Xiao Ke. Xiao repeatedly stated during that visit that the Chinese people and the PLA "stand on the side of Pakistan, which is under the direct threat of Soviet aggression and expansion."

Since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Chinese media have closely followed official Pakistani statements on the Afghan issue. Strong statements by Ziaul Haq in opposition to Moscow's actions have been reported promptly and very favorably by XINHUA, as have Pakistani efforts beginning in January to improve relations with its neighbors in the region--particularly India--in response to the Afghan situation.

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* Huang Hua's 18-23 January visit to Pakistan is discussed in the 30 January 1980 TRENDS, pages 8-9.

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Beijing particularly applauded Ziaul Haq's rejection of a recent proposal by Kabul that Afghan, Pakistani, and Iranian leaders meet to discuss common issues. The proposal has been attacked by Beijing as a Soviet-instigated effort to win key diplomatic recognition for the Karmal regime and undermine support for the Afghan resistance effort.

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CHINA

LEADERSHIP DIFFERENCES OVER MODERNIZATION REFORMS RE-EMERGE

Recent speeches and press comment have exposed resurgent differences in the Chinese leadership over how to deal with problems and side effects of modernization and economic reform. Party Chairman Hua Guofeng, in calling for China to hold to its socialist principles in pursuing rapid economic modernization, appears to have pitted himself against the party wing pressing for drastic economic and political reform. Hua's nominal subordinate, Zhao Ziyang, and press comment have taken opposing positions, defending specific economic reforms as being in keeping with "socialist modernization." While such differences have divided the post-Mao leadership persistently in the past, their reappearance now cracks the facade of unity behind the modernization program that the party's recent fifth plenum had made great efforts to build.

HUA GUOFENG SPEECH In a 29 April speech to a PLA conference on political work, Hua Guofeng strongly reaffirmed a theme on which he has been outspoken in the past--that China's modernization should proceed without straying from socialist values. "We are carrying out socialist modernization," Hua declared, and he went on to stress the party's crucial role in guiding Chinese modernization along a socialist path.

That Hua's remarks to the army conference, published in RENMIN RIBAO on 8 May, were intended not only for the PLA's party apparatus but also for the party as a whole is clear from his repeated references to work both in the PLA and outside it. Noting that units in both the army and "various localities" have neglected political work for some time, Hua claimed that political work is "still the lifeline of economic work and the lifeline of army work."

Specifically addressing the problem of motivating support for economic modernization, Hua stressed the importance of political education in a context of constrained financial resources rather than overreliance on material incentives. Hua stated that "only when the people understand the goal and significance of their own work--that doing a good job in production and work is necessary for building a powerful socialist state . . . can their enthusiasm and creativity be put into full play, can there be a powerful driving force behind their actions, and can their vigor be maintained and carried forward in a lasting manner along the correct path." By contrast, Hua warned that the "blind pursuit" of material reward and "one-sided emphasis" on economic means

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would lead to "results" that "will definitely be rather poor." "To go beyond the capacity of the development of production and unduly overemphasize the improvement of living standards is impossible," Hua stated, adding that "what we should do is raise people's consciousness through political-ideological work and carry forward the revolutionary pioneering spirit."

DEFENSE OF RURAL POLICIES Commentary strongly defending the attempt to motivate economic production by appealing to the people's interests through material incentives--at least within the context of the party's rural policies--appeared quickly on the heels of the release of Hua Guofeng's remarks to the PLA conference. Distinctly defensive in tone, a 13 May XINHUA correspondents' discussion of rural policy and a 14 May RENMIN RIBAO editorial appeared to reflect unusual concern and frustration over the depth of continuing political opposition to the rural economic reforms that the party adopted 18 months ago and has repeatedly defended since. In the context of Hua's remarks to the PLA conference, the editorial and related comment may also reflect anxiety that, uncontested, Hua's statements will accelerate the pace of attacks on the reforms.

According to the editorial and the XINHUA correspondents, the party's rural policies--which stress material incentives, greater independence for peasant production organizations, limited farming of private plots, encouragement of sideline enterprises, and some free markets--have been criticized as departures from acceptable socialist practice. The critics have:

+ called the fixing of output quotas on the basis of work groups and households "a deviation from the socialist orbit";

+ charged that permitting some peasants to become wealthy more quickly than others "runs counter to the socialist goal of everyone's becoming well-to-do together" and will lead to "polarization" in the countryside;

+ labeled sideline production of goods and participating in free markets a "spontaneous trend of capitalism."

Responding sharply to such attacks, and implicitly to the thrust of Hua Guofeng's remarks to the PLA conference on political work, the editorial called the rural policies' critics "narrowminded," lacking in "faith," and victims of the influence of discredited "leftist ideology" and "leftist policies." At fundamental odds with Hua's assertion that appealing to the enthusiasm of the people through "moral incentives" and political consciousness is the key to promoting production, the editorial argued that past leftist policies--including heavy doses of political indoctrination--had "damaged the peasants' enthusiasm" because they had not taken the material interests of the peasants into account. By contrast, the current policies had considered the

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"interests of the state, the collective, and the individual"; and, the editorial continued, if "persistently" and "unswervingly" implemented for several years, they would protect and arouse the peasants' enthusiasm and creativity.

OTHER COMMENTARY Other recent comment, although only tangentially related to the issues treated directly in Hua's speech and in comment on rural policy, has rebuked the party's persistent critics and may even have been aimed indirectly at Hua himself. A 6 May RENMIN RIBAO Contributing Commentator article on party leadership--published two days before Hua's remarks were published, but a week after they were made--reviewed the past failings of the CCP leadership and demanded that its organizations and members adapt to the party's overriding focus on the economy. "We must learn," Commentator said, "the work methods which bring the wisdom of the masses and experts into full play, be good at arousing their enthusiasm, and avoid disturbing and suppressing them." The article decried the behavior of party members who withhold comment on issues in party councils but "willfully air their discontent, distrust, and dissension regardless of the place and party discipline" and "make irresponsible and wanton remarks on the party's current policies and on the points which they regard as questions and mistakes of the party."

It also seems plausible that Vice Premier Deng--who in the past has seemed to offer advice to living leaders by recounting the virtues of those he has eulogized in funerals--may have indirectly chastized Hua in his eulogy to Liu Shaoqi on 17 May. Recalling Liu's leadership of China's labor movements in the 1920's and 1930's, Deng observed that Liu was "good at combining the party's political tasks with the workers' vital interests and organizing them in fruitful struggles." His ideas on labor, trade unions, raising workers' political consciousness, and paying attention to their vital interests, Deng added, "continue to be of guiding significance."

HUA AND ZHAO ZIYANG Hua Guofeng's strong warnings on the need to uphold socialist values and orientation in pursuing rapid economic modernization place him publicly in opposition to his direct subordinate on the State Council, Zhao Ziyang, for the first time since Zhao assumed national-level responsibilities following the fifth plenum last February. While Hua, as premier, heads the State Council, XINHUA on 21 April cited Deng Xiaoping's acknowledgement to a foreign delegation that Zhao has assumed responsibility for its "day-to-day work."

Hua and Zhao have yet to speak publicly on identical issues at a single major conference, as Hua and Deng Xiaoping did in 1978, when their speeches revealed major differences in approach to China's modernization. But a speech Zhao delivered on economic reform to the Sichuan CCP committee in March--frontpaged by RENMIN RIBAO on 21 April--offers similar illuminating contrasts in approach, which almost certainly

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will bring the two men into repeated conflict as they vie for authority in the State Council. In his speech, for example, Zhao forthrightly detailed the problems that have accompanied economic reform in Sichuan and seemed to offer adjustments different from those Hua had recommended. Among problems, Zhao listed speculation, profiteering, seeking private gain at public expense, and fraud--all problems Hua seemed to be broadly concerned over as manifestations of resurgent "bourgeois ideology." Instead of an ideological education drive, however, Zhao offered modifications to reforms and steps to uphold regulations and enforce discipline. At the same time, Zhao warned against indiscriminate and broad-ranging reaction to abuses of reform, saying that "we must not commit the same mistake we did in the past when a free rein leads to chaos, chaos forces us to rein in, and once we rein in the thing becomes dead."

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YUGOSLAVIA

BELGRADE REAFFIRMS LEADERSHIP COLLECTIVITY, CRITICIZES MOSCOW

Belgrade has continued to demonstrate self-assurance and stabiiity in comment on the first regular leadership rotation of the post-Tito period. Reaffirming its commitment to leadership collectivity and annual rotation, the state Presidency on 15 May named Cvijetin Mijatovic president to replace Lazar Kolisevski and elected Sergej Kraigher vice president. Several days earlier Belgrade had criticized Moscow for the first time since Tito's death for playing down Yugoslav independence.

The importance of Tito's mandate on collective leadership was stressed by the outgoing and incoming presidents, Kolisevski and Mijatovic, in speeches at the 15 May Presidency session, reported by TANJUG that day. Kolisevski, praising Yugoslavs for their unity and dignity during Tito's funeral, said that the recent experience of the Presidency "forcefully illuminated and confirmed the historic importance" of Tito's efforts to strengthen collective work, responsibility, and decisionmaking in the Yugoslav system. Mijatovic similarly stressed the Yugoslav system's "firmness and vitality" and the continuing need for "joint work and maximum individual efforts" by members of the Presidency. While the election of Mijatovic--an ethnic Serb from Bosnia--is required under the Presidency's set rotational pattern, it serves to augment further the already large number of Serbs and Montenegrins in top offices--including the party chairman and secretary, the premier, the assembly president, and the defense secretary.

Displaying Yugoslavia's usual sensitivity to any perceived slighting of its self-image, Belgrade POLITIKA Moscow correspondent Risto Bajalski on 12 May took issue with an 11 May PRAVDA article for accusing the West of trying to "frighten" Yugoslavia with talk of a Soviet threat. Bajalski said the use of such an "unfortunate expression" would cause "perplexity" among the Soviet people who know that "it was not possible in the past, nor is it possible now, to 'frighten' Yugoslavia and its people from abroad--with anything or by any side." He also complained that Moscow's "condensed report" on Tito's funeral did not allow the Soviet public to "see well enough how the Yugoslavs behaved last week or to hear anything about the Yugoslavs' pledges to Tito's work." Two days earlier, on 10 May, Bajalski similarly had said that the Soviet press had cited only "two or three ideas" from the funeral speeches.

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BRIEF

KAMPUCHEAN LEADERSHIP: Although KPRC President Heng Samrin has returned to public life following an absence of nearly five weeks, his future role in the regime remains clouded by signs that political problems prompted his sudden disappearance last month. Heng Samrin's resurfacing in Phnom Penh on 8 May to greet a visiting Vietnamese Foreign Ministry delegation was followed by other appearances--receiving more foreign visitors and speaking at local meetings. But there is evidence suggesting he may now share some of his former power with Vice President Pen Sovan, who also serves as minister of defense and commander in chief of the army and who filled the void created by Heng Samrin's temporary retreat from the Kampuchean political scene.* Before Heng Samrin's disappearance, the signing of KPRC directives was regarded as the president's exclusive preserve. But it was Pen Sovan, not Heng Samrin, who signed a 12 May KPRC circular on commemorating Ho Chi Minh's birthday. Heng Samrin had resumed signing KPRC directives on 10 May, when his name appeared on an instruction establishing a commission for organizing the celebration of Ho's birthday. During the period Heng Samrin was out of sight, signs of his apparent political decline included a 22 April report on the new PRK draft constitution, which made no mention of the office of the presidency, and Pen Sovan's failure to even mention the absent president in remarks at the 15 April national day banquet, at which he introduced the "inner circle of the revolutionary family."

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* See the 23 April 1980 TRENDS, pages 5-7.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 12-18 MAY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3280 items)			Beijing (841 items)		
Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, Warsaw	16%	(--)	Mauritanian President Haydala in PRC	16%	(--)
Soviet Party-Government Approval	4%	(--)	Memorial Service for Liu Shaoqi	10%	(--)
Warsaw Pact 25th Anniversary	4%	(2%)	PRC Vice Premier Li Xiannian in New Zealand	4%	(--)
Austrian State Treaty 25th Anniversary	4%	(--)	Former British Prime Minister Callaghan in PRC	3%	(--)
VE Day 35th Anniversary	3%	(17%)	Japanese Friendship Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)
NATO Session, Brussels	3%	(--)			

During the reporting period there has been no commentary on the meeting between Secretary of State Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna on 16 May 1980.

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on Afghanistan
- DPRK on events in South Korea
- I. Aleksandrov criticism of PRC
- USSR-Romanian relations

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW SUPPORTS KABUL CALL FOR TALKS, INFLEXIBLE ON WITHDRAWAL

Moscow has recently stepped up its professions of interest in a political settlement of the Afghan crisis even though it remains inflexible on the conditions for withdrawal of Soviet troops. A show of support for Kabul's latest proposal for talks with Iran and Pakistan, capped by a Brezhnev speech on 27 May, contrasts with Moscow's seeming air of indifference to similar Afghan suggestions last month. Moscow's more vigorous rhetorical support for a negotiated settlement may be responsive to continuing foreign criticism of the Soviet intervention--particularly by the West Europeans and Islamic nations at their recently concluded Islamabad conference. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has remained unbending on its conditions for the removal of Soviet troops, set forth by Brezhnev in his February election speech, and the Soviet president has now implied that withdrawal could be a lengthy process.

AFGHAN PROPOSALS, SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

Moscow's welcome for Kabul's latest settlement proposal, hailed by Soviet President Brezhnev himself in the wake of the 17-22 May Islamabad meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), seems designed to reassure Islamic as well as Western critics of Soviet policy, without budging on the issue of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Following the Islamabad meeting, a 25 May "A. Petrov" article in PRAVDA lamented the ICO's failure to admit an Afghan delegation or to discuss Afghanistan's proposal. Brezhnev, two days later, supported Kabul's proposal but indicated that even if Soviet terms were met, withdrawal would be a prolonged affair--with the implication that withdrawal would be contingent on the Afghan internal situation.

Speaking at a 27 May dinner for the visiting South Yemeni leader, Brezhnev welcomed Kabul's "concrete program" for a political settlement and said the proposal required "businesslike negotiations" by Afghanistan's neighbors. In effect moving a total Soviet withdrawal far into the future, Brezhnev maintained that the reasons for Soviet assistance had to be removed before a Soviet withdrawal, but he added that a "political settlement is fully possible." The date "for the beginning" of a withdrawal and "further steps in this direction" could be decided, according to

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Brezhnev, in the framework of the Afghan proposal and with "appropriate international guarantees" for the cessation and nonresumption of all forms of outside interference.

Moscow's position on the specifics of a negotiated settlement has evolved little since Brezhnev declared in his 22 February election speech that the Soviet Union would be "ready to begin" withdrawal of troops once there was a guarantee from the United States and Afghanistan's neighbors of a complete cessation of outside interference in Afghan affairs. Two months later, the first Afghan proposal for talks with Iran and Pakistan on normalizing relations received little Soviet publicity.*

Moscow has shown little interest in other suggestions for a solution. It rejected British-inspired EC proposals, under discussion in February and early March, for a "neutralized" Afghanistan. And it had not even endorsed efforts by its ally Cuba, in March and April, to offer its good offices; the 25 May Petrov PRAVDA article merely replayed Kabul's modest approbation of Havana's "good services" as chairman of the nonaligned movement. As for the ideas of the Islamabad conference, Moscow, using Kabul as a proxy, has not closed the door on the ICO's proposal of a tripartite commission composed of Iran, Pakistan, and the Arab League to "contact the interested parties," Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Thus TASS on the 27th reported Afghan Foreign Minister Dost as saying Afghanistan would study the committee's approach to see if it harmonized with Kabul's own proposal. But Dost flatly rejected the ICO's further suggestion for an international conference under UN or other aegis, calling this interference in Afghan affairs.

IRAN, PAKISTAN Moscow has continued to try to avoid exacerbating its differences with Tehran over Afghanistan, but Islamabad has come in for some of the periodically stronger Soviet attacks in the wake of President Ziaul Haq's early May visit to Beijing and as a result of Pakistan's role as host of the Islamic conference. Moscow at times portrays Pakistan as caught in a web of U.S. and Chinese machinations against Afghanistan and at other times holds Islamabad directly responsible for anti-Afghan subversion--an inconsistency of treatment perhaps calculated to keep the Pakistani regime off balance. Brezhnev pointedly called on Pakistan, "above all," to respond to Kabul's proposal, while the Petrov PRAVDA article accused Pakistan of helping foment "military-political hysteria" over the Afghan issue at the Islamic conference and

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* Both Afghan proposals--the first issued on 17 April by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan as part of the PDPA theses on Afghanistan's second revolution anniversary, and the second issued by the government on 14 May--seemed timed for the Islamabad conference, which was originally scheduled for April.

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complained that President Ziaul Haq, by rejecting the Afghan proposal, left no doubt that "he did not even think of ending subversive anti-Afghan actions from Pakistan's territory."

Moscow noted Iran's role in including Afghan opposition figures in its Islamic conference delegation, but the strongest criticism was left to Kabul: TASS on the 27th reported Afghan Foreign Minister Dost as expressing Afghan indignation that those "paid agents of imperialism and reaction" were in the Iranian delegation. A similar remark in the Petrov PRAVDA article was carefully deleted, however, from a summary of the article broadcast in Persian to Iran. And Moscow, continuing its generally restrained approach to Iranian officials' periodic anti-Soviet pronouncements, ignored Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh's statement in Islamabad that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a "flagrant violation of international law." Moscow radio's Persian-language service did take a swipe at the Iranian foreign minister on 21 May for confirming, from "faraway Islamabad," a PARS news agency report of an incursion by Soviet-made helicopters into Iran from Afghanistan. Avoiding an outright denial of the incident, the radio ridiculed Qotbzadeh's charge that the objective of the reported attack was to force Iran "to deviate from its policy" at the Islamabad meeting. "Some in Iran," the radio said, seize on the "smallest excuse" to start a commotion over the "mythical" Soviet threat.

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KOREA

PYONGYANG PLEDGES NONINTERVENTION, DIALOGUE OUTLOOK DIM

Pyongyang has used harsh language to compare the recent broadening of martial law and the crackdown on dissent in South Korea to the May 1961 coup that brought Pak Chong-hui to power, but it has carefully rebutted charges from the South that it seeks to exploit the situation and intervene. The North's scathing criticism of military strong-man Chon Tu-hwan and his followers suggests that Pyongyang sees little future for its six-month-old policy of seeking accommodation with the post-Pak regime, a perception that casts a cloud over the future of the current North-South talks. The speed and decisiveness of Pyongyang's reaction to the turn of events in the South contrast sharply with the slower, more tentative DPRK reaction following Pak Chong-hui's assassination in October--a difference suggesting that there was no need this time for a period of policy reappraisal to respond to the new political realities in the South.

NONINTERVENTION, NORTH-SOUTH TALKS

Pyongyang has taken special pains to deny any connection with the disorders in the South or any intention to become involved in Seoul's internal affairs. While these disclaimers are probably intended to lessen foreign apprehensions, they also serve notice to the domestic North Korean audience that armed conflict is not imminent.

Pyongyang's sensitivity on the question of intervention was apparent when it released two KCNA statements--on 14 May and 23 May--rejecting ROK charges of a DPRK threat to the South. And beginning with a NODONG SINMUN editorial article on the 17th, the North not only repeatedly voiced the standard disclaimer that it had no intention of invading, but also underscored this point by flatly stating it does not seek to "take advantage" of the "complicated situation" in the South. Embellishing this theme, both the KCNA statement on the 23d and a speech by Political Committee member Yim Chun-chu at a Pyongyang rally on the 25th portrayed events in the South as strictly an "internal affair," in which the North did not intend to interfere, "no matter how it may develop."

Buttressing its assertion that it will not exploit the situation in the South, Pyongyang had highlighted the fact that following Pak's assassination it had not intervened in the "confused" situation but had proposed instead a new North-South dialogue. The North may have

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decided to go ahead with a working-level meeting between the two sides at Panmunjom on 22 May to reemphasize the point that it was in fact hewing to its policy of nonintervention. Following the meeting, the KCNA statement of the 23d noted that the dialogue was continuing even though the situation in the South was "complicated." The rally speech on the 25th also noted that contacts at Panmunjom were continuing.

Although the North has reiterated its interest in the dialogue on several occasions over the past week, its sharply negative portrayal of the new situation in the South and its view that developments there play a direct role in creating the atmosphere for the North-South talks seem to indicate that Pyongyang feels it cannot productively negotiate with the new military leaders in Seoul. Since Pyongyang's practice in recent years has been to exercise rhetorical restraint when seeking dialogue with the South, it seems unlikely that the North would actively pursue talks while continuing to harshly criticize the new ROK Government. This impression was reinforced in a 24 May NODONG SINMUN commentary on the working-level talks two days earlier, which argued that meetings could not "proceed smoothly" until the South ended its suppression and freed political prisoners. Pyongyang had taken a similar position when the dialogue begun in 1972 had effectively collapsed into a series of propaganda exchanges.

CHON TU-HWAN A review of DPRK media treatment of Chon Tu-hwan over the past month suggests that the North has viewed his rise to prominence as a growing threat to the interim ROK Government's plans for democratization and to an atmosphere conducive to North-South talks. In early May, after Chon had given his first public press conference, Pyongyang signaled that it considered his influence predominant and the situation in the South on the verge of serious deterioration. Reflecting this appraisal, DPRK media carried statements by several North Korean front organizations--a form of criticism not used since Pak's death--harshly censuring the South. At that point, however, Pyongyang had not yet entirely abandoned its more conciliatory stance, and authoritative comment on 14 and 17 May--a KCNA-authorized statement and a NODONG SINMUN editorial article on signs of an impending crackdown in the South--eschewed the invective against the ROK authorities used in the earlier statements.

By contrast, the first DPRK statement following the introduction of expanded martial law measures, a 20 May joint statement by various DPRK parties and front organizations, used invective reminiscent of that employed against Pak Chong-hui in describing events in the South, referring to "military fascist elements" headed by "gangster" Chon Tu-hwan. Such language has grown sharper in subsequent DPRK comment on developments in the South: a 29 May NODONG SINMUN

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editorial on events in Kwangju called Chon a "heinous butcher." The North's portrayal of the new regime in Seoul as an unacceptable replica of the one headed by Pak Chong-hui contrasts sharply with its cautious approach toward the government formed after Pak's assassination.

KWANGJU SITUATION The North treated the antigovernment takeover of the southern provincial capital of Kwangju with marked restraint, an approach in accord with its nonintervention claims. Throughout the nine-day period, when the situation in Kwangju was extremely tense, Pyongyang offered virtually no support for the South Korean dissidents. The most inflammatory comment on Kwangju came in the 29 May NODONG SINMUN editorial, two days after the crisis had been resolved.

The first expressions of DPRK support came in the 20 May joint statement, which routinely noted that the North would remain "firm" on the side of the South Korean people and would "actively" support their struggle. Even that minimal position was diluted when the main speaker at the Pyongyang rally on the 25th seemed to define the North's responsibility in narrow terms, asserting that it was through work in the economic sector that the people of the North could show support for the South. The NODONG SINMUN editorial on the 29th voiced no explicit DPRK support for the struggle in the South. During the riots last October, Pyongyang had been less reticent, with support voiced then by the rally speaker and a NODONG SINMUN editorial. Otherwise, the level and amount of DPRK comment has been comparable to that during demonstrations in the South in past years, although the mass rally in Pyongyang this time brought a higher level leadership turnout than similar rallies in October 1973 and October 1979.

Before the ROK army took over the city, KCNA noted several foreign reports which referred to the situation in Kwangju as an "uprising," a characterization that connotes the type of genuinely revolutionary situation that the North has indicated would be necessary before it would consider intervention. In its own comment, however, Pyongyang carefully portrayed the events in Kwangju only as a "riot" until the editorial on 29 May. At that point, the North abruptly changed its assessment, calling events in Kwangju a "popular uprising," which was "the highest form of struggle against fascism." The editorial went on to claim that Kwangju was "the biggest and fiercest, proud massive rioting," the "first in the modern history of the eastern people struggling against despotism."

The clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification played its usual role of revolutionary agitator during the turmoil, urging the people of Kwangju not to surrender and the rest of the South Korean population to join the struggle for "democratization."

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Official North Korean media, however, are not known to have reported an inflammatory RPR "manifesto" to the South on the Kwangju situation. The North had reported a similar RPR appeal last October during riots in the South.

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USSR - PRC

MOSCOW REJECTS NOTION OF CHANGES IN CHINESE POLICY

Moscow has taken pains to deny that China is "softening" its foreign policy. An authoritative "I. Aleksandrov" PRAVDA article on 26 May, in restating Moscow's uncompromising view of the policies of the post-Mao leadership, delivered the harshest Soviet criticism of Beijing since bilateral political talks opened last fall. The article comes in the wake of Italian Communist Party (PCI) leader Berlinguer's ground-breaking visit to Beijing in mid-April, but its arguments serve to disabuse those at home and abroad who might see the time as propitious for diplomatic flexibility toward the Chinese.

The Aleksandrov article appears designed to convince the communist world that recent developments in Beijing offer no cause to take a fresh look at Chinese foreign policy. Some "well-wishers of neo-Maoism," the article asserted, have pointed to the fact that China's present leaders speak of the possibility of deferring war and have argued that this represents a "softening" of China's foreign policy. Such talk from Beijing, the article rejoined, is nothing more than "a propaganda trick"--China's "strategy" remains the one set forth by Mao. Chinese leaders, the article contended, merely wish to delay war in order to build their military strength and then assert Chinese hegemonism. The question has also been raised, the article noted, whether Chinese criticism of the cultural revolution and the recent rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi may lead to a review of Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it countered, Beijing leaders have "hastened to reassure their main imperialist partners" and to declare that China's turn toward the United States is a "long-term, strategic" policy. There is no hint of "anything new, let alone constructive," the article concluded, in any of Beijing's statements or actions.

The Aleksandrov article is notable for its direct warning to those who would succumb to Beijing's newly invigorated efforts to cultivate ties within the world communist movement. Having failed to create a "pro-Maoist international," it maintained, Beijing is now trying through "subversive and provocative activity" to introduce its ideas directly into the communist movement. The impression that Moscow's effort to reassert a pessimistic picture of Chinese policy is directed in part at the PCI was reinforced by a 16 May NEW TIMES article (No. 20) critiquing the results of the Berlinguer Beijing

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visit. Without directly attacking the PCI, the NEW TIMES article drew on Chinese statements during and after the visit in an attempt to demonstrate that Beijing had exploited the occasion to pursue its pro-imperialist, anti-Soviet aims. Beijing's move to restore ties with communist parties it had previously shunned, NEW TIMES maintained, was conceived as a component of its strategy of establishing a "broad international united front" directed against the USSR and the socialist bloc. Far from changing China's policy, the article concluded, the PCI visit "bolstered" it.

The tone and substance of the Aleksandrov article suggest that, perhaps encouraged by a series of recent harsh statements from Beijing, Moscow has found fresh grounds for pessimism about improving Sino-Soviet ties.* Although CPSU Central Committee Secretary Rusakov, in a speech in Moscow on 21 May, perfunctorily expressed Soviet readiness for "businesslike talks" with the Chinese, the Aleksandrov article totally ignored the prospects for bilateral dialogue. While the last Aleksandrov PRAVDA article on 7 April had urged that "every opportunity" for normalizing Sino-Soviet relations be used, the present article seemed more intent on discounting Beijing's receptivity. China, the article said, has made it clear that it "prefers not to have a treaty with the Soviet Union." On the contrary, it claimed, the Chinese leaders' intention "to create insurmountable barriers in the path of normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations" is now evident.

* For an analysis of these Chinese statements, see the 7 May 1980 TRENDS, pages 4-6.

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USSR - ROMANIA

KOSYGIN LINKS BILATERAL COOPERATION TO ROMANIAN BEHAVIOR

Moscow has served public notice on Bucharest that the degree of cooperation it can expect from the Soviets may be affected by Romanian behavior on broader policy issues. This hint of Soviet pressure on the Romanians came from Premier Kosygin during the visit of his Romanian counterpart, Premier Verdet, to Moscow on 19-20 May. While the visit followed Bucharest's participation in a Warsaw Pact summit, which made a show of bloc solidarity, Kosygin's remarks suggest continuing irritation with Romania over such issues as Afghanistan, China, and its boycott of the recent European communist parley in Paris.

Kosygin's veiled warning to Bucharest came in a 19 May banquet speech for Verdet, in which he balanced a declaration of respect for national interests with an emphasis on Soviet bloc unity. Assuring Verdet of Moscow's adherence to principles such as independence, equal rights, and noninterference in internal affairs, he said that cooperation between socialist countries serves the interests of "each country and of the whole community." But he also insisted that this cooperation "cannot be subordinated to one-sided interests" and that "in the final analysis" the development of Soviet-Romanian relations in "individual spheres"--presumably including economic cooperation--is "determined by the degree of political cooperation." He went on to say that "this demands the steady broadening of cooperation on political issues" and an increase in understanding and trust between the two parties and states.

While Kosygin's remarks underscore Moscow's special problems with Romania, they also seem to reflect the extent to which Moscow's relations with East Europe are being affected by growing economic stringencies. The problems have become more acute as the bloc states, accustomed to relatively cheap Soviet oil, have experienced price hikes triggered by the inflation of world market prices. Moscow has tried to have it both ways on this issue, insisting that its fuel deliveries to East Europe are high and remain advantageously priced, while also drawing attention to growing difficulties in its own energy production and warning its bloc partners, as in Kosygin's CEMA speeches in 1978 and 1979, that they must rely increasingly on their own resources. The East Europeans have complained openly: Polish Premier Jaroszewicz--since dismissed--in his 1978 CEMA speech cited "obstacles" encountered by his country

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in getting enough oil from the USSR; and Czechoslovak Premier Strougal at the CEMA session the following year stressed hardships suffered by the CSSR economy in meeting CEMA demands for developing nuclear power technology. Signs of discord in economic cooperation have also surfaced during high-level bilateral meetings, such as Brezhnev's visit to Sofia and Kosygin's to Prague in January and May of last year, respectively, and new Polish Premier Babiuch's trip to Moscow early this month.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 19-25 MAY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3343 items)			Beijing (656 items)		
Miami Race Riots	8%	(--)	PRC ICBM Test	8%	(--)
French President Giscard-Brezhnev Meeting, Warsaw	6%	(--)	Japanese Mountain Climbing Team in PRC	4%	(--)
Africa Liberation Day	6%	(--)	Ho Chi Minh Birth Anniversary	3%	(1%)
Romanian Premier Verdet in USSR	6%	(--)	South Korean Situation	3%	(--)
Soviet-Iranian Diplomatic Relations, 60th Anniversary	3%	(--)	North Korean Workers Party Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)
South Korean Situation	3%	(--)	Islamic Conference, Islamabad	3%	(--)
Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, Warsaw	3%	(16%)			

During comparable reporting periods in each of the preceeding five years, Beijing broadcast only one commentary item, in 1975, on the birth anniversary of Ho Chi Minh.

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Geng Biao visit to U.S.
- Soviet livestock policy
- Polish meat prices

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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P R C - U. S.

GENG BIAO PLEADS FOR STRONGER U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST USSR

> Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao made an unusually strong call during his Washington visit for a more effective U.S. response to Soviet aggression and expansionism. Geng's appeal seems at odds with Beijing's optimistic appraisal of trends in U.S. foreign policy in recent months and, like other aspects of the visit, was given remarkably low-key attention in Chinese domestic media. His statements on the Soviet threat, despite his insistent reaffirmation of the constancy of China's commitment to Sino-U.S. cooperation, may reflect pressure from elements in the Beijing leadership who doubt the strength of Washington's stamina to oppose Soviet aggression in the wake of the Afghan invasion.

Apparent concern over the permanence of the shift in U.S. policy toward Moscow in the wake of Afghanistan emerged during Geng Biao's visit most clearly in his 27 May toast at the welcoming banquet hosted by Secretary of Defense Brown. Warning that the situation since Afghanistan has reached "a crucial stage," Geng claimed that Moscow and Hanoi have "resorted to schemes for a peace offensive" while continuing to wage "wars of aggression" in Afghanistan and Kampuchea respectively. Stressing that the Soviet and Vietnamese actions are not problems of regional defense but "issues that concern the entire situation of global struggle and actions of a long-premeditated strategic offensive," Geng maintained that Moscow and Hanoi have presented "a strategic challenge" that requires "a strategic response." He concluded emphatically:

> Now is the time for us to make a decision--a correct choice between two alternatives: to persist in and step up our struggle or to weaken and give up our struggle. Failure to make the decision now would leave no time for future choice. It would mean either surrender or war.

While appealing to his audience for a reaffirmed and strengthened commitment to oppose Soviet aggression, Geng at the same time insisted on the permanence of Beijing's own foreign policy orientation in the present context. While China hopes for peace, Geng stated, both "historical lessons and current realities"

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demonstrate that China is "still under the threat of Soviet hegemonist aggression" and that "peace cannot be obtained by prayers or compromise." The Chinese people accordingly are "determined to fight unremittingly against Soviet hegemonist aggression and expansion and make due contributions to the defense of world peace, security, and stability," he declared. Regarding Sino-U.S. relations, Geng insisted that "Chinese leaders have repeatedly pointed out" that the development of Beijing's relations with Washington is not a matter of "expediency but a long-term strategic policy."

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY The urgency of Geng's enjoinder for a renewed commitment to oppose Soviet aggression seems out of step both with Chinese comment during Secretary Brown's visit to Beijing last January--which Geng's trip reciprocates--and with the overall thrust of Chinese media treatment of the Administration's strategic policies since then. While Chinese public statements during Secretary Brown's visit stressed the crucial importance of Sino-American collaboration against Moscow in the wake of Afghanistan, Chinese comment on the visit included no warnings of the consequences of vacillation and appeasement in the face of the new Soviet challenge--aspects which Beijing media had attributed to U.S. strategic policy up until then--and in fact reflected satisfaction with the strength of the Secretary's anti-Soviet rhetoric in the Chinese capital.*

Moreover, subsequent Chinese media attention to the Administration's foreign policy shifts in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has suggested, with only minor reservation, that Washington's attitudes toward Moscow have shifted decisively from detente and compromise toward active confrontation in areas of conflicting crucial interests:

+ A RENMIN RIBAO commentary on President Carter's State of the Union address said that the speech demonstrated that the Administration, backed by strong public sentiment against detente and with broad Congressional support, had decisively abandoned its former policies of "appeasement and accommodation."

+ A 25 March RENMIN RIBAO appraisal of shifts in U.S. defense posture since Afghanistan stressed that U.S. steps to improve its strategic defenses are "not measures of expediency" but "the inevitable result" of the development of the global situation. While there may be instances of vacillation and hesitation in implementing the new military policies, particularly in an election year when "voices" for detente can still be heard, RENMIN RIBAO observed, the tendency toward confrontation as the "main feature" of Soviet-American relations in the future is "irreversible."

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* Secretary Brown's 5-13 January China visit is discussed in the 16 January 1980 TRENDS, pages 12-14.

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+ Chinese commentary on the resignation of former Secretary Vance and the appointment of Senator Muskie as secretary of state speculated that Carter's choice was motivated partly out of a desire to appease liberal misgivings about the trend away from detente in U.S.-Soviet relations, but such comment at the same time concluded that the cabinet change would facilitate the new trend in Washington's relations with Moscow.

+ XINHUA, throughout the period since Secretary Brown's China visit, has promptly and favorably reported statements by Administration leaders.

+ Chinese comment since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan warning against Soviet "peace offensives" has not focused on inconsistent or ineffective U.S. measures, but has appeared to be aimed at West European and Southeast Asian proposals for the "neutralization" of Afghanistan and "political solutions" to the Kampuchean question.

PRC FOREIGN POLICY Geng's insistence on the constancy of the anti-Soviet orientation of Chinese foreign policy and his reaffirmation of Beijing's long-term interests in working with the United States seem consistent with unusual Chinese efforts recently to ensure that the direction of its foreign policy is clearly understood abroad in the current context. Beijing appeared in late April and early May to go to unusual lengths to underscore its view that prospects for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement are poor and that recent domestic discussions of the problem of "revisionism" and steps such as the restoration of party ties with the Italian Communist Party and the dispatch of a new PRC ambassador to Moscow do not signal otherwise. *

Geng's unreservedly explicit anti-Soviet rhetoric at the welcoming banquet hosted by Secretary Brown also departs from Chinese practice on such formal occasions in the past. While Chinese leaders frequently attack the Soviet Union explicitly when entertaining foreign guests in Beijing itself, Chinese leaders abroad normally refer to the USSR only indirectly, presumably out of deference to the prevailing sensitivities of their hosts. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, for example, avoided harsh and explicit reference to the Soviet Union in formal bilateral settings during his Washington visit in January last year, even though he explicitly attacked Moscow in his meetings with the U.S. press and in his remarks to public foreign affairs groups.

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* Recent Chinese steps to underscore that it has no intention of seeking improved relations with Moscow are discussed in the 7 May 1980 TRENDS, pages 4-6.

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MEDIA BEHAVIOR Chinese media during the Geng visit gave unusual prominence to U.S. readiness to sell certain categories of military equipment to China, an aspect that departs from Beijing's normal practice of playing down or ignoring altogether the topic of transfer of foreign military materiel and seems in keeping with Geng's apparent call for the United States to respond more effectively to the challenge of Soviet aggression. XINHUA quoted Geng as saying to the foreign press on his departure from Beijing for Washington that Beijing is "willing to buy what she needs" from the United States but could not "force" Washington to sell military equipment if it chose not to. Thereafter XINHUA highlighted Secretary Brown's announcement at the welcoming banquet and in summing up talks with Geng of the decision to license export of some military equipment to China.

That aside, however, Geng's visit was curiously played down in Chinese domestic media. XINHUA reporting on the Geng visit was disseminated widely and prominently in Beijing's foreign language broadcasting; in Beijing's Russian-language broadcasts, for example, reports on the Geng trip typically were preceded only by reports on Premier Hua Guofeng's visit to Japan. In Beijing radio's daily national hookup domestic programming, however, reports on the Geng trip were given less prominence. Geng's 28 May meeting with President Carter, for example, was placed well after reports on Hua's Japan visit and several items of domestic and other foreign news. It actually followed a report of Vice Premier Bo Yibo's conversation with a delegation of the University of Missouri's school of journalism. RENMIN RIBAO consistently buried reports on the Geng visit among other foreign news on page six. By contrast, XINHUA reports on Secretary Brown's visit to Beijing had been placed consistently on the front page of the party newspaper.

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U S S R

PRAVDA ARTICLE APPEARS TO SIGNAL CHANGE IN LIVESTOCK POLICY

In an unusual departure from the current Soviet strategy for maintaining meat production capacity in a period of fodder shortage, a PRAVDA article has argued that keeping fewer but better fed animals is a more effective method of producing meat and milk than maintaining larger numbers of underfed animals. Soviet strategy for dealing with the current fodder shortage caused by last year's drought and the U.S. grain embargo has been to reduce feed rations to keep as many animals alive as possible in order to facilitate rapid expansion of herds once the fodder shortage is over. The article, by economist N. Smetanin, does not refer to the current fodder shortage directly but, focusing on long-term trends, portrays the present approach as too costly to follow in the future and advocates more room for local option in maintaining larger herds. Coming at a time when some local leaders have been complaining of declines in meat supplies in some republics where the large herds maintained on reduced rations have been producing less meat and milk per animal, the article appears to signal a more differentiated approach to the fodder problem.

The article, which appeared in the 21 May PRAVDA, argues that most republics have been concentrating too much on expanding the number of animals and that in recent years this expansion has ceased producing a commensurate increase in meat and milk production. Smetanin declares that the USSR now has as many cattle per capita as the United States, and even more than the EC, but it still produces less meat. The increase in numbers of animals has outpaced fodder production, he argues, resulting in declining productivity, that is, less meat and milk output per animal. Moreover, this increase in numbers has come at huge cost--over 63 billion rubles for new livestock facilities since 1966--with much of the expenditure wasted and many expensive new livestock farms remaining half empty.

Such considerations, writes Smetanin, "are indisputably serious arguments in favor of reconsidering the established trends" and shifting emphasis from increasing the number of animals to raising their productivity. He states that if fodder production were

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"significantly" growing, "growth of output by an increase in the number of animals would be economically justified," but this is not the case. The question whether to press for quantity (larger herds) or quality (fewer but better fed animals) should be left to each republic or region to decide, according to Smetanin, based on the availability of fodder.

Although there has already been evidence of some regional diversity in these decisions, the maintenance of large herds has severely strained some fodder-short areas and produced sharp declines in productivity. In the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania, meat and milk production was down during the first quarter of this year, which prompted local leaders to complain about the declining yield per animal. Statements by Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy on 15 April, Belorussian First Secretary Masherov on 12 March, and Lithuanian First Secretary Grishkyavichus on 6 March expressed satisfaction with the avoidance of widespread slaughter but indicated that the reduction of feed rations is showing up in falling productivity and hence in declining meat supplies.

A decision to implement Smetanin's proposals in the near future would mean that Soviet leaders would have to back down considerably from their well-publicized commitments to maintain the Soviet livestock herds. Stung by the U.S. grain embargo and determined to avoid a repetition of the disastrous cutbacks in animals that followed the 1975 crop failure, Soviet leaders have seemed concerned to prove that the U.S. action would not deal a severe setback to their livestock program. The commitment to maintaining the herds was described by Kirilenko in his 19 February republic supreme soviet election speech as an "immediate national task" and as a "battle" to be won, and other leaders have indicated that they view the subject in the same politicized terms.

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POLAND

GIEREK REGIME WARNS OF IMPENDING INCREASES IN MEAT PRICES

The Gierek regime has given the clearest sign to date that it is preparing to take the unpopular step of raising meat prices--but in an indirect manner apparently calculated to avoid a repetition of the widespread rioting over the last hike of official meat prices in June 1976. The party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on 28 May explained that increased meat supplies will be shifted from state-owned stores--where government-subsidized, artificially low prices presumably will still apply--to "commercial shops" charging higher prices.

The TRYBUNA LUDU article, signed by Ewa Fiala, appeared aimed at forestalling public protest by explaining and rationalizing the proposed shift. While conceding that the change in pricing will not be "easy or popular," it assured the public that the profits from increased sales of meat in the commercial shops "would be used to increase family allowances, pensions, and the lowest wages" of workers. Under the "commercial" system, operating on a limited scale since 1978, the government supplies meat to the private shops and shares the profits.

The article reminded the reader that heavily subsidized low official meat prices meant in fact that the poor are supporting the rich, since those with higher incomes can buy much larger supplies of the subsidized meat than those with lower wages. Appealing further to workers' self-interest, the article pointed out that "the system of such large meat subsidies prevents increases in wages and makes it necessary to maintain relatively high prices on nonconsumer goods." It also stressed that higher meat prices were inevitable because of the country's steadily increasing imports of fodder grains to support its meat production, noting that about half of all meat produced in Poland this year will depend on fodder imports. The article added that the country's trade balance in this area "deteriorates every year."

Poland's worsening trade balance, together with the energy crunch and a succession of poor harvests, are no doubt pushing the Gierek regime toward a resolution of the longstanding impasse over meat prices. Earlier evidence that the regime was preparing to take bolder action in this regard was the replacement, at the Eighth PZPR Congress in February, of Premier Jaroszewicz, who was widely regarded as the symbol of the mismanaged effort to raise meat prices in 1976. Jaroszewicz's successor as premier, Babiuch, in a speech to the Sejm

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(parliament) on 3 April, hinted at the policy that is now described by TRYBUNA LUDU. Noting that currently "a certain amount" of meat was being sold at commercial prices, "which are near production costs," he said "the market situation favors broadening this form of sale." Acknowledging public opposition to such a move, Babiuch added that "at the same time, we see the negative side of that way of solving the meat problem, particularly its negative influence on workers' family budgets." Evidently at pains to avoid the mistakes of his predecessor, Babiuch remarked that the meat price rises would be gradual and spread over several years.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 26 MAY - 1 JUNE 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3403 items)			Beijing (968 items)		
PDRY Leader 'Ali Nasir Muhammad in USSR	10%	(--)	Hua Guofeng in Japan	42%	(--)
			Joint Press Communique	3%	(--)
Soviet-Hungarian Soyuz 36 Space Mission	7%	(--)			
			UN Conference on Kampuchean Aid	5%	(--)
South Korean Situation	3%	(3%)			
			PRC Vice Premier Geng Biao in U.S.	4%	(--)
PRC Vice Premier Geng Biao in U.S.	3%	(--)			
Miami Race Riots	3%	(8%)			

Beijing paid significantly more attention to Hua Guofeng's visit to Japan during this reporting period than it did during a comparable reporting period following the October 1978 visit to Japan by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (28 percent). Moscow devoted 2 percent of its commentary items to Hua's visit.

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on Sino-U.S. defense contacts
- Hua Guofeng visit to Japan
- New Beijing policies for Tibet
- Language studies in Soviet republics
- Soviet livestock shortages

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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U.S.-USSR-CHINA

MOSCOW ADOPTS LOW-KEY STANCE ON SINO-U.S. DEFENSE DIALOGUE

Moscow has signaled equanimity rather than alarm over the development of Sino-U.S. military contacts since the beginning of the year. While Soviet media have routinely denounced the relationship as a threat to peace, authoritative Soviet political commentators have deemphasized its impact on the USSR--portraying a continued disparity in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy objectives and expressing confidence in the Soviet global strategic position. Moscow's measured response to Sino-U.S. cooperation suggests it is not yet contemplating any significant policy departures in response.

Moscow's air of confidence has been most apparent in substantive commentary evoked by Secretary of Defense Brown's visit to Beijing in January and PRC Vice Premier Geng Biao's return visit to Washington last month. In an 8 January IZVESTIYA article published during the course of Secretary Brown's visit, prominent political observer Aleksandr Bovin argued that, while U.S. policy was "perhaps" moving from an attempt to bluff the USSR through use of the China card to establishing "close ties" or even "arming China," U.S. calculations were "shortsighted to say the least." With the present and foreseeable "correlation of forces," Bovin wrote, the United States could not strengthen its national security or compensate for a deterioration of Soviet-U.S. relations through "close ties" with China. The result would be quite the opposite, he concluded.

CPSU Central Committee official Nikolay Shishlin, in a subsequent 18 March Moscow domestic radio assessment of the U.S.-China relationship, took the same approach. Shishlin acknowledged that Washington and Beijing were forming a "dangerous" if unofficial military partnership. But he countered, in effect, that China's current foreign policy line in general, including its effort to establish a united front with the United States, will collapse under its own weight. "Yes, this policy is dangerous," he concluded, but since it conflicts with China's own vital interests as well as with broader historical trends, "it is a policy without a future."

GENG BIAO VISIT Despite the agreement reached on the sale of "dual purpose" U.S. technology to China during Vice Premier Geng Biao's late May visit, Moscow has not changed its public assessment. Much of Moscow's routine commentary, such as

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a 31 May PRAVDA dispatch from New York, has been at pains to characterize the Geng visit as the latest step on the path of defense collaboration initiated by Secretary Brown's visit. But the two most authoritative commentaries on the visit have de-emphasized its implications for the USSR. In a 7 June commentary, PRAVDA political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov suggested that there was a large element of bluff in the U.S.-PRC relationship. Both Washington and Beijing, he said, are "overemphasizing" the anti-Soviet orientation and the military aspects of their relationship. He argued that Washington's decision to sell China a number of commodities banned for export to the Soviet Union did not give grounds for speaking of a military alliance. Washington's efforts to play the "China card" and Beijing's attempts to play the "American card" in turn, he said, reflect the selfish goals of each side and in both cases were based on "near-sighted, illusory calculations."

In a 5 June SOVIET RUSSIA article, Central Committee official Shishlin expanded on the arguments he had made in his 18 March commentary. Not only do Washington and Beijing have different goals, he said, but their calculations fail to reckon with the "realities" of the world today. He maintained that China and the United States are underestimating not only the determination and influence of the socialist countries but also the opposition to their policies from the Third World and from important elements within the capitalist countries themselves. These combined forces, he concluded, are "an adequate counterweight" to U.S.-PRC actions, a counterweight secured by the overall favorable "correlation of world forces" that gave birth to detente in the first place.

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PRC-JAPAN-DPRK

Beijing has used PRC Premier Hua Guofeng's visit to Japan to focus on the importance of close Sino-Japanese collaboration in foreign affairs and economic development, particularly in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Beijing pressed forward with the trip despite the collapse of the Ohira government on the eve of Hua's departure, and during the visit Chinese comment took pains to suggest that long-term Sino-Japanese cooperation need not be disrupted by Japan's shifting domestic political situation.

For the first time appearing to endorse Beijing's efforts to establish close ties with Tokyo, Pyongyang gave extensive attention to the Hua trip. Pyongyang's reaction suggests that it may again be considering the renewal of its own efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Tokyo. It is unclear whether North Korea has similarly overcome its apparent misgivings about the Sino-U.S. rapprochement.

HUA TOKYO VISIT STRESSES CONVERGING SINO-JAPANESE INTERESTS

Hua Guofeng's 27 May-1 June visit to Japan reciprocated the China visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira in December last year. The highest ranking Chinese leader to visit Japan, Hua held talks with Ohira, was received by Emperor Hirohito, concluded a long-term scientific and technological exchange agreement, and met with several leading Japanese political and public figures. As had been the case with Ohira's Beijing visit last December, a long "joint press communique" summarizing the results of the visit was issued at the end of Hua's Tokyo stay.

SINO-JAPANESE INTERESTS While Beijing has traditionally maintained that the growth of Sino-Japanese friendship plays an important role in world affairs, Chinese comment on Hua's visit went to unusual lengths to emphasize the increasing congruence of long-term Chinese and Japanese international and economic needs in the context of a rapidly changing Asian situation, particularly following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Setting the stage for commentary later in the visit, a XINHUA analysis on 27 May--the day Hua arrived in Tokyo--set forth the long-term implications of the Soviet Afghan intervention for

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Japanese foreign policy. The Soviet action, XINHUA observed, has forced Tokyo to abandon its former foreign policy which was "frequently swayed by considerations affecting the country's supply of raw materials." Increasingly, the XINHUA dispatch stated, Tokyo has adopted a policy of strengthening cooperation with Washington and its allies, of stepping up cooperation with Asian-Pacific countries to "dam up the Soviet drive in this region," and of "integrating considerations of economic security with global strategy." In a similar vein, a long XINHUA review of the growth of Sino-Japanese economic ties on the same day noted that China's abundance of coal, petroleum and rare metals and Japan's technical and management expertise create "favorable conditions for developing economic and technical cooperation" in this international setting.

Hua himself during his Tokyo visit stressed these same themes of a growing convergence of economic and international interests much more than he had during Prime Minister Ohira's visit to Beijing last December. Thus, in his speech at the welcoming banquet on 28 May, as reported that day by XINHUA, Hua noted that "as the international situation faces potential crises in the 1980's, it is all the more necessary for China and Japan to strengthen their cooperation and make positive efforts for peace and stability in Asia." Pointing to an increasing need for foreign policy collaboration, Hua on the same occasion added that "in the present turbulent international situation," the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship "has increasingly demonstrated its immediate importance and far-reaching significance." Underscoring the complementary aspects of the Chinese and Japanese economies in this international setting, Hua noted in a speech to Japanese economic organizations on the 29th that China's natural resources and Japan's expertise "can very well supplement each other's needs and deficiencies."

A XINHUA correspondent's report on 3 June summarizing the results of the visit--now a standard feature of Beijing's treatment of trips by high-level Chinese leaders abroad and by foreign leaders to China--similarly concluded that "the tension in the world exacerbated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan" has made closer Sino-Japanese cooperation "the need of the times." The correspondent went on to observe that Moscow's actions and Vietnam's "expansion in Southeast Asia" have threatened Japan "not only militarily but also economically by the possible disruption of oil supplies and its traditional markets in Southeast Asia." Recalling that Hua had raised the possibility during Ohira's Beijing visit that the USSR might threaten Japanese interests by seeking control of oil routes in the Middle East, the XINHUA correspondent noted that "this time"--in the wake of the Soviet Afghan intervention--Hua and Ohira "reached basic agreement on the current international situation." In such a context, XINHUA added, China can do much to alleviate Japan's energy concerns, with Japanese financial and technical help to tap Chinese coal resources.

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JAPANESE DOMESTIC SITUATION

Chinese commentary surrounding Hua's trip urged that potential political instability in Japan not impede the consolidation of ties between the two countries over the long term. That Beijing views the 16 May Diet vote of no confidence against the Ohira government as auguring such instability was suggested in an 18 May RENMIN RIBAO analysis of the Diet vote, which observed that a 25-year period of stability in Japan is ending and that a period of "more fierce struggles between political parties and of political upheavals" has begun.

Chinese comment preceding the Hua trip seemed anxious that the visit proceed. XINHUA promptly reported Ohira's 19 May press conference statement advocating that the impact of the new domestic political uncertainty on Japan's foreign policy be minimized. The Chinese news agency on 23 May cited Hua as telling a visiting Japanese delegation that he was eager for the visit to go on and thanking the Japanese Government for its "well-planned and meticulous arrangements" for the trip despite the pressures of upcoming elections. On 25 May, a RENMIN RIBAO report on preparations for the Hua trip to Japan observed that the Ohira government had proceeded with planning for the visit as usual, despite the Diet vote, and cited articles from the Japanese constitution to demonstrate that Ohira still "has the power to handle normal affairs in the domestic and international field, including such important matters as...receiving state guests."

During the visit, Chinese comment similarly stressed that the domestic situation in Japan should not affect relations with China. The 3 June XINHUA correspondent's summary of the visit results, for example, observed that Sino-Japanese relations have "entered a stage of more concrete and realistic cooperation" which "cannot be reversed by the changing political situation in Japan." In his speech to Japanese economic groups on the 29th, Hua--in what could have been a reference to strains both from the domestic situation in Japan and from international developments--noted that "the bridge of China-Japan friendship can stand the test of storms only when it has a firm and solid foundation with our economic cooperation developing vigorously."

DPRK SHIFTS TOWARD ENDORSEMENT OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP

North Korean treatment of Hua Guofeng's visit to Japan appears to signal a significant change in policy. Pyongyang media fully reported the visit, giving it attention comparable to North Korean publicity for Hua's trip to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran in 1978, and considerably more than that given his visit to West Europe in 1979.

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Pyongyang's attitude toward Japan and Sino-Japanese ties had been much cooler. PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's visit to Japan in October 1978 was totally ignored by DPRK media, although Deng's foreign travels before and after the Japan trip had been reported. The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed while Deng was in Tokyo, was ackowledged by Pyongyang only months later. Pyongyang also revived old warnings about the resurgence of Japanese militarism following the July 1979 visit of the head of the Japan Defense Agency to Seoul, and appeared to endorse Moscow's position against the emerging Beijing-Tokyo relationship by replaying Soviet comment denying that the Soviet Union posed a threat to Japan.

North Korea's more positive approach to Hua's visit may reflect a decision to push once again for closer Pyongyang-Tokyo relations, as it had in the early 1970's. In April 1978 Pyongyang had signaled a retreat from earlier moves toward establishing diplomatic relations, denying reports that it was secretly negotiating with Tokyo on the issue. In October that same year, in an interview with the Japanese journal SEKAI, Kim Il-song argued that establishing ties with Japan might be misinterpreted as DPRK endorsement of the U.S. proposals for "cross recognition," a plan which calls for the United States and Japan to improve relations with Pyongyang while Beijing and Moscow reciprocate with Seoul.

ATTITUDE TOWARD SINO-U.S. TIES

A 31 May Pyongyang radio report of Hua's press conference in Tokyo noted, without mentioning Hua's response, that Hua had been asked whether his talks with Japan's prime minister had touched on the matter of strengthening Japan-China-U.S. relations--an idea which Pyongyang had not previously mentioned. It is unclear whether North Korea, having apparently shifted its view of Sino-Japanese ties, has also overcome its misgivings about the Sino-U.S. relationship. Pyongyang gave only tepid backing to the joint statement normalizing Sino-U.S. relations in December 1979 and clearly signaled its misgivings about Chinese policy on this score by ignoring Deng Xiaoping's January 1979 visit to the United States.

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C H I N A

NEW APPROACH TO TIBET REFLECTS DOMESTIC, FOREIGN CONCERNS

Beijing has undertaken a major effort to improve the economic and political lot of the Tibetan minority nationality. Beijing's new approach to the strategic autonomous region of Tibet, dramatized by the dispatch of a high-level party delegation to Lhasa, includes major steps toward a high degree of political autonomy and economic liberalization. Publicity for the new policies toward Tibet suggests, moreover, that they are clearly intended for emulation in other minority nationality areas in China.

The new Beijing approach to Tibet also supplements Beijing's efforts to induce the return of the Dalai Lama, a leader whom Beijing fears may become a tool for Soviet subversion in frontier minority areas and whose residence in India since 1959 has complicated Beijing's relations with New Delhi. In providing a new model of strengthened regional autonomy, Beijing's publicity for its new policies in Tibet may also be intended to suggest potential parallels for the incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC.

NEW POLICIES Beijing's new policies toward Tibet were laid out in a Central Committee circular, reported by XINHUA on 26 May, and by party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, leader of a party "central work group" which visited Lhasa on 22-31 May. The new approach to the region grants considerable political autonomy:

+ Tibet's leadership is now free to ignore or "flexibly implement" central-level guidelines and directives for nationwide use in cases where they "are not suited to Tibet's actual conditions." Policies that are adopted for implementation in the region must have the "wholehearted support and consent" of Tibet's native cadres and people; otherwise, they should be revised or postponed.

+ Efforts will be stepped up to recruit and train native Tibetan cadres and increase their representation in Tibet's leadership and administration so that they "shoulder the main responsibility" for work in the region. At the same time, steps will be taken to rotate

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Han nationality cadres, who have apparently dominated work in the region in the last two decades, back into China proper.

+ Ren Rong, party chief in Tibet since 1971, has been replaced by Yin Fatang, a Han Chinese with experience in Tibet dating back to Beijing's first efforts to incorporate the region into the PRC in 1950. Tibet's party committee has been instructed to sum up the shortcomings in its work in the past and particularly to overcome the influence of "ultraleftist" thinking persisting since the fall of the "gang of four."

Policies adopted to "rehabilitate" Tibet's economy and improve the Tibetan people's livelihood, which Hu frankly acknowledged has remained at poverty level, are equally liberal:

+ Tibet has been exempted from paying taxes and meeting state commodity purchase quotas "for the next few years." Central funds allocated to Tibet, which Hu indicated have exceeded those to any other province or region in the PRC in the past, will be increased further and will be concentrated on improving production in the region and aiding the Tibetan people's material and cultural life.

+ Economic policies which were applied uniformly throughout the PRC have been abandoned and agricultural production in the region will now be diversified according to the region's natural characteristics. "Peasants may plant whatever crops they wish," Hu emphasized, and "no one should interfere."

+ Former emphasis on economic collectivization and centralization at the expense of production is to be dropped, according to Hu. Production teams should be reduced in size where they cannot effectively manage production over Tibet's extensive but sparsely populated area. Sideline plots for personal use should be expanded, and sideline industries should be supported with state loans, Hu declared.

The economic measures are aimed, according to Hu, at changing the "poor and difficult situation" in the region in the next two to three years and making "big" improvements over the next decade. "Getting rich is nothing to be afraid of," Hu claimed, and he summarized the thrust of the reforms in the economy by urging that the "policy requirements be relaxed, relaxed, and relaxed again."

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Many of the specific political and economic reforms prescribed by the Central Committee circular and during Hu Yaobang's Lhasa visit were foreshadowed, if not elaborated in detail, in authoritative central-level comment in the past two years. While central commentary has encouraged a greater decentralization of administrative prerogatives into provincial hands throughout China, such comment has suggested that the devolution of administrative power should proceed even further in minority autonomous areas. Politburo member Ulanhu, a nationalities affairs specialist, for example, declared at a National People's Congress (NPC) Nationalities Commission meeting in October last year that "it is wrong to equate regional autonomy in the nationality areas with the power of local administrative organs in Han areas." "Autonomy or the right to self-government" in such autonomous region institutions, he noted, makes them "different from ordinary local organs"; autonomy should not "exist in name only" but should be set down accurately in law. The economic reforms incorporated in the new approach to Tibet similarly extend Beijing's prescriptions for the PRC as a whole for greater regional economic diversification and specialization according to local conditions and for a more economically rational approach to collectivization and private production.

The length to which Beijing has currently gone to publicize its reforms for Tibet, however, was not foreshadowed in previous comment. That the liberalization of political and economic policy in Tibet is intended as a model for other minority areas is clear from media reporting on other autonomous minority regions' studies of the Tibet policies. Tibet radio on 3 June, for example, reported Hu Yaobang's comments, during a stopover in Qinghai on his way back to Beijing, that the recommendations for work in Tibet "are basically in conformity with the situation in Qinghai." Urumqi radio on 31 May similarly reported the conclusion of the Tibet party committee that the Central Committee circular's guidelines for Tibet are "completely applicable to Xinjiang."

FOREIGN IMPLICATIONS Aside from the importance the new approach to Tibet has for other minority autonomous areas, Beijing may calculate that it will further other important Chinese objectives: encourage the return of the Dalai Lama, help reduce tensions in minority border areas which could be exploited by the Soviet Union, and provide a blueprint for a conciliatory approach to the unification of Taiwan with the PRC.

While the spate of commentary generated by the Hu visit to Lhasa has included no appeals to the Dalai Lama to return, the connection between Beijing's new Tibetan policies and its hopes to regain the allegiance of the Dalai Lama has been drawn explicitly in the PRC-controlled communist press in Hong Kong. The new Beijing policies, WEN WEI PO observed on 8 June, can "narrow the distance"

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between Beijing and the Dalai Lama. Earlier, on 31 May, TA KUNG PAO suggested that China's concern over Soviet designs in the region had prompted its publicity for the new policies. Noting that the policies were undertaken in the context of repeated calls for the Dalai Lama's return and of a new Beijing effort to improve relations with India, the paper stated that "China is obviously aiming at wrecking the Soviet dream of plotting trouble in China's southwestern corner."

Beijing initiated a more conciliatory approach to the Dalai Lama in 1978. While denunciations of the "crimes of the traitorous Dalai clique against the motherland" continued to appear in Chinese media as late as the end of 1977, calls for his return to the PRC began to be voiced regularly in the media in the fall of 1978. At the same time, Beijing began to publicize its approval for the release of groups of "criminals" who participated in the 1959 revolt, announcing the completion of such work in the spring of 1979. A long message to Tibetans abroad in January 1979 by Pagbalha Geleg Namgya, a Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference vice chairman, paralleled a nearly simultaneous appeal to Taiwan in an NPC message in urging all Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama, to participate in China's reunification and in laying out Beijing's new attitudes toward Tibetans abroad.

Chinese concern that the Dalai Lama might become a tool in Moscow's hands against the PRC were reflected thereafter, in May 1979, when XINHUA publicized foreign press comment suggesting that Moscow's efforts to induce the Dalai Lama to attend an Asian Buddhists' conference in Ulan Bataar amounted to an attempt to "exploit the Dalai Lama" to "encourage dissidence" against China's central authorities in Tibet and Xinjiang. Although XINHUA subsequently conveyed Beijing's regret at the Dalai Lama's attendance at the conference in Mongolia as a "very serious mistake," Beijing's calls for his voluntary return continued.

Although the current comment on Tibet in PRC media has drawn no parallels between Tibet's newly enhanced autonomy and the potential status of Taiwan after unification into the PRC, Chinese comment has done so in the past. A Beijing radio broadcast beamed to Taiwan in December 1978, immediately after the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, for example, carried an article by Ngapoi Ngawang Jigmi, a Tibetan on the NPC Standing Committee, which suggested that Taiwan could be gradually incorporated into the PRC in the way that Tibet had been under the 1951 agreement on Tibet's "peaceful liberation." The connection between Tibet's current autonomy and Taiwan has been explicitly pointed out in Hong Kong communist press commentary; the WEN WEI PO comment on 8 June observed that the Tibetan case might "establish a pattern for Taiwan."

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U S S R

STUDY OF EASTERN LANGUAGES PROMOTED IN CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA

Moscow's interest in cultivating relations with its neighbors to the south appears to be creating new support for relevant language training in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics and providing local cultural enthusiasts a new rationale for asserting their aspirations for self-identity. This was recently illustrated by a conference in Tbilisi promoting the study of languages of the Muslim world in the schools of the Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia. Reports on the meeting indicated that support for the program was expressed by those who saw it as a means for training future civil servants as well as by those who saw it as a means for fostering local cultural pride.

The short announcement of the conference, which appeared in ZARYA VOSTOKA on 29 April, emphasized the utilitarian aspects of the language training program. It explained that the introduction of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish into the school curriculums of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan was motivated by the "growing international role" of the eastern countries, and that "the development of cultural and economic ties with them increases the demand for specialists" knowing the languages. The international focus of the language program was emphasized by the placement of the article on the page of the newspaper carrying international news and next to a long article on Iran. Articles in the Georgian-language education newspaper, SAKHALKHO GANATLEBA, on 25 April, the opening day of the conference, also stressed the international significance of the program.* Their authors, local intellectuals, presumably understood that the program stood to profit if officials were convinced of its utilitarian value.

While placing due emphasis on the practical aspects of the new language program, the local scholars and educators drew attention also to its cultural benefits for the local populations. K. Tsereteli, the head of the Oriental Studies Department of

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* Translations of these articles will appear in a future issue of the JPRS publication USSR REPORT: POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS.

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Tbilisi State University and one of the chief organizers of the program, explained how mastery of these languages would give students a better understanding of their local histories, cultures, and literatures, which, he said, are "closely linked to the Orient." Although Tsereteli didn't mention the point, both his argument and his recommendations drew strength from the fact that there are linguistic ties between some of the languages of the Soviet Muslim republics and Turkish and Persian. Azeri and Uzbek, for example, are related to Turkish, and Tajiki is related to Persian.

While the enthusiasm for the new program was clearly reflected in the reports, the scope of the planned effort is obscure. A pilot program begun in Georgia in 1977 has so far been installed in only six schools in Tbilisi, according to the articles in SAKHALKHO GANATLEBA. One article noted that the Tbilisi program called for initiating the study of oriental languages in the second grade, while the study of Western languages in the same schools is not begun until the fifth grade. Another revealed that in at least one school the program had to face opposition from parents who questioned its utility. Presumably the program will receive more support in Muslim republics.

GEORGIAN LEADER STRUGGLES WITH FALTERING LIVESTOCK PROGRAM

This winter's fodder shortage has dealt another serious blow to Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze's controversial campaign to transform Georgia into a major livestock raising area and reduce its heavy dependence on meat and milk from other republics. Production has increased little since the program was adopted in 1975, and statements by Shevardnadze and others at a 16 May Georgian plenum indicate that the campaign is floundering. Shevardnadze's failure to reduce Georgia's need for imports from other regions of the Soviet Union is especially serious in view of this year's tight national meat and fodder situation, and his frustration was clearly evident in his harsh tongue lashing of local farm leaders at the plenum.

Shevardnadze's program to transform Georgia into an important livestock raising area was adopted at a September 1975 republic plenum over strong local opposition. In his present speech, carried in ZARYA VOSTOKA on 20 May, Shevardnadze recalled that many local agricultural leaders had insisted that Georgia should continue to specialize in tea, grapes, and other fruit and should import meat and milk, which it could not produce on a large scale. Speaking of those earlier arguments, but apparently referring also to the current situation, Shevardnadze reminded his listeners that those who talked of getting more meat from central stocks clearly showed "lack of understanding of existing

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circumstances," since Moscow had only "limited" possibilities for helping the republic with meat supplies.

Shevardnadze's hopes have not been realized, however, and, as he himself acknowledged in his speech, 30 percent of all meat and 60 percent of all milk consumed in Georgia is still drawn from national stocks and there is little prospect for a change in the near future. Moreover, Shevardnadze admitted that there are meat and milk shortages and that, despite big increases in investment in the last four years, livestock raising remains unprofitable on almost all Georgian farms. Devoting a large portion of his speech to defending the 1975 decision, Shevardnadze basically argued that the present situation would be even worse if the campaign had not been undertaken. He complained of mismanagement and dishonesty, and angrily attributed the shortcomings to the "insufficient competence" of the "overwhelming majority" of Georgian livestock workers, from ordinary farmers to the top officials in the republic Agriculture Ministry and republic Central Committee.

Despite his evident frustration, Shevardnadze proposed several new devices to reinvigorate his campaign. He announced a new program for increasing fodder production, which he said had been worked out with the CPSU Central Committee's Agriculture Section and CPSU Agriculture Secretary Gorbachev, whom he thanked for "much useful advice." He pressed for even more effort to encourage private livestock raising which, he pointed out, required no additional state investment. He urged farms to copy Hungary's system of contracting with private farmers to raise livestock and stated that Georgia's Abashskiy Rayon experiment, which uses this system, has been approved by CPSU Secretary Gorbachev. Finally, he even called for creation of a network of special vegetarian restaurants to ease pressure on meat supplies. Shevardnadze warned that there would be an urgent need for more livestock products in the years ahead with the continuing population increase, rise of purchasing power, and growing influx of vacationers--who, according to Shevardnadze, eat twice as much meat per capita as the average Georgian.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 2-6 JUNE 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3380 items)			Beijing (883 items)		
Indian Foreign Minister Rao in USSR	11%	(--)	Argentine President Videla in PRC	16%	(1%)
Soviet-Hungarian Soyuz 36 Space Mission	5%	(7%)	Hua Guofeng in Japan	6%	(42%)
Tehran Conference on U.S. "Crimes"	4%	(--)			

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on Afghanistan
- Nonaligned conference proposal
- Beijing on Reagan comments
- Soviet stand on arms talks
- Kampuchean security problems

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR - AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW OUTLINES PRECONDITIONS FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

The Soviet Union's month-long propaganda campaign to sell the Kabul government's 14 May proposal on talks with its neighbors seems to have acquired new impetus as Moscow shows signs of concern to counter criticism of its intervention and to impose its own conditions for any political settlement. Pressing the case for recognition of the legitimacy of the Kabul regime, Moscow is arguing that the sociopolitical changes brought about by the Afghan revolution are "irreversible" and that Afghanistan must be a party to any negotiations. The Soviet Union's own security interests have been advanced as as factor that must be included in any solution.

At the same time, Moscow continues to accuse the United States, Pakistan, and China of abetting the Afghan insurgents, additionally charging Beijing with increasing tension along its borders with Afghanistan and India. While rejecting reports of deterioration within Afghanistan, Soviet media have conceded that the situation "around" the country is not normal and, perhaps preparing the Soviet public for further revelations, have provided details on the disorders in Kabul in February.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONS

Minister Gromyko stressed in speeches on 30 May and 3 June during luncheons for his visiting counterparts from Sweden and India. All attempts to change the "realities" in Afghanistan are hopeless, he said on the latter occasion, and he ruled out any discussions of Afghan internal affairs. No one, he said in his May speech, can reverse the changes in Afghanistan's political life since the April 1978 revolution.

Implicitly making clear that Moscow will countenance no proposals for a change in the direction of the Afghan regime, Foreign the irreversibility of the Afghan revolution

This position was underscored in somewhat more conciliatory remarks by the first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, Vadim Zagladin, in an interview appearing in the Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD on 6 June. In statements designed for the West Europeans, Zagladin maintained that the matter of "changing the regime in Afghanistan under the pretext of causing our troops to withdraw" will "never succeed." He said there was no "fundamental problem"

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regarding Soviet troop withdrawal, which could take place "in a reasonable manner and in the not too distant future." But he insisted that first "the danger of a transformation of Afghanistan into a different kind of country--a country like Iran under the shah--must cease to exist." If the Europeans are prepared to cooperate in creating conditions to enable a withdrawal, "we will gratefully accept that," Zagladin said. He did not rule out discussion of the troop issue at the Madrid followup conference on European security this fall. For example, the Soviets would be willing to answer "unjust" Western suspicions that the troops in Afghanistan might be used against other countries in the region, he said. The USSR has said from the outset, he added, that "we do not wish to go anywhere; we wish to do what must be done there and withdraw our troops."

Another precondition--assurance of Soviet security interests--was raised by O. Anichkin and A. Vlasov in a discussion of settlement possibilities in the 15 June IZVESTIYA. Suggesting that "people" were becoming aware of the real facts about outside intervention in Afghan affairs, the authors said it was also "beginning to be understood" that a political solution "must take into account the interests and security of the Soviet Union," Afghanistan's neighbor. Moscow has periodically raised the security aspect, which Brezhnev himself stressed in his 13 January PRAVDA interview in contending that outside aggression against Afghanistan posed a threat to Soviet security.

Anichkin and Vlasov also hinted that any settlement process might also have to address broader questions of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Moscow appears to be holding this idea--which was floated in Kabul's 14 May proposal--in reserve for potential bargaining purposes. The process of a political solution cannot be reduced to Afghanistan alone, the authors argued, since interference in that country's affairs comes from territories of countries in the region. They explained that it was a matter of "taking into account military-political activity" in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and they specifically pointed to the U.S. naval presence in the region.

MEDIATION INITIATIVES Vigorously promoting the Afghan proposal and adding elements of its own, Moscow has shown little interest in other possible initiatives. The British-EEC "neutrality" idea has been dismissed repeatedly. An offer, contained in a 10 June statement by the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, of an AAPSO good will mission was in effect given implicit approval by TASS, which noted that the Pakistani Government had not yet responded to this "peaceful initiative." Moscow is clearly not in favor of nonaligned involvement in the issue and has

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given no publicity to a possible nonaligned session beyond brief acknowledgment of Cuba's proposal for a meeting to discuss unspecified conflict situations.

The Anichkin-Vlasov article in IZVESTIYA did, however, leave the door ajar to the Islamic Conference Organization's tripartite committee--the Iranian and Pakistani foreign ministers and the secretary general of the ICO--which has announced efforts to convene a meeting in July of Afghan "freedom fighters" and representatives of the "ruling party in Kabul." The IZVESTIYA authors repeated previous Soviet hints that the ICO committee's approach was unacceptable when they labeled "provocative" unidentified attempts to give some kind of "official status" to the "ringleaders of the counterrevolutionary groupings" based in Pakistan and Iran. On the other hand, they seemed to see the committee device as a possible means of gaining recognition of the Afghan Government. They cited Afghan Foreign Minister Dost as saying the committee's intention of consulting with Kabul "constitutes recognition of obvious realities" and of the need for participation by the Afghan Government. And they concluded that those interested in a "real" political settlement could find "reliable guidelines for establishing direct contacts with the Afghan Government."

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NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

Prodded into defensive action by moderate members of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), current nonaligned chairman Cuba has proposed a special ministerial session in Havana to discuss "several conflicts" contributing to the "deteriorating international situation." Havana, which in its nonaligned role has been publicly dodging the Afghan question, except to conduct some exploratory talks with Southwest Asian countries this spring, is clearly reluctant to get caught between its nonaligned critics and Moscow on this issue. Yugoslavia, NAM cofounder and spokesman for the moderates, has been lobbying for a more assertive NAM. It has implied support for a nonaligned meeting to adopt a broad declaration condemning all foreign intervention, without explicitly linking the conference to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Belgrade's complaints about the NAM's inactivity since last year's nonaligned summit have been echoed by Pyongyang, which recently called for action to "revitalize and enliven" the organization.

CUBA RESPONDS TO NONALIGNED CRITICS WITH PROPOSAL FOR TALKS

In calling for a special nonaligned ministerial meeting at this time, Cuba's primary motive appears to be to wrest the initiative from Belgrade and host a conference on home ground in Havana which could be shaped in an "anti-imperialist," pro-Soviet mold.* The proposal points up Cuban sensitivity to persistent complaints by some member countries of a lack of momentum in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan last December. Cuban treatment of this issue has underscored its dilemma in preserving both its nonaligned status and its Soviet relationship.

Havana broke ranks with the majority of the nonaligned when it voted against condemnation of the intervention in the 9 January UN General Assembly resolution, but it has withheld explicit endorsement of the

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* The suggestion of Havana as the site of the meeting will probably be unacceptable to member countries that complained of Cuban manipulation of the summit conference there last September. Indonesia, for one, *following talks with Yugoslavia*, has said that a number of nonaligned countries prefer to hold the meeting in Africa or Asia.

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Soviet move, evidently trying to salvage its nonaligned credentials.* It has blandly replayed Moscow's version of events in Afghanistan, while virtually ignoring nonaligned Coordinating Bureau sessions in New York on the subject.

Havana's lack of enthusiasm for any formal nonaligned discussions on the Afghan problem has been indicated by the limited publicity given the Cuban Foreign Ministry announcement proposing the ministerial conference. The announcement was broadcast by Havana's domestic service on 30 May, but there has been no reporting from Cuba on any followup contacts to promote the meeting. Havana suggested that the ministers "could discuss several conflicts and areas of tension" as well as world economic problems, with details such as agenda topics and date to be decided "through consultations and the preparatory mechanisms" of the movement.

The only other available Havana reference to the proposal came in a 7 June PRENSA LATINA commentary that sought to counter complaints of the NAM's ineffectual performance since the Afghan problem arose. The commentary listed a number of "intensive and varied" activities carried out--"some through diplomatic channels and others publicly through declarations"--under Cuba's leadership, including the call for a ministerial conference. Putting Castro in the role of peacemaker, the commentary described Havana's proposal as "a modest contribution" by Cuba, as NAM chairman, to search for solutions to unspecified "peace-threatening conflicts" and declared that it was "undoubtedly necessary at this juncture" for nonaligned countries to "raise their voices and outline their position" in order to resolve these problems. PRENSA LATINA as usual accused "imperialist forces" of creating "confrontations" between nonaligned countries designed to weaken the movement.

BELGRADE, PYONGYANG EXPRESS CONCERN OVER NONALIGNED INACTION

YUGOSLAVIA The idea of convening a ministerial conference was broached in February by Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Vrhovec and more recently by LCY Presidium foreign affairs expert Milos Minic. Vrhovec said on 27 February that a special ministerial conference was a "realistic" proposal that needed further discussion. Minic observed on 19 May that the Afghanistan situation had created "serious difficulties" within the NAM, and maintained that the "overwhelming majority" of nonaligned countries favored holding a meeting to discuss the "general world situation" and what the

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* Cuban treatment of the UN debate on Afghanistan is discussed in the 16 January 1980 TRENDS, pages 10-11.

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nonaligned could do about it. In an earlier interview, reported by TANJUG on 11 February, Minic implied criticism of Havana when he asserted that the chairman of the Coordinating Bureau--Cuba--was responsible for revitalizing the NAM, which had become unusually inactive. Minic added that it was "particularly important" for the nonaligned countries and the international community to adopt a declaration against intervention, the use of force, and interference.

Belgrade's concern about the inactivity of the NAM was evident in its first major nonaligned diplomatic venture since Tito's death--a visit in late May and early June by Secretary Vrhovec to important nonaligned moderates--Zambia, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Singapore, and India. In a statement on his return home, reported by TANJUG on 12 June, Vrhovec asked rhetorically why the NAM had been "passive" and "on the sidelines" and "cannot say the right thing" at a time of increased tendency toward interference and intervention in sovereign countries. He called on the nonaligned to overcome their differences and "adopt joint stances" on these issues, although he referred in this regard only to meetings in New York, presumably of the Coordinating Bureau.

NORTH KOREA At an 11 June joint meeting of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) Political Committee and the DPRK Central People's Committee, Pyongyang supported the call for a nonaligned ministerial conference, arguing that the NAM ran the risk of becoming "impotent" if it remained paralyzed in the face of a "complex" world situation. As it has since 1978, Pyongyang followed the Yugoslav lead, implicitly criticizing Cuban views on how the movement should function and develop. The 12 June KCNA report on the meeting contained sharper language on the need to resolve problems within the movement than that employed in the July 1979 report on the last party-government meeting on nonaligned issues--a possible sign that Pyongyang sees a major test of strength between the Yugoslav and Cuban approaches to nonalignment in the offing. Even though the points covered were basically the same as the ones covered a year ago, the report on the latest meeting called on the movement to guard "strictly" against involvement and influence by great powers, to reject "categorically" efforts to classify nonaligned members according to how progressive they are, and to repudiate "thoroughly" attempts to change the inherent nature of the movement. Similarly, this meeting seemed to go beyond the scope of last year's in condemning outside intervention and urging a nonaligned stand against it. In what could be read as an oblique reference to the Afghanistan situation, which Pyongyang has otherwise ignored, the meeting noted that armed intervention, the presence of troops on another's territory, and "outrageous interference" in internal affairs of other countries were among the factors producing "various delicate problems" within the NAM, and it argued that the nonaligned countries "cannot permit this."

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PRC-U.S.

BEIJING REACTS SHARPLY TO REAGAN CAMPAIGN COMMENTS ON TAIWAN

Beijing has bristled at recent campaign statements by Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan calling for a resumption of official ties with Taipei. Despite the conviction expressed in the Chinese comment that PRC-U.S. ties will advance unimpeded by Reagan's statements, the sharpness, authority and extent of Beijing's response suggest serious concern over the statements in the Chinese capital. Based on an apparent recognition that Reagan probably will be the Republican nominee for president, Beijing's warnings of the potential danger of Reagan's views for Sino-U.S. bilateral ties and for strategic collaboration against Moscow are an unusual instance of Chinese readiness to criticize nonofficial U.S. views on the Taiwan question.

Capping the Chinese reaction to Reagan's calls for resumed official ties with Taipei was a 14 June RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article--a low-level but nonetheless authoritative press vehicle. Since the signing of the Shanghai communique in 1972, Beijing has not previously expressed dissatisfaction with any aspect of PRC-U.S. bilateral relations in an authoritative press commentary. Identifying Reagan's statements, together with recent U.S. press comment urging a revival of the 1954 ROC-U.S. defense pact, as "a tiny adverse current" in the "smooth development" of PRC-U.S. relations since normalization, the Commentator article warned that Reagan's views, if acted upon, would "thoroughly destroy" the foundation of relations between Washington and Beijing.

Chinese media attention to the Reagan comments on Taiwan preceding the RENMIN RIBAO Commentator was extensive but sudden. XINHUA led off the Chinese reaction on 8 June, when it reported Secretary Muskie's criticisms of Reagan's views on NBC television the same day. On the 11th, Washington-based XINHUA correspondent Peng Di attacked "a handful of persons" who continue to press for a resumption of official ties with Taiwan as "the most absurd type" of proponents for evenhanded U.S. diplomacy between China and the Soviet Union. On the 12th, XINHUA reported Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke's comments to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that Reagan's views, if implemented, would seriously jeopardize U.S. strategic interests as well as peace in the Taiwan Strait. On 13 June XINHUA cited President Carter as stating in his address to the Democratic Party Platform Committee that he

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could not agree with "those who say that there is no further benefit to be gained from the China relationship; also on the 13th the news agency released a "commentator" article spelling out the same points elaborated by the RENMIN RIBAO Commentator on the next day. Accompanying the RENMIN RIBAO Commentator on the 14th was a report detailing Reagan's campaign statements on the Taiwan issue, the alleged business connections between his campaign aides and Taipei, and recent comments by press columnist William F. Buckley on reviving the 1954 ROC-U.S. defense agreement.

Although the statements by Reagan on the Taiwan question date back as far as 17 May, Chinese media virtually ignored them until the current spate of comment, probably concurrent with Beijing's recognition that Reagan will presumably win the Republican presidential nomination. XINHUA's 21 May dispatch on the results of the Michigan primary--Reagan's 17 May comments were made while campaigning in Detroit--did not mention Reagan's statements. The only reference to Reagan's views in Chinese media preceding the current round of commentary was in a 4 April RENMIN RIBAO report on the background and views of the principal candidates in the Republican and Democratic primaries, which stated only that Reagan is "in favor of improving relations between the United States and China but against 'sacrificing' and 'discarding' the 'old friend, Taiwan.'"

The Chinese response, a measure of the seriousness of Beijing's concern about Reagan's statements, is an unusual departure from Beijing's normal media practices. Chinese media ordinarily ignore comments favoring ties with Taipei at the expense of relations with Beijing uttered by U.S. public figures other than spokesmen for the Administration itself. Beijing has not criticized such views held by non-Administration leaders by name, for example, since March 1976, when a XINHUA dispatch attacked comments on the Taiwan issue by Senator Barry Goldwater.

BACKGROUND Both the XINHUA commentator on 13 June and the RENMIN RIBAO Commentator on the 14th expressed particular irritation that the Reagan comments came in the context of PRC-U.S. efforts to step up collaboration against Moscow in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a consideration which at least in part accounts for the sharpness and authority of Beijing's response to the Reagan statements. More directly, however, Beijing's response probably reflects persistent Chinese doubts and anxieties over U.S. official and unofficial views on Taiwan which have surfaced periodically in the media, despite an overall effort by Beijing to play down Taiwan as an impediment to improved PRC-U.S. relations.

According to XINHUA, for example, PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua protested separate congressional draft bills on U.S. relations with Taipei in March 1979, although Beijing subsequently failed to protest

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or comment publicly on the passage and signing of the final Taiwan bill. Premier Hua Guofeng's summary comments on PRC-U.S. relations to the National People's Congress session in June 1979 observed that relations will continue to advance as long as Washington "strictly implements all the principles" of the normalization agreement and "refrains from actions harmful" to the reunification of Taiwan with the PRC.

PRC concerns over the Taiwan issue were evident in media reporting on the Beijing visit of Vice President Mondale in August last year. Vice Premier Li Xiannian was cited by XINHUA on 27 September as observing that the Mondale visit had been successful but that Beijing and Washington "have not yet reached complete agreement on the question of Taiwan." And in October last year, XINHUA dispatches and commentary on a federal court challenge to President Carter's steps to abrogate the 1954 ROC-U.S. defense pact vented Beijing's irritation at a "small number of people" who continue to try to "create a little trouble for the normal development" of PRC-U.S. relations, although no authoritative comment or formal protest was issued during that episode.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

MOSCOW STRESSES ARMS TALKS, HOLDS FAST ON NEGOTIATING DEMANDS

European security issues are getting renewed high-level attention in Moscow but without any public indication that changes in the Soviet negotiating posture are being considered. The documents issued by the mid-May Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting and a 3 June PRAVDA editorial article have restored MBFR and the question of prospective negotiations on limiting medium-range strategic systems to the prominent place on Moscow's public agenda that they temporarily lost following the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan. But both documents reaffirmed the uncompromising positions on specific points at issue that Moscow first set out in the wake of the arms initiatives approved by the NATO Council last December. Moscow has given the cold shoulder to FRG Chancellor Schmidt's proposal that both sides declare a three-year moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles.

THEATER STRATEGIC WEAPONS Moscow continues to press the condition for opening theater nuclear forces (TNF) limitation negotiations that it first asserted publicly last January. As phrased in the 10 January communique on French Communist Party leader Marchais' visit to Moscow, NATO must "cancel" or at least "discontinue the implementation" of the 12 December decision to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles. That position was repeated most recently in the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee's 15 May declaration. While that declaration was notable for the importance it appeared to attach to opening theater arms talks, it reaffirmed that NATO had to cancel its decision on the production and deployment of new missiles "or at least halt its realization."

Another sticking point on TNF talks, from the Soviet view, remains the scope of the negotiating agenda. In his 2 March statement last year, which first recorded Moscow's readiness to enter talks, President Brezhnev said Moscow was willing to discuss reducing medium-range weapons provided "due account" was taken of U.S. forward-based systems in Europe as well. Throughout the summer and fall of 1979, Soviet spokesmen discussing the TNF issue stressed that Soviet missiles were intended to counter NATO's forward-based systems--they cited the FB-111 and carrier-based aircraft specifically--and, consequently, that any talks must also cover those capabilities. In offering Moscow's first substantive reaction to the NATO decision on Soviet television last December, Central Committee International Department First Deputy

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Chief Vadim Zagladin complained that NATO's offer to negotiate only on land-based medium-range missiles was a ploy to avoid limits on the other NATO forward-based systems capable of striking the USSR.

Moscow's recent official statements on the question of TNF talks--including the Warsaw Pact declaration--have raised some question about their scope by referring only to talks on limiting "medium-range nuclear missiles." Nonetheless, Soviet officials in their public remarks have continued to insist that other Western systems in Europe must be taken into account. In a 9 June DER SPIEGEL interview, Soviet Germany expert Nikolay Portugalov--who recently has served as an increasingly important spokesman for Moscow's views on East-West issues--maintained that NATO's offer to negotiate on medium-range systems was "absolutely devoid of interest" to the East as long as the West tried to discuss only the new Western missiles and not those theater systems "already in existence." Portugalov reaffirmed that in order for talks to begin, not only must the December decision be "suspended," but "all Eurostrategic arms" must be included.

In complaining about systems left out in NATO's offer, Moscow has frequently alluded--as Portugalov did in DER SPIEGEL-- to both British and French capabilities, but without directly demanding their inclusion in the talks. During Moscow's anti-TNF media campaign last fall, Soviet discussions implied that British and French strategic capabilities need not be included in the first stage of negotiations, while emphasizing that they were relevant in assessing the overall balance. Zagladin, in a 6 June interview with Rotterdam's NRC HANDELSBLAD, was more definite on this point, saying that the missiles at issue were the "U.S. missiles," and that the French and British missiles are "not under consideration." It is therefore the United States which must conduct talks with the Soviet Union, Zagladin concluded, "perhaps with the participation of other countries."

Zagladin also pressed the point he made last fall that Moscow did not link future TNF talks with the status of SALT II and that negotiations could begin even prior to ratification. Alluding to the NATO decision in December, Zagladin indicated that the West's offer to negotiate on TNF within the SALT III context was "pointless" since SALT II was currently "blocked" and--according to the terms of the Vienna agreement--SALT III talks were only possible after SALT II came into force.

Soviet media have also ignored FRG Chancellor Schmidt's proposal--made in April and reiterated last week--for a mutual moratorium on deploying additional medium-range missiles as a way to get around the impasse over conditions for beginning theater arms limitation talks. The most direct Soviet public assessment so far was provided by Portugalov in his 9 June DER SPIEGEL interview. Asked to respond to Schmidt's observation that negotiations during such a moratorium could conceivably preclude the deployment of any new Western missiles, Portugalov stated that he did

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not believe in "ideal cases," and he implied that any suggestion that the West's nondeployment of missiles during the three-year period was a positive gesture was "cheating," since the missiles would not be ready to deploy in any event. Zagladin took a similar line, dismissing Western proposals as "propagandistic" and designed to "make us cease manufacturing our missiles" while allowing "all other U.S. weapons in Europe to exist." We can scarcely see any real possibilities in these suggestions, he concluded.

MBFR TALKS Moscow's position on the formula for progress on MBFR has been closely tied to its campaign against the NATO theater force modernization decision. Since the talks resumed in January, Soviet commentators have stressed the negative impact of the NATO decision on the climate for MBFR. Portugalov, in a hard-hitting 9 January LITERARY GAZETTE article, clearly laid out the Soviet position: the "main point," he said, is that the new missile plan "jeopardizes" the whole concept of the Vienna talks. Moscow has been equally unyielding with regard to the new MBFR proposals approved at the NATO meeting and submitted to the East at the end of the 19th round in late December. The new proposals, Soviet commentary has charged, actually erase the progress that had been made slowly since the talks began in 1973 and fail to address the central issues of European security.

Moscow's latest authoritative statement of its MBFR views, contained in the 3 June PRAVDA editorial article, confirmed that there has been no change in the hardline position Moscow set forth in January. But it placed full responsibility for introducing movement squarely on the West. The latest NATO offer, PRAVDA declared, merely serves to confirm that the West "lacks the political will" to lessen military confrontation in central Europe. The East believes there are possibilities for progress in Vienna, the editorial maintained, but only if the West gives up its efforts to obtain unilateral advantages, adopts a "constructive" approach, and indicates "clearly and simply" what specific contributions each state is prepared to make toward force reductions. The article sought to project a desire for early progress at the talks, concluding that further delays are "absolutely inadmissable."

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KAMPUCHEA

PRK TREASON TRIAL REVEALS ADMINISTRATIVE, SECURITY PROBLEMS

A recently concluded treason trial of 17 members of the antigovernment Sereika group reflected the Hanoi-backed Phnom Penh regime's continuing inability to broaden its popular base, a task apparently compounded by persistent discontent over the Vietnamese presence. Reporting on the 5-7 June trial painted a bleak picture of a regime vulnerable to infiltration and plagued by its inability to meet basic security needs--an image underscored by Phnom Penh reports on a 10 June antigovernment attack on a passenger train near the capital. Phnom Penh's failure to resolve the problem of how to broaden local participation in the regime without opening the gates to politically unreliable elements increases its dependency on Hanoi, a trend likely to hinder severely future efforts to build a reliable administrative structure to exercise control over the country.

VIETNAMESE PRESENCE While last summer Phnom Penh seemed preoccupied with the problem of popular discontent with the Vietnamese presence, the reporting on the recent trial did not dwell on attempts by antigovernment forces to undermine the solidarity between Kampuchea and Vietnam.* Nevertheless, a Phnom Penh report on the 12th indicated that tension over this issue continues to be exploited by antigovernment groups. It noted, without further comment, that the accused had slandered the PRK-SRV treaty as part of their efforts to overthrow the regime. The problems created by the Vietnamese military presence in Kampuchea were also implied in Phnom Penh's 5 June release of a 15 May KPRC decree outlining penalties for treason and other crimes. It specifically cited opposition to the regime's foreign policies--the cornerstone of which is Phnom Penh's relationship with Hanoi--as one of the determinants of treason, and it specified stringent penalties for crimes against foreigners and their property.

CADRE PROBLEMS In January Phnom Penh indicated that it had been successful in overcoming some of the administrative problems that had plagued the regime since last summer, but the decree and the crimes of the Sereika counterrevolutionaries suggest that the recruitment of reliable cadres and the establishment

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* For a discussion of earlier signs of problems between Kampucheans and SRV forces, see the 8 August 1979 TRENDS, pages 14-16.

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of a viable administrative structure continue to pose major headaches for the regime. A dossier prepared by the Interior Ministry for the trial revealed the existence of a well-organized antigovernment substructure operating in several provinces and successfully infiltrating the Heng Samrin administrative apparatus, particularly within the Foreign and Economic Ministries. The accused apparently traveled freely throughout Kampuchea, and even to Thailand, holding meetings in Phnom Penh, and operating without detection for the better part of a year. The activities of the defendants were virtually terminated by September 1979, but other antigovernment elements reportedly pose a current threat to the regime. A 6 June Phnom Penh radio commentary admitted that there are still others who are "stubbornly conducting clandestine activities," and the KPRC decree on treason and other crimes proclaimed Phnom Penh's intention to track down "immediately" all those working to topple Kampuchea's "revolutionary administration." Thus far Phnom Penh has given no sign that any high-level leader is involved in the subversion attempts.

SECURITY SITUATION While Phnom Penh continues to take an upbeat view of the threat from the remnant forces of Democratic Kampuchea and other antigovernment forces, the reporting on the trial suggests that the regime's ability to provide security and maintian order is minimal. The Interior Ministry's trial dossier, for example, noted the freedom of movement enjoyed by the Sereika forces, including their ability to operate in Phnom Penh. The regime's tenuous control over the country was dramatically underlined by a rare 14 June admission of a successful attack four days earlier by "armed bandits" on a passenger train shortly after it had left a station in Kompong Chhnang Province on its way to Phnom Penh. According to subsequent reporting, many passengers were killed before Kampuchean and Vietnamese forces were able to rescue the survivors.

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U S S R

ESTONIA SAVES LIVESTOCK HERDS, BUT WITH RENEWED MOSCOW AID

Estonian First Secretary Vayno's strategy of refusing to cut back livestock herds in the face of this winter's fodder shortage and the U.S. grain embargo has been vindicated, according to a 27 May special Estonian plenum on fodder production. The plenum also indicated, however, that Estonia's calculations were so close that farms ran out of fodder owing to a late spring and Moscow had to send emergency shipments to save livestock herds--as it had to do last year. Estonia's "success" actually amounts to little more than a return to the levels of meat and milk output reached before 1979--a disastrous year for Estonian livestock--but its present improved supplies nevertheless contrast with the declining meat supplies in some other republics and again underscore the mixed pattern of reactions to the feed shortage in different Soviet republics.

During the past winter Vayno had insisted on maintaining the livestock herds and even increasing the number of pigs, despite what he called the tight fodder balance and the fact that some farmers apparently believed it would be more prudent to cut herds to get through the winter. At the plenum the republic leader pronounced the wintering of livestock a success and boasted that both the number of animals and meat production were up substantially in early 1980 compared with early 1979. He stated that during 1979 and 1980 Estonia had not slaughtered underweight pigs "in spite of the doubts of some farm leaders." He also declared that the republic would continue to increase its pig herds, warning that those who do not understand this "will be in error."

Other statements and data suggest that Vayno's claims are somewhat exaggerated. Yearend figures indicate that the number of pigs is up sharply, as Vayno indicated, but that cattle herds are still below pre-1979 levels. Moreover, the number of privately owned cattle, which usually suffer the most in a fodder shortage, was down sharply in early 1980, and a statement by Meat and Dairy Minister A. Essenson at the plenum suggests that this drop continues. Essenson stated that significantly more privately owned livestock had been arriving at meat processing plants recently and therefore these plants had been ordered to work Saturdays and Sundays to handle the load. Monthly meat production figures appearing in ECONOMIC GAZETTE suggest that the increases claimed by Vayno bring Estonian meat and milk output back to pre-1979 levels only. Early 1980 meat and milk

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output has been running about 10-16 percent above early 1979 levels, but these levels were extremely low compared with 1978--down about 14 percent for meat and 10 percent for milk.

Even Vayno admitted that his approach had almost foundered on bad weather, and that Estonia's livestock problem was not yet entirely solved. He complained that a cold spring had made May "especially complicated" and that even in June there would be less grass available for pasturage than normal. This put many farms in a "difficult situation with fodder," he said, but "at this difficult moment" Moscow, on Brezhnev's "personal instructions," allotted additional fodder for Estonia, enabling the republic to support its livestock herds. But fodder remains a serious problem for the long term, as the holding of this special plenum indicated. The plenum speeches of Vayno and Agriculture Secretary A.B. Upsi stated that fodder production had not been increasing as fast as planned for several years now and would have to more than double to relieve the restraints on livestock development.

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BRIEF

KOSYGIN USE OF STALIN SYMBOL: Breaking with his long-established practice of avoiding mentions of Stalin in his public statements, Premier Kosygin, in an unusual KOMMUNIST article (No. 7 1980), referred favorably to Stalin as a leader of the Soviet war effort in World War II. The reference was consistent with the subject and tone of the article, which reviewed the results of Soviet economic mobilization in the prewar, wartime, and postwar periods and stressed the values of discipline and centralized leadership. While some other V-E Day articles this year, and in previous years, also mentioned Stalin, this was evidently the first time Kosygin mentioned Stalin in a positive way since Khrushchev launched his denigration of Stalin in the 1950's. For example, in a speech on 7 May 1965 marking the 20th anniversary of V-E Day, Kosygin ignored Stalin, while Brezhnev, in his anniversary speech the following day, referred to Stalin as head of the State Defense Committee. Likewise, 10 years later--in 1975--Kosygin wrote a foreward to a book on the 30th anniversary of the end of the war, in which he referred to the State Defense Committee but not to Stalin. In drawing lessons from his review of history, Kosygin stressed the importance for the present day of skilled economic management, strict labor discipline, and a frugal attitude toward time and materials. As for foreign policy, his stress on discipline and "socialist patriotism" appeared suggestive of a tough stance on international issues, although his remarks addressed directly to this subject were fully consistent with the positions currently being expressed by other Soviet spokesmen.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 9-15 JUNE 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3113 items)			Beijing (761 items)		
Soviet Space Missions	10%	(7%)	Barbados Prime Minister Adams in PRC	17%	(--)
Soviet-Hungarian Soyuz 36 Space Mission	7%	(5%)	Japanese Prime Minister Ohira's Death	9%	(--)
Soyuz T-2 Space Mission	3%	(2%)	Vice Premier Deng Yingchao in France	3%	(2%)
Afghan Situation	4%	(1%)	Afghan Situation	3%	(3%)
U.S.-Iran Situation	3%	(4%)			

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Partial USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan
- CPSU plenum
- CEMA economic difficulties
- PRC objections to U.S. Taiwan policies
- Beijing on Southeast Asia CP's
- Soviet machine-building industry
- Soviet Azerbaijan as model for Asia
- Chinese economic readjustment

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25 JUNE 1980
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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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CPSU PLENUM

The CPSU's first foreign policy plenum since 1975 was overshadowed a day earlier by the announcement that "some" Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan. Whatever its importance in military terms, the 22 June announcement is politically symbolic. It suggests that Moscow finds the political liabilities--whether at home or abroad--of its military presence in Afghanistan of sufficient concern to abandon its previous position that a political settlement must precede even the beginning of withdrawal. While Moscow may hope that its announcement will stimulate movement toward a political solution on Afghanistan, the plenum resolution's restatement of uncompromising positions on outstanding East-West issues suggests no expectation in the Soviet capital of early movement on this front.

The plenum itself was held in a routine atmosphere, offering no indication that the withdrawal announcement was the occasion for significant policy debate. No personnel actions were announced. The plenum set the date for the next party congress--23 February 1981--and again charged President Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin with reporting on the work of the Central Committee and the new five-year plan, respectively. Uncertainty regarding the status of Defense Minister Ustinov, who had not been seen in public or mentioned in the press in three months, has now been removed with his appearance at the Supreme Soviet session, which took place the day after the plenum.

USSR ANNOUNCES PARTIAL AFGHAN WITHDRAWAL, URGES WEST RESPOND

Moscow's announcement of a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan caps a stepped up Soviet effort in recent weeks to promote a negotiated settlement based on the Afghan Government's 14 May proposal. The announcement may have been designed to generate movement, especially in Europe, toward a political solution acceptable to Moscow. Initial commentary on Moscow's "good will" gesture, highlighted by a semiauthoritative A. Petrov PRAVDA article on the 25th, has welcomed signs of receptiveness from France and other European countries while attacking Washington for refusing to consider a political settlement.

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The timing of the move gave the impression of a propaganda ploy designed for maximum effect on Western leaders at the seven-nation summit in Venice. But it seems significant that less than a month after President Brezhnev for the second time set forth the Soviet scenario for a solution, Moscow has quietly dropped the key element--that withdrawal could "begin" only after all other conditions were met. At least through mid-June, Soviet commentators had been insisting that withdrawal could be addressed only after cessation of "outside interference" had been guaranteed.

WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT The initial one-sentence withdrawal announcement on 22 June--in a TASS dispatch from Kabul broadcast almost simultaneously by Moscow's domestic service--said only that some army units whose stay in Afghanistan was not necessary "at present" were being withdrawn in agreement with the Afghan Government. Not until the 24th did TASS commentators acknowledge, in passing, that Brezhnev earlier--on the 20th--had notified French President Giscard d'Estaing about the withdrawal of the "first batch" of Soviet troops.

The first authoritative Soviet explanation of the withdrawal decision was offered by Brezhnev in his 23 June plenum speech, but his remarks had been foreshadowed in a Moscow domestic service report on the 22d on foreign reaction to the move. The radio cited the Beirut ASH-SHA'B as saying the step had become possible "as a result of a certain stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan resulting from the routing of large formations of Afghan counterrevolutionaries." The only details on the size of the withdrawal came in a Moscow World Service report on the 23d--not broadcast by the domestic service--which attributed to an Afghan minister the information that one Soviet division and 108 tanks were leaving Kabul for the USSR.

BREZHNEV SPEECH Setting the stage for the CPSU Central Committee's approval of last December's Afghan intervention, Brezhnev in his plenum speech on the 23d reiterated charges of U.S. and Chinese support for "armed aggression" against Afghanistan. He again decried accusations that the Soviet Union was seeking to "reach the warm seas" or obtain oil--much as he had done in his January PRAVDA interview, in which he had said that the decision to intervene had not been simple. Addressing the plenum, he seemed to be speaking defensively, perhaps to domestic questioners, when he maintained that the Soviet Union had "no choice" but to send troops and that "events have confirmed that this was the only correct decision."

In justification of the limited withdrawal, Brezhnev guardedly described life in Afghanistan as "now gradually coming back to

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normal." He made no claim of any sweeping victory, saying only that "large gangs of counterrevolutionaries were routed" and the "interventionists" have suffered a serious defeat." Brezhnev's observations did not seem to point to any marked improvements recently on the internal Afghan scene; media assessments have varied over the months as the situation has fluctuated. SOCIALIST INDUSTRY in late April, for instance, professed to see "signs of normalization" throughout the country, yet only last week a Moscow radio commentator called the situation in the area "anything but normal." And Moscow off and on for months has reported local victories by Afghan army units and the populace over assorted bandits, mercenaries, and other "enemies" of the revolution.

In the present conditions, Brezhnev said, the USSR decided in agreement with the Afghan Government and "its head, Comrade Babrak Karmal," to withdraw some units of the military contingent. He went on to pledge further, unspecified, help to Kabul in building the country's new life and preserving the gains of the April 1978 revolution.

PLENUM RESOLUTION, FUTURE WITHDRAWAL

The CPSU plenum resolution endorsed the Soviet intervention in December, according full approval to measures taken to give Afghanistan "all-round assistance in repulsing armed raids and outside interference." Supporting a political settlement, the resolution reiterated calls for an end to aggression against Afghanistan and for "reliable guarantees" of this but no longer described these elements as essential preconditions for discussion of Soviet withdrawal.

Since the withdrawal announcement, Moscow has suggested that any further scaling-down of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan depends on fulfillment of these conditions. TASS and Moscow radio commentators on the 23d recalled that the USSR had declared repeatedly that Soviet units would be withdrawn once outside interference had ceased and they described the present withdrawal as a demonstration of Soviet "good will." Senior PRAVDA observer Yuriy Zhukov, in remarks reported by Prague radio on 23 June, said the Soviet public welcomed the decision, which "obviously meant that the Afghan army, with the support of a limited contingent, is able to defend the revolution." Declaring that "we have never intended to keep our troops in Afghanistan too long," Zhukov added that how the situation develops is up to "the Western powers." If they completely stop activity against Afghanistan and guarantee that it will not be renewed, the Soviet Government "will withdraw its troops from there."

PLENUM RESOLUTION UNCOMPROMISING ON EAST-WEST ISSUES

Moscow tempered its conciliatory step on Afghanistan with a clear reaffirmation of inflexibility on East-West relations in the plenum

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resolution released on 25 June. The resolution repeated without nuance the bleak assessment of U.S. intentions and the international situation that has characterized Soviet statements since the Afghanistan crisis began.

While the resolution called for the preservation of detente, its stress was more on unilateral Soviet capabilities than the potential for multilateral dialogue:

+ It accused NATO of seeking to alter the strategic balance that Moscow claims made detente possible in the first place.

+ It charged that U.S. actions in the Afghanistan crisis have led to a "heightening of the danger of war."

+ It made no reference to SALT or MBFR.

The resolution concluded that the current situation calls for "constant vigilance and all-round strengthening of the defense potential" of the USSR.

APRIL 1975 PLENUM The plenum's timing and subject matter are less extraordinary than circumstances might suggest. The meeting closely parallels the comparable plenum in April 1975 which fixed the date for the last party congress. Both plenums issued broad-brush resolutions on foreign policy while approving the activity of Brezhnev and the Politburo since the previous congress. In 1975, as at the present plenum, Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke to the topic "On the International Situation and the Soviet Union's Foreign Policy."

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C E M A

PREMIERS' SESSION IN PRAGUE AIRS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

The annual meeting of CEMA-member premiers in Prague from 17 to 19 June--attended for the first time by new official "observer" Afghanistan--provided evidence that the bloc economic organization is feeling the pinch from the world energy shortage and the new pressures on East-West economic activity created by the Afghanistan crisis. Soviet Premier Kosygin informed the East European representatives that they could not expect any increase in the level of Soviet oil shipments after this year, and both he and the host country spokesman, Strougal, were critical of the bloc countries' slow progress in marshaling their energy resources. Maverick Romania implied dissatisfaction with the level of its fuel supplies from the Soviet Union and called for more intensive CEMA energy cooperation. Yugoslavia, an associate member, warned that its trade with CEMA may be adversely affected unless its deficit with some member countries is corrected. Despite such signs of discord, the final communique on the Prague meeting claimed "unanimity"--the first use of this term in such a document since 1976.

KOSYGIN In his speech on the 17th, the Soviet premier was blunt about the energy crunch and vehement in denouncing Western economic measures against the USSR. Reiterating a recurrent Soviet complaint in recent months, he cited "difficulties connected with the worsening conditions of extraction" of Soviet oil to explain why deliveries of oil to Moscow's CEMA partners during the next five-year plan period would remain at 1980 levels. Also warning the bloc countries of further increases in Soviet oil prices, Kosygin noted that, while "uncontrolled price changes" had been avoided in this area, "the change in the world energy and raw materials situation" and the increased cost of producing fuels had to be taken into account. Criticizing the CEMA countries on energy conservation, he charged that they had not "tackled this task" and that they continued to put too much emphasis on "ever new" energy sources instead of focusing on "better utilization of all that we have at our disposal."

While stressing the USSR's continued policy of equal and mutually advantageous relations with capitalist countries, the Soviet

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premier charged that "imperialist" forces were trying to undermine economic cooperation with the USSR and its allies by violating existing agreements and contracts. While conceding that such measures might cause "some temporary difficulties" in individual projects, he asserted that the USSR's economic progress and plan fulfillment could not be impeded even if the U.S. Government imposes an embargo on all American goods.

STROUGAL — CSSR Premier Strougal, in his 17 June "debate" speech, also criticized slow progress in the CEMA members' coordination of their upcoming five-year plans, implying that this affected their energy supplies among other things. Strougal outspokenly asserted that "CEMA should not be reconciled to the fact that in a number of important ventures, the preparation of relevant agreements is lagging behind," adding that this was "unfavorably" reflected in the preparation of 1981-85 plans and longer term programs. The Czechoslovak premier also expressed dissatisfaction with CEMA's pricing policy--a sensitive issue in connection with Soviet oil deliveries to the bloc. While voicing appreciation for the USSR's "attitude" in negotiations on setting contractual prices for the period 1981-85, he noted that "unfortunately" a number of problems connected with CEMA's pricing "remain unresolved, which understandably does not contribute to developing and strengthening integration."

Strougal's critical remarks on these issues were included in a Prague radio broadcast of the speech on the 17th, but were omitted from the version published the next day in the party organ RUDE PRAVO.

ROMANIA'S VERDET — Bucharest's expression of discontent with CEMA energy cooperation--and by extension with the newly announced limits on Soviet oil supplies--came in the speech by Romanian Premier Verdet on 18 June. In terms at least as strong as those contained in his CEMA speech last year, Verdet asserted that covering the needs of CEMA member-countries for raw materials, fuel and energy is "one of the major problems we have not yet solved properly and which requires immediate solution." Reflecting Romania's recent status as a net oil importer, he said that Bucharest had "permanently proved willing" to cooperate within CEMA to secure its fuel needs but that CEMA's "failure to solve" Romania's crude oil requirements had forced Bucharest to "look for sources of supply in other countries." Insisting that CEMA must find a solution to this problem, he proposed CEMA's adoption in the first half of 1981 of an energy program to further increase cooperation in fuel production, conservation, and the development of alternative energy sources.

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P R C - U. S.

BEIJING SHARPLY CRITICIZES U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN

Beijing has taken sharp but belated issue with U.S. plans to sell new arms to Taipei. Beijing's current protest contrasts with its virtual silence on previous U.S. actions in this regard since normalizing relations with the PRC. Coming in the context of Chinese press attacks on statements on the Taiwan issue by Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, Beijing's criticism of the new arms arrangements with Taipei appears to manifest resurgent doubts and anxieties among the Chinese leadership regarding U.S. attitudes toward the island.

Beijing's complaint came in a 20 June XINHUA "commentator" article--a nonauthoritative vehicle--which conveyed the "strong demand of the Chinese people" that Washington "stop forthwith" its arms sales to Taipei. The commentator denounced U.S. arms arrangements with Taiwan as a "breach of the principles" of Sino-U.S. normalization, citing a U.S. decision to permit U.S. companies to negotiate the sale of FX fighter aircraft with Taipei, as announced in House testimony on 11 June by Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, and an earlier decision to offer a new weapons package, announced last January and discussed by the assistant secretary in his House testimony. Accusing Washington of "bad faith in international relations," the XINHUA commentator warned that the U.S. decisions "cannot but jeopardize the process of normal development" of relations between the two countries. Earlier on the same day, a XINHUA dispatch critically reported details of the U.S. decisions and noted that Washington's "moves" have "already drawn the attention of the authorities concerned."

Chinese media had earlier taken note of remarks by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke in his House testimony attacking Ronald Reagan's statements on the Taiwan issue but had not reported his testimony on arms sales to Taipei. XINHUA on 12 June thus favorably reported the assistant secretary's comments that Reagan's views, if implemented, would seriously damage U.S. bilateral ties with Beijing and American strategic interests in Asia.

The sharpness of Beijing's current media reaction to the U.S. decisions contrast with its virtual silence on the issue in the past year and a half since normalization. At a press conference announcing the PRC-U.S. decision to normalize relations in December 1978, PRC Premier Hua Guofeng had registered Beijing's categorical

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opposition to any U.S. arms sales to Taiwan following normalization. The only reference to U.S actions in this regard subsequently, however, came in a brief, mildly critical XINHUA dispatch on 3 January this year reporting the Department of State's announcement that the Administration had decided to sell a new package of arms to Taipei--the same package protested in the current comment. That dispatch only recalled that Beijing had previously declared its opposition to continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and noted that the U.S. spokesman had referred to the "Government on Taiwan."

Beijing's public response to the U.S. decisions on arms sales to Taipei closely follows unusually outspoken attacks in Chinese media recently on statements by Ronald Reagan on the Taiwan question. The XINHUA commentator article on the U.S. arms decisions seemed to recall earlier press attacks on Reagan's remarks in expressing confidence that the "people" of both countries will continue to promote PRC-U.S. relations and stop "some people in the United States" who are attempting to "obstruct reunification" of Taiwan with the mainland and "turn back the wheel of history" in Sino-U.S. relations. Chinese press criticisms of Reagan's statements on Taiwan have meanwhile continued; a 21 June RENMIN RIBAO report denounced comments by Reagan aide Richard Allen on the Taiwan question on the 20th, predicting that Reagan's views on the issue might in the end hinder his presidential campaign.

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PRC-SOUTHEAST ASIA

PRC IGNORES PKI ANNIVERSARY; PKI ALTERS REVOLUTIONARY LINE

Beijing media have failed to observe the 60th anniversary of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), traditionally one of the CCP's closest fraternal allies. The Chinese omission is in keeping with Beijing's efforts since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea to play down public support for the Southeast Asian insurgencies while attempting to promote solidarity with the region's noncommunist governments against Soviet and Vietnamese expansionism.

The PKI itself has issued a long anniversary statement that confirms trends apparent since last year suggesting that the party has begun to moderate its traditional reliance on rural armed struggle as its primary revolutionary tactic in favor of increased attention to urban mass struggle.

BEIJING Beijing has failed to mark in its own media the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PKI. Chinese media are not known to have carried a greetings message from the CCP Central Committee or to have reported the long 23 May anniversary statement by the PKI Central Committee, which the PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR) broadcast on 24 and 27 May.

Beijing's omission is consistent with Chinese efforts to play down public support for the Maoist insurgencies in Southeast Asia while attempting to rally opposition to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea among the non communist governments of countries in which those insurgencies operate. Since late 1978 Chinese media have not been known to observe quinquennial anniversaries--which Beijing had habitually marked previously--for the Thai Communist Party (CPT), the Philippine Communist Party, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP), and, most recently, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Beginning in December 1978, Beijing also dropped media observances of the founding anniversary of the CPT, which it formerly had marked annually.* In the cases of both the Burmese party's 40th anniversary

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* An analysis of Beijing's modified treatment of the PCP and BCP anniversaries in 1979 is contained in the TRENDS of 22 August 1979, pages 4-6.

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in August last year and the MCP's 50th anniversary this April at least, the CCP Central Committee did send greetings, which while not reported in Chinese media, were carried over the PRC-based clandestine radios Voice of the People of Burma and VOMR, respectively.

Beijing's moderation of its public support for the Southeast Asian insurgencies in the context of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea has modified but not fundamentally altered the "dual track" policy the PRC has applied to its relations with noncommunist countries in the region since the early 1970's. Under that approach Beijing has attempted to improve state relations with the various noncommunist governments in the region while upholding Chinese relations with the insurgent communist parties in those countries as a separate, party-to-party matter. This principle was reaffirmed authoritatively in November 1978--when Beijing was predicting renewed aggression by Vietnam in Kampuchea--by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping during a visit to Thailand.

Accordingly, in the case of the PKI, Chinese attention to the Indonesian party has waned over the past year and a half but has not dropped off altogether. Jusuf Adjitirop, head of the Central Committee "delegation" that has long resided in Beijing, was last reported by Chinese media as appearing in Beijing on PRC national day in October 1978, although on 2 October last year RENMIN RIBAO carried a message from the PKI Central Committee signed by Adjitirop greeting the PRC's 30th national day. In March last year XINHUA briefly cited a denunciation of Hanoi by the PKI journal VOICE OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE.

At the same time, the Suharto government has continued to receive positive treatments in Chinese media. XINHUA, for example, favorably reported Jakarta's stand on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and highlighted Indonesian official statements of solidarity with the position of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on the Kampuchean question. XINHUA, reporting on anti-Chinese rioting in Ujung Pandang last April, stressed the concern of Indonesian officials, and of Suharto himself, over the incident. Reflecting Beijing's evident optimism that Jakarta may have been seriously considering improving relations with the PRC, Chinese media began late last year to report statements by Indonesian officials on the possibility of restored ties with China. Reminiscent of Beijing's use of sports contacts in the past as a step toward improved state relations with other countries, XINHUA took favorable note of a "friendly competition" between Chinese and Indonesian badminton teams last February.

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PKI STATEMENT The PKI Central Committee's annual statement on the party anniversary this year furthered the transition in the party's revolutionary tactics, evident already in last year's anniversary statement, away from rural armed struggle. Following the crushing of the party in 1965, the PKI, based on its 1966 "self-criticism" and 1967 "new program," had rigorously adhered to an agrarian guerrilla strategy to which urban-based political struggle was subordinated. This position was reaffirmed authoritatively as recently as 1978, when the Central Committee's anniversary statement identified the Indonesian peasantry as "the main force of the revolution" and called rural armed struggle the "only" correct road to power and the "reliable pillar" for mass struggles in the cities.

The current PKI statment reaffirmed that the 1966 "self-criticism" and 1967 "new program" have "shown the correct course and strategic tasks" of the PKI's struggle "in all stages." At the same time, however, it added that "new changes and developments at home and on the international scene have compelled Indonesian Communists further to assess more valuable experiences and designate correct policies and tactics" to implement the 1966 and 1967 documents in the "prevailing situation and characteristics" of the revolution. The statement called on the party to "be intelligent and energetic in determining concrete policies and tactics in line with the objective and subjective conditions" in Indonesia and in the international situation, and it urged that the party implement Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought "not in a dogmatic, but in a creative way."

The statment made no reference to rural armed struggle as the party's primary tactic, did not identify the peasantry as the "main force" of the revolution, and instead prescribed as the party's "present task" the need to "foster close relations with the masses and join them in their struggle." The statement avoided the harsh characterizations of the Suharto government--referring only to the "Suharto clique"--that have appeared in anniversary statements in recent years. Instead of calling for the regime's overthrow, as the 1978 statement had done, the statement urged the party to "fight for democratic rights and social justice, for complete independence and for national liberation." While the 1978 statement had warned of the danger to Indonesia, of both "U.S. imperialism" and "Soviet social imperialism," the current statement dwelled on Soviet attempts to gain inroads into Indonesia and the Soviet-Vietnamese threat to Southeast Asia as a whole and virtually ignored the notion of a threat from the United States.

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Many of the shifts in the party's line clearly evident in the current statement were already evident in the party's anniversary statement last year. While reaffirming the 1966 and 1967 documents, that statement also had not explicitly referred to rural armed struggle in Indonesia--even though the statement praised the "armed struggle" of fraternal Southeast Asian parties--but it did call upon the party to work to "destroy the Suharto fascist military regime." Foreshadowing the less exclusive focus on the peasantry in this year's statement, the party statement last year called on the party to "rely fully on the working class and peasantry" and cautioned that party work in the rural areas "does not mean to neglect activities in cities and industrial centers." Last year's statement also focused strongly on Soviet designs on Indonesia and the Soviet-Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea.

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USSR

INCREASING INVESTMENTS IN MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY CHALLENGED

The machine-building industry--the key to Soviet hopes to boost technological progress and restore lagging economic growth--is coming under increasing criticism for failing to produce the needed technological development despite huge state investments in this sphere. Recently some economists have challenged the wisdom of such heavy investment of resources, openly warning that this investment will be ineffective unless machine building is reorganized to make it more receptive to technological progress. As the competition for resources intensifies in connection with the preparation of the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan, this issue may become a new focus of controversy. Brezhnev has stressed that technological progress requires reform of the machine-building industry, but Kirilenko and Kosygin, the leaders most directly identified with the industry, have largely ignored the need for reform.

The main complaint lodged against the machine-building industry is that the involved ministries are not effectively using the huge resources allocated to them to promote technological progress. The argument against pouring more money into machine building in its present structure was presented most clearly in a May EKO article by economist S. A. Kheynman, who advocated "new technical and organizational decisions" in this industry. Pointing out the declining return on investment, he declared that "it is completely obvious that further long-term development of machine building along the old path" will require amounts of labor and material resources "that society simply cannot allocate."

Kheynman went on to analyze the reasons for the poor performance and to prescribe some remedies. Pointing out that most machine-building ministries are organized along narrow branch lines and only a few--instrument building, tool building, and so forth--have a broad enough mandate to encourage technological development with across-the-board applicability, Kheynman complained that too little of the investment goes into these key ministries and hence into new technology. Kheynman stated that the USSR has more metal-cutting machinery than the United States, Japan, and West Germany combined but that it gets less return because machine-building plants are scattered among a multitude of branch ministries--including many non-machine-building ministries--which use their plants for narrow purposes. Maintaining that branch

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ministries are an obstacle to scientific-technological progress, he proposed to circumvent present branch lines by organizing machine-building plants into interbranch associations.

In a parallel argument, some economists have also been maintaining that research institutes belonging to machine-building ministries and other ministries are not contributing to technological progress because of the branch system. Legal scholar V. P. Rassokhin, in the January 1980 EKO, argued that machine-building ministries load down their institutes with narrow branch tasks, leaving them no time to work on technological progress. To promote scientific research crossing branch lines, he proposed transferring these institutes from the ministries to the State Committee on Science and Technology. In the March 1980 EKO, journalist I. Ognev mentioned others supporting this proposal on the grounds that these institutes now must serve exclusively branch interests and have no time to work on developing new technologies.

PRESSURE FOR TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

The problems inherent in the branch structure and the slowness of technological development have been recognized for some time. At the 1976 party congress, Brezhnev declared that the structure of the machine-building industry "should be improved and become more flexible and receptive to technical innovations" and that this meant devoting more attention to the development of its tool-building, instrument-building, electrical equipment, and electronics branches. He also called for creating systems to administer groups of related ministries to overcome departmentalism.

Recently there have been new complaints from some state officials about insufficient support for the ministries oriented around research and development. In a 14 March 1979 IZVESTIYA article, Minister of the Machine Tool and Toolbuilding Industry A. I. Kostousov argued that his ministry was being shortchanged in comparison with other machine-building ministries. Complaining about "disproportions between development of machine building as a whole and development of the tool-instrument industry" and about a 25-percent cut in construction for his ministry in 1979, he stated that "we simply cannot understand why the USSR Gosplan cuts capital investments in the tool-instrument industry." Citing Brezhnev's 1976 appeal for more attention for the toolbuilding and instrument-building industries, he complained that planning of machine building still gave insufficient consideration to technological progress. Kostousov's point was seconded by recently appointed Gosplan First Deputy Chairman Ya. Ryabov in a December 1979 PLANNED ECONOMY article on scientific-technical progress. He also insisted that the branches determining technological progress were often shortchanged in planning, noting in particular that the material and financial resources allocated to instrument-building and toolbuilding were "insufficient."

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Official dissatisfaction with the work of the toolbuilding and instrument-building ministries has been expressed more strongly this year as pressure to speed technological progress increases. In a 16 March 1980 IZVESTIYA article, Kostousov admitted that for the first time since World War II his industry had failed to fulfill its plan--although he did not blame this on investment cuts. In February a special Central Committee - Council of Ministers decree was issued on the toolbuilding and instrument-building industries calling on these two ministries to sharply increase and improve their production of new, technologically advanced machinery. At a special 10-11 March Central Committee conference on this decree, Kirilenko, according to the 12 March 1980 PRAVDA, particularly assailed Kostousov's ministry for poor development of progressive technology.

Kosygin and Kirilenko, who directly supervise the machine-building ministries, recognize the need for better technological development but have been more reticent than Brezhnev about the need for reorganization. In a July 1979 PLANNED ECONOMY article, Kosygin acknowledged that "raising the effectiveness of machine building is inseparably connected with improving its organizational structure," but his definition of the needed changes did not include upsetting the present branch structure. Kirilenko frequently discusses the development of machine building, but has failed to mention controversial aspects such as the need for reform or the defects in the present branch system.

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AZERBAIJAN SEEKS ROLE AS MODEL OF SOCIALISM ON IRANIAN BORDER

Soviet Azerbaijan's ambitious first secretary, Aliyev, appears to be capitalizing on Moscow's concern with developments in the Islamic world to promote his republic as a showcase of Soviet life for the "peoples of the East." In a speech on the 60th anniversary of the republic in April, Aliyev projected an image of Azerbaijan as an appropriate modern instrument for carrying on the Soviet Union's historical efforts to promote friendly relations with the peoples of Asia. Although he did not say so explicitly, his listeners would be aware that the people best situated to be impressed by Azerbaijan's example would be its neighbors in Iranian Azarbayjan. Aliyev subsequently went out of his way to draw attention to the key strategic location of Azerbaijan, the land bridge between the Soviet Union and Iran. Aliyev's rhetoric and boosterism is consistent with his hard-driving record as leader of Azerbaijan and may be calculated additionally to improve his chances for generous investment allocations in the forthcoming five-year plan.

Aliyev's speech promoting Azerbaijan as a model for the East was set in the broader context of a laudatory account of the Soviet Union's nationalities policy. According to the text published in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY on 26 April, Aliyev claimed that the Soviet Union had provided an environment for the flourishing of national cultures, "including those professing Islam." Asserting that this historical achievement provides an "attractive example" for people fighting for freedom and national independence, Aliyev went on to argue that Azerbaijan was ideally suited to convey this example to the multinational East. "The best agitation, the best propaganda," he said, would be the image of Azerbaijan as a "model socialist republic."

Aliyev added further touches to his showcase concept in a recent visit to the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichivan, a region of Azerbaijan located directly on the border with Iran. The press treatment of the visit seemed calculated to underscore the current strategic sensitivity of the area--the account of the visit in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY on 27 May reported that Aliyev had met with border guards and stressed the need to increase vigilance along the frontier. The account also noted that Aliyev and his traveling companion, Armenian First Secretary Demirchyan, had just come from a meeting of the Transcaucasus Military District in Yerevan. Despite this emphasis on defense, Aliyev indicated his intention of making Nakhichivan a socialist example. "If Azerbaijan is to be called the advanced post of socialism in the East," he proclaimed, "then the advanced post of the republic is Nakhichivan."

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Aliyev underscored this commitment by pledging to transform Nakhichivan during the next five-year plan from an area whose economy had lagged behind the rest of the republic for the past 10 years into one of the leading regions of Azerbaijan. Aliyev also made it clear that the appeal to be directed to the peoples of the East should be based on more than mere material wealth. He cautioned that new buildings should be designed with "national coloring" and that examples of old Azerbaijani architecture should be preserved.

BACKGROUND Since his promotion in 1969 from local KGB chief to party head, Aliyev has led an impressive economic revival in Azerbaijan. Until the mid-1970's, the economy of erbaijan was plagued by numerous difficulties. However, according to figures cited by Aliyev at the local Central Committee plenum, reported in the 19 December 1979 BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, not only will Azerbaijan be the only republic to overfulfill its goal during the current five-year plan, it will also achieve the highest industrial growth rate of any republic. Boasting of Azerbaijan's achievements in the May issue of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, Aliyev predicted that the rate of growth would reach 47 percent by the end of the current plan, an impressive eight percentage points above plan. This peformance contrasts sharply with that of all the other Muslim republics, which are now lagging hopelessly behind their planned targets. In August the 57-year-old Aliyev was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for his economic achievements--an honor not usually awarded until a leader's 60th birthday.

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CHINA

ECONOMIC PLAN DISCUSSIONS SPARK READJUSTMENT POLICY DEBATE

A series of authoritative Chinese press commentaries on economic readjustment reflect high-level dissatisfaction with progress made since last year toward rectifying disproportionate development in China's economy. Although problems in the readjustment program have been aired periodically, the current discussion appears related to efforts under way to evaluate the results of last year's economic plan and to draw up new plans, possibly for endorsement at the National People's Congress session this August and at a party congress later in the year. While the commentaries unanimously denounce lower level resistance to the readjustment policies, they seem to reflect considerable debate over major related questions on economic development.

DEFENSE OF READJUSTMENT

A series of four RENMIN RIBAO editorials have reiterated Beijing's concern, first voiced during the party's landmark third plenum, in December 1978, that China's economy is advancing with "serious imbalances" and have strongly defended the economic readjustment policies formulated in the spring of 1979. The first editorial, appearing on 7 April, during a national conference on capital construction work, lamented that the "chaotic situation in the fields of production, construction, circulation, and distribution has not yet been eliminated" and introduced a new "guiding principle" of "doing things according to capability." The editorial explained that the overall situation is characterized by increasing expenses and declining state revenue and that more construction is being discussed without consideration for China's existing financial and material resources.

The three subsequent editorials, published on 9, 12 and 16 June, well after the close of the national work conference in mid-April and following a broad press debate, further elaborated the themes of the first editorial. They complained that there are still too many capital projects under construction, that high production quotas are still being "blindly" pursued, and that economic plans are being drawn up without provision for sources of money and materials. The editorials demanded that leaders and planners apply the new "guiding principle," carefully assess the current situation, plan only what can reasonably be accomplished, take care to account in planning for all sources of money and supplies needed to reach output quotas, and strictly adhere to plans. The editorials called for unity behind the adjustment policies and threatened disciplinary action against those who continue to violate the policies.

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Clearly difficult to implement from the beginning, the readjustment policies have been the subject of numerous editorials and commentaries in the 16 months since they were put into effect. Renewed, vigorous discussions of them now has evidently been prompted by high-level evaluation of the results of the 1979 economic plan, published last April, and by deliberation over contents of the 1980 economic plan. The current discussion may also be related to work on the new 10-year development plan, which is scheduled to be completed this year.

SOURCES OF RESISTANCE

The four editorials and related press comments have consistently attributed resistance to the readjustment policies either to officials who perceive adjustment efforts to be in conflict with their own bureaucratic and economic interests or to others who have ideological reservations about the current policies and remain faithful to now-discredited leftist development strategies. Dealing with the first kind of opposition, the 12 June editorial attacked officials who "always emphasize the special needs of their own localities and departments." According to the editorial, such officials believe that "readjustment in your department means retrenchment, but readjustment in mine means development," and that "you should act according to your capability, but preferential treatment should be given to my department."

In response to the continuing and apparently widespread attachment to leftist policies, even sharper criticism has been aimed at ideological resistance to readjustment. A 10 June RENMIN RIBAO Contributing Commentator, for example, blamed the "old notion that every province and area should strive to build an 'independent economic system'" for the continuing failure to curb capital construction substantially. Other leftist views were similarly criticized in the four RENMIN RIBAO editorials, including the beliefs that only high production quotas and high output speed are Marxist, that it is advantageous to quickly build more and bigger capital construction, and that political enthusiasm can overcome material weaknesses and shortcomings in economic plans.

Prescriptions offered by current comment to overcome resistance to adjustment policies include both vague calls to develop "ideological unity on the principle of doing things according to actual capabilities," and threats of legal action. "Those who apply for and approve projects in violation of normal procedures for capital construction and do not seek truth from facts and cause serious losses," the 9 June editorial warned, "must be investigated and must take full legal responsibility."

LACK OF CONSENSUS ON RELATED ISSUES

While the latest editorials seem to suggest a high-level consensus on the need to overcome opposition to readjustment measures, comment has betrayed less unanimity on related economic issues that have a

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bearing on current efforts to set long-range economic plans. Some of the economic issues touch on such politically sensitive problems as allocation of resources between consumer and industrial products and pricing and bonus policy. As discussion of the economic problems continues, it seems increasingly likely that leadership differences over the related political questions will surface just as they did earlier this spring, when party Chairman Hua Guofeng seemed to speak out against some current economic reforms.*

One crucial area in which a firm consensus apparently has only begun to emerge concerns the issue of how much of China's revenue should be set aside for reinvestment to expand the existing production base. Although economists appear to agree that in the past the amount, or "accumulation rate," has been too high to the detriment of wage levels and consumer goods, not all agree on what the proper rate should be or how quickly a new appropriate level should be reached. The 9 June editorial, for example, evidently reflecting an emerging consensus, prescribed that the suitable rate should be 25 percent, down from the 1978 high of 36.6 percent. Two articles in RENMIN RIBAO, on 15 and 27 May, predicted that figure, but an editor's note with the first pointed out that the discussion was in its "preliminary" stage and urged that economists "seriously study the question." The 27 May article supported the 25-percent accumulation rate but cautioned that that figure could be reached only very slowly, over several years. Such a proposal, if adopted, would extend the current readjustment period beyond the two years remaining in the original plan.

The same 27 May RENMIN RIBAO article raised a second area of controversy--the issue of the priority of economic management reform. The article took issue with some economists who hold that adjustments in investment ratios are less important in returning balance to the economy than fundamental reforms in China's economic management system. It argued that reforms such as the freer use of market forces, decentralization, and bonuses tied to profits would take too long to implement, would require further study, and would lead to chaos if implemented on a large scale before imbalances are corrected.

A third area of disagreement, touching on both ideological and economic issues, involves the fundamental question of whether the principal orientation of China's economy should be toward production of consumer goods or toward the development of heavier industrial production. A 12 June RENMIN RIBAO article, attributed to Wu Shuqing argued that lack of understanding of the "aims of socialist production" is currently obstructing effective readjustment of the economy and also hinders thorough elimination of leftist economic views. Wu's argument echoed the more specific complaint aired in a 31 January

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* Hua's views are discussed in the 20 May 1980 TRENDS, pages 14-17.

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RENMIN RIBAO article that Beijing, in calling for readjustment, had offered only a set of expedient criteria that could be used to stop construction and nothing that could represent a "principle task or fundamental objective of readjustment."

Wu's article, along with two others published since 9 June in RENMIN RIBAO, revive the late 1979 press discussion of "aims of socialist production." The theme had been introduced in October 1979 in major RENMIN RIBAO articles--one of which was attributed to the leading economist Yu Guangyuan--which held that the goal of a socialist economy was to "increase the end products needed by the people to the fullest extent possible." Even though at least one provincial radio likened importance of the discussion to that of the 1978 and 1979 discussions of the principle that "practice is the sole criterion of truth," the topic virtually disappeared from the popular media--except for the 31 January RENMIN RIBAO article--after December 1979. Beijing offered no public explanation for aborting the discussion, although the halt may have been prompted by a desire to avoid raising public hopes that China will be able rapidly to increase production of consumer goods.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 16-22 JUNE 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3274 items)		
CEMA Session, Prague	10%	(--)
Warsaw Pact Parliamentary Meeting	6%	(--)
Moscow Olympics	5%	(--)
Afghan Situation	4%	(4%)
Anniversary of Nazi Attack on USSR	3%	(--)

Beijing (774 items)		
Western Somoa Prime Minister Efi in PRC	13%	(--)
Vice Premier Deng Yingchao in France	4%	(3%)
Afghan Situation	3%	(3%)

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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USSR - AFGHANISTAN

PRAVDA DEFINES PRECONDITIONS FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Following up its partial troop withdrawal "initiative" announced on 22 June, Moscow has pressed its case for a political settlement of the Afghan crisis in an authoritative PRAVDA editorial article. Essentially a restatement of standard Soviet positions on the problem since the December 1979 intervention, the editorial article did define some preconditions for negotiations.

The 2 July PRAVDA editorial article--the first such article issued on the Afghan situation--spelled out in greater detail than heretofore the Soviet conditions for a settlement. PRAVDA called for a reliable guarantee that subversive cross-border activities be ended and not be resumed. It defined as "effective measures" the closure of the camps where mercenaries are being trained and the cessation of arms supplies to the insurgents. These are an expansion of the conditions first set forth by Brezhnev in his 22 February election speech. These measures, PRAVDA said, would "create favorable preconditions for a solution to the question of further steps toward withdrawal" of Soviet troops. PRAVDA also hinted at possible fluctuations in the size of the Soviet force in Afghanistan. It explained that the "length of stay" and the "number" of the Soviet troops are contingent on the need to support Afghanistan against armed interference from outside.

Brezhnev himself was reported by TASS on 30 June as having told visiting West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that the USSR supported a political settlement on the basis of the Afghan Government proposal, with the question of troop withdrawal to be resolved "in the context of the above-mentioned political settlement."

PRAVDA again rejected the U.S. idea of a transitional settlement, charging that the proposal aimed only at replacing the "legitimate" government with "puppets." Drawing on passages in the 25 June "A. Petrov" article in PRAVDA, the editorial article accused Washington, along with Beijing, of using Pakistan as a springboard for an "undeclared war" against Afghanistan. It charged that bands of mercenaries "by the thousands" were being sent into Afghanistan--a statement which seemed somewhat at odds with President Brezhnev's 23 June assertion, in justifying the partial withdrawal, that "large gangs of counterrevolutionaries were routed" and "the interventionists have suffered a serious defeat."

PRAVDA also elaborated on the associated theme that it is the United States, not the Soviet Union, which has designs on the Persian Gulf

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and its oil--a point broached by Brezhnev in his January PRAVDA interview and developed in subsequent Soviet commentary. In line with recent Soviet press commentary--possibly timed with an eye to the Western economic summit in Venice last month--PRAVDA cautioned West Europe and Japan that the United States was attempting to establish exclusive control over the energy resources of the capitalist world, a policy aimed, it said, at both producers and consumers of Middle East oil.

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USSR-IRAN

MOSCOW RESPONDS TO DIPLOMAT'S ARREST, CRITICISM OF AFGHAN ROLE

Moscow is showing increasing frustration over its inability to capitalize on the U.S.-Iranian crisis and make headway in its own relations with Iran. Soviet-Iranian ties have recently been further strained by the arrest of a Soviet diplomat in Tehran, an incident which prompted Moscow to join cause with the United States in reiterating its support for the principle of diplomatic immunity in the case of the U.S. hostages in Iran and in all other contexts. Disappointment with the attitudes of Iran's leaders has been reflected in Soviet comment implicitly rebuking Ayatollah Khomeyni and directly challenging Iranian Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh's repeated criticism of the Soviet role in Afghanistan. Media attention to the recent Soviet-Iranian economic talks in Moscow has left the impression that little progress was made on most issues.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY Moscow has not acknowledged the expulsion from Iran of the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, but the incident apparently caused a rare Moscow reaffirmation, in the context of the U.S. hostages in Iran, of its support for the principle of diplomatic immunity. According to Tehran radio on 30 June, the first secretary was apprehended "last week" while "exchanging intelligence documents detrimental to the interests" of Iran with an unidentified "foreign national." The diplomat was "arrested," Tehran said, and after investigation was declared persona non grata.

Soviet displeasure with Iran's detention of its diplomat was made clear in an A. Grachev article in IZVESTIYA, published before the Tehran announcement, which gratuitously addressed the American hostage issue for the first time in many weeks. Along the lines of previous comment, Grachev criticized the U.S. approach to the hostage problem, advocated a peaceful settlement, and recalled Foreign Minister Gromyko's remark, on 23 November last year, supporting the principle of diplomatic immunity. Adding further strictures that seemed applicable to the Soviet Union's own diplomatic problem with Iran, he asserted that the Soviet Union considers it inadmissible, in any international conflict, including that between the United States and Iran, to resort to violating the sovereignty "of any country" or to exert pressure "in any form on any country."

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In the absence of any recent developments on the U.S. hostage question, the article seems to have been intended as a warning to Tehran about the treatment of Moscow's own diplomats. Soviet aversion to issuing reaffirmations of its stand on diplomatic immunity was indicated by Gromyko at a Paris press conference on 25 April, the day the abortive U.S. mission to rescue the hostages was announced. The Soviet position on the hostage issue was set forth earlier, Gromyko said, and there "is no need to repeat it."

Making sure that Tehran got the message, Moscow radio carried the article in Persian but gave it no other broadcast publicity. The article appeared on 26 June in the evening edition of IZVESTIYA, generally not available outside the Soviet Union, but was deleted from the next day's morning edition, which is circulated abroad. Such changes in the morning edition have occurred in the past, but they are the exception to the rule. The article was broadcast in Persian on the 27th and carried again, in the usual repeat programming pattern of Moscow radio's Persian service, the following morning.

IRANIAN LEADERS In its treatment of the Iranian leadership, Moscow has continued to abstain from criticizing Ayatollah Khomeyni, but at least four Persian-language commentaries in mid-June assailed unnamed Iranian "circles" for advancing the "concept of two superpowers," a frequent Khomeyni theme. Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh has been a particular target of criticism in reaction to his calls for the establishment of Afghan rebel bases on Iranian territory if the Afghan situation is not settled to Iran's satisfaction. For example, a 19 June PRAVDA article, broadcast in Persian the same day, assailed Qotbzadeh for his "insinuations about Soviet policy" in Afghanistan and for ascribing to the Soviet Union "all but responsibility for the crimes of the shah." By echoing American propaganda, PRAVDA intimated, Qotbzadeh is directly serving the interests of the United States. Picking up on the Afghan rebel base theme, a semiauthoritative "A. Petrov" article in the 25 June PRAVDA insinuated that unnamed "local authorities" in northeastern Iran, just as their opposite numbers in Pakistan, were aiding "counterrevolutionary groups" in their armed struggle against the Afghan regime and were thereby allowing the CIA to operate via its "agents" on Iranian territory. PRAVDA repeated this assertion in a 2 July editorial article.

ECONOMIC TALKS Moscow initially took a positive approach to the results of the 17-20 June meeting in Moscow of the Soviet-Iranian committee on economic and technical cooperation. Semen Skachkov, chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and head of the Soviet delegation at the talks, was reported by TASS

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on the 20th as saying the protocol signed reflected the "positive development of cooperation" between the two countries. But in remarks subsequently reported by Moscow radio in Persian, Skachkov seemed to be toning down this assessment, and Tehran media provided further indications of disagreements. On 22 June, Moscow reported Skachkov as observing that the Soviet side was satisfied "in general" with the discussions, but it did not mention his remark--cited by a Tehran newspaper on 21 June--that the two sides had not attempted to reach a definitive solution to the question of the suspended Iranian natural gas shipments to the USSR. Soviet coverage of the talks made no mention of the gas issue.

There apparently was also disagreement over transport questions, judging from Iranian accounts. A Tehran paper on 26 June reported Soviet rejection of an Iranian proposal for the establishment of a "joint shipping company" to move cargo to Iran via the Volga River and the Caspian Sea. Skachkov, as cited by Moscow radio on 27 June, said only that the USSR would provide the "means for increasing" the amount of cargo shipped to Iran via the Volga-Caspian route. The Soviet side, Skachkov said, urged the Iranians to take measures to provide for cargo transport by "other means of transportation," including rail, and he added that the sides would discuss this question in a "forthcoming special commission" set up to study bilateral transport questions.

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U.S.-YUGOSLAVIA

President Carter's visit to Yugoslavia on 24-25 June has demonstrated the new Yugoslav leadership's commitment to strengthening its close ties with the United States without aggravating its delicate relationship with the Soviet Union. This Yugoslav approach has been projected in Belgrade comment, which has portrayed U.S.-Yugoslav relations at a high-water mark while underscoring Belgrade's intention to avoid entangling itself with any bloc. Despite this Yugoslav position, Moscow, for the first time in 10 years, has commented critically on a U.S.-Yugoslav summit, reflecting its new strains with Washington and its concern to prevent any potential pro-Western policy shift by the new Yugoslav leadership.

BELGRADE VOICES SATISFACTION WITH CARTER VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia's satisfaction with the President's visit and its intention to pursue a balanced approach in its relations with the superpowers were authoritatively confirmed by Foreign Secretary Vrhovec in a speech to the Assembly on 26 June, following the visit. Portraying favorably Belgrade's ties with all the major powers, including the Soviet Union, Vrhovec assessed the President's visit "very positively" and said that bilateral relations were developing "along an ascending line." He also implied that a longstanding Yugoslav complaint had been satisfactorily acknowledged when he praised the President's pledge not to tolerate anti-Yugoslav terrorism, a point made also by Internal Affairs Secretary Herljevic in an Assembly speech the same day. In other comment, Zagreb radio's Sundic on 25 June said that the dialogue had more than lived up to expectations, and Belgrade BORBA's Teslic on the 29th said that Yugoslavia highly appreciated the President's support and "respect" for the principles of U.S.-Yugoslav relations. Other commentators said that bilateral relations had "never been better."

Belgrade's customary concern to avoid needlessly offending Soviet sensibilities was reflected in its selective reporting of a previsit interview granted by President Carter to Yugoslav media. Belgrade excised statements by the President on the implications of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan for the Nonaligned Movement, Cuban efforts to seize leadership of that movement, and on other delicate topics in lengthy accounts of the interview carried by Belgrade radio, TANJUG, and POLITIKA on the eve of the visit. This editing of contentious statements on the Nonaligned Movement came several months after PRAVDA on 13 March had replayed scorching criticisms of Yugoslavia's role in

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that movement, including its positions on Afghanistan and Kampuchea and its relationship with Washington and Beijing. In another transparent effort to allay Soviet concerns, Zagreb radio's Sundic on the 25th reiterated the standard Yugoslav position that U.S.-Yugoslav cooperation "does not affect anyone and does not occur at anybody's expense whatsoever." But the Yugoslavs did not go so far as to disavow their disapproval of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which was implicitly condemned in the joint declaration on the visit.

MOSCOW CRITICIZES CARTER STATEMENTS ON YUGOSLAVIA

Despite Belgrade's assurances, Moscow has sharply impugned the motives behind President Carter's visit to Yugoslavia and his statements in support of Yugoslav independence. The critical approach to this U.S.-Yugoslav summit meeting contrasts with the absence of Moscow comment on the last three meetings--in 1971, 1975, and 1978--when U.S.-Soviet ties were warmer, Soviet-Yugoslav relations were less strained, and Tito was still in charge. In contrast to Moscow's last comment on such a summit--President Nixon's visit to Belgrade in 1970--the Soviets this time have directed their criticisms only at U.S. and not at Yugoslav policy.

The thrust of Soviet commentary, which has been aimed almost exclusively at foreign audiences, has been that Washington is trying to impose on Belgrade unsolicited help against an imagined Soviet threat. In several TASS commentaries from 24 to 26 June, Moscow has accused the President of trying to become the "unwanted guarantor" of Yugoslav independence, to "sidetrack" Yugoslavia from its "invariable foreign policy course," and to pose "demagogically" as a friend of the Nonaligned Movement. These themes were carried even further in a Nikolay Shishlin commentary aired over Moscow radio's Yugoslav program on 23 June, which went to unusual lengths to disparage and minimize U.S.-Yugoslav political and economic ties. Shishlin's remarks followed two other Soviet reports since Tito's death suggesting that the Yugoslav public has become disenchanted with Washington.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

Hanoi's recent incursion into Thailand, resulting in the most serious armed clash between Thailand and Vietnam to date, marked a strategic departure from its previous policy of military restraint. Hanoi's decision to cross the Kampuchean-Thai border and use military force to disrupt Thai support for Khmer elements hostile to the Heng Samrin regime implies a willingness to risk a deterioration of its relations with other Southeast Asian nations in exchange for consolidating its security position in Kampuchea.

Routine Soviet comment on the Thai-Vietnamese clash has sought to place it within the larger context of a Beijing-Washington attempt to halt a growing trend toward normalization of ASEAN-Indochinese relations.

In responding sharply to the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand and in spurning a Vietnamese offer to resume bilateral talks, Beijing has strongly reaffirmed the cardinal points of its policies in Southeast Asia. Chinese comment on the incursion has renewed previous broad pledges to support Bangkok against Vietnamese aggression and has attempted to use the Thai-SRV clash to promote regional solidarity against Hanoi.

HANOI APPLIES MILITARY PRESSURE ON THAILAND OVER KAMPUCHEA

HANOI, PHNOM PENH — Hanoi denounced Bangkok charges of aggression against Thailand in a 27 June SRV Foreign Ministry statement, which labeled the Thai claims "slanders" aimed at diverting public opinion from the basic cause of border tension--the anti-Kampuchean policy of the United States, China, and Thailand. The statement developed Hanoi's thesis that the 22-23 June fighting between Thai and Vietnamese forces occurred in response to Thai military support for attacks by "reactionary Khmers" operating inside Kampuchea. It claimed that a key element in the Washington-Beijing-Bangkok plan to weaken the Phnom Penh regime in the current rainy season is Thailand's voluntary repatriation program, which sets the stage for the "sabotage of the Kampuchean revolution" by reactionary Khmers. Claiming that the recent hostilities were provoked by the return of these elements, the statement implied that Thailand's recent implementation of the repatriation program triggered Vietnam's decision to apply military pressure on Thailand.

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The Hanoi-backed Phonm Penh regime was somewhat more direct in its accusations about the underlying reasons for the recent clashes on the border. In its 27 June Foreign Ministry statement refuting Thai charges, Phnom Penh denounced the "direct and dangerous threats to the security of Kampuchea" posed by "continuous and systematic" Thai violations of Kampuchea's sovereignty and Bangkok's "collusion" with Beijing and Washington. Focusing on alleged joint Chinese and Thai efforts to train, arm, and return Pol Pot forces and antigovernment "Sereika elements" to Kampuchea under the repatriation plan, the statement declared that the Kampuchean army has the "right and obligation" to "counterattack and wipe out" armed reactionaries who return to sabotage Kampuchea's reconstruction efforts.

Although Vietnam's Foreign Ministry statement renewed the pledge to respect Thai sovereignty and territorial integrity, it also reflected Hanoi's new resolve to use military force against Thailand if necessary in order to consolidate its security position in Kampuchea. The statement's point that Hanoi will continue to enhance its relations of solidarity and mutual support with its Indochina neighbors "in the defense of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each country" was sharpened in a 27 June NHAN DAN commentary, which noted that the Indochinese countries, "having united for the defense of each other," are "determined to oppose and destroy all schemes aimed at violating our sovereignty and territorial integrity." And a Hanoi radio commentary broadcast in Thai and English on the same day portrayed Hanoi as unwilling "to sit with folded arms so that the Beijing expansionists, the U.S. imperialists, and other reactionaries are free to blockade, create struggles, and invade the three Indochinese countries."

Hanoi's use of military force against Thailand comes in the wake of a diplomatic and media blitz, which included visits by the SRV Foreign Minister to Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, several proposals from Phnom Penh for talks with Thailand on border tension and refugee repatriation, and a series of sharp warnings to Thailand about the consequences of its "hostile" Kampuchean policy. Phnom Penh's offers to talk with the Bangkok government, or even the Thai Red Cross, tried to overcome the main Thai objection to such a dialogue by emphasizing that recognition of the PRK was not a "precondition" for talks. The call for Red Cross talks was reiterated most recently by the PRK Red Cross chairman on 24 June, just after the Thai-Vietnamese clash.

The incursion of Vietnamese forces into Thailand complicates Hanoi's ongoing task of convincing its Southeast Asian neighbors of its good intentions. Hanoi has failed to respond directly to the charges contained in a 25 June statement issued by ASEAN nations meeting in Kuala Lumpur, which held that the Vietnamese incursion had undermined Hanoi's credibility and diminished the trust that ASEAN had sought to create. But recently a spate of Hanoi comment has implicitly addressed

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the ASEAN position by reiterating the stock Vietnamese view that ASEAN members should guard against being "duped" by Washington and Beijing. A 30 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary did contain a passing reference to the ASEAN statement on the Thai-Vietnamese clash, but only to make the point that it reflected the "manipulation and pressure" Beijing and Washington had used on ASEAN members at the meetings. Seeking to dilute the ASEAN criticism, the commentary reiterated Hanoi's standard view that ASEAN statements do not always represent the "wishes of every member country." Hanoi's traditional tendency to portray division within ASEAN was also reflected in a 30 June NHAN DAN article, which claimed that Malaysia and Indonesia, unlike other ASEAN members, have resisted outside pressure to sidetrack dialogue between the ASEAN nations and Vietnam.

MOSCOW In an apparent attempt to refurbish its ally's image in the wake of the incursion, Moscow has predictably endorsed Vietnam's view that the United States and China are responsible for the increased tension along the Thai-Kampuchean border. It has developed the thesis that Thai provocations represent Sino-U.S. efforts to disrupt a growing trend for peace, dialogue, and normalization of ASEAN-Vietnamese relations. Noting that the Thai-Vietnamese fighting came on the eve of the Kuala Lumpur ASEAN conference, a 26 June TASS report argued that the possibility of improved ASEAN-Vietnamese relations had prompted "fierce opposition" from those who favor "turning Southeast Asia into an area of the cold war." And a PRAVDA article, carried by TASS on the 27th, added the charge that the claim of a Vietnamese attack on Thailand was an attempt to pressure ASEAN to refrain from taking the "realistic step" of recognizing the Heng Samrin regime.

To buttress its view of Hanoi's good intentions toward its neighbors, Moscow has pointed to SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach's recent tour of Southeast Asia as an example of Hanoi's initiative in encouraging a dialogue with ASEAN. A 28 June rejoinder by TASS commentator Leonid Zhelagov credited Thach's travels with having served to help Southeast Asians "see that the real threat to the area is the expansionist policy of Beijing."

BEIJING WARNS HANOI ON THAI CLASH, SPURNS RENEWED TALKS

Two PRC Foreign Ministry statements, released three days apart, reacted sharply to the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand and flatly rejected a Vietnamese proposal for reopening the Sino-Vietnamese political talks, frozen since last March. In denouncing Vietnamese actions on the Thai-Kampuchean border, Beijing has renewed authoritative pledges made since last fall to support Bangkok against Vietnamese aggression and has attempted to use the incursion to dramatize the necessity for continued ASEAN solidarity against Hanoi. Beijing's rejection of negotiations with the Vietnamese is consistent

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with Chinese efforts to galvanize international opposition to Hanoi.

THAI-SRV CLASH Beijing's official protest over the Thai-SRV clash on the Thai-Kampuchean border came in a 26 June PRC Foreign Ministry statement, which "called the attention" of Hanoi to the "grave danger involved" if Vietnam persists in its "aggression" against Thailand. Warning that the Chinese Government is "watching the developments closely," the statement declared that the PRC Government and people "will resolutely support the government and people of Thailand in their struggle against aggression." A RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article on the same day elaborated the Foreign Ministry statement's warning to Hanoi, noting that Thailand "is far from isolated" and recalling that the Chinese leadership has repeatedly pledged in the past that if the SRV invades Thailand, "China will stand on Thailand's side."

Similar authoritative Chinese statements of support for Bangkok have been offered in the past, although Beijing has not previously issued an official protest on a Thai-Vietnamese clash. Chinese media began to report leadership statements of support for Thailand last fall, when Beijing was warning that an anticipated Vietnamese dry season offensive against the Kampuchean resistance would spill over into Thailand. PRC reports of such declarations dropped off this spring as the rainy season approached and Beijing applauded the "failure" of Vietnamese operations in Kampuchea. Although Chinese leaders, according to Western media, continued to make such statements to foreign visitors, the last such pledge reported in PRC media was on 6 February, when National People's Congress Standing Committee Vice Chairman Deng Yingchao declared at a banquet in Bangkok that "China will stand firmly on the side of the Thai people" if Thai security is threatened.

Chinese media have not elaborated the potential nature and extent of backing implicit in such broad formulations pledging "resolute support" for Bangkok in the event of a Vietnamese attack. In particular, PRC media are not known ever to have asserted the existence of an "organic" connection between Vietnamese actions on the Thai-Kampuchean and Sino-Vietnamese borders. Beijing had established such a link between Vietnamese actions on the SRV-Kampuchean and PRC-SRV borders in December 1978, just as Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea began and preceding Beijing's punitive attack on northern Vietnam in February 1979.

ASEAN MEETING While underscoring the Foreign Ministry note's renewed pledge of support for Thailand, the 26 June RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article seemed primarily aimed at drawing the lesson of the Thai-Vietnamese clash for the 25-26 June ASEAN foreign ministers conference in Kuala Lumpur. Calling the

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Vietnamese action "a premeditated act of aggression" intended as "a display of power" to the ASEAN meeting, Commentator warned that unless Hanoi's tactic of "peace offensive and military offensive" is resisted, "a second or third Laos or Kampuchea will surely emerge in Southeast Asia."

The 26 June RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article's promptness in underscoring the implications of the Thai-SRV clash for the Kuala Lumpur ASEAN conference reflects Beijing's concern, apparent in Chinese commentary before the opening of the conference, that ASEAN not waver in its opposition to Vietnam's actions in Kampuchea. A XINHUA correspondent's commentary on the 25th, for example, had cautioned that, while "the Southeast Asian countries and people...naturally wish that Vietnam would stay a safe distance away from the Soviet Union," it is "purely wishful thinking" to try to encourage Hanoi to do so by officially accepting Vietnamese "hegemony" in Indochina. "It is more sensible and realistic," the commentary suggested, "to act together to repudiate Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea and to support the Kampuchean people's resistance."

Subsequent Chinese comment on the results of the ASEAN meeting predictably has praised the conference's denunciation of Hanoi's incursion into Thailand. A RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article on 28 June called the meeting's condemnation of Hanoi a "stunning blow" to Vietnam's efforts to weaken ASEAN unity and predicted that the meeting's stand on continued recognition of the Democratic Kampuchean Government will "have a salutary effect" on the Kampuchean situation. A XINHUA commentary on the 29th effusively praised the "remarkable achievements" of the meeting in solidifying common opposition to Hanoi's actions, not only among the ASEAN states themselves, but also in conjunction with other countries in the Asian-Pacific region.

REJECTION OF TALKS — Beijing formally rejected Hanoi's proposal for talks, made in an SRV Foreign Ministry note of 16 June, in a 23 June Chinese Foreign Ministry note, which XINHUA reported--possibly not in full--on the same day. As a PRC Foreign Ministry note had done in freezing the talks on 6 March, the current note cited Hanoi's "intensified execution" of a "hostile anti-China policy," persistence in its "military occupation of Kampuchea," and its continued pursuit of regional "hegemonism" as indications that the current "situation and atmosphere" are "very unfavorable" for reopening the talks. Beijing, the note claimed, is "willing to wait patiently" and remains ready to reopen the negotiations "as soon as an active factor in favor of the talks emerges, even if it is a small one" on Hanoi's part.

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Beijing's suspension of the negotiations last March was one of a number of steps taken by the Chinese in their efforts to rally international support against both Moscow and Hanoi in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Chinese commentary since Moscow's intervention last December has persistently stressed the strategic linkage between the Soviet action in Afghanistan and Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and the consequent need for a coordinated international response to both. In its own foreign policy actions, Beijing's freeze on talks with Hanoi followed its suspension in January of the bilateral political talks with Moscow as "inappropriate" in the context of Soviet actions in Afghanistan. The last session of the Sino-Vietnamese talks preceded the Soviet Afghan intervention; by late January, Vietnamese media claimed that Beijing was suggesting that its negotiators were "too busy" to attend a new session of the Sino-Vietnamese talks. Commentary accompanying the 6 March Foreign Ministry note freezing the Sino-Vietnamese talks specifically linked Hanoi's hostile attitude toward China and its actions in Kampuchea--factors cited as leading to the suspension of the talks--with Soviet actions in Afghanistan.

Since the suspension of the Sino-Vietnamese talks, Chinese media attention to alleged Vietnamese violations and provocations along the Sino-Vietnamese border has dropped off. While XINHUA summaries of such violations appeared about every 10 days when the talks were in session, XINHUA reporting since March has been sporadic. Beijing's last formal protest of Vietnamese violations came in a 17 March PRC Foreign Ministry note, soon after the suspension of the bilateral negotiations.

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BRIEF

PRC-TAIWAN: In a new elaboration of its view of how Taiwan could be incorporated into the PRC, Beijing has suggested that the island could enjoy the "special" status of Hong Kong and Macao. A Beijing radio broadcast to Taiwan on 16 June reported statements by Guangdong Province party chief and Governor Xi Zhongxun during a recent visit to Macao in which he said that Hong Kong and Macao are "actually special zones" whose "historical status should be maintained to promote stability and prosperity." Taiwan, Xi remarked further, could also "enjoy the status of a special zone" following its unification with the mainland. The issue of territorial sovereignty aside, Xi noted, "pertinent measures applicable to such cases should be flexible." Beijing has not previously drawn any parallel between the political status of Hong Kong and Macao and the potential status of Taiwan, although Xi Zhongxun's suggestion appears to be in keeping with Beijing's flexible approach to the Taiwan question as elaborated in Chinese media since the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations in December 1978. While avoiding precise indications of how Taiwan might be incorporated into the PRC, Beijing has consistently expressed a general preference for Taiwan's "peaceful reunification" and pledged to "respect" the economic and social "realities on Taiwan." In December 1978, a Beijing radio broadcast to Taiwan had suggested a parallel between Tibet's "peaceful liberation" under the 1951 agreement and Taiwan's potential unification with the mainland. More recently, the Hong Kong communist press suggested in June of this year that Beijing's new policy of enhanced political autonomy for Tibet might similarly be applied to Taiwan.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 23-29 JUNE 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (2,987 items)			Beijing (715 items)		
CPSU CC Plenum	9%	(--)	Vietnamese Incursion into Thailand	10%	(--)
Partial Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Afghanistan	7%	(--)	Partial Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Afghanistan	5%	(--)
CEMA Session	4%	(10%)	Sino-Vietnamese Dispute	5%	(1%)
Forthcoming 26th CPSU Congress	4%	(--)	Korean War 30th Anniversary	3%	(--)
Moscow Olympics	3%	(5%)	Botswana Party Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)
Supreme Soviet Session	3%	(--)	Zambian Military Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on medium-range arms talks
- Soviet-Vietnamese summit
- PRC protest on SRV border actions
- Warsaw on meat price increase
- Sino-Indian relations
- DPRK focus on domestic concerns
- Ties between Soviet, Iranian Azerbaijan

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9 JULY 1980
FB TM 80-028

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

For the second time in three weeks, Moscow has altered its position on a key issue in the current East-West impasse. A Politburo statement on 4 July belatedly confirmed that during Chancellor Schmidt's 30 June - 1 July visit Moscow had dropped its demand that a revision of NATO's decision to deploy new U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe precede any negotiations to limit such systems on each side. In late June Moscow, in announcing a "partial" troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, had abandoned its position that a political settlement of the Afghan situation must precede even the beginning of a Soviet withdrawal. Both steps were taken in connection with East-West summitry--the first linked implicitly to French President Giscard's 19 May meeting with Brezhnev in Warsaw by its early communication to Paris and the second timed to coincide with Schmidt's visit. Soviet commentary has left no doubt that Moscow hopes to demonstrate through its show of flexibility the advantages of pursuing dialogue rather than open confrontation with the USSR. This abrupt change of position on two issues central to the current stalemate suggests that there may be emerging in Moscow a more flexible leadership consensus than that which seemed to hold sway during the first half of 1980.

MOSCOW OFFERS MISSILE TALKS TIED TO U.S. SYSTEMS, SALT TREATY

Moscow is treating the new Soviet proposal on European strategic arms negotiations as the key result of FRG Chancellor Schmidt's recent visit. As presented in Soviet pronouncements following the visit, Moscow's new position is that negotiations to limit Soviet and American medium-range systems in Europe can begin even before SALT II is ratified, with the proviso that any agreement would take effect only after the treaty comes into force. The latest Soviet offer drops what has been Moscow's major precondition for talks since last December but reaffirms another. It abandons the demand that NATO first cancel or suspend its decision to deploy new U.S. medium-range missiles; but, returning to the terms of reference Moscow sought to establish last year, it requires that American forward-based systems in Europe be discussed along with Soviet missiles.

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After three days of bland commentary on the Schmidt visit Moscow first revealed its stance on negotiations in the 4 July joint party-government statement approving the results of the summit discussions. While Moscow's followup was slow, perhaps awaiting Chancellor Schmidt's formal report to the FRG Bundestag on the 3d, commentary in recent days has played up the new initiative as an effort to "break the deadlock" that has stalled the opening of talks since last fall. As outlined in the 4 July statement and detailed further in an 8 July PRAVDA editorial article, the Soviet position now is that discussions on limiting medium-range nuclear missile weapons and U.S. forward-based systems begin "simultaneously and in organic connection."

FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS The direct link between talks on medium-range missiles and U.S. forward-based systems is in essence a concrete reaffirmation of the proposed agenda for theater strategic arms limitation talks first set forth by Brezhnev in March 1979. In his Supreme Soviet election speech in the Kremlin, Brezhnev had then said the Soviet Union was willing to reach agreement on reducing medium-range weapons in Europe, "but with due account, of course, for the existence there of American military bases as well."

Soviet officials discussed in considerable detail what they consider to be relevant U.S. forward-based systems during last fall's publicity blitz against NATO's impending missile deployment decision. A 7 July TASS commentary keyed to the new proposal repeated most of the essentials of the earlier listings. The TASS commentary cited three types of systems in particular:

+ "bombers" based in Britain and West Germany. Though TASS did not specify the type, previous Soviet discussions have indicated these are the FB-111.

+ F-4 Phantoms based on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.

+ submarines with Poseidon missiles carrying almost 500 nuclear warheads. Five submarines of this type, TASS said, have been placed at the disposal of the NATO command.

In all, TASS concluded, there are approximately 784 units of U.S. forward-based weapons in Europe, and according to the December decision another 600 qualitatively new medium-range missiles are to be deployed.

DROPPED PRECONDITION None of Moscow's official statements of the new Soviet position have mentioned what had been the key Soviet precondition for talks since the December session of the NATO Council--that the alliance "cancel or halt the implementation"

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of its plans to deploy new U.S. missiles. That demand was reiterated as recently as the 15 May declaration issued by the Warsaw meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee. The former demand was also conspicuously ignored in a 5 July Moscow domestic radio commentary on the new proposal by one of the Central Committee's key spokesmen on East-West security issues, International Department First Deputy Chief Vadim Zagladin.

Soviet media as a whole seemed a bit sluggish in shifting to the new position. TASS ran excerpts on 2 and 3 July of articles from NEW TIMES and SOVIET RUSSIA which again invoked the "cancel or suspend" formulation as a requirement for talks. And Moscow radio's world service carried a commentary by PRAVDA senior political observer Yuriy Zhukov on the 5th that reasserted the previous position the day after the leadership approval statement had formally announced the new approach.

Moscow's new proposal returns the Soviet position on theater strategic arms talks to something like the offer Brezhnev first made last fall, but with notable elaborations that appear keyed to the negotiating offer NATO made after its December session. The talks are now being tied to the SALT II treaty rather than to the elusive SALT III negotiations as suggested by NATO. Moreover, at least as outlined in the 4 July leadership statement, the new offer appears to limit the range of Soviet weapons available for negotiation to medium-range "missile" systems, in much the same way that NATO proposed to discuss only land-based medium-range missiles. In first professing Soviet interest in talks last year, Brezhnev defined their scope as encompassing "medium-range nuclear means" or "weapons." In his 6 October 1979 East Berlin speech in particular, Brezhnev made it clea that he was including both missiles and aircraft in his calculation of the Soviet medium-range capabilities Moscow would consider limiting.

U.S. RESPONSE Moscow has left no doubt that it expects an appropriate reply to what it claims is a "serious step" toward restarting the East-West arms dialogue. Thus far, Soviet media have given straightforward treatment to the Carter Administration's response and avoided tendentious propaganda. TASS reported without elaboration Secretary of State Muskie's comment, following FRG Foreign Minister Genscher's 3 July briefing, that the President found Genscher's information "very valuable and interesting." In a similar fashion, TASS cited President Carter as remarking on the 6th that he found the Soviet proposal "worthy of study" and did not consider it a "trap." The latter report was carried by PRAVDA on the 7th.

Moscow has not yet offered any observations of its own about the Carter Administration's response. TASS commentator Kornilov managed to avoid any reference to the Administration position in complaining

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routinely on 8 July that "certain imperialist quarters" were calling the Soviet offer a "maneuver."

SCHMIDT VISIT HIGHLIGHTS SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH FRG TIES

Though bilateral relations were overshadowed during Chancellor Schmidt's visit by the issue of Afghanistan and medium-range missiles, Moscow took the opportunity to vent its dissatisfaction with the state of USSR-FRG ties. The 8 July PRAVDA editorial article on the visit assessed the status of bilateral ties bluntly: The FRG leaders were told, PRAVDA said, that relations "have begun limping in recent years" and that the Soviet Union was not to blame for this development. PRAVDA said that during the talks the Soviet side had presented a "well-argued criticism" of Bonn's actions concerning the issue of military detente in Europe, particularly of the FRG's role in promoting NATO's recent defense modernization decisions. Taking an implicit swipe at the chancellor himself, the article dismissed as "farfetched" the notion that Soviet modernization of its medium-range weapons had "allegedly upset" the military balance in Europe. Moscow's current mood on Soviet-West German relations was apparent in PRAVDA's comment that Bonn's commitment to detente would be judged by the extent to which statements by FRG officials are "implemented in concrete steps."

Moscow's no-nonsense approach to airing its differences with Schmidt is fully consistent with the atmosphere that Soviet media established prior to Schmidt's arrival. This spring, even as Moscow encouraged the West Europeans to chart a course independent of Washington on the Afghanistan crisis, Soviet officials openly expressed their concern over trends in FRG policy under Schmidt's direction. A 25 April PRAVDA article by the semiauthoritative "A. Petrov" and two subsequent articles by CPSU official and FRG expert Nikolay Portugalov seemed intent on placing the chancellor on the defensive. The Petrov article accused Bonn of having a "relapse" from detente to cold war. Portugalov went so far as to raise the specter of German remilitarism in a 14 May LITERARY GAZETTE article, charging that Bonn was bowing to Washington's lead on Afghanistan in exchange for U.S. acquiescence to Bonn's desire for "military predominance" in West Europe.

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USSR-VIETNAM-CHINA

In the wake of Vietnam's incursion into Thailand last month, Moscow and Hanoi have highlighted their close relationship with a meeting of top Soviet and Vietnamese leaders, an opportune gathering in Moscow that served the purpose of reminding Beijing of Hanoi's Moscow connection at a time of increased tension in Southeast Asia. Moscow has presented the summit as an important step in expanding Soviet-Vietnamese relations.

Beijing has renewed attention to tensions on its borders with Vietnam, issuing its first public protest over incidents there in more than three months and linking Vietnamese violations to Hanoi's actions along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Although PRC media have not explicitly done so, the Hong Kong communist press has noted the possibility of a second Chinese punitive strike against Vietnam.

SOVIET, VIETNAMESE LEADERS HIGHLIGHT TIES AT TALKS IN MOSCOW

The Soviet-Vietnamese summit provided an opportunity for authoritative Soviet comment on the situation in Southeast Asia in the wake of the 22-23 June Vietnamese incursion across the Kampuchean-Thai border to disrupt Thai support for Khmer elements hostile to the Heng Samrin regime. Lengthy, identical Moscow and Hanoi press releases on the 3 July meeting between President Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin and Vietnamese party chief Le Duan and SRV Premier Pham Van Dong stated that both sides had blamed tension in Southeast Asia on Beijing efforts, with U.S. support, to destabilize the area. In particular, the meeting concluded that the "complications" on the Thai-Kampuchean border were due to Beijing hegemonism, and the Soviet side expressed "understanding and approval" for the "actions and initiatives" of Vietnam and other Southeast Asian states to establish an atmosphere of peace and stability. Brezhnev, speaking on the same day at a ceremony where he and other Soviet leaders were given awards, claimed that there was complete Soviet-Vietnamese accord in international affairs and that the two nations "have a common approach to the problem of such a troubled region as Southeast Asia."

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Le Duan's remarks at a 3 July banquet highlighted Hanoi's stock theme that its ties with Moscow are a potential deterrent to outside aggression. He declared that the "wonderful results" of the meeting will become a "powerful inspiring factor" for Vietnam in its efforts to build socialism and "reliably defend the homeland against Beijing reactionaries who are forming a bloc with imperialist forces." Earlier in the day, Le Duan had similarly recalled the "great strength" that Hanoi's ties with Moscow had lent to the Vietnamese people in their struggles against the United States and China, underscoring his case by citing Brezhnev's previous expressions of support for Vietnam.

Brezhnev's remarks at the awards ceremony served as a measure of the improvement of Soviet-Vietnamese relations since Le Duan's last visit to Moscow, to sign the USSR-SRV treaty of friendship and cooperation in November 1978. Brezhnev alluded to the rocky beginnings of their friendship, noting that it "was not created overnight," but in a "gradual" process of "getting to know each other and learning to value mutual support." Now, however, the two countries are in "complete accord," and the relationship has become "richer" and acquired a "new dimension and depth." In describing the talks held during Le Duan's last visit, Moscow had used the term "comradely frankness," a codeword for substantive disagreement. By contrast, the recent talks were described by both sides as having been held in a "fraternal, cordial atmosphere."

PRC SCORES SRV BORDER ACTIONS IN WAKE OF SRV-THAI FIGHTING

The formal PRC protest to Hanoi over recent violations of the Sino-Vietnamese border breaks Beijing's pattern of playing down tension along the frontier since the suspension of the PRC-SRV negotiations last March. Although the warnings in the 5 July PRC Foreign Ministry note were unexceptional, they seemed clearly intended as a reminder to Hanoi of the potential for Chinese pressure on the Sino-Vietnamese border should Vietnamese forces repeat their 22-23 June incursions across the Kampuchean border into Thailand.*

As previous Chinese protests to Hanoi over border violations have done in the past year, the note accused Vietnam of "incessant provocations" intended to "aggravate tension" along the Sino-

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* A 26 June PRC Foreign Ministry statement protesting Vietnamese incursions into Thailand and Beijing's rejection of renewed negotiations with Hanoi are discussed in the 2 July 1980 TRENDS, pages 10-13.

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Vietnamese border. It recounted several incidents alleged to have taken place on 2-3 July, including one in which Chinese border guards were "forced to return fire and give due punishment to the troublemakers." Like all such protests since the PRC's punitive attack on northern Vietnam in February 1979, the note warned of no specific response in retaliation, admonishing only that Hanoi must bear full responsibility for all consequences.

The timing of the note and other Chinese attention to the Sino-Vietnamese border strongly suggest that Beijing's real concern is Vietnam's recent hostile action against Thailand. The 5 July note is the first official public protest of Vietnamese border violations since 17 March--just after Beijing suspended bilateral talks with Vietnam--when a PRC Foreign Ministry note formally denounced SRV border violations as evidence that Hanoi itself was responsible for "undermining the relations between the two countries." Beijing has also stepped up lower level publicity for border incidents, with XINHUA carrying reports on alleged violations on 29 and 30 June and 1 and 3 July. While the Sino-Vietnamese talks were in session, Chinese media reported Vietnamese border violations every 10 days, but such reports were sharply curtailed after the suspension of the talks, appearing only about once a month.

The Vietnamese-Thai hostilities were raised in both the 5 July note and accompanying comment on the Sino-Vietnamese border. The note observed that Vietnam's provocations on the Chinese border coincided with Hanoi's efforts to "intensify its war of aggression" in Kampuchea and its "flagrant armed incursion" into Thailand. These actions, the note charged, "fully prove" Hanoi's "blind faith in armed force" and its intention to continue its pursuit of "regional hegemonism" and "an anti-China and hate China policy." Similarly a 4 July XINHUA report summarizing recent SRV violations of the Chinese border claimed that Hanoi had simultaneously "stepped up" provocations along the PRC border and "conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign" against China to divert international attention both from its operations in Kampuchea and against Thailand and from Soviet actions in Afgnanistan. A XINHUA correspondent's commentary on 7 July pressed this theme further, rebutting Soviet and Vietnamese charges, stemming from Le Duan's talks with Brezhnev in Moscow, that Beijing is staging a "display of military might" along Vietnam's borders.

While the appearance of the 5 July protest thus seems to reflect Chinese concerns over Vietnamese actions against Thailand, both the note and accompanying commentary have stopped well short of asserting the existence of an "organic link" between Vietnamese actions on the Sino-Vietnamese and Thai-Kampuchean borders.

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Beijing had posited such a link in the course of giving Hanoi "clear warning" about violations of the Chinese border in December 1978, just as Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea began and preceding the Chinese "counterattack" on northern Vietnam the following February. While Chinese leaders have recently authoritatively reaffirmed pledges to take Thailand's "side" against Vietnamese aggression, Chinese media are not known to have referred to the need to teach Hanoi a second "lesson."

That a renewed Chinese effort to "punish" Vietnam along the Sino-Vietnamese border in response to Vietnamese actions against Thailand is possible was nevertheless raised on 8 July by a regular commentator in the PRC-controlled Hong Kong communist paper TA KUNG PAO. Citing "observers in Beijing," TA KUNG PAO columnist Shih Chun-yu noted that recent Beijing assurances to support Bangkok "carry weight" and that "China will keep her word." Recalling Beijing's punitive strike against Vietnam last year, Shih warned that "if the Vietnamese authorities are so carried away as to launch a full-scale invasion of Thailand, they must reckon with possible action from China."

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POLAND

WARSAW REASSURES PUBLIC FOLLOWING MEAT PRICE INCREASE

Warsaw has taken steps to reassure the public of the necessity and limited scope of an increase in some meat prices, which it initiated without prior notice on 1 July. According to limited available comment, the increase involves the sale of about 20 percent of total meat supplies at nonsubsidized "commercial" stores, while the bulk of the available supplies will continue to be sold at state stores at existing prices. The comment also stressed that the price change affected mainly better cuts of meat and that lower income families would be compensated for the rise by income supplements. While Warsaw media have acknowledged a large number of public queries about the decision, they have provided no information tending to substantiate Western news reports of work stoppages at several major Polish factories.

The first monitored announcement of the meat price rise came in a Warsaw TV interview with an official of a consumer cooperative organization late on 2 July, nearly two days after the prices officially went into effect, and was followed by several commentaries the next day. Defending the increase as necessary to "rationalize consumption" in view of a "very difficult" meat supply situation, the consumer official stressed that many varieties of meat still would be available at current prices in state shops, that the old prices would still apply for workers' canteens and kindergarten camps, and that funds collected from the higher prices would be earmarked for lower income families. Responding to an assertion by the interviewer that "many television viewers feel surprised" by the decision, the official said that the meat problem was "not new," noting in this connection that it had been discussed at a 3 April Sejm (parliament) session. Similar reassurances were provided in articles in the Warsaw dailies TRYBUNA LUDU and ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 3 July. TRYBUNA LUDU commentator Ewa Fiala, in response to "many questions from our readers" about the price hike, defended the decision as "indispensable" and said it had been "announced in advance."

Although the regime did not reveal in advance the exact date of the price increase or appear to carry out thorough public

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consultations, Premier Babiuch did discuss the need for such an increase in a 3 April Sejm speech, and a TRYBUNA LUDU article subsequently hinted strongly that a change would be forthcoming. Babiuch stressed the need to "broaden" the sale of meat in the commercial shops, promising at the same time that any changes would be gradual, that there would be adequate compensation for lower income families, and that there would be advance consultations. TRYBUNA LUDU on 28 May, noting that meat price increases are not "easy or popular," interpreted Babiuch's remarks as a signal that the government "would take action to put the meat situation in order."

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CHINA-INDIA

BEIJING OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED SINO-INDIAN TIES

Beijing has expressed optimism about the prospects for improved Sino-Indian relations following the recent visit to Beijing by Indian Secretary of External Affairs Eric Gonsalves. Throughout the visit Chinese comment stressed the heightened need for improved Sino-Indian relations in the context of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. While urging that the longstanding Sino-Indian border dispute be set aside and not hinder progress in other aspects of bilateral ties, Beijing at the same time has resurrected the negotiating formula it employed in talks on the border before the 1962 Sino-Indian border war.

Chinese satisfaction with the results of the 20-24 June Gonsalves visit was registered in a 24 June XINHUA correspondent's commentary--now a standard media vehicle used to summarize the results of high-level Chinese-foreign contacts from Beijing's point of view. Citing "observers" in Beijing, the XINHUA correspondent stated that the restoration of "direct contacts and dialogue" between China and India "shows that both governments are willing to restore good state-to-state relations as soon as possible and are now moving toward this goal." Both sides, the correspondent concluded, "will assuredly take new and firm strides" toward improved relations and cooperation.

IMPETUS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS

Beijing's heightened interest in improved relations with New Delhi in the context of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan emerged clearly in Chinese media treatment of the Gonsalves visit. Throughout the visit Chinese spokesmen and commentary repeatedly stressed the greater importance of improved bilateral ties for a troubled South Asian situation, although in apparent deference to Indian sensitivities they only alluded to the Afghanistan problem. The 24 June XINHUA correspondent's commentary appraising the results of the visit, for example, noted that "recent tense events" have shown that Asia has become a "hot spot of aggression and expansion by the hegemonists." "In such a serious situation," the XINHUA correspondent observed, "improved and extended Sino-Indian relations" will "undoubtedly exercise positive influences" that should "by no means be neglected."

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Earlier, at a 20 June banquet welcoming Gonsalves, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong struck a similar theme, pointing out that China and India, "as two big nations in Asia," are "shouldering the important responsibility of safeguarding" peace in the region. XINHUA's account of the banquet also highlighted Gonsalves' comments that New Delhi shares Beijing's awareness that the world situation has become more tense "because of certain events happening around India" and that "big powers outside this area should not come to aggravate the tension" in the region or station troops "in any country of this area."

BOUNDARY DISPUTE In a rare discussion of the Sino-Indian boundary problem, the 24 June XINHUA correspondent's commentary stressed Beijing's preference that the longstanding border dispute be set aside and not be allowed to impede improved bilateral relations or strategic cooperation. A willingness by both sides to "maintain the status quo along the border while simultaneously developing" other aspects of bilateral ties, the correspondent stated, will foster an "atmosphere of harmony and friendship" that will prove "indispensable" for resolving the boundary dispute. He recalled that such an approach had been applied in the past and, alluding to current regional pressures impelling improved bilateral accommodation, added that "there is no reason for the two countries not to do so again today when there is so much global unrest."

While thus urging that the boundary issue not distract from larger concerns, the 24 June XINHUA correspondent's commentary at the same time suggested that the border question could be resolved through "mutual understanding and concession" on both sides. The correspondent cited a recent remark--not previously reported by XINHUA--by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to a visiting Indian journalist that "peaceful negotiations" might resolve the border issue as long as both sides are "sincere" and "tolerant" and "respect the present state on the border."

As an illustration of Beijing's readiness to undertake negotiations in a "spirit of mutual understanding and concession," the XINHUA correspondent recalled that in the past China had suggested that both sides "make concessions, China in the east sector and India in the west sector, on the basis of the actually controlled borderline, so as to resolve the Sino-Indian border question in a package plan." This formulation appears to recapitulate the negotiating stance adopted by the Chinese in talks on the boundary dispute with India before the outbreak of hostilities in 1962, as it was disclosed in Indian official statements and press accounts at that time. While official PRC statements in Chinese media at

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that time had routinely called for an overall settlement of the various border issues in dispute, they are not known to have explicitly acknowledged, either in the period before 1962 or thereafter, this particular package approach to settling the issue.

BACKGROUND Chinese interest in improving relations with New Delhi was signaled in PRC media soon after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as part of an overall Beijing effort to rally South Asian opposition to the Soviet action. Chinese media have favorably reported Indian official statements in keeping with this larger strategic effort, but at the same time they have occasionally carried commentary sharply criticizing Indian statements and actions which are not. Although XINHUA has promptly and favorably reported statements by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressing optimism about the prospects for improved ties with China, for example, a RENMIN RIBAO commentary in early March sharply rebutted attacks on China by Gandhi and warned that such remarks would "impair" joint efforts to mend bilateral relations.*

Similarly, in Chinese media treatment of Indian foreign policy, XINHUA briefly reported the new Soviet-Indian arms agreement on 28 May without comment and on 1 June promptly reported an official Indian spokesman's claim that the arms deal would not affect Indian views on Afghanistan. On 9 July, however, RENMIN RIBAO attacked New Delhi's recognition of the Heng Samrin regime as a "stupid decision" and suggested that in accepting the Soviet arms package as a "bribe" in exchange for recognition of the Kampuchean government backed by the USSR and Vietnam, India has "completely departed from its correct stand of nonalignment."

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* Early Chinese efforts to improve relations with New Delhi in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan are discussed in the TRENDS of 30 January 1980, pages 9-10, and 5 March 1980, page 19.

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KOREA

DPRK TURNS TOWARD DOMESTIC CONCERNS BEFORE PARTY CONGRESS

Pyongyang's modest observance of the 30th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war suggests an intensification of North Korean efforts to focus attention on domestic issues in preparation for the October party congress and reduced interest in arousing popular sentiments against South Korea and the United States. But the change of focus from other years has not resulted in a softening of the North's rhetoric about the South. Harsh anniversary invective against the ROK reinforced other evidence that Pyongyang has virtually ruled out progress in the North-South dialogue as long as the current military regime remains in power in Seoul. Chinese treatment of the anniversary was noticeably reduced from the last decennial, in line with Beijing's efforts since 1978 to minimize identification of China with this anti-U.S. commemoration.

DOMESTIC FOCUS — Breaking with his practice on the two previous decennials, Kim Il-song failed to appear at the main Pyongyang war anniversary rally on 25 June, one of the smallest rallies on that occasion in over 20 years. Kim did appear, however, at a conference on light industry three days later, sharpening the impression that the North is more concerned with economic issues than with traditional anti-U.S. agitation as the first party congress in 10 years approaches.

In announcing the congress last December, Pyongyang had indicated that the meeting would focus on domestic matters, an emphasis reflected anew in slogans for the congress issued by the Korean Workers Party (KWP) Central Committee on 3 July. While similar in many respects to slogans issued in February 1975 in preparation for the 30th anniversary of the KWP, the current list gives less attention to the South Korean situation and to the need for preparations for war. A 5 July NODONG SINMUN editorial praising the slogans focused on their importance in preparing for the congress politically and economically and made only passing reference to their application toward "expediting" reunification and strengthening solidarity with international revolutionary forces.

NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE — Pyongyang treatment of the North-South dialogue in the Korean war anniversary comment reinforced other signs that the North Koreans feel either

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that they cannot or need not deal with the military regime in power in Seoul since mid-May. While reiterating in general terms the North's continued commitment to "dialogue and negotiations," Pyongyang has cast its objections to the current ROK regime in fundamental terms. It has made no pretense of suggesting that progress in the talks depends merely on a change in attitude by Seoul toward the dialogue; rather, it has suggested that there cannot be progress until the regime itself is replaced. The main speaker at the 25 June Pyongyang rally made no reference to the current dialogue. Even more striking, a 4 July NODONG SINMUN editorial, pegged to the eighth anniversary of the 1972 North-South joint statement on reunification, repeated Pyongyang's harsh line against the Chon Tu-hwan regime and painted a bleak picture of the history of DPRK-ROK contacts, a view that offered little hope for the future of the current talks.

At the ninth North-South working-level meeting, on 24 June, Pyongyang had reinforced the impression that it views the dialogue as moribund. Pledging to continue the talks, despite what it termed the "confusion" and "abnormal" situation in the South, the North nevertheless seemed to be shutting off the possibility for progress. In a set of demands similar to those it had advanced in 1974, after the first round of the North-South dialogue became deadlocked, Pyongyang claimed that progress was impossible until "obstacles" to the dialogue, such as martial law, military rule, and "anticommunist rackets and war preparations," were removed in the South. On the grounds that there is currently no one for the DPRK to meet with, even if premier-level talks were to take place, the North precluded further discussion of the final outstanding issue at the working-level talks--an agenda for the premiers' meeting--until the South's acting premier is formally approved by the ROK National Assembly, which has so far been prohibited from meeting by Seoul's military leaders.

BEIJING Beijing's treatment of the 30th Korean war anniversary was similar to its annual observances in recent years, with no special function or comment to honor the decennial. By contrast, in 1970 the Chinese held a mass rally in the capital and exchanged high-level delegations with Pyongyang to mark the occasion. This year the Chinese commemorated the anniversary with the usual 25 June RENMIN RIBAO editorial. (Quinquennials in 1970 and 1975 were marked with more authoritative joint editorials, but Beijing has not used joint editorials since April 1978.) The RENMIN RIBAO editorial treated the Korean issue, including the question of a U.S. troop withdrawal, in standard terms. In what

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could be read as a call for a new U.S. Korea policy to fit the new situation on the peninsula, the editorial went beyond Beijing's normal observation that U.S. troops remain in Korea and the country is still divided many years after the armistice, pointedly noting that the international situation had changed "tremendously" since the 1950's.

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U S S R

CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN SOVIET, IRANIAN AZERBAIJAN PROMOTED

Moscow may be tolerating a reemergence of Azerbaijani cultural activism as a tool to cultivate ties between northern (Soviet) and southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan. This possibility was raised with the publication in January of an unusual article in AZERBAIJAN, the Azeri-language journal of the AzSSR writers union, which discussed the status of Azerbaijani literature in Iran following the overthrow of the shah. The article may reflect Soviet interest in influencing Azerbaijani intellectuals in Iran, an interest that would be consistent with recent statements by AzSSR First Secretary Aliyev promoting the republic as a showcase for "peoples of the East."* At the same time, the article's stirring appeal for cultural identity and its denunciation of cultural oppression, though specifically linked to Iranian Azerbaijani experience under the shah, could well apply to similar phenomena on the northern side of the border.

The January article was written by Mirza Ibrahimov, a former president of the AzSSR and an outstanding Azerbaijani literary figure who has longstanding ties to southern Azerbaijan and a history of defending Azerbaijani culture against russification. His article portrayed a flowering of southern Azerbaijani literature after the fall of the shah, quoting extensive samples of recent writings and giving a lengthy account of a meeting held by southern writers in April 1979 to discuss the issues of a standard Azeri language and the organization of a writers union.

Insistence on freedom to use the Azeri language, the vehicle of Azerbaijani culture, was one of the most important themes in the writings presented by Ibrahimov. He quoted a letter that described as natural rights such activities as "reading and writing in one's own language, hearing lectures in one's own language in all schools, the use of the mother tongue in the organs of justice, the courts, on radio and television, and having newspapers and magazines in one's own language." In another expression of fiery nationalism, a poem presented by Ibrahimov condemned as a "satanic rebellion against the will of Allah" the efforts of those who "wish to tie us by force

* Aliyev's statements are discussed in the 25 June 1980 TRENDS, pages 16-17.

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to their languages and cultures." Another poem, in a clear allusion to cultural imperialism, called on Azerbaijanis to resist the "aggressor" invading their homeland. Since these complaints could have been voiced against the treatment of Soviet Azerbaijan, as well as the policies followed in Iranian Azerbaijan, it seems notable that Ibrahimov did not interject any defense of the Soviet nationalities policies.

Implicit throughout the Ibrahimov article is the notion of strong ties and a cultural identity between Azerbaijanis in the Soviet Union and Iran. A suggestion of the desirability of the unification of the Azerbaijani people appeared in one poem, offered without comment by Ibrahimov. The work, by an Azerbaijani poet from Iran, addresses brethren on the Soviet side of the border, reminding them that the barriers separating Azerbaijanis are not physical but man-made and should be "pulled down."

Ibrahimov's article does not make clear the exact nature of his contacts with Iranian Azerbaijani authors, although his background suggests that such contacts exist. The report on the Iranian Azerbaijani writers meeting included in his article, he notes, was "submitted" by the Iranian journal SIRUS.* The views of the authors expressed at the meeting were widely divergent, including some clearly far to the left. All the participants were united in their Azerbaijani nationalism, and some even spoke of an independent Azerbaijan.

BACKGROUND Ibrahimov** has combined a distinguished career in the Soviet bureaucracy with a reputation as a champion of Azerbaijani culture and as a literary figure in his own right. Southern Azerbaijan has been a recurrent object of his interests in the latter capacity. Apparently a native of southern Azerbaijan, he returned during World War II to participate in propaganda work. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1946, he wrote extensively on the democratic movement in southern Azerbaijan, and in 1951 he received the Stalin prize for a work on that topic. On the broader subject of cultural freedom, Ibrahimov has made public protests against russification, even while holding high posts

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* Neither SIRUS nor other Iranian journals cited by Ibrahimov are known to be available outside Iran, and some may have been banned by Tehran since they first began publication following the fall of the shah.

** When transliterated from Russian the author's name appears as Ibragimov, from Azeri, as Ibrahimov.

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in the Soviet regime. In October 1956, for example, while serving as president of the republic and member of its party bureau, Ibrahimov strongly denounced linguistic russification in an article appearing in the Azeri-language daily, KOMMUNIST. A little over a year later, he was relieved of his posts and publicly criticized for his erroneous views on the nationalities question. In spite of this record of Azerbaijani nationalism, Ibrahimov has continued to remain active in political life, serving as the first secretary of the Azerbaijani Writers Union from 1965 to 1975, and currently as chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African Countries.

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OUTSPOKEN SCIENTIST WRITES OF KHRUSHCHEV, PAST CONFLICTS

In an unusual display of editorial independence, the Siberian economic journal EKO has published outspoken memoirs by the former president of the Academy of Sciences' Siberian Division, M. A. Lavrentyev, which violate many of the shibboleths restricting material appearing in the Soviet press. The memoirs, appearing in EKO from July 1979 through June 1980, discuss Khrushchev repeatedly in both favorable and unfavorable terms, illuminate involvement of party and government leaders in scientific decisions, describe conflicts among leading scientists and scientific organizations, and call on scientists to fight actively against scientific and political decisions with which they disagree. The appearance of the memoirs can be ascribed to an apparent concession by the authorities in the face of the determination of this prestigious scientist and the drive of EKO's independent-minded editor, A. G. Aganbegyan, who is himself a Lavrentyev protege. Such concessions, while exceptional, occur from time to time in the Soviet Union, where the phenomenon of the independent-minded and outspoken intellectual poses a recurrent problem for the authorities.

The style of the memoirs is demonstrated most clearly in Lavrentyev's treatment of Khrushchev, whose name is normally not mentioned in the Soviet press. While portraying and criticizing Khrushchev's heavyhanded and often uninformed intervention in science, Lavrentyev also gives Khrushchev credit for being farsighted enough to give scientists crucial support on some very controversial decisions: development of computers in the late 1940's, creation of the Academy of Sciences' Siberian Division in the late 1950's, and the establishment in 1963 of a Council on Science in the Council of Ministers to give scientists a greater voice in government science decisions. Lavrentyev wrote in the December EKO: "I have already spoken of the difficulties we experienced because of some hasty decisions of N. S. Khrushchev, but for the sake of justice, I must say that he rendered us great aid." His harshest criticism of Khrushchev related to the latter's attempts to force scientists to accept the dictates of the notorious charlatan Lysenko, who is also frequently mentioned in the memoirs.

Lavrentyev has long had the reputation of being a stubborn and sharp-tongued fighter who rose to the top because of his scientific brilliance rather than political compliance, and the memoirs amply reconfirm this. He describes sharp exchanges with Khrushchev,

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recounting, for example, the occasion when he told Khrushchev directly that his favorite scientist, Lysenko, was nothing but an "obscurantist." He also angered Khrushchev by stubbornly resisting--on environmental grounds--the government's decision to build a cellulose plant on Lake Baykal. Khrushchev characteristically retained a high regard for Lavrentyev and named him head of the Council on Science, which he created in 1963.

Ever the outspoken individualist, Lavrentyev in his memoirs indicated that sometimes he simply ignored or evaded higher level decisions with which he disagreed and urged others to do likewise. For example, he described how the Siberian Division, which he headed, ignored Lysenko's proposals in the late 1950's and fought off Moscow commissions which came to purge Lysenko's foes. Again, in the Baykal controversy he subverted orders from Moscow and finally received an official rebuke for his obstructionism. As if reveling in controversy, Lavrentyev boasted of his stubbornness in defending unpopular causes and assailed scientists who shied away from conflicts. In the April installment he directly called on scientists to boldly fight projects which they felt were wrong, and in the May installment he lamented that "unfortunately, there are still people among us who put the opinion of the authorities above scientific truth."

Academician Lavrentyev, a giant in Soviet science since the 1950's, is by no means the only example of an independent-minded Soviet establishment figure who has sometimes violated conventional restrictions in his public utterances. Among other such figures in recent years have been Andrey Sakharov in physics, Aleksey Rumyantsev in economics, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy in literature--all of whom demonstrated dedication to principle over conformity, and all of whom suffered to a greater or lesser extent for their independence. Lavrentyev surrendered his main official positions--vice president of the Academy of Sciences and president of the Academy's Siberian Division--in 1975 at the age of 75, but he clearly retains great influence, particularly in the Siberian Division, which he helped to create and which he led for over 20 years.

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BRIEF

SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS: While maintaining silence on Iran's expulsion of a Soviet Embassy official last week, Moscow has made clear its apprehensions that its diplomatic mission and personnel in Tehran may be subjected to harassment or attack. Serving notice to Iran--as well as to the Soviet public--about its concern, Moscow has thus followed up the implicit warning conveyed in the 26 June Grachev article in IZVESTIYA, which ostensibly addressed the issue of the American hostages and reiterated Soviet support for the principle of diplomatic immunity. TASS on 7 July reported a statement issued to Iranian media by the press attache of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran warning of "information" that "elements hostile to the Soviet Union intend to carry out provocative actions" against the embassy "up to and including seizure." The embassy, the statement said, "demands" that the Iranian Foreign Ministry and "other competent Iranian authorities" take measures to prevent such "dangerous" actions. TASS on the 8th subsequently noted that Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh had said Iranian "security bodies" had been instructed to take "additional" measures to ensure the security of the Soviet Embassy, "just as of other foreign embassies" in Tehran. Moscow not only broadcast the embassy statement to Persian listeners, but emphasized the publicity it was given by Soviet domestic media; TASS on the 8th took pains to point out that the statement had been published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA and reported by Moscow radio and television. But Moscow has not acknowledged other difficulties in its relations with Tehran, including Qotbzadeh's 2 July "announcement" calling for, among other things, a reduction in the number of Soviet Embassy personnel and the establishment of an Iranian consulate in the capital of Soviet Tajikistan. Nor, unlike Tehran, has Moscow mentioned last weekend's demonstrations at the Iranian Consulate in Baku involving persons described by the Iranian ambassador to the USSR as "communists" who took refuge in the Soviet Union 30 years ago.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 30 JUNE - 6 JULY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,423 items)			Beijing (683 items)		
FRG Chancellor Schmidt in USSR	18%	(--)	Vietnamese Incursion into Thailand	8%	(10%)
Vietnamese Political Leaders in USSR	11%	(--)	Sino-Vietnamese Dispute	4%	(5%)
Afghan Situation	6%	(9%)	Partial Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Afghanistan	3%	(5%)
Thai Border Situation	4%	(--)			
OAU Summit Conference, Sierra Leone	3%	(--)	OAU Summit Conference, Sierra Leone	4%	(--)
Moscow Olympics	3%	(3%)	Portuguese Minister of Commerce & Tourism Horta in PRC	3%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on forward-based systems
- Kabul overtures to Afghan clergy
- Moscow on Saudi Arabia
- Kim Il-song succession issue
- Pyongyang ties with Moscow, Beijing

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Moscow, Beijing Broadcast Statistics 1

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

- SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

- SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

- TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

- SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

- SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

- TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

MOSCOW PRESSES BROAD DEFINITION OF U.S. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS

Moscow is setting forth a broad definition of the U.S. weapons that would be included under its 4 July proposal for talks on limiting forward-based systems (FBS) along with medium-range missiles in the European theater. Initial Soviet statements on the proposal--including a 15 July PRAVDA editorial article--have for the first time defined the American systems of concern as those capable of reaching Soviet allies as well as the USSR. There is still no public indication of how this expanded definition will affect specific weapon systems figuring in Moscow's calculations of the European strategic balance.

The PRAVDA editorial article offered a lengthy justification of the Soviet insistence that U.S. forward-based systems be included in the negotiations.* It defined the focus of Moscow's concern as those "large quantities of American nuclear means" that are located "in Europe and near it" and can "hit the territory of the USSR and its allies." Without citing specific weapon systems, PRAVDA further defined FBS as "planes" stationed in West Europe and on American aircraft carriers and "American missile-carrying submarines" assigned to NATO. Previous Soviet formulations on FBS had generally posited a weapon system's ability to reach the USSR as the main criterion and made no reference to the vulnerability of the East European allies. It was in this spirit that Moscow argued last fall that the introduction of new Pershing II and cruise missiles under NATO's modernization plan would upset the prevailing European balance since they could strike the western USSR.

BACKGROUND Moscow made clear within days of signing the SALT II treaty in Vienna in June 1979 that it would make U.S. European forward-based systems a key issue in subsequent arms talks. In his 25 June postsummit press conference, Foreign Minister Gromyko maintained that movement on SALT III would mean giving "due regard" to other factors, such as FBS, affecting the strategic situation. At a press conference in West Germany on 23 November 1979 Gromyko pressed the point that future talks must take into account the "geographic factor" that puts the USSR at a disadvantage.

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* Moscow's initial treatment of the new proposal is discussed in the 9 July 1980 TRENDS, pages 1-4.

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While Moscow has remained vague on specific U.S. systems in Europe that would be included under its new proposal for negotiations, Soviet officials were more open last fall in the wake of President Brezhnev's initial proposal for talks. At that time a series of second-echelon officials--from the Central Committee International and International Information Departments and the Academy of Sciences institutes specializing in security issues--pictured the Soviet medium-range SS-20 missiles as intended to compensate for U.S. FBS and generally described the latter as follows:

+ Overall. The total number of Western strategic systems facing the USSR was said to be 1,500, about 800 of which were identified as U.S. FBS. The most precise breakdown was offered by Central Committee International Information Department chief Leonid Zamyatin in a December 1979 commentary. Zamyatin counted 384 land-based aircraft, 292 carrier-based aircraft, and 108 Pershing I's--producing the same total of 784 cited in a recent 7 July TASS commentary, which remains the most detailed Soviet listing of FBS since the new Soviet offer was revealed on 4 July.

+ Land-based aircraft. FB-111's were most frequently cited as the chief concern, with one specialist suggesting it was the counterpart of the Soviet Backfire bomber. Other, tactical, aircraft--primarily the F-4 Phantom--were cited as capable of carrying nuclear weapons the required distance. One general staff official also cited the F-14 and F-15 as "advanced fighter-bombers" capable of performing the "whole range of combat duties."

+ Carrier-based aircraft. Naval F-4 aircraft were invariably cited in this regard. Soviet statements often appeared to include other naval bombers currently deployed.

+ Pershing I missiles. Said to have a 750-kilometer range, these missiles were characterized by one Soviet expert as able to hit Kaliningrad if launched from West German territory.

+ Poseidon missile submarines. Poseidon submarines have usually been cited as a complement to the above-mentioned systems. Five such boats were said to be assigned to the NATO command and thus to constitute for Soviet planners a factor to be taken into account in assessing NATO's European-based strength. The 15 July PRAVDA editorial article suggested that it was not the submarines themselves but their forward bases that Moscow objected to, noting that the use of such facilities by these submarines "substantially increases the possibility of their being in battle positions."

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW, KABUL SEEK ACCOMMODATION WITH AFGHAN ISLAMIC LEADERS

Kabul has adopted a new approach toward its Afghan Muslim opponents, conceding them their traditional rights while trying to mobilize them for service to the revolutionary state. The attempt to come to terms with the Afghan Muslims was signaled in an address by Afghan leader Babrak Karmal at a conference of the Afghan ulema and clergy in Kabul, the first of its type in Afghanistan, and in Soviet and Afghan followup comment. In this comment, and in coverage of the subsequent visit by 88 Afghan religious leaders to Soviet Muslim institutions, Kabul and Moscow have elaborated a cautious and sympathetic policy toward Afghan Muslims, which is markedly at variance with the previous harsher attitude. The recent actions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) bear a strong resemblance to measures taken by the Soviet Government toward its Muslim population in the 1920's and may arouse a similar reaction.

RELIGIOUS CONFERENCE, NEW MUSLIM BODIES

The 30 June - 1 July conference was convened by the DRA authorities to provide a forum for Babrak Karmal's appeal to Muslims and to begin the process of encadrement of Islam in Afghanistan. The more than 800 members of the Afghan clergy reportedly discussed a variety of issues and adopted a resolution approving the actions of the Karmal government and calling on all Afghan Muslims to cease resistance to it.

Despite Soviet and Afghan claims of unanimity and representativeness, the conference appeared to be less than harmonious. Moscow in effect conceded as much in its first account of the conference: An English-language broadcast on 30 June reported that the Muslims "who spoke" supported those measures of the DRA leadership "that correspond to the principle of Islam and meet the aspirations of the Afghan people." In fact, according to a 10 July AFP report, the Muslims who spoke for the government were loudly booed by the others. Almost all the speakers named in the reports were identified as Shi'ites, a minority group often persecuted by the Sunni majority. Moscow and Kabul had earlier claimed Shi'ite support for the government. Perhaps reflecting a lack of DRA control in the countryside, all identified delegates came from Kabul or other major cities.

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Following the Soviet model for the treatment of Islam, the DRA leadership proposed and the conference "approved" the establishment of a Chief Board on Islamic Questions, attached to the DRA Revolutionary Council, as well as a Supreme Council of the Ulemas and Clergy of Afghanistan. In the Soviet Union, the authorities have used analogous institutions in their encadrement attempts to control the Islamic community by coopting its clergy. Since Sunni Islam lacks a clerical hierarchy and Shi'ite Islam has only an informal one, the institutions provide a form of organization and a means of exercising control. In Afghanistan the government's intervention into religion may cause some Muslims to go into political opposition to the regime and others to form underground Islamic sects.

KARMAL ON NEW DRA SOCIAL COMPACT

In his dramatic and emotional speech on 1 July, Babrak Karmal greeted the conference delegates in typical Islamic fashion and proceeded to wrap himself and his government in the green flag of Islam. Addressing the "working Muslims," Karmal claimed that both he and the DRA authorities "profoundly respect the sacred religion" of Islam and that those "brigands" fighting against the DRA were behaving in an "un-Muslim" manner. His opponents, Karmal said, were not true Muslims but rather people who have "willfully" called themselves Muslims--a contradiction in Islamic terms since Islam connotes submission to God. Accusing the rebels of blowing up mosques and religious shrines, he asked: "What connection do these atrocities have with Islam?" This theme has been played up recently by Moscow and Kabul in deploring an attempt early this month to destroy the holy mosque near the tomb of Ali in northern Afghanistan, one of the chief points of pilgrimage in the Muslim world.

Karmal promised that "we will build in Afghanistan a new Muslim society based on justice, equality, and respect for the sacred religion" of Islam. He noted that the DRA had made respect for Islam obligatory, and he specified that his opponents would be punished according to the shari'at, DRA fundamental principles, and other laws. His mention of shari'at law, a code of Muslim precepts, is extremely significant, appearing to reflect an attempt to establish a social contract with the Muslim clergy. In most parts of Afghanistan, central authority does not reach beyond the level of the village chief. Below that, affairs are typically supervised by the local mullah or shaykh according to the principles of shari'at law. If the assembled Muslim religious leaders agreed, Karmal seemed to be saying, the DRA would permit them to exercise their traditional authority locally in return for their support of the central government. This, too, is a page *from the Soviet book on how to deal with insurgent Islam.*

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The idea of a social compact between the DRA and the Muslim clergy was developed in an Igor Savchenko commentary broadcast by Moscow in Dari on 10 July. Savchenko said the conference had provided the basis for establishing ties between religious circles and tribes on the one hand and the DRA on the other. The future strengthening of these ties, he said, "will also create conditions for the development of the social base on which this government is founded." If the social base of the DRA is to be the religious leaders rather than the toiling masses, the DRA leadership has conceded--at least for a time--indirect rule in the rural areas and a large measure of Islamic influence in governing the country. It is perhaps significant that other recent Soviet comment has not mentioned the Muslim clergy in cataloging the opponents of the Afghan regime.

AFGHAN MUSLIMS IN USSR

In his speech to the conference, Babrak Karmal contrasted the United States, which "gives aid to sin" in the form of subsidies to the DRA's opponents, to the Soviet Union, in which "more than 40 million Muslims enjoy complete freedom of religious practice." He challenged those of his audience who did not believe this to see for themselves and promised government support for their travels. On 6 July, 88 Afghan Muslims--not all of them clergy, as subsequent reporting made clear--left for the Soviet Union, where they met with various officials of the Muslim Spiritual Directorates and gave interviews extolling what they had seen. Again almost all of the Afghans listed by name were Shi'ites. This attention to Shi'ites may be part of a Soviet effort to impress the Shi'ite leadership of Iran. It may also be an attempt to contrast, for the Muslim world, the conditions that Shi'ites enjoy in Afghanistan with those they experience in Pakistan, where there have been numerous Shi'ite protests in recent weeks.

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USSR-SAUDI ARABIA

MOSCOW AGAIN SUGGESTS RIYADH SHOULD CONSIDER TIES WITH USSR

Moscow has made a new low-key bid to exploit U.S.-Saudi differences and to suggest that Riyadh reconsider its attitude toward the Soviet Union. The exploratory approach, like the first significant trial balloon in January 1979, came from Soviet Arabist Igor Belyayev in a LITERARY GAZETTE article. The earlier article had signaled a shift from unrelieved Soviet criticism to qualified approval of Saudi policies. In recent months Riyadh's opposition to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has produced continuing complaints from Moscow about alleged Saudi assistance to the Afghan insurgents.

Following up on his 1979 thesis that Saudi Arabia should rethink its political orientation in light of the Iranian experience and the Camp David accords, Belyayev in his 9 July article professed to see increasing Saudi dissatisfaction with the United States, whether over the military relationship, oil issues, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or public speculation about royal family politics and minority Shi'ite demands. But Moscow apparently had few illusions that Belyayev's approach would win Saudi converts and made little effort to publicize the article for Arab audiences. Excerpts of the article--omitting what Belyayev called "fantastic rumors" about internal affairs which would offend the Saudis--were broadcast in Arabic on only one day, 10 July. In contrast, excerpts of the January 1979 article were rebroadcast for three days.*

While Belyayev in his previous article had broached the subject of Soviet-Saudi diplomatic ties indirectly, he remarked in his current piece that "some members of the ruling family" believed it was time to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In this context he cited

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* Belyayev's earlier article is discussed in the 7 February 1979 TRENDS, pages 12-14.

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Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud as saying that if Riyadh offered the Russians "something serious and important," the USSR in exchange would respect Saudi sovereignty and not try to pressure Saudi Arabia. Belyayev explained that the Soviet Union did support Saudi independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty, and had exerted no pressure, and that no disputed issues had arisen between the two countries in 54 years. He brushed aside "the 'Afghan bugaboo'" as a U.S. invention designed to convince the Saudis of the need for an American military presence in the kingdom. And seeking to stress areas of agreement, he pointed out the "definite similarity" between Soviet and Saudi stands on prime Arab-Israeli issues.

Belyayev did not directly discuss religion, as he had done in his 1979 article, when he offered assurance on Soviet advocacy of freedom of religion and remarked that the question of whether Saudi subjects were "acting correctly in adhering to Wahhabi postulates" was an internal Saudi affair, "never raised" in the Soviet Union. In the current article, however, he seemed to place unusual stress on Wahhabism by referring nine times to the "Wahhabite Kingdom." Such terminology is rarely, if ever, used by the Saudis and is equally unusual, if not unique, in Soviet media treatment of Saudi Arabia. The term suggests that Belyayev may have been aiming his article at conservative elements in Saudi Arabia who are concerned about what they see as threats to Islamic values there.

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KOREA

BROADCASTS OUTLINE PLAN FOR SUCCESSION TO KIM IL-SONG

North Korea has recently aired unusually detailed discussions of the process of establishing a successor to Kim Il-song, outlining a plan to give the successor a leading role in the party while Kim is alive and remains the source of ultimate authority. Although presented as abstract theory, reflecting the sensitivity with which the succession issue is addressed publicly, the recent comment may signal that the party congress will take action on the question in October. The more explicit discussions of the succession issue have been confined so far to the clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (VRPR), which traditionally has dealt more openly with the issue than central Pyongyang media. Although VRPR has shed no new light on the successor's identity, it has reinforced the longstanding impression that Kim Il-song's son, Kim Chong-il, is the heir apparent.

Recent VRPR commentaries, including a lengthy roundtable discussion on 8 July, have supplied details on the possible mechanics of North Korean succession not seen in previous treatment of the issue. The discussion on the 8th advocated that the successor "assist" the leader, suggesting that succession should begin before Kim's death and that Kim and his successor may share responsibilities for a time. In defining the division of power between Kim and his successor, VRPR held that the successor must establish "sole management over party work." It appeared to be suggesting that the successor may take over responsibility for the operations of the party while Kim Il-song retains his position as the final authority. The 8 July discussion maintained that the successor's "unitary guidance system" would be consolidated through his management of party work. The issue of consolidating the successor's "unitary guidance system" was raised as far back as January 1978 in a VRPR commentary on the succession issue,* which, like the recent comment, seemed to be attempting to establish legitimacy and authority for the line of Kim's successor.

Movement toward giving Kim's successor greater responsibility for party affairs may explain the trend in DPRK media in recent years toward placing increasing emphasis on the leadership role of the party, a role

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* See the 25 January 1978 TRENDS, pages 23-24.

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once granted almost exclusively to Kim Il-song. The extent of this new emphasis on the institutional role of the party was illustrated in Central Committee slogans issued earlier this month in preparation for the party congress. The slogans seemed to play down Kim's leadership and put more stress on the leading role of the party itself than the last set of slogans, issued in 1975 for the party's 30th anniversary.

Like the 8 July VRPR discussion, commentaries carried by the clandestine radio earlier this year had suggested that the succession process may have reached a new stage. For example, VRPR on 14 April, reporting seminars in South Korea among RPR members on the succession issue, claimed that the question of a successor "has achieved its fruition brilliantly in practice." Although not as specific as the recent VRPR commentaries, central Pyongyang media for the past several years have hinted that a process similar to the one described by the clandestine radio has been in the works for some time. For example, central Pyongyang media have frequently called for establishing the "unitary guidance" of the "party center," a codeword Pyongyang uses to refer to Kim Chong-il, who is not referred to by name in the media. Unlike VRPR, the central media have not discussed the need for "unitary guidance" in connection with succession.

VRPR comment this year strengthens earlier public evidence that Kim Chong-il has been chosen as his father's successor, without actually acknowledging that a successor has been named. VRPR on 2 and 8 July used the term "chidoja" (leader) to refer to Kim Il-song's successor; South Korean newspapers earlier this year reported that at a session of the intra-Korea talks at Panmunjom in April, the North Koreans revealed that the same term was being used in the North to refer to Kim Chong-il. Pyongyang uses another term, "suryong" (supreme leader), to refer to Kim Il-song.

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PYONGYANG WOOS MOSCOW, HINTS OF STRAIN IN TIES WITH BEIJING

Pyongyang's contrasting treatment of the anniversaries of its mutual assistance treaties with its two major allies suggests continued North Korean interest in improving relations with Moscow and the possibility of lingering difficulties in its ties with Beijing. Moscow's treatment of the 6 July anniversary of the Soviet-Korean treaty was typically low key, offering no apparent encouragement to the nearly two-year-old Korean trend of paying increasingly cordial attention to its ties with the USSR. Beijing's observance of the 11 July anniversary of the Sino-Korean treaty, seemed more enthusiastic than last year, but it still lacked the flowing expressions of solidarity seen throughout most of the last decade. As it has for several years, Beijing specifically ignored the joint security aspects of its pact with Pyongyang.

Sustained North Korean interest in Soviet-DPRK ties was reflected in the 6 July NODONG SINMUN anniversary article, which highlighted the meeting between Kim Il-song and Soviet President Brezhnev in Yugoslavia in May, calling it a "historic event of weighty significance." By contrast, the 11 July article on the Sino-Korean anniversary, judging by the available KCNA version, made no reference to Kim's meeting with PRC Premier Hua Guofeng, which also took place in Yugoslavia. Moreover, the article failed to credit the current Chinese leadership with fostering Korean-Chinese friendship, a regular feature in anniversary comment in past years.

For the first time in many years, the Korean turnout at the Soviet ambassador's reception on 7 July was led by a Political Committee member and included a representative from the military. This is in line with the trend, which began in late 1978, toward higher level Korean representation and the reintroduction of DPRK military officials at Soviet-related anniversary events. The DPRK leadership turnout at the Chinese Embassy banquet on 10 July was comparable to that in recent years, but the Korean speaker was of lower ranking than usual--a candidate rather than a full member of the Political Committee.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

CHINESE AND SPANISH PARTIES PREPARE TO RESTORE NORMAL TIES

Recent exchanges between subordinate organs of the CCP and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) suggest that the two parties will soon reestablish ties broken during the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese party has taken similar steps to resume relations with other parties that have different ideological platforms than the CCP but assert their independence from Moscow within the international communist movement.

Beijing's treatment of a visiting delegation of the PCE's youth organization provided the latest manifestation of its movement toward the restoration of full ties with the Spanish party. CCP Communist Youth League (CYL) First Secretary Han Ying, speaking at a banquet for the delegation, revealed that the two youth organizations had already "officially established friendly relations." According to a 4 July XINHUA report, Han added that the CYL was willing to establish such ties with "progressive" youth organizations of various countries so as to "contribute to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism and for world peace." The XINHUA dispatch also noted the statement by Josep Palau Balletbo--identified by the news agency as head of the Spanish Union of Communist Youth and an alternate on the PCE Executive Committee--that "we share common views on many points" and that "we can cooperate effectively despite our different views, which are no obstacle to mutual understanding."

The first indication of a change in the CCP attitude toward the PCE came in August last year, when Chinese media began to refer neutrally to the Spanish party and its secretary general, Santiago Carrillo. In December XINHUA reported Ji Pengfei's receiving PCE journalists in Beijing, but referred to Ji in his position as vice premier rather than as head of the CCP's International Liaison Department. On 30 May this year XINHUA reported that Carrillo and PCE Chairman Dolores Ibarruri had received a delegation of the CCP paper RENMIN RIBAO in Madrid that day. Chinese media have thus far not confirmed a report, appearing in Madrid's EL PAIS on 2 July, that Carrillo will visit the PRC later this year.

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The PCE in recent years has maintained a standing invitation to the CCP to resume ties. Carrillo visited Beijing in 1971 and was received by then CCP International Liaison Department chief Geng Biao, although no restoration of ties between the two parties followed. Beijing may yet retain ties to the PCE's "Marxist-Leninist" rivals; Chinese media in October last year acknowledged receipt of a 30th PRC national day greetings from the Spanish Workers Party.

The rapprochement between the CCP and PCE has been the result primarily of a Chinese decision, following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, to compete more actively for influence with the Soviet Union among world communist and "progressive" parties that the CCP once considered "revisionist." The first major indication of this shift in Beijing's attitude toward the international communist movement was the CCP's resumption of party ties with the Yugoslav Communist League in 1977. The most dramatic recent manifestation of Beijing's revised views on foreign party relations was the CCP's reestablishment of ties with the Italian Communist Party this spring, following a process of lower level party exchanges similar to those now taking place between the CCP and PCE.*

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* The Beijing visit by PCI leader Enrico Berlinger is discussed in the 30 April 1980 TRENDS, pages 13-16.

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BRIEF

AZERBAIJAN: Native Replaces Russian as KGB Chief

In what appears to be a new sign of Moscow's satisfaction with First Secretary Aliyev's administration of affairs in Azerbaijan, the sensitive post of republic KGB chairman has again been assigned to an Azerbaijani after more than 10 years in Russian hands. BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY on 19 June announced that the long-time Russian KGB chairman, V.S. Krasilnikov, was being replaced by an Azerbaijani, Z.M. Yusif-zade. Krasilnikov had been sent to this post in 1969, when exposures of high-level corruption in Azerbaijan began and Aliyev was appointed first secretary to clean up the republic. Although most non-Russian republics have Russian or Ukrainian KGB chiefs, Azerbaijan's neighbors, Georgia and Armenia, have native KGB heads, and the present shift will certainly appeal to Azerbaijani national pride. Azerbaijan leader Aliyev has been highly regarded in Moscow, as was demonstrated in last August's special designation of him as "Hero of Socialist Labor" and Brezhnev's warm praise for him at the September presentation ceremony.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 7-13 JULY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,198 items)			Beijing (911 items)		
Moscow Olympics	8%	(3%)	Japanese Prime Minister Ohira Funeral	10%	(--)
USSR Latvian Anniversary	6%	(--)	Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso in PRC	7%	(2%)
FRG Chancellor Schmidt in USSR	5%	(18%)	U.S. Senator Byrd in PRC	6%	(--)
Mongolian Revolutionary Anniversary	3%	(--)	Indian Recognition of Samrin Regime in Kampuchea	5%	(--)
			Thai National Assembly Delegation in PRC	4%	(--)
			Vietnamese Incursion Into Thailand	4%	(8%)
			Sino-Vietnamese Dispute	4%	(4%)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Warsaw on strikes
- Afghan Government reorganization

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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POLAND

REGIME DEPLORES STRIKES OVER MEAT PRICES; MOSCOW SILENT

The Polish regime has belatedly acknowledged the work stoppages that have spread over the country following the installation on 1 July of a new meat distribution system effectively boosting prices. Apparently abandoning the effort to finesse the crisis by minimizing publicity for the protest movement and by promising wage adjustments and other compensations for workers, the regime has switched to a more direct appeal for public understanding and cooperation. Party First Secretary Gierek spoke on the 17th, the PZPR Politburo issued a statement on the 18th, and TRYBUNA LUDU published an editorial in the 19-20 July weekend issue. Moscow in the meantime has maintained a discreet silence on the events.

CONTRAST WITH EARLIER CRISES The long official silence of the regime on the present strikes contrasts with its prompt acknowledgement of the riots of December 1970 and June 1976, disturbances which were also set off by consumer price increases. In 1970 Warsaw radio reported "serious street incidents" in Gdansk within two days of the outbreak of the violence that eventually brought down Gomulka's regime. In 1976 the reaction was even faster. It was undoubtedly its experience with the volatility of public reaction that prompted the regime this time to try to minimize public attention to the price hike. Although the government had warned the public that price changes were coming, no precise indication had been given of when the new system would be installed. In fact, the system was installed without notice on 1 July and was not mentioned in the press until 3 July, when TRYBUNA LUDU and ZYCIE WARSZAWY commented on it.*

POLISH STATEMENTS The common denominator of the new Polish statements is an appeal to reason. Gierek, in his 17 July speech in Chelm, insisted, in effect, that the government had no other choice but to implement an "unpopular"

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* See the TRENDS of 4 June 1980, pages 7-8, and 9 July 1980, pages 9-10.

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price hike and stressed that the workers would be serving their own best interests and standard of living by going back to their jobs and increasing productivity. Similarly, the Politburo--addressing the workers in Lublin directly--tried to make it clear that the strikers were only hurting themselves by bringing discomfort to the city's entire population as well as adding to the country's economic losses. To demonstrate regime good faith, it announced creation of a commission headed by a Politburo member from the Lublin area, Jagielski, to study the workers' grievances. And the TRYBUNA LUDU editorial combined a defense of the necessity of the price hikes with a frank admission that "bureaucratic errors" had been committed in implementing them.

The statements also included veiled reminders of the obvious possibility of Soviet intervention if the situation should get out of control. Gierek thus urged the strikers to reflect carefully on the country's "true interests" and to maintain civic discipline, adding that "anyone who now acts differently exposes the motherland to great danger" and harms himself and his family. Echoing Gierek, the TRYBUNA LUDU editorial underscored "the duty of all patriots, party members, and nonparty people to profoundly think over the situation and to act in keeping with the best conceived good of the motherland."

MOSCOW TREATMENT Moscow, which so far has maintained silence on the current Polish events, showed similar reticence in 1976 but gave moderate publicity to the events of December 1970, presumably to firm up support for the new Gierek regime which took over at that time.

+ On 16 December 1970 Moscow radio waited only four hours to replay Warsaw radio's initial report on the Gdansk riots, and TASS two days later carried the text of a Polish Council of Ministers decree and a TRYBUNA LUDU editorial on the disturbances. On the 21st, Moscow radio carried Brezhnev's message to new party leader Gierek, expressing confidence that the PZPR under his leadership would be able to "successfully overcome the difficulties which recently occurred in the country's life."

+ In June 1976 Soviet media publicized the Warsaw regime's announcements of the abortive meat price rise and of its abrupt recision after only one day, without giving any indication that the cancellation was the result of public disturbances.

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USSR - AFGHANISTAN

KARMAL REORGANIZES GOVERNMENT TO UNDERMINE PARTY RIVALS

In a move that will undercut his Khalqi rivals in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Afghan leader Babrak Karmal has assailed the government bureaucracy and assumed broader powers over both the central administration and local government bodies. For its part, the Soviet Union has tried to give the impression of a hands-off attitude on an internal Afghan matter. Citing Kabul radio as its source, Moscow thus far has only briefly reported the governmental reorganization, which is aimed, it said, at "improving management" and bettering the life of the people.

BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS

In a 12 July speech to a Kabul state conference on government efficiency, Babrak Karmal paved the way for the subsequent governmental changes with a sweeping attack on the Afghan bureaucracy, calling it undemocratic, "antihuman," and a survival from the past, from the days of his late predecessor, Hafizollah Amin. Asserting that "the people can no longer live peacefully with the existing shortcomings," he presented an impressive catalogue of current problems: nepotism, bribery, red tape, waste, and general incompetence. According to Karmal, these failings of the bureaucracy have caused a "disruption in the rule of law" in Afghanistan. Karmal warned that "the principle of collective leadership does not restrict the individual responsibility of officials" and noted that in Afghanistan, government employees draw their pay only "against" their work. Citing the experience of Soviet leaders in the first years after the October Revolution, Karmal suggested that decisive action was needed. He called for party supervision of all appointments and promotions and for greater party attention to the execution of government decisions.

NEW POWERS FOR PRIME MINISTER

The reorganization followed on the heels of Karmal's speech. It was contained in a decision taken by the PDPA Central Committee at its weekly meeting on 15 July and ratified by the Afghan Council of Ministers at its regular meeting on the 20th. The decision, announced that day by Kabul radio, gives broad, new authority over both the central administration and local government to the office of Prime Minister Karmal. Karmal in effect arrogated for the Parchamite wing of the PDPA and to himself all authority over personnel matters in the state bureaucracy, thereby denying it to his rivals still in

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the government. Much of the institutional basis for this power was taken directly from the Interior Ministry, headed by Karmal's Khalqi rival, Seyyed Mohammed Gulabzoi. Western media have reported unconfirmed rumors that Gulabzoi was arrested just before this announcement.

The new institutions in the prime minister's office include:

+ General Directorate for Guidance of Local Administrative Organs. Taken directly from the Interior Ministry, this powerful body is responsible for central supervision of all local government in the country.

+ General Directorate of Policies and Investigation. This directorate replaces the General Directorate of Administrative Reform, which had been in the prime minister's office. It has assumed the additional responsibility of checking on the fulfillment of all government decisions.

+ Directorate of Work and Social Provisions. This directorate replaces the prime minister's Directorate of Manpower and absorbs the Directorate of Labor from the Ministry of Mines and Industry, giving the prime minister effective control over all wages and salaries in the public sector.

These changes mean that the Interior Ministry has been isolated from any direct contact with local officials, a major blow to the Khalq faction, which has drawn much of its support from such people. Karmal's move puts him in a position to control or replace local officials directly, without having to work through a hostile ministry.

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MOSCOW TRACES HISTORY OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN AFGHANISTAN

Moscow has acknowledged the existence of a Muslim brotherhood indigenous to Afghanistan. Hitherto Soviet commentary had suggested that analogous Muslim groups involved in the Afghan fighting were introduced from abroad. An article in SOVIET RUSSIA links the "United Group of Muslim Brothers" in Afghanistan with the highly political Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East. But in discussing the history of the Afghan group, the article provides details suggesting that it may be a relatively autonomous religious order, one of a group of organizations known in the Islamic world as the Sufi brotherhoods.

The 11 July SOVIET RUSSIA article, by Ye. Artyukhov and A. Ostalskiy, first traced the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, noting that the group was established in 1929 under the slogan "a return to the 'true Muslim faith'" and with the avowed aim of ending British colonial domination of Egypt. According to the authors, the organization soon showed its true reactionary colors; its leader would "stoop to anything in his desire to grab a piece of the cake of power," and he "cooperated actively with Egypt's corrupt monarchy, with the British colonial authorities, and, during World War II, with fascist Germany's intelligence service." The organization moved its headquarters to Saudi Arabia after having been banned by former Egyptian President Abd an-Nasir in 1954 but returned to Anwar as-Sadat's Egypt in the early 1970's, the authors said. There it has become "a kind of 'black hundred'" to be used against opponents of the Camp David accords. Syria has been a major target, Artyukhov and Ostalskiy claimed. SOVIET RUSSIA charged that these "religious extremists" operate primarily against national liberation forces in the Middle East.

Turning to the Afghan situation, Artyukhov and Ostalskiy suggested that the Muslim brotherhood "has a history" inside that country. Previous Soviet treatment of the role of the Muslim brotherhood in Afghanistan--as in major PRAVDA articles in March 1979 by I. Aleksandrov and A. Petrov--had presented the organization as some sort of external force. But SOVIET RUSSIA has now asserted that the United Group of Muslim Brothers was established in Afghanistan "at the end of the sixties." The authors described its members as "inveterate Afghan reactionaries" who conceal their pro-American sentiments behind a "mask" of religious fanaticism. They further claimed that this group has close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia.

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According to the authors, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and China have "gambled" on this Muslim brotherhood as an organizing center for those groups opposed to the Karmal government. These countries hope that the brotherhood's "Islamic cover" will be a "trump card" in this political game; but Artryukhov and Ostalskiy argue that while some "barely literate but deeply religious" Afghans may be won over, the majority of the population will see through the Muslim brotherhood and reject its appeals. They conclude that "the time of the 'brotherhood' is past."

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U S S R

GAPUROV PROMOTES NATIONALITY POLICY, HITS FOREIGN BROADCASTS

Islamic beliefs and practices and local nationalist sentiments are still far too common in Soviet Turkmenistan, according to republic First Secretary Gapurov. In a lengthy, defensive speech last month, Gapurov outlined new programs to promote Russian-Turkmen biligualism and to eliminate "survivals of the past"--popular traditions identified by Soviet authorities as backward or regressive. Gapurov blamed the tenacious prevalence of Islamic traditions, at least in part, on the influence of broadcasts from Iran and other countries. Coming almost exactly a year after a 5 June 1979 CPSU decree had sharply criticized the Turkmen leadership for failures in ideological education and economic performance, the speech testified both to the republic leadership's continuing efforts to ameliorate nationality problems and to its limited success.

Speaking on 1 June to a "scientific-practical" conference in the republic capital of Ashkabad, Gapurov tried to accent the positive in his discussion of nationality-related problems. It was apparent from his remarks, however, that the issues of religion, culture, and local nationalism remain vexing for the Turkmen leadership. Gapurov complained that national and religious customs continued to "sustain and nourish" each other and acknowledged that there were still many believers in the republic. He even hinted that these attachments had subversive implications, saying that religious beliefs were "disuniting peoples and setting them against each other." In an apparent expression of the leadership's frustration, Gapurov described these "national prejudices" as "exceedingly tenacious" and reiterated familiar Soviet dictums condemning religious customs and beliefs.

Gapurov attributed the persistence of traditional customs in his republic, at least in part, to the encouragement they have been receiving from foreign propaganda. These efforts to "sow hostility" among the local population, Gapurov reported, have come from radio

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Gorgan and Mashhad television in Iran,* Radio Liberty, Radio Beijing, as well as from several emigre groups printing propaganda in the West and in Turkey. Although the exact content of the broadcasts was not specified, Gapurov criticized foreign propaganda for spreading pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideas, promoting Islam, and "sowing enmity among the peoples of the USSR living and working in Soviet Turkmenistan in a single fraternal family."

Gapurov indicated that the Turkmen leadership was dealing with these problems both by promoting educational campaigns and by setting up new academic-administrative bodies to look for new solutions. On the educational front, he noted that the Turkmen Central Committee had recently sponsored a conference designed to encourage efforts to replace outmoded and harmful customs with socialist traditions and rituals. On the administrative front, he reported that a special section on the "criticism of foreign ideological trends" was being set up in the local Academy of Sciences. He also revealed that another section was being added to the Academy to promote bilingualism, a category in which Turkmenistan ranks at the bottom among Soviet republics according to the 1979 census. He observed--seemingly with a note of asperity--that the leadership "expected more effective help" in dealing with nationality problems from scientific bodies, including the newly created section on foreign ideological trends.

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* Both Gorgan and Mashhad are located in northern Iran not far from the Soviet border with Turkmenistan, where there is a large Iranian-Turkmen population. A 1979 Soviet book by N. Bayramsakhatov reports that residents of the area have long listened to religious programs broadcast from Iran and that tape recordings of these programs have been played by Soviet mullahs in other areas of the republic. A 13 June English-language broadcast by Radio Tehran alluded to Gapurov's complaints against the broadcasts from Iran.

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CHINA

ASSESSMENT OF "FEUDAL" LEGACY ADVANCES DENG'S PARTY REFORMS

Competition between the political programs of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Hua Guofeng and party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping may lie behind recent authoritative Beijing press discussion of the political impact of China's "feudal legacy." The discussion serves to reinforce Deng's continuing challenge to the left by laying the foundation for party reform measures and a reinterpretation of sensitive historical questions. At the same time, by focusing on the current dangers of feudal ideology, it rejects Hua's emphasis on the problems of rightism in a speech this spring warning against bourgeois ideology.

The current debate in the Beijing press on the problem of feudal ideology began suddenly in late June and has developed rapidly since. Among the most prominent issues raised have been the following:

+ Party leadership. A 22 June RENMIN RIBAO Contributing Commentator article blamed the "deeprooted and widespread influence of feudal ideas" for nepotism in the CCP. On 24 June a Commentator article in the party paper related the problem of continuing factionalism in the CCP to the lingering impact of China's "feudal" heritage.

+ Party work style. On 24 June XINHUA reported a forum of State Council offices, sponsored by the CCP Discipline Inspection Commission and attended by party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, which concluded that "many of the unhealthy tendencies" prevailing in the State Council's work "have something to do with feudal ideology." On 6 July GUANGMING RIBAO publicized a nationwide symposium of party schools in June that called on the schools to conduct education in "eliminating feudal ideology" and criticized the party's failure to do so in the past.

+ Assessment of Mao and party's past. A 4 July RENMIN RIBAO Contributing Commentator article traced the "feudal" historical and social roots of China's tendency to exaggerate the roles of individuals in history and advocated specific reforms to prevent its recurrence. On 11 July a RENMIN RIBAO signed article observed that Lin Biao and the "gang of four" "were not monsters coming

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from other planets but venomous germs bred in our land" and that 'bnly by finding out their social and historical background will we be able to correctly sum up the lesson of history that we have dearly paid for." After detailing the political and economic features of China's feudal past, the article declared flatly that "wrong leadership after liberation" was responsible for carrying "the burden of feudalism up to today."

+ Link to modernization drive. An 18 July RENMIN RIBAO Contributing Commentator article underscored the threat of persistent "feudalistic thinking" to China's modernization. In pointing out the need to assess the impact of such thought in Chinese social life and "particularly in intraparty life," the article called the effort to eliminate feudal ideology "a struggle of strategic significance."

AIMS OF CAMPAIGN

The new campaign against feudal ideology appears to have three complementary goals. It reviews efforts to lay an ideological and historical foundation for the permanent political reforms long pressed by Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and his allies and it provides an ideological basis for disciplining officials not only of leftist but of any political persuasion who abuse their powers. In reiterating the rectification themes of the fifth plenum, the campaign also revitalizes the slowly unfolding party rectification effort endorsed by the plenum last February.

The manifestations of feudalistic thinking detailed in the current round of press commentary--lifetime tenure and special privileges for officials, a patriarchal style of leadership, and the institution of personality cults--are all problems on which the party's reform wing, led by Deng Xiaoping, has focused consistently. The problem of assessing the impact of feudalism on Chinese politics was raised last year in media comment clearly associated with Deng and his effort to press party rectification and reform. During a meeting of the party's Organization Department convened in September last year to consider reforms in the party's personnel system, for example, the historical journal LISHI YANJUI discussed the problem of feudalism at length. In November last year the theme was developed further at an academic seminar sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and reported by GUANGMING RIBAO. (Both the Academy and the paper have introduced and supported political campaigns associated with Deng in the past.)

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In pressing the discussion of feudalism, commentary has also rigorously reasserted the need to proceed with the party rectification as set down by the fifth plenum. The 24 June XINHUA report on the discipline forum in the State Council linked implementation of the "Guiding Principles for Inner Party Political Life" -- the standards for political behavior that the fifth plenum approved and on which rectification was to be based -- with elimination of the influence of Lin and the gang of four and eradication of feudal ideology.

HUA GUOFENG AND BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY The reintroduction of the antifeudal theme in the media in the context of an effort to reassert the goals and tactics of the party rectification drive set down at the fifth plenum appears to rebut Hua Guofeng's recent statement on the need to "eliminate bourgeois ideology." Hua's statements, made at a PLA conference on political work last April and published in early May, reflected his continuing reservations over views held by Deng and his supporters on the issues of what constitutes the principal threat to China's "socialist" modernization and how to deal with it. Hua expressed concern that overemphasis on material incentives and economic measures--to the exclusion of ideological and political work--threatened to lead China's modernization on a wrong course.* In his published remarks Hua did not mention the fifth plenum or the "Guiding Principles." Instead he urged the army to conduct ideological education to improve discipline and to begin a "struggle" to "foster proletarian ideology and eliminate bourgeois ideology," a slogan introduced in the 1950's and effectively used in the Cultural Revolution by the radical left.

Hua's call for a movement to eliminate bourgeois ideology has been endorsed by several provincial and regional military leaders, but it has gotten only sporadic civilian support. He appears, however, to have the significant backing of CCP Secretary Wang Renzhong, who, in a speech to a Communist Youth League assembly in Beijing on 4 May, endorsed the slogan, at least as it applies to the young, who have been most vulnerable to "bourgeois" enticements. In addition, the party ideological journal HONGQI, since Wang assumed propaganda responsibilities in March and presumably took control of the journal, has regularly published articles sharply critical of manifestations in society of bourgeois tendencies toward individualism and the singleminded

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* Hua's speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 May 1980, pages 14-17.

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pursuit of profit. The journal, for example, published a lengthy defense of the antibourgeois slogan in its 16 April edition. On 1 July it published an article that cited a deceased model communist's warning against the influence of "individualist ideas of 'material benefit' and 'satisfaction'" and, in marked contrast to RENMIN RIBAO's 18 July emphasis on the dangers of the effects of feudalism, said that the warning "hits right at the ills of the times."

The 1 July RENMIN RIBAO editorial marking the party's founding anniversary appeared to reflect the leadership divisions over the issues of bourgeois and feudal ideology. Typically a document reflecting the leadership consensus on important political issues, the editorial acknowledged the problem of bourgeois ideology but suggested that the problem of feudal ideology is more significant. After listing the political practices that other antifeudal comment had unequivocally attributed to feudalism in China, for example, the editorial observed that "these things [exist] in a capitalist society, but when they appear in our society, they have more of a feudal coloring." In prescribing the means to overcome such "nonproletarian ideas," moreover, the editorial noted that "of course the solution to this question calls for doing ideological and political work." "What is more important, however, is effectively doing a good job in rectifying the party's work style," the editorial added.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 14-20 JULY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,045 items)			Beijing (644 items)		
Moscow Olympics	38%	(8%)	Moscow Olympics	5%	(--)
Afghan Situation	4%	(2%)	Australian Senate President Lauche in PRC	5%	(--)
UN World Conference on Women's Decade	4%	(--)			
Brezhnev Greetings	2%	(--)	Election of Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki	5%	(--)
Soviet-Vietnamese Economic Cooperation 25th Anniversary	3%	(--)			
			UN World Conference on Women's Decade	4%	(--)
			Korean Reunification	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Hints of Chinese leadership changes
- DPRK interest in contacts with U.S.
- Nicaragua as a revolutionary model

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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CHINA

BEIJING PROVIDES HINTS OF UPCOMING STATE LEADERSHIP CHANGES

Beijing has not reported in its own media revelations to foreign visitors by Chinese officials that a National People's Congress (NPC) session next month will ratify major personnel changes in China's government structure, including the replacement of Premier Hua Guofeng. Chinese media have nevertheless provided some oblique indication of the changes being contemplated.

That the upcoming NPC session will undertake extensive leadership changes in the PRC state apparatus has seemed likely since the party's fifth plenum last February. The plenum's restoration of the Central Committee Secretariat to oversee and ensure implementation of party policy in the government structure suggested that corresponding steps would be taken to streamline the central state apparatus itself. Since the plenum, moreover, the Beijing press has carried a steady stream of commentary on the need for the introduction of younger leaders into high, responsible positions both to alleviate administrative burdens on the regime's aging leadership and to give the newcomers experience for their eventual succession to top positions.

While thus preparing the ground for changes in the state structure, Beijing has been guarded in revealing exactly what changes will be made. Beijing's taciturn tack on the specifics of the contemplated shifts was illustrated in XINHUA's account of Vice Premier Li Xiannian's 25 July interview with New York TIMES correspondent Harrison Salisbury. According to Salisbury's account, Li detailed the upcoming changes he said would take place at the NPC in August, including the resignation of Premier Hua Guofeng in favor of Vice Premier Zhao Ziyang and the retirement of aging Vice Premiers Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Xu Xiangqian, Wang Zhen, and Li himself from their state posts. The XINHUA report on the 25th did not mention the NPC date or any of the leaders specifically named by Li. It did repeat the vice premier's generalization that "keeping the ranks of our leading cadres young"--translated evocatively as "age pruning among our leading cadres" in the English-language version of the report--is a "strategic task facing us now."

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HUA GUOFENG Hua Guofeng's replacement as premier by Zhao Ziyang has seemed possible on at least two grounds. First, as a matter of institutional principle, Beijing's evident promotion of the separation of the highest party and state responsibilities in the series of provincial administrative reorganizations in the past year has suggested that the same division of responsibilities might be extended to the central party and state organizations themselves.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Hua has appeared once again to come into conflict with the increasingly Dengist orientation of the regime's modernization policies since the fifth plenum. Consistently concerned that many of the drastic party reforms and modernization policies undertaken under Deng's initiative may damage China's socialist orientation, Hua, in a late April speech to a PLA conference on political work, appeared to put himself directly at odds with his nominal subordinate Zhao Ziyang, who has actively promoted Deng's policies and views.* In an unusual instance of attention to the inner workings of the Chinese leadership, XINHUA in mid-April cited a statement by Deng Xiaoping to a foreign guest that Zhao Ziyang had already assumed responsibility for managing the day-to-day affairs of the State Council, the PRC's cabinet body normally directed by the premier.

Perhaps in an effort calculated to underscore his determination to continue in a leadership role even after the NPC and to dampen speculation that he will resign with a tarnished reputation, Hua has maintained a high public profile. Thus, since the fifth plenum, the normally prominent media treatment accorded to Hua's official foreign visits has been supplemented by reports highlighting his domestic responsibilities--notably in publicity to his inspection tours of at least two major PRC cities and two provinces. In the most recent of these, XINHUA on 5 July reported Hua, identified only as chairman of the party and its Military Commission, touring Liaoning; RENMIN RIBAO carried the XINHUA report prominently on its front page on the next day.

The impending personnel changes may not meet with the approval of all of China's top leaders, most notably NPC Chairman Ye Jianying, who probably has been Hua's strongest advocate since the purge in 1976 of the "gang of four." Ye may also be resisting efforts to retire the party's elders, including himself. At 82 and reportedly in poor health, Ye has not been included among those named to foreign visitors privately as likely to retire during the NPC. Instead, Ye,

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* Hua's speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 May 1980, pages 14-17.

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in a public show of vigor, has been on tour of several provinces since April. Conceivably in an effort to delay the NPC and forestall for a time decisions with which he does not agree, moreover, Ye, in a circular released by XINHUA on 22 July, has ordered NPC Standing Committee members to inspect conditions outside the capital. Although the circular issued no guidance on how long inspections should last, there seems little time left for wide-ranging surveys such as Ye's if the NPC is to open in August.

OTHER CHANGES Recent press criticism of past policies and faulty implementation of current policies suggests that officials other than those already named in foreign press reports may also be relieved or transferred. China's economic establishment will probably be most affected. In addition to the retirements of Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, minister and vice minister of the Financial and Economic Commission, the NPC may also ratify the dismissal or transfer of State Economic Commission Minister Kang Shien and State Planning Commission Minister Yu Qiuli.

Both Kang and Yu--who are concurrently vice premiers--are vulnerable to criticism for the failure of China's economic readjustment policies to take hold in 1979.* Kang, moreover, as minister of petroleum industries from 1975 to 1978, may also be called to account for the ministry's abysmal safety record, exposed and criticized in XINHUA reports this month on a 1979 offshore oil rig accident, in which 72 men died. XINHUA's 21 July account of the accident accused responsible officials of covering up the event and blamed the ministry for over 1,000 accidents costing 105 lives and 114 serious injuries between 1975 and 1979.

The NPC may also attend to the removal of vice premier Chen Yonggui. Although virtually powerless since the Dazhai agricultural model he founded and represented was discredited in 1978, Chen has retained his Politburo and government posts. Renewed and especially sharp and detailed press criticism in June and July of the impractical projects and falsification of records spawned in the name of learning from Dazhai and of absurd application of the model's experiences suggest, however, that Chen's departure may be imminent.

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* The problems in implementing economic policies were treated in a series of RENMIN RIBAO editorials in the spring of 1980 and are discussed in the TRENDS of 25 June, pages 18-21.

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TIANJIN CONGRESS REFLECTS CONFLICTING CENTRAL, LOCAL CONCERNS

A classic example of a conflict between central and local authorities may have caused the long delay in the mandated reorganization of the government of the city of Tianjin, one of three Chinese cities with provincial-level status. Tianjin lagged two months or more behind all other provincial-level units when it convened its Municipal People's Congress in June and completed the transfer of government power from the revolutionary committee installed during the Cultural Revolution to a government structure that last existed in the early 1960's. The delay in this transformation, coming a year after it had been ordered by national authorities, seems related to intractable problems Tianjin has had in meeting goals to overcome the damage caused by the 1976 earthquake, which devastated the city.

The reestablishment of the Tianjin Municipal People's Government at the 23-30 June Ninth Tianjin People's Congress completed the process of restoring pre-Cultural-Revolution people's governments throughout China to replace the provincial-level revolutionary committees introduced during the Cultural Revolution. This process of administrative reorganization had been mandated by a session of the Fifth National People's Congress in June 1979 and begun in August. By early April of this year, all of China's provincial-level units except Tianjin had completed restoration of the old provincial government bodies.

The political process leading up to the Tianjin congress differed from that in other localities but did not seem to be a sufficient cause for the delay in the formation of the new government. Tianjin held people's congresses at lower organizational levels before holding the municipality-wide congress, and Tianjin media played up the uniqueness of this approach, although it was not touted as an example in national media. A TIANJIN RIBAO editorial on 23 June, for example, claimed that Tianjin was the only province-level unit in China to complete district and county-level elections before convening the provincial congress. Even so, the lower level elections were completed in early April, according to a 10 April Tianjin radio broadcast, presumably leaving sufficient time for the people's congress to have been scheduled much earlier.

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RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS

A more likely reason for the delay in convening the Tianjin congress may be the apparent protracted haggling between the local Tianjin leadership and Beijing over central aid to earthquake reconstruction in the city. The three-year program of reconstruction announced at the congress by Tianjin CCP First Secretary Chen Weida seemed to reflect a compromise between Beijing and Tianjin authorities on central assistance reached only shortly before the congress convened. In addition, the selection of Hu Qili as Tianjin's mayor, an official with no known previous experience in the city, deviated from the pattern followed in other provincial reorganizations, suggesting that Beijing felt it needed new municipal leadership more responsive to central interests.

In his work report to the congress, Chen Weida reported that "Chairman Hua, the CCP Central Committee Secretariat, and the State Council" had approved a report by the Tianjin Government on progress in rebuilding housing and public works installations in the city and had "decided on the main points and scale of postquake reconstruction work" for a three-year period beginning in 1981. Acknowledging that the city had "failed to fulfill much of the municipal reconstruction work," Chen added that the report to central authorities had followed "a special trip" by CCP Central Committee Secretary Gu Mu to Tianjin "to help us study and resolve" the reconstruction problem. A Tianjin radio broadcast on 24 July revealed that approval of the report by central organs had come only in May this year, and in addition to deciding "the main points and scale" of such reconstruction work, Beijing had "granted staunch support with regard to funds and building materials."

Beijing's grant of funds and building materials was a major reversal in the central government's attitude toward reconstruction work in Tianjin over the past two years. The central press had repeatedly bemoaned persistent shortages of building materials in the national economy overall, and the central authorities have strongly demanded sharp cutbacks in capital construction projects in a fiscally constrained period of readjustment in the national economy. Therefore, central assistance to reconstruction work over the past two years has likely been limited, and central guidance has probably stressed the primary role of local initiative and resources in Tianjin itself.

Central expectations for the restoration of Tianjin as a major industrial center and port have nevertheless been high, and what central assistance there may have been has probably gone toward reconstruction of Tianjin's industrial production facilities rather than of its housing and public services. A 25 June TIANJIN RIBAO editorial on earthquake reconstruction work,

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appearing while the congress was in session, acknowledged as much when it recalled that "over the past two years" the city had carried out reconstruction "within our means in terms of financial and material power." Nevertheless, the editorial noted, "a relatively wide gap" had developed in the "bones and flesh" of the city's construction work--between reconstruction of the basic production infrastructure and construction of supporting areas such as housing and public works.

Caught between high central expectations and constrained financial and material resources, the Tianjin leadership undoubtedly faced severe problems financially, administratively, and politically and dragged its heels in reconstruction work. With regard to financial difficulties, the 25 June TIANJIN RIBAO editorial observed that the "special funds" granted Tianjin by Beijing would enable the city to "pay back the debts" incurred in reconstruction work since the 1976 earthquake. In calling on the Tianjin party organization to heed people's congress' call to "combine the Central Committee's line, principles, and policies with the realities of Tianjin," a 1 July TIANJIN RIBAO editorial on the close of the congress urged cadres "to eliminate resolutely such bureaucratic things as procrastination and petty disputes," phenomena which probably plagued reconstruction work in the past.

Recovery from the damage of the 1976 earthquake has previously been linked to political developments in Tianjin. Accelerated reconstruction efforts were a major part of the Tianjin leadership's mandate when it was installed by central intervention in 1978. Central instructions on resolving Tianjin's housing shortage and public services problems in April 1978 and replacing the Tianjin party leadership in June of that year preceded a purge of the Tianjin party organization through that summer. A RENMIN RIBAO article in October 1978 detailing the rectification of the Tianjin party organization noted that the revitalized party had begun to pay special attention to meeting the city's persistent water and housing shortages, and in November XINHUA announced that 90 percent of Tianjin's housing damaged in the 1976 earthquake was expected to be restored.

Efforts may have fallen short in this regard, however, as the Tianjin leadership avoided addressing the issue publicly thereafter. Chen Weida, for example, did not even mention the problem at a November 1979 work conference on economic tasks in the city or at a December 1979 Revolutionary Committee plenum on the city's tasks for 1980. The seriousness of the problem the Tianjin leadership faced was nevertheless underscored in the 25 June TIANJIN RIBAO editorial, which observed that 42 percent of all families in four Tianjin districts lack permanent housing and that there are still "serious

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insufficiencies" in hospitals, schools, and shops as well as problems in water supply, sewage, and traffic congestion. With the consequent difficulties in maintaining public order, the paper added, such difficulties "have now become a political problem in our municipality."

While Chen Weida may have thus gained a major concession from Beijing in winning financial and material support for earthquake reconstruction work, the election of Hu Qili as Tianjin mayor may represent a step by Beijing authorities to ensure the proper implementation of the terms of its aid agreement with Tianjin and convey a measure of doubt that Chen effectively represents their concerns against local interests. An outsider to Tianjin politics, Hu appears to have been rehabilitated as a Cultural Revolution victim into central-level organs under the aegis of party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and General Secretary Hu Yaobang and may thus be a leader whose loyalty to the central party leadership can be counted on.

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KOREA

DPRK EASES ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC FOLLOWING CONGRESSMAN'S VISIT

Pyongyang noticeably softened its anti-U.S. invective in comment on the 27 July anniversary of the Korean war armistice--a gesture of moderation that may have been intended to reinforce the recent efforts, made during the 15-18 July visit to the DPRK by U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz, to foster contacts with the United States. Pyongyang similarly eased its anti-U.S. rhetoric in early 1977, following President Carter's inauguration, and in early 1979, preceding the President's visit to Seoul. Both times the North apparently hoped to induce favorable developments in Washington's policies toward Korea.

The 27 July NODONG SINMUN editorial on the Korean war armistice anniversary moderated the anti-U.S. rhetoric standard on the occasion, eschewing, in the current context, references to U.S. "imperialism" or to the "imperialist aggressors." This shift in tone contrasted not only with past anniversary comment but also with Pyongyang's harsh attacks on the United States since mid-May, when martial law was expanded in South Korea. The softened rhetoric was not matched, however, by any noticeable alteration in the basic DPRK criticism of U.S. policy. The editorial routinely condemned the United States for turning South Korea to a military base and increasing the danger of war on the peninsula, and it reiterated the standard call for U.S. withdrawal and for Korea-U.S. talks on converting the armistice to a peace agreement.

SOLARZ VISIT Pyongyang's invitation to Congressman Solarz, which dates back to last year, was part of a longtime North Korean effort to establish contacts with the United States. The visit--the first by a U.S. official since the Korean war--was given more limited, restrained attention by Pyongyang media than is usual for foreign visits. The congressman's activities, including a banquet in his honor on the 15th and meetings with President Kim Il-song and KWP International Affairs Department head Kim Yong-nam, were briefly reported; but no details of the banquet were supplied, and the standard

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description of the atmosphere of the session with Kim Il-Song--usually "cordial and friendly"--was omitted. Pyongyang's report on the last publicized meeting between Kim and an American--Washington POST correspondent Selig Harrison, in June 1972--similarly omitted any characterization. The North did not report details of the Kim-Solarz conversation, which is not unusual. Of Kim's numerous meetings with foreign visitors each year, very few are reported at length.

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USSR-CUBA-NICARAGUA

Moscow and Havana, observing the first anniversary of the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, have held up the Sandinist victory as an appropriate revolutionary model for other countries in the area. Cuban President Fidel Castro, in his low-key speech in Managua, commended the Sandinist example of unified revolutionary struggle. Analyses of the Nicaraguan experience in Soviet theoretical literature have argued that such political-military fronts are often more effective in Latin conditions than the local communist parties in assuming the role of the revolutionary vanguard.

CASTRO LAUDS NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM, NOTES U.S. AID

On his first visit to Nicaragua, Castro seemed at pains to discredit the view that Cuba is promoting revolution throughout the region and to foster the idea that revolutionary turmoil in Central America in fact has its own dynamics. Pointedly abstaining from inflammatory rhetoric in his 19 July speech in Managua, he declared that he would "neither engage in polemics nor deliver an ardent harangue" out of consideration for the political and ideological diversity of the countries represented at the anniversary festivities.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF U.S. AID

Complaining that pledges of assistance by some countries following the overthrow of the Somoza government had not been honored, Castro did offer qualified praise of U.S. economic aid. But he went on to express "sincere regret" that the amount of Washington's assistance was "too little" in proportion to U.S. wealth. He said the United States was planning to spend "one trillion dollars" in the next five years on military hardware, and money earmarked for the arms race would be better spent helping underdeveloped countries like Nicaragua.

Castro also offered his first public comment on the U.S. presidential election campaign, criticizing the Republican Party's "terrible" election platform for "threatening to use the big stick in Latin America again." He returned to the subject in his 26 July speech in Havana, on the anniversary of the Moncada Barracks attack, in which he assailed Republican positions on Latin American issues and warned that there would be "war" between the United States and Latin America if the party's platform were to be fulfilled. Castro disclaimed any intention to interfere in the U.S. electoral process--"we do not care" who is president, he said. But he refused to remain silent on

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what he called a matter of "international concern" simply because "some North Americans" believed that Cuban criticism of the Republican program might "give it more merit" in the eyes of the public.

NICARAGUAN EXAMPLE Castro, in his Managua speech, paid tribute to the wisdom of the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) in leading a unified revolutionary struggle against the Somoza regime and in including all social sectors in the country's reconstruction process and allowing political pluralism. He particularly approved the FSLN's decision to encourage broad participation at the present stage of the revolution, calling it the wisest course of action "under the circumstances." Havana and Moscow have long advocated this approach as a prime tenet of revolutionary strategy for Latin America in the belief that it lends legitimacy to the revolution and safeguards it against counterrevolution as well as outside interference. Castro was careful to point out that he was not meddling in Nicaragua's internal affairs when he stressed that he had not come "to teach or influence, or to give uncalled-for advice." But he did caution Nicaraguans against expecting quick and easy solutions to their problems. He noted Nicaragua's "impressive" achievements in such areas as literacy, health, and welfare--sectors in which Cuba has been offering assistance--but he pointed to "the long road ahead" and said that "whoever tells you that you will see material benefits tomorrow is lying; he is a demagogue."

MOSCOW SEES NICARAGUA AS "CORRECT" LATIN REVOLUTIONARY MODEL

Discussing Nicaragua in the context of what it views as a developing revolutionary situation in Central America, Moscow has depicted the FSLN's method of achieving power as worthy of general emulation throughout the region. As for Nicaragua itself, Brezhnev's anniversary message on the 19th, which expressed readiness to develop "multisided friendly relations," approvingly noted that the Sandinist-led government had implemented a "number of important socioeconomic transformations" in the past year. But PRAVDA on the same day cautioned that it was "still too early to lay down arms," and maintained that the defense of the revolution against internal and external enemies remained an important task.

COMMUNISTS OR FRONTS IN ROLE OF VANGUARD The Nicaraguan anniversary has prompted assessments, such as that by TASS political analyst Nikolay Chigir on 18 July, that the Sandinist victory "convincingly" demonstrated the "correctness" of the Latin American revolutionary strategy

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adopted at the conference of Latin communist parties in Havana in June 1975.* However, the central assumption of that conference, that the "vanguard" role in the Latin revolutionary struggle would be played by orthodox communist parties, has recently been questioned by Soviet theoreticians. The major document of the 1975 Havana conference also called for contributions by other forces in stating that the participation of the "broadest social sector" was essential. Soviet academicians, citing the Nicaraguan experience, have suggested that the most profitable revolutionary course in Latin America is not through traditional communist parties--particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala, where they are overshadowed by more influential leftist parties--but through political-military fronts like the FSLN.

This message was stressed in the March 1980 issue of AMERICA LATINA, journal of the Institute for Latin America of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which carried several articles under the broad rubric "Nicaragua: Experience of a Victorious Revolution." On the question of the "revolutionary vanguard," Institute director S.A. Mikoyan wrote:

> The political-military front of the 26 July Movement type in Cuba and the Sandinist National Liberation Front type in Nicaragua has shown (and it can be said today that it has been proved) that in certain conditions it can replace the political parties of the proletariat as the revolutionary vanguard. . . . The political activity of these fronts, supported by the closest ties with the masses and directed against the military organizational power, proved so efficient that even though they were at first purely military organizations, they in fact gradually took upon themselves the functions of political parties.**

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* The June 1975 Havana conference was the first such gathering since 1964. The most recent conference--an international theoretical conference on class struggle in Latin America--was held in Havana in March 1980 under the auspices of the Cuban Communist Party and the Prague-based theoretical journal PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM. The conference proceedings are to be presented in future issues of the journal, according to an announcement in the June issue.

** Castro, in his 19 July speech in Managua, appeared to place his imprimatur on this concept when he referred to the FSLN as Nicaragua's revolutionary vanguard--a role, he said, the Sandinists have assumed "not arbitrarily," but "because they knew how to gain the place of vanguard in the struggle for their people."

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Mikoyan appeared to question the position set forth in the 1975 Havana conference declaration. That document apparently did not take into consideration the possibility that political-military groupings--whose prospects for acceding to power might be greater than those of a given communist party--might appropriately serve as the revolutionary vanguard. Pointing again to the Nicaraguan and Cuban examples, Mikoyan argued that "in both cases, none of the political parties, including the communist parties, could even come close to the 26 July movement in Cuba and the FSLN in Nicaragua in terms of their potential as a vanguard."

While Mikoyan conceded that the quality of the leadership of the 26 July Movement and the FSLN had played a role in the success of these movements in becoming the vanguard, he suggested that this factor was not of overriding importance:

> It is clear that this problem is not limited to the subjective personal characteristics of one political leader or another. The problem lies in the objective conditions that are established in the nations of the continent. Consequently, it is possible to talk of a new type of revolutionary vanguard, about its objective emergence in a number of Latin American nations these days.

Mikoyan made it clear, however, that this view of the role of the revolutionary vanguard does not necessarily signal a shift in Moscow's aspirations for traditional communist parties once leftist power has been established. It must not be forgotten, he said, that "the title of 'vanguard' is not given in perpetuity, that it must be constantly revalidated in the process of class struggle; the title can be lost, but it can also be gained."

Another of the AMERICA LATINA articles, by Kiva Maydanik, criticized what was portrayed as a tendency by some Latin communist parties to eschew cooperation with other leftist forces. While Maydanik upheld the necessity to distinguish between "genuine" revolutionaries and Troyskyites and Maoists, he cautioned against pinning sectarian labels like "adventurists" and "extremists" on leftist groups calling for decisive, forceful change and against claiming to "possess a monopoly on the truth." Such a posture, he said, would "objectively" work against the communists as well. Maydanik cited the example of a "sector" of the Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN)--Nicaragua's pro-Soviet communist party--whose lack of unity with the FSLN in the last years of the struggle was colored, "consciously or unconsciously," by their doubt about the need for cooperation by "authentic Marxists" with the Sandinists and "ultraleftists." This position, Maydanik

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argued, was due in large part to the PSN's "incorrect" treatment of the question relative to the "hierarchy of unity." By contrast, Maydanik commended the position of the Salvadoran Communist Party on this issue, saying the Salvadoran communists had always maintained and "underscored very clearly" that "leftists" are revolutionaries and that unity with them is necessary.

LEFTIST UNIFICATION IN EL SALVADOR

Since the Sandinist victory in Nicaragua, Moscow has viewed El Salvador as the next target of the national liberation struggle against a local oligarchy backed by "U.S. imperialism." Moscow recently has referred approvingly to the "complete" unification of Salvadoran leftists, depicting this as an indication that the conflict there is approaching a "final outcome." A participant in Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program on 13 July remarked, for example, that the Salvadoran left, including the communists, had not simply agreed to coordinate their actions but had reached overall agreement on political and military strategy. Such a strategy, he recalled, was a "most important precondition" of the Sandinist victory in Nicaragua.

Soviet treatment of the upheavals in El Salvador and Guatemala since January has in the main reiterated stereotyped charges that the U.S. policy of supporting "repressive" military regimes is responsible for the continued turmoil in Central America. Moscow has depicted the Salvadoran and Guatemalan regimes as creatures of the United States, subject to replacement if necessary to preserve U.S. interests in the region. While Moscow has placed most of the blame for the violent clashes between the Salvadoran right and left on U.S. ties to the Salvadoran regime, comment has also pointed to the junta's "gradual rightward slide" and its failure to carry out promised reforms. In recent comment, Moscow has charged the United States with attempting to stabilize El Salvador through "pacification formulas" while raising the specter of U.S. intervention in the country--either directly or through an inter-American military force composed of Andean Pact countries--if that approach fails.

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YUGOSLAVIA

NORTH-SOUTH TENSIONS RENEWED OVER DEVELOPMENT AID ISSUE

The new Yugoslav leadership is facing one of the first tests of its political skill in coordinating the interregional development aid program for 1981-85. Long a source of potential friction, the program involves the diversion of funds from the developed northern regions to the less developed southern ones. The 1981-85 aid package has been discussed recently in federal coordinating bodies and will be taken up by the Federal Assembly in the coming months. Although there have been some signs of compromise in the preliminary meetings, reports on the meetings and statements by some regional leaders have reflected the persistence of basic disagreements.

Press reports on negotiations in the federal social councils have claimed broad agreement on some aid questions but have revealed continuing north-south disagreements on others. According to BORBA on 13 July, council representatives agreed that more aid should be in the form of interenterprise cooperation rather than of credits. They also proposed a compromise formula on the sensitive issue of development criteria, resolving that Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro should retain their underdeveloped status, while Kosovo should be treated as "exceptionally" underdeveloped. But BORBA reported continuing disagreements over the volume of aid to be provided and a "temporary postponement" in finding objective criteria to determine development levels, saying that the latter issue should be further discussed "calmly and without excitement." The weekly NIN on 13 July said that discussions in the social councils had been "frank and sometimes temperamental," but it stressed that the overall concept of aid had never been questioned.

North-south differences on the aid issue also have been revealed in statements by some regional leaders in recent weeks. Slovene party leader Franc Popit, whose republic in April proposed measures that would seem to sharply reduce its aid responsibilities, has been one of the most vigorous spokesmen for the northern donor regions. In an interview reported by BORBA on 21 June, he complained about the attitudes of the underdeveloped regions and asserted flatly that "Slovenia cannot give more for the advancement of the less developed regions than it has given to date."

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By contrast, Kosovo Assembly President Dusan Ristic, at a local meeting reported by TANJUG on 26 July, blamed Kosovo's underdevelopment "above all" on "insufficient and inadequate measures to stimulate development" and called for more aid both through the development fund and through other special measures. He warned that continuing failure to close development gaps could have "political consequences."

While the social councils seem to have reached agreement on some broad aspects of the aid question, the self-restraint of the regions will be put to the test when the issue comes before the Federal Assembly for a decision. Some Assembly delegates began voicing their concerns on development aid when negotiations over the 1981-85 package opened last summer, and the Assembly proved its capacity to engage in prolonged and stormy debates on economic issues in last fall's deliberations on the 1980 budget. The willingness of the regions to compromise in the coming Assembly discussions may set the tone for talks on other sensitive interregional issues in the months to come.

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BRIEFS

AFGHANISTAN: Ambiguous Signals on Party Factionalism

At a 23 July plenum of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Afghan leader Babrak Karmal appeared to promise an end to factional infighting between his Parchamite supporters and Khalqi opponents. The infighting may have intensified when Karmal moved against a leading rival, Interior Minister Gulabzoi, by stripping him of power in the recent government reorganization. Neither he nor other senior Khalqi leaders have been purged. Perhaps reflecting concern over the reported mutiny of Khalqi-led troops in Ghazni, Karmal in his plenum speech made a number of concessions to his rivals, but then took back as much as he had given. On the one hand, Karmal called for an end to "previous divisions" in the party and promised "security" to all loyal party members "without regard" to their past factional allegiances. In addition, he announced plans to improve living conditions for the largely Khalqi officer corps. On the other hand, he called for "iron discipline" within the PDPA and demanded greater central control over the heavily Khalqi local party organizations. And he retained for himself the definition of party "loyalty." Karmal said these steps were necessary to "consolidate" the party and people in their fight with the Afghan rebels. Soviet treatment of the plenum, in 24 and 27 July PRAVDA articles, largely ignored these intra-party issues and again called for the formation of a "United National Fatherland Front" in Afghanistan.

ROMANIA: Protest Against Olympic Judging

Romania has again placed national pride above Soviet bloc harmony in denouncing what it described as unfair judging at the Moscow Olympic games, which cost its star gymnast, Nadia Comaneci, a gold medal. Commenting on the decision of Soviet bloc judges on 24 July, the party daily SCINTEIA the next day declared that "Nadia was the best" of the competitors and that the judges had "flagrantly violated sports ethics and the Olympic spirit" by "defrauding" her of a gold medal. In the same vein, SCINTEIA on the 26th described Comaneci's subsequent gold medals as an "expected and welcome act of justice" following the "grave arbitration errors" that had created conditions "repeatedly adverse to Romania's representatives." PRAVDA on 27 July said that Comaneci's performances deserved high praise but added, ungallantly, that some experts said "she must update her program." The latest recriminations recall Romania's withdrawal from a women's gymnastic competition in Prague in May 1977, at which Bucharest similarly protested the prejudices of Soviet bloc judges.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21-27 JULY 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,326 items)			Beijing (669 items)		
Moscow Olympics	37%	(38%)	Bangladesh President Rahman in PRC	13%	(--)
Soviet-Vietnamese Soyuz 37 Space Mission	9%	(--)	Vietnamese, Kampuchean and Laotian Foreign Ministers Meeting, Vientiane	7%	(--)
Brezhnev Crimean Meeting With Hungarian First Secretary Kadar	4%	(--)	PRC Foreign Ministry Denial of Sino-Israeli Relations	3%	(--)
Polish Republic Anniversary	4%	(--)	Soviet-Vietnamese Oil Exploration Agreement in South China Sea	3%	(--)
			Emergency UN Session on Palestine	3%	(--)
			PRC Criticism of Soviet Attack on Hua-Carter Meeting, Tokyo	3%	(--)

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CORRECTION TO THE 16 JULY 1980 TRENDS

The following is a correction to the article entitled "Moscow Presses Broad Definition of U.S. Forward-Based Systems," published in the TRENDS of 16 July 1980, pages 1-2:

Page 2, substitute the following for the last sentence of paragraph 2: "Zamyatin counted 384 land-based aircraft and 292 carrier-based aircraft in his tally of 800 systems. Other Soviet commentators have also included 108 Pershing I's deployed in West Germany in their discussions of U.S. FBS--altogether producing the same number, 784, cited in a recent 7 July TASS commentary. The TASS listing remains the most detailed Soviet discussion of FBS since the new Soviet offer was revealed on 4 July."

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on U.S. presidential election
- Chinese foreign policy controversy
- Brezhnev as economic troubleshooter

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6 AUGUST 1980
FB TM 80-032

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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U. S. - U S S R

MOSCOW PLAYS UP PRESIDENT CARTER'S CAMPAIGN DIFFICULTIES

Moscow has begun to address directly the possibility that President Carter might lose to Governor Reagan in the November election. Soviet media have been casting a possible Reagan presidency in a less critical light by tempering their traditional censure of his foreign policy while vigorously pursuing their media offensive against President Carter. Moscow has given prominent play in recent days to charges in U.S. media about impropriety in the Administration.

Soviet media have been publicizing Western campaign commentary asserting that President Carter is in serious political trouble. Soviet reporting has given considerable play to U.S. poll results unfavorable to the President and has cited U.S. sources to suggest that even the President's renomination is not assured. On 29 July, in a report for domestic listeners citing UPI as its source, Moscow radio went so far as to say that President Carter "will almost certainly lose" the election to Governor Reagan.

The Soviet treatment of the controversy surrounding Billy Carter's relationship with Libya illustrates Moscow's unsparing treatment of the President. Soviet media have prominently reported developments in the controversy as well as U.S. press speculation about their effect on President Carter's election prospects. A lengthy TASS report on the President's 4 August press conference at the White House cited "political observers" to characterize his explanations as "very contradictory." The report said Americans were deeply shocked at the "illegal machinations by a member of the Carter family." In contrast, Moscow remained silent about the Watergate affair during the 1972 presidential campaign until long after the election--out of appreciation of President Nixon's overwhelming lead in the polls, perhaps, as well as his foreign policies.

Moscow's public commentary continues to suggest that Governor Reagan, were he to be elected, would be a more flexible negotiating partner than past Soviet appraisals of his foreign policy stance might imply. While continuing to criticize both major candidates, Soviet commentators have professed to see further evidence of a moderation of Governor Reagan's positions in the proceedings of the Republican convention in Detroit. They have cited Governor Reagan's selection of Ambassador George Bush as his

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running mate as evidence of such flexibility. Moreover, a 26 July IZVESTIYA article pointed to a "noticeable divergence" between the Republican platform's foreign policy planks--which Moscow has sharply attacked--and the "more diffuse and moderate formulas" in the acceptance speeches of Governor Reagan and Ambassador Bush.

Soviet media continue to avoid speculation about the post-election period. The Central Committee's deputy chief of the International Department, Vadim Zagladin, recently implied in an interview for Hungarian television that there is, in fact, no consensus in Moscow on the probable course of U.S. policy after November. Zagladin said some people expect improvements shortly after the election regardless of who wins. Others, he maintained, expect the current "toughness" in U.S. policy to prevail for "five or maybe even seven years"--the amount of time needed for the United States "to work out the new types of armaments, to obtain self-assurance."

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CHINA

HISTORICAL ARTICLE RAISES SENSITIVE FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS

A long Beijing press article on a controversial period of 19th century Chinese history may provide insights into a contemporary PRC foreign policy debate. Joining earlier commentaries on the same general theme, the article seemed to be intended to serve dual, interrelated objectives: to repudiate Cultural Revolution attacks on the foreign policy line of Liu Shaoqi, and to defend, in allegorical terms, foreign policy views associated with CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping.

The article, published in a periodic feature column on historiography in the 8 July GUANGMING RIBAO and attributed to an unknown author--Kong Xiangji, describes political contention at the Qing dynasty court over how China should deal with the threat from Japan during the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War. It depicts a conflict between "diehard" elements led by the Empress Dowager Cixi and a "modernization" clique led by the young, powerless Guangxu Emperor. Taking issue with past PRC scholarship on this period--particularly interpretations put forward during the Cultural Revolution--the author argues that these Qing leadership groups were not "jackals of the same lair." On the contrary, Kong maintains, the leadership conflict at that time represented "a struggle between patriots and traitors."

The Kong Xianji article is the latest in a series of articles, published in Beijing papers and the Academy of Social Sciences historical journal LISHI YANJIU in recent months, that have attacked a 1967 article that had used criticism of a film on late Qing events to condemn Liu Shaoqi's foreign and domestic policies. The 1967 article, published in the CCP theoretical journal HONGQI, was entitled "Patriotism or National Betrayal?--on the Reactionary Film 'The Inside Story of the Qing Court'" and was written by the radical historian Qi Benyu. It inaugurated a vigorous press campaign attacking Liu as a traitor in modern times.

Historical articles revising the Cultural Revolution verdict on the late Qing modernization movement began to appear in Chinese media on the eve of the CCP's third plenum in late 1978, but only in November last year, when the party was preparing to exonerate Liu Shaoqi publicly, did the press begin to attack Qi Benyu's article directly. Among articles in the growing genre of Qi Benyu criticism are:

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+ A long attack on Qi's 1967 article, appearing in the December 1979 LISHI YANJIU, upheld the reformers led by the Guangxu Emperor as the true patriots of the late 19th century and attacked Qi's praise for "blind, indiscriminate exclusionism" as a patriotic approach to foreign affairs.

+ A long article in the 8 January GUANGMING RIBAO this year attacked Qi Benyu for "smudging the distinction" between patriotism and national betrayal over the issues of learning from the West in resisting Western imperialism and over attitudes toward peace and war.

+ An article in the No. 7 issue of HONGQI this year detailed links between the appearance of Qi's article in 1967 and efforts to attack Liu Shaoqi and the veteran party leadership by Lin Biao and the "gang of four."

+ A RENMIN RIBAO article on 10 April ridiculed Qi Benyu's high appraisal of xenophobia during the Boxer Rebellion.

+ A 20 June RENMIN RIBAO article struck a balanced assessment of the role of the 1898 reform movement, praising its "progressive" efforts to uphold national independence adopting Western doctrines and technology and to promote domestic reform.

In repudiating Qi Benyu's 1967 broadside against Liu Shaoqi, the current campaign of historical articles seems aimed at implicitly defending Liu's foreign policy views, something which Beijing press discussion of Liu's exoneration at the party's fifth plenum last February has avoided doing explicitly. Many facets of Liu's domestic policy attitudes and positions have been reappraised positively and directly in press commentary since the plenum, but neither the plenum communique or subsequent comment has hinted that Liu Shaoqi held foreign policy views different from those of Mao Zedong before the Cultural Revolution, a fact which, typically, is too sensitive for public review.

At the same time, the historical articles implicitly exonerating Liu Shaoqi's foreign policy line also could be read as a defense of current foreign policy views descendant from Liu's--those advocated most strongly in the top party leadership by party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping. The current GUANGMING RIBAO article's discussion of Qing court politics during the Sino-Japanese War, for example, puts forward themes which bear striking resemblance to foreign policy views associated with Deng. The article praises the approach of active resistance to the Japanese threat to China by means of rapid modernization and extensive domestic reforms advocated by the reformist group led by Guangxu Emperor. It condemns the approach of the political

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"diehard" opposition, which feared the foreign threat and sought to "avoid war and make peace" with Japan by offering territorial concessions and signing a treaty.

In a contemporary setting, the themes of the GUANGMING RIBAO article seem to parallel the essentials of Deng Xiaoping's approach to China's underdeveloped state in the face of a dangerous threat from the Soviet Union. Deng has advocated the rapid pursuit of the modernization and drastic political reform at the expense of the "socialist" values and principles upheld by China's leftist leadership in past years. He has also favored a hardline, confrontationist approach to relations with the Soviet Union and very close relations with the United States. This interrelated domestic and foreign policy orientation promoted by Deng has appeared to meet major opposition from other elements in the Chinese leadership in the past two years, particularly from a group of moderate leaders who have appeared to advocate, because of their ideological concerns and their different assessment of China's domestic political problems and international situation, gradual domestic reform, the introduction of a degree of detente into Sino-Soviet relations, and a measure of restraint in Sino-American relations.*

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* An important instance of contention over these issues preceded Beijing's offer to open political talks with Moscow in April 1979, and is discussed in the TRENDS of 18 April 1979, pages 1-6.

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U S S R

The extent to which economic problems are now affecting Soviet domestic politics has been highlighted by recent developments involving Brezhnev and the new 1981-85 five-year plan. Reports by local party leaders have portrayed Brezhnev as putting on an impressive display of energy and authority, intervening personally to spur efforts to break economic logjams. Meanwhile, uncertainty that the new five-year plan will be completed on time has been indicated by the failure of the recently adopted agendas for next year's republic party congresses to include the plan as a topic of discussion.

BREZHNEV INTERVENES AS ECONOMIC OVERSEER, TROUBLESHOOTER

According to speeches by republic first secretaries at July aktiv meetings, Brezhnev telephoned at least six of them during June, strongly urging them to take additional measures to speed completion of lagging construction projects. In addition, he has recently sent formal memoranda (zapiski) to the CPSU Central Committee, urging action on several pressing economic problems. Brezhnev's actions appear to reflect grave concern over the increased amount of resources that have been tied down in unfinished construction, thus intensifying the squeeze on investments. Publicity for the activities also serves the purpose of portraying Brezhnev, at a time when questions have been raised about his health, as an impressively energetic leader, asserting his authority in economic management functions which would normally be charged to Kosygin or Kirilenko.

Brezhnev's telephone campaign to prod party leaders to speed construction work appears to be the first publicly recorded example of any such concentrated effort conducted by phone. The Brezhnev calls were described in some detail in early July speeches by the first secretaries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze indicated that Brezhnev had also phoned various oblast leaders on the same subject. The first secretaries of Moldavia, the Ukraine, and Kirgizia mentioned that Brezhnev had recently pointed out construction

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shortfalls in their republics, although they did not specify that this occurred during telephone conversations. The phone calls all appear to have occurred during June: Azerbaijan leader Aliyev specified 9 June as the date of his call, Turkmen leader Gapurov mid-June, Estonia's Vayno late June, while Shevardnadze and Latvian chief Voss dated theirs as shortly before the 23 June CPSU plenum.

In all cases Brezhnev pointed out lags in construction in the relevant republic and proposed speeding up specific projects. According to Estonian leader Vayno, Brezhnev used rather strong terms, presenting him with a list of projects that "absolutely" had to be completed during 1980. The local secretaries reported that their republic bureaus had then quickly gathered to adopt measures to carry out Brezhnev's instructions. Lithuanian leader Grishkyavichus, according to the 5 July SOVIET LITHUANIA account, drew the conclusion that all this showed "how Leonid Ilich himself directly handles all questions of further development of the country's economy."

Brezhnev's intervention in economic questions has also recently taken the form of presenting the Central Committee with formal memoranda, a type of internal party communication used to define problems and propose actions. In his speech to the 23 June CPSU plenum, Brezhnev himself stated that "I have had to touch on some key questions of development of our economy in memos to the Central Committee, with which the participants in the plenum are familiar," and he specified the subjects as energy, transportation, use of agricultural equipment, and imports of equipment. In his aktiv speech, Shevardnadze also noted that Brezhnev had recently sent a memo to the Central Committee on transportation problems.

Such memoranda were a favorite tool of Khrushchev, who often used them to propose major controversial actions, such as shifting resources to agriculture, initiating an expensive chemical fertilizer program, proposing reorganizations, and promoting expansion of his favorite crops. One effect of a memorandum is to personalize initiatives, identifying a leader with the action proposed, an effect which Brezhnev has tended to avoid. Very few memoranda by Brezhnev have been published.

AGENDAS OF 1981 REPUBLIC CONGRESSES HINT DELAY IN PLAN

The agendas recently adopted for the republic party congresses which will be held in mid-January and early February 1981 indicate that party leaders are still uncertain about the completion date of work on the 1981-85 five-year plan. None of the agendas include

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a report on the five-year plan, even though the plan will be one of the main items discussed at the CPSU Congress which is scheduled to open on 23 February. In past years, the republic congresses have discussed the draft five-year plans. The absence of the item from the agendas this time suggests that party planners expect work on the plan to continue to the last hour and that they wish to keep open the options either of dispensing with the discussions this time or of rescheduling the republic congresses.

The havoc that such delay in the plan can cause was demonstrated in 1971, when late completion of the initial draft of the 1971-75 plan forced postponement of 10 of the republic congresses which had been scheduled for January and early February. A draft of the plan was finally published on 14 February, and the first republic congress then opened on 17 February. In 1976 everything went smoothly since a draft of the new five-year plan was published in December 1975 and the republic congress agendas adopted in late 1975 included reports on the plan.

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IRAN

"NATIONAL VOICE" WAVERS ON KURDS' RIGHTS, CHIDES "PSEUDOCLERGY"

A review of the content of the Baku-based clandestine radio "National Voice of Iran" (NVOI) over the past three months shows that the radio has modified its position on only one aspect of Iran's turbulent political scene. NVOI in June watered down its generalized support for Kurdish national rights by publicizing a Kurdish dissidents' statement which in effect argued that the Kurds should put the country's interests before their own. The radio continues to misrepresent Ayatollah Khomeyni's positions, professing agreement with its version of his views. Programming focuses on established themes, ranging from calls for purges of Iranian officialdom to appeals for Iranian friendship with Afghanistan and attacks on the United States, with only passing references to the American hostages.

SHIFT ON KURDS Coinciding with reports in Tehran media of a split in the traditionally leftist Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), NVOI on 21 June called on the Kurds to face their problem "realistically" and in effect advised them to put the country's interests above their own. Two days later, NVOI sanctioned the breakaway faction of the KDP by broadcasting, in three installments, a statement by the dissidents which argued that Iran's "anti-imperialist" struggle takes precedence over the country's "ethnic problem."* However, the radio has offered no subsequent comment on the KDP split which might confirm NVOI's withdrawal of support from the KDP leadership.

The dissidents' statement catalogued "contradictory forces" on both the government and Kurdish sides. It suggested that the situation in Kordestan is in considerable disarray, with contending elements which include imperialist agents and pseudoleftists experimenting with "self-invented theories," and uninformed Kurds "drowned in the swirl of nationalism." It even accused the KDP

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* A member of the breakaway faction told a Tehran newspaper at the time that the group's line was in keeping with the policy of the KDP's fourth congress, and if the Iranian Tudeh (communist) Party were to accept this line, that would be "fine."

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of harboring Ba'thist elements--in effect, of collaboration with Iran's antagonist, Iraq. The statement left no doubt that the breakaway faction was endorsing at least a conditional capitulation to Tehran: The leadership of the Kurdish movement, it said, should place itself and the Kurdish people "beside the revolution."

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS NVOI continues to call for vigilance against coup plots and stresses the need for purges in the Iranian military, bureaucracy, and mass media; a 28 June broadcast even called for purging organizations "assigned to purge" the oil industry. NVOI commentary is normally couched in generalities, but the radio has occasionally urged the purging of specific individuals. Advocating the "cleansing" of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, a 25 July talk attacked Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh for "enlarging the Afghan problem" and thereby "opening the gates to the arch enemy, the United States." NVOI continues to stress the need for unity of Iran's "revolutionary forces," while occasionally taking oblique swipes at the clergy and the dominant Islamic Republican Party. Responding to attacks by Islamic groups on gatherings and premises of various leftist groups, including the Tudeh Party headquarters in Tehran, several talks assailed unidentified "pseudoclergy" for provoking ignorant persons and "clubwielders" into attacking individuals loyal to the revolution.

U.S. HOSTAGE "PRETEXT" NVOI has generally skirted the U.S. hostage issue in its commentaries in the last few months. A late May talk, pegged to an earlier International Court of Justice ruling on the case, complained about the court's "unfair charges" against Iran and accused the Carter Administration of using court pronouncements as a "pretext" to lend plausibility to its "adventurist plots" against Iran. A mid-July broadcast denouncing the U.S. economic embargo similarly declared that the measure was not aimed at securing the hostages' release but at continuing the crisis so as to facilitate the creation of new U.S. military bases in the Persian Gulf region. A commentary broadcast several days after the shah's death approvingly recited Iran's preconditions for resolution of the hostage issue: acknowledgment by the United States of its complicity in the shah's "criminal acts," return of the former ruler's "plundered wealth" to Iran, and a guarantee of future noninterference in Iran's affairs.

DEFENSE OF AFGHANISTAN Urging its listeners to respond favorably to Kabul's bids for improved relations with Tehran, NVOI commentaries have echoed the line of Soviet central media in defending the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and arguing

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that the United States, not the Soviet Union, poses a danger to Iran. Thus a 4 August talk warned that Afghan "counterrevolutionaries" were being trained in Iran by the CIA with the aim of weakening the united front of "true" Iranian revolutionary forces against U.S. "imperialism." Appealing to Muslim sentiments, NVOI charged that the United States and its "associates" were exploiting the Afghan "counterrevolutionary" center in the northeast Iranian city of Mashhad to incite the religious feeling of "people who are not aware of the facts and nature of the Afghan revolution." NVOI has periodically reassured Iran's Muslims on that score, as in a mid-July broadcast which told listeners that Afghan clergymen support their country's revolution.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 28 JULY-3 AUGUST 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,191 items)			Beijing (695 items)		
Moscow Olympics	33%	(37%)	Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi in PRC	7%	(--)
CSCE Anniversary	11%	(--)	Vanuatu Independence	4%	(--)
Brezhnev's Crimea Meetings:	11%	(4%)	Mali Democratic Union Delegation in PRC	4%	(--)
Czechoslovakia's Husak	4%	(--)			
Poland's Gierek	4%	(--)			
Portuguese CP Secretary General Cunhal	3%	(--)	Afghan Situation	3%	(1%)
Soviet-Vietnamese Soyuz 37 Space Mission	5%	(9%)	People's Liberation Army 53rd Anniversary	3%	(--)
			Israeli Annexation of Jerusalem	3%	(--)
			Romanian Food-Processing Industry Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)

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- Criticism of Mao by Chinese leaders

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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CHINA

HIGH-LEVEL CONTROVERSY FLARES OVER MAO ZEDONG'S LEGACY

The sensitive question of evaluating Mao Zedong's role in the Chinese Communist Party history has surfaced again in three foreign press interviews with top-level Chinese leaders. The interviews and their treatment by Chinese media confirm that the issue of Mao and his legacy continues to be the focus of unresolved controversy in the Chinese leadership. Both the future power of CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng and the fate of party and policy reforms advocated by Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping may be affected by the way in which the Mao question is handled at upcoming Chinese government and party congresses.

A 28 July Hua Guofeng interview with a Yugoslav newspaper was the third such interview by a top CCP official in recent weeks that dealt with the leadership of Mao Zedong. CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang in June and CCP Vice Chairman Li Xiannian earlier in July had discussed the same issue with foreign journalists, with Deng's protege Hu offering the most critical assessment of the late chairman. Although Hua was relatively moderate in his criticism of Mao, his remarks have been reported by Chinese media only to foreign audiences, not in the Chinese press or any monitored domestic broadcast. Hu's remarks are not known to have been mentioned at all by Chinese media and Li's were reported only in part.

In an interview with Yugoslav reporters carried only by the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG on 21 June, Hu Yaobang asserted that in the last years of his life Mao made mistakes which, in TANJUG's words, "had caused a disaster for the Chinese party and people." In remarks to New York TIMES correspondent Harrison Salisbury on 25 July, reported in the TIMES on 27 July, Li Xiannian called the Mao-inspired Great Leap Forward of 1958 "nothing but a mistake" and seemed to hold Mao directly responsible for the failings of the Cultural Revolution. According to Salisbury, Li acknowledged that while Mao had come to criticize Lin Biao's role in fueling the excesses of the Cultural Revolution he had failed to deal with the grave mistakes of the gang of four.

Hua Guofeng's view of Mao, contained in a written interview with a Yugoslav correspondent reported by XINHUA in English and the Zagreb paper VJESNIK on 10 August, hewed more closely to the moderate

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and indirect criticism of Mao common since the CCP plenum of December 1978. His belated reply to questions posed by the correspondent last May appears to have been calculated both to affect domestic debate and to subdue foreign speculation that total denigration of Mao is underway. Hua acknowledged that serious mistakes were made between 1958 and 1976, but he attributed the errors to the work of the party and conceded only that "as chairman of the party Comrade Mao Zedong, of course, bore responsibility for these mistakes." Hua admitted that in his later years Mao's failing health worked to the advantage of the gang of four, but he asserted, in seeming contrast to Li Xiannian's reported remarks, that Mao "to some extent did perceive the gang's conspiracies and exposed and criticized the four." Hua took pains to separate Mao from the gang by observing that the leftists "did not represent the party or Comrade Mao Zedong."

All three Chinese leaders may have been seeking a forum in which to register their views on Mao at a time when a review of the last 30 years of party history has become a key issue which will influence deliberations both at the National People's Congress (NPC) later this month and at the party congress which is to be held in late 1980 or early 1981. Strong criticism of Mao's authoritarian leadership style supports efforts by Deng Xiaoping to reform the system to concentrate less power in a single person or position. Hua's more moderate approach in assessing Mao appears to reflect his efforts to protect his own position which is threatened by such reforms. Because Hua owes not only the premiership but also the party chairmanship to Mao's personal imprimateur in 1976, harsh assessments of Mao's leadership and abilities, particularly in the months before his death in 1976, inevitably diminish Hua's standing. Already almost certain to forfeit his government post in favor of Deng Xiaoping's ally Zhao Ziyang during the NPC, Hua is also increasingly hard pressed to maintain his authority as party chairman against Dengist rival General Secretary Hu Yaobang.

The reassessment of Mao may also be connected with a current review of the 1978 state constitution which enshrined Mao and his theoretical contributions in a preeminent position out of keeping with the present more balanced perspective on the dead leader. Revisions of the passages on Mao would be consistent with a recent party order, reported by XINHUA on 11 August, to drastically reduce the number of Mao's photographs and quotations on display in public places. The instruction also applied to other leaders and will almost certainly lead to the removal of pictures of Hua as well.

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USSR-ROMANIA

BREZHNEV, CEAUSESCU PLAY DOWN TENSIONS DURING CRIMEA TALKS

The statement issued on this summer's Crimea meeting between the Soviet and Romanian party leaders on 4 August is the most cordial in three years and suggests an effort by both sides to play down their differences over various foreign policy issues. The statement, much like that on Romanian Premier Verdet's visit to Moscow in May, favorably portrayed the atmosphere of the talks, highlighted economic cooperation, and avoided potentially contentious foreign policy questions such as Afghanistan. At the same time, some aspects of the visit reflected a continuing coolness in relations, and Romania underlined its independent course in advance of the trip by signing unprecedented trade and cooperation agreements with the European Economic Community--thus breaking Moscow's stricture against direct EEC contacts by CEMA members.

The atmosphere of this year's Brezhnev-Ceausescu Crimea session was described as "friendly," a warmer characterization than those of the last two years, both of which contained the term "frank," but less effusive than the "cordial and friendly" meetings in 1976 and 1977. The statement also reported the two sides' "mutual understanding," suggesting a greater degree of tolerance than during the last few years but falling short of the "identity" of views usually claimed when Brezhnev meets with other East European leaders. As during the past three summers, the visit was a one-day trip at the invitation of Brezhnev and not a lengthier "vacation" at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, as is customary for the other East European leaders.

Bucharest's interest in strengthening its economic ties with Moscow was reflected in the statement's support for a "deepening of integration and cooperation both on a bilateral basis and within the CEMA framework." Although Romania has periodically reaffirmed support for the 1971 comprehensive CEMA integration program, to which it is a subscriber, it has avoided such direct endorsements of bilateral or CEMA integration in joint statements with the Soviets during recent years. The apparent softening of Bucharest's public stand on this issue underscores its increasing energy and hard currency problems and follows other signs of a greater Romanian

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interest in CEMA cooperation in 1979 and 1980. Such signs, however, come at a time when Moscow is increasingly informing its East European allies of its own constraints in providing them with greater energy and raw materials supplies.

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USSR

MEAT OUTPUT DROPS, PLANNERS PROPOSE NEW LIVESTOCK STRATEGY

Recently published figures indicate that some parts of the Soviet Union, notably the key meat producing regions in the western USSR, suffered significant shortfalls in meat production and a decline in pig and sheep herds in the first half of this year. The decline in meat supplies in some areas has reached a level that produced public unrest last year. The difficulty in maintaining herds in the face of serious fodder shortages appears to be prompting articles by Soviet agricultural planners urging less stress on larger herds as a strategy for raising meat output.

MEAT, MILK SUPPLIES

Figures published in July issues of PRAVDA, ECONOMIC GAZETTE, and republic papers indicate that overall 1-2 percent less meat was produced in the Soviet Union during the first half of 1980 than during the same period of 1979. Regionally the problem appears more serious than the national statistics indicate, however, since the shortfall occurred almost entirely in four republics, while most other republics produced more meat than last year. Figures for live weight of slaughtered animals in the 14 July ECONOMIC GAZETTE showed the RSFSR down 3 percent, the Ukraine 4 percent, Belorussia 5 percent, and Lithuania 9 percent. Moreover, figures for processed meat production given in local papers in some cases were even lower, showing the Ukraine down 6 percent and Lithuania down 12 percent. For the hardest hit republic, Lithuania, the drop almost equalled Estonia's 16 percent drop in meat output in early 1979, a drop which produced signs of public unrest.* Moreover, this was the second year of decline in Lithuania, following a 6 percent fall in meat production in the first half of 1979.

Soviet meat output had been running above last year's level up until June. According to monthly ECONOMIC GAZETTE figures, production in January and February was 13 percent above the comparable 1979 period. It began dropping in early spring and by the end of June finally dipped to 95,000 tons less than the first half of 1979. The initial high output was apparently from slaughtering larger numbers of animals rather than from heavier animals, since the average slaughter weight for both cattle and pigs has been consistently below 1979 every month this year.

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* See the TRENDS of 22 August 1979, pages 14-15; 9 January 1980, pages 7-8; and 16 January 1980, pages 26-28.

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Milk production has suffered even more than meat output. According to ECONOMIC GAZETTE figures, Soviet milk output for the first six months of this year was 4 percent below the 1979 period and milk purchased by the government was down 5 percent. The RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania accounted for virtually all the 1.4 million ton drop in government milk procurement. As in meat, Lithuania was lowest in milk, down 7 percent in production and 11 percent in government procurement.

LIVESTOCK HERDS

The main Soviet objective in facing this winter's fodder shortage has been to avoid distress slaughtering such as that which followed the 1975 crop failure and set back livestock raising for several years. Figures for publicly owned animals published in the 21 July PRAVDA and 14 July ECONOMIC GAZETTE indicate that, while cattle herds were preserved, pigs and sheep were cut back sharply. Nationally, there were over 700,000 more cattle on 1 July 1980 than on 1 July 1979, but pigs were down about one million and sheep down about 2.4 million. Local government figures appearing in republic papers in late ly indicate that the slaughtering occurred mainly in the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Belorussia. There were over 800,000 fewer pigs in the RSFSR and 700,000 fewer in the Ukraine. Only considerable increases in other parts of the country prevented a worse national figure. Sheep were down over 3 million in the RSFSR, 200,000 in the Ukraine, and 180,000 in Tadzhikistan; however, a big increase in Kazakhstan--almost one million--softened the setback. In Belorussia, the fodder shortage was so severe that even the cattle herds were somewhat reduced--by about 3,000 head.

NEW STRESS ON PRODUCTIVITY

In a sign that some rethinking of livestock development may be underway, three recent Soviet articles have criticized the slow growth of meat production and defects in the present livestock raising system. The articles have urged that productivity of animals, rather than larger herds, be stressed in the future. The issue was broached in two articles in the July issue of ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE. One, by a deputy chief of Gosplan's agriculture department, G. Ya. Yelistratov, maintained that the Soviet Union already has more livestock per capita than other developed countries but gets too little meat per animal. He argued that animals are fattened too slowly and too much fodder is wasted, and he declared that raising livestock productivity is the "main reserve" for further growth in output. The other article, by an unknown author, N. Knyazev, noted that increases in meat output in recent years have been coming from expansion of herds rather than from raising productivity, and he urged that fodder rations for

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livestock be increased in order to get more meat per animal. Similar arguments had been presented in a 21 May PRAVDA article by N. Ye. Smetanin, also a deputy chief of the Gosplan agriculture department. Smetanin went so far as to directly appeal for a shift from Soviet policies stressing the expansion of herds.*

SAKHAROV RESEARCH PUBLISHED DESPITE OFFICIAL OPPROBRIUM

The publication of an article by the outspoken dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov in the June issue of the prestigious Soviet Academy of Sciences organ JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL PHYSICS could have political overtones.

The new article is the first published by Sakharov in a Soviet journal in several years. According to publication data in the journal, the article was received on 4 February, only two weeks after Sakharov's exile to Gorkiy by the USSR Supreme Soviet and later than any of the other articles in the issue. The journal identifies the author with his former workplace in Moscow, the Lebedev Institute of Physics. A footnote reference in the article indicates that a second article by Sakharov will appear in a future issue.

The article's appearance could be interpreted as a gesture of support for Sakharov from the Soviet scientific community, which has jealously guarded its independence from political authorities. The journal's chief editor, Petr Kapitsa, has strongly defended Sakharov in the Academy in the past and Western press accounts reported his refusal to sign an August 1973 letter from Academy members published in the Soviet press which criticized the dissident scientist.

Soviet authorities could have their own reasons for tolerating publication of the Sakharov article in a journal widely read in the Western scientific community. They might calculate that evidence of regime respect for Sakharov's professional credentials could mitigate foreign reaction to its harsh censure of his political activities. After Sakharov's exile in January, Soviet commentaries attempted to show that he was being treated mildly, and some pointed out that he would be able to continue his professional work.

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* See the TRENDS of 4 June 1980, pages 5-6.

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PLANNING OFFICIAL REPORTS FIVE-YEAR PLAN DRAFT ON SCHEDULE

A top Soviet planning official has portrayed preparations for the 1981-85 five-year economic plan as proceeding on schedule. Offering Moscow's first public comments on the timetable for completing the new plan in two recent articles, Gosplan Deputy Chairman A.V. Bachurin cited Politburo decisions which foresee completion of an initial draft next month. Bachurin's optimistic picture of plan preparations may not be shared by some leaders, in view of the fact that discussion of the document was omitted from the agendas recently announced for next winter's republic party congresses.*

In an article in the July issue of Gosplan's monthly PLANNED ECONOMY, Bachurin stated that the "directive organs"--a term usually meaning the Politburo--have ordered that a draft of the "Main Directions" of the new five-year plan, as well as a limited number of figures for the 10-year plan, be presented to them "not later than 15 September." At the same time, he wrote, Gosplan has been ordered to continue work on the plan after this date in order to present a final draft to the Central Committee and Council of Ministers by 15 May 1981. He asserted that the latter date would make it possible to use the February 1981 CPSU congress decisions in finishing the draft. Bachurin gave further details on the status of five-year plan preparations in a 7 July ECONOMIC GAZETTE article.

Bachurin admitted that the currently envisaged five-year plan timetable will delay introduction of many changes in planning and administration ordered by the July 1979 economic reform decrees. He reported that it would prove impossible to include most of the changes in the 1981 annual plan since Gosplan had been ordered to submit the draft plan to the "directive organs" by 1 August 1980--long before the five-year plan is to be approved. Bachurin indicated that the envisaged reforms--including a new incentive system and expansion of the rights of ministries and plants in compiling annual plans--will first be introduced in the 1982 plan.

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* See the 6 August 1980 TRENDS, pages 7-8.

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The schedule outlined by Bachurin appears similar to that followed for the last two five-year plans, which were discussed and approved in general outline at party congresses early in the first year of the plan and then finally adopted at Central Committee plenums and Supreme Soviet sessions several months later. The role of the party congresses in the process is illustrated by the February-March 1976 25th congress, which discussed the draft "Main Directions" for 1976-80, elected a commission to consider changes in the draft, and then adopted a decree approving it and ordering the Council of Ministers to finish working out the amended plan for presentation to the Supreme Soviet in September 1976.

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BRIEF

USSR-IRAN: "National Voice" Broadcast on Hostage Trials

The Baku-based clandestine radio "National Voice of Iran" (NVOI) in a 6 August commentary offered the first known NVOI endorsement of "preparations" for a trial of the American hostages. The endorsement of a Majlis decision to prepare the grounds for a trial seemed calculated to keep NVOI's position in line with the mood in Tehran and to play to the ascendant hardliners. NVOI from time to time has favorably cited various Iranian conditions for release of the hostages, most recently in a talk broadcast several days after the shah's death. Moscow has never publicly acknowledged the existence of this radio, which purports to represent the Iranian people, and it is unclear what type and amount of Soviet central direction is provided to NVOI.* In the immediate aftermath of the hostage seizure in November 1979, NVOI supported the embassy takeover while counseling restraint in treating the hostages. Perhaps in response to instruction, NVOI later that month shifted to a call for release of the hostages, uncharacteristically out of step with opinion in Iran. The radio for a time moderated its traditionally shrill anti-U.S. invective, but by early this year it resumed its strident denunciations of American "imperialism." The 6 August commentary, in typical NVOI style, described the Majlis decision to ask the Supreme Judicial Council to complete preliminaries for a trial of the "American spies" as "a very proper measure and a hard punch in the mouth of the officials of mad U.S. imperialism."

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* For background on NVOI behavior, see the TRENDS of 15 and 21 November and 12 December 1979.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 4-10 AUGUST 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,016 items)		
Moscow Olympics	17%	(33%)
Brezhnev Crimea	8%	(11%)
Meetings:		
Bulgaria's Zhivkov	5%	(--)
Romania's Ceausescu	3%	(--)
Middle East Situation	4%	(2%)

Beijing (530 items)		
Soviet Base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam	3%	(--)
UN Secretary General Waldheim in Vietnam	3%	(--)
Israeli Annexation of Jerusalem	6%	(3%)
PRC Foreign Ministry Statement	4%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Communist reaction to Polish strikes:
  Increased concern in Warsaw, Moscow
  Cautious East Europe support for Gierek
  Divided response in West Europe
  Beijing reportage without comment

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27 AUGUST 1980
FB TM 80-035

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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POLAND

The failure of a high-level leadership shakeup and new concessions on the trade union issue to bring about a settlement of the Polish strikes has evoked a stern warning in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU of the danger of anarchy and, in thinly veiled terms, of Soviet intervention. At the same time, the paper offered assurances that the party has not yet abandoned the conciliation approach to seeking a settlement. A Polish trade union plenum, held on the 26th, outlined a series of reforms that appeared to grant the workers extensive powers of self-management, although the critical issues of trade union autonomy and party control were not mentioned explicitly in reports on the plenum.

Moscow has been circumspect in its treatment of the crisis and has indicated at least tentative support for the Gierek regime by reporting official Polish statements without comment. Initially Moscow's reportage for the domestic Soviet audience omitted news of the more disturbing aspects of the events in Poland. However, the Moscow domestic service did carry a 27 August TASS commentary that claimed foreign and Polish "antisocialist elements" were trying to exploit the crisis--a charge that seemed to reflect a Soviet effort to stiffen Polish resistance to the workers' demands.

TRYBUNA LUDU WARNS OF INTERVENTION DANGER IF STRIKES CONTINUE

The article in TRYBUNA LUDU on the 27th warned strike leaders, in effect, that if they persist in and escalate their demands Soviet intervention may be unavoidable. The article, read on Warsaw TV the day before by its author, authoritative foreign affairs commentator Ryszard Wojna, called attention to the fact that Poland lies in the center of Europe "in the direct security zone of a world socialist power, the Soviet Union." The present course of events, he warned, could result in a "national catastrophe" reminiscent of the partition of Poland in the late 18th century. In an apparent appeal to the workers, he declared that raising "ever new demands" and ignoring the danger of "anarchizing" public life will lead to "pernicious" consequences for Poland, whose fate is now "in the balance." The moment may come, he added, when those making excessive demands "will say, We did not want that, but then

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it will be too late." Wojna concluded by echoing previous assertions by PZPR First Secretary Gierek to the effect that the communist structure of the country is not negotiable and that there are limits beyond which "nobody" is allowed to go.

The new warning in TRYBUNA LUDU comes in the wake of a notably conciliatory plenum of the PZPR Central Committee at which Gierek made concessions in the direction of greater democracy in trade union management and at which a liberalization of the top leadership, including the replacement of Premier Babiuch, was carried out. While not agreeing to the strikers' demand for fully independent trade unions, PZPR First Secretary Gierek in his plenum speech on the 24th advocated liberalization of elections to the existing trade union bodies. He called for election of new trade union officials in all factories in which the workers desire them, asserting that such elections "should be fully democratic and secret and have an unlimited number of candidates." He also predicted that the workers' representatives who "spontaneously" emerged as leaders in the strike situation "will surely be" elected to the trade union governing bodies.

On the changes in the party and government leadership, Gierek self-critically noted that the newly appointed functionaries included "those comrades who earlier had perceived the growing irregularities and tried to counteract them, whose voices we had not heeded in time." This remark applied most directly to Stefan Olszowski, an economics expert and potential Gierek rival who was dropped from the Politburo and Secretariat at the PZPR Congress in February and was reinstated to both bodies at the 24 August plenum. In the major governmental change, Edward Babiuch, who was elected premier only in February and whose chief qualification was loyalty to Gierek, was replaced by Jozef Pinkowski, heretofore the party secretary in charge of economic affairs. In addition to Babiuch, three others were removed from the Politburo in an effort to clear the air in currently controversial areas--Jerzy Lukaszewicz (media), Jan Szydlak (trade unions), and Tadeusz Wrzaszczyk (state planning).

A plenum of the Trade Union Central Council (CRZZ) on the 26th, which formally accepted Szydlak's resignation as trade union chief and announced his successor, Romuald Jankowski, continued the self-critical, reformist line signaled by the party plenum two days earlier. In discussing the trade union bill now being drafted, the trade union plenum reflected the strikers' demands in repeatedly using the term "independent." The plenum asserted that the new law is to "guarantee conditions for an independent and autonomous functioning of the trade union movement in the system of socialist democracy"--a reminder that the existing trade union system will be retained--and guarantee to the trade unions the right to take "independent legislative initiatives." Reflecting another key demand, the plenum said that when all other recourses are exhausted, "the trade unions should have the right to strike."

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The Gierek regime took the unusual step, on the 26th, of carrying extensive excerpts on Warsaw television of a sermon by Polish Primate Cardinal Wyszynski, which included appeals for calm and a return to work. As excerpted, the Wyszynski sermon, delivered at Czestochowa the previous day, amounted to a lengthy tribute to the virtues of work, including a reminder that there is no "prosperity without work." He noted at the same time that people have the right to make their position known "even if this is by refusing to work." In appealing for calm, he declared that although the people are now justifiably becoming more aware of their "rights," they should not expect all their demands to be met at once but should be aware of their "responsibility for the whole Polish nation," whose economy is suffering during the wave of strikes. Warsaw television announced on the 26th that the sermon would be repeated "tomorrow after the afternoon news."

SOVIET CONCERN APPEARS TO SHARPEN AS DEADLOCK CONTINUES

Soviet publicity on the Polish events struck an ominous note on 27 August, when a TASS commentary warned that "antisocialist elements"--a term evidently meant to apply to groups inside as well as outside the country--were attempting to "push Poland off its chosen socialist path." Heretofore, Moscow has avoided such alarmist charges, maintaining a posture of official detachment with regard to the crisis. It has indicated by its words and actions that it is supporting the Gierek regime's efforts to settle the strikes. Moscow promptly publicized both Gierek's tough speech of 18 August and his conciliatory address of 24 August to the PZPR plenum in its foreign broadcasts and news service dispatches. It gave similar publicity to the key TRYBUNA LUDU articles of 23-24 August and 27 August. In all these cases, it published briefer accounts in the domestic media, presumably to shield the public from information deemed to be unduly alarming or disturbing.

The 27 August TASS commentary, which drew in part on a TASS commentary by Kornilov two days earlier, as well as on the most recent TRYBUNA LUDU article, charged that "antisocialist elements" are exploiting the current events to the detriment of Poland. TASS also alleged that certain circles in West Germany were going so far as to try to reopen the question of the Polish-German border, an extremely serious charge that recalls the warnings of "revanchism" raised at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. Such charges could obviously be used again if the Gierek regime fails to resolve the crisis and if the Soviet Union should ever wish to intervene. Unlike the Kornilov commentary, which was not published in the domestic media, the TASS commentary was broadcast in full on the Moscow domestic service.

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EAST EUROPEANS SUPPORT GIEREK REGIME'S HANDLING OF STRIKES

Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies and Yugoslavia have made it clear in reportage and comment that they support the Gierek regime's efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the strikes. The East European allies began their reportage on the Polish work stoppages before Moscow, Hungary being first to break the silence on 14 August.

While slanted reports, largely opposing the strikers' demands, have been frequent in the East European media, there has been little actual comment. A Prague broadcast in English to the UK and Ireland on the 23d did point out that, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, "now certain antisocialist forces in Poland" are posing as defenders of human rights, with encouragement from anticommunist centers abroad.

There is little evidence so far to indicate that the Warsaw Pact maneuvers, scheduled to begin in northern East Germany in early September, are being used to influence events in Poland. The publicity on the allied armies arriving in the GDR and the speeches and comment in GDR media follow the same general pattern noted in similar Pact exercises in the GDR 10 years ago, which, like the present ones, involved contingents from all the Pact members. An effort by the GDR to underscore the lack of connection between the exercises and the Polish events was suggested by the fact that East Berlin television and "Voice of the GDR" domestic radio reports on the impending maneuvers have not immediately preceded or followed reports on the Polish crisis. Also broadcasts by these media carrying lengthy reports on the Pact exercise preparations have not contained any reference to the Polish events in the same program.

YUGOSLAVIA

Belgrade has reported more extensively on the Polish situation than other East European countries but so far has issued no official authoritative comment. In one of the more forthright remarks on the crisis, TANJUG's Warsaw correspondent, Zoran Zlatanovic, on 24 August praised the "wisdom" of the Polish leadership in deciding to resolve the problem without using force, warning that to do otherwise could have "possible consequences for peace in Europe and the world." He similarly asserted on the 26th that all the countries of Europe have an interest in the normalization of the situation. Other, more prominent and normally outspoken Yugoslav commentators have said little or nothing on the Polish situation, underscoring Belgrade's caution on the issue. Belgrade reportage, while seeking to take a neutral tone, has tended to play down the demands by strikers for free trade unions--which do not exist in Yugoslavia--although it has highlighted statements suggesting the need for reform of the Polish system.

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WEST EUROPE CP'S EXHIBIT TRADITIONAL DIFFERENCES ON CRISIS

West Europe's four major communist parties--the Italian, French, Spanish, and Portuguese--have been restrained but characteristically divergent in their treatment of events in Poland. Official comment thus far has been sparse, owing apparently as much to the sensitivity of the situation as to the fact that party leaders Berlinguer, Marchais, and Carrillo have been in East Europe on their traditional August vacations. Comments from a number of second-level officials in the four parties have differed noticeably in the sympathies they have shown, the independent Italian and Spanish expressing support for the striking workers, the more orthodox French and Portuguese conveying understanding for the difficult position of the Warsaw regime.

The most explicit support for the strikers has come from the Italians. L'UNITA editor Reichlin, writing in the paper's 19 August edition, attributed the strikes to the contrast between Poland's "rigid" political structure and the "varied, multiform, and pluralist" Polish society. The lesson to be drawn, he said, is that a "socialist-type economy" cannot be directed "solely from above." PCI Directorate member and foreign affairs expert Pajetta stated in a 20 August speech in Siena that the Gdansk events required "boldness" in seeking answers to the problems raised by the workers and a "prompt correction of errors." A socialist society, Pajetta declared, should ensure "all freedoms, including trade union freedoms and the right to strike."

Similar sentiments favoring the strikers' demands have been expressed by the Spanish Communists. The PCE, its daily paper currently shut down, has offered no official comment. But PCE Secretary General Santiago Carrillo was quoted by the Madrid paper ABC on the 21st as saying that the Polish political system was as much to blame for the current troubles as economic factors. Solution of the crisis, Carrillo concluded, requires "serious reform of the economic and political system" to make Poland's socialism "more closely linked with the Polish people's own personality." The PCE-dominated trade union Workers' Commissions also weighed in with a statement of solidarity with the strikers and dispatched trade union Secretary General Camacho to Poland on a fact-finding visit. Camacho told Madrid radio on his return on the 22d that Polish trade union officials were not considering using force against the strikers and did not feel that the situation would result in Soviet intervention.

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The more orthodox French and Portuguese Communists have come to the defense of the Polish regime but have attempted to minimize the impact of their stand on their domestic popularity by taking the offensive against their Socialist rivals. L'HUMANITE director and Politburo member Leroy issued a statement on the 20th which declared support for the "Polish workers and communists" but was plainly more interested in denouncing Socialist Party (PS) leader Mitterand's public comments on the events as an attempt to cover up the PS policy of tolerating "repression" of French workers. PCF Politburo member Gremetz, interviewed by Paris radio on the 25th, praised Polish leader Gierek's approach to the crisis of "tackling issues frankly" and listening to the needs of the country's masses. Commentary in the Portuguese party organ AVANTE has taken the same tack, attributing the current unrest narrowly to a rise in meat prices and defending the Gierek regime's efforts to improve the Polish workers' life.

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BEIJING REPORTS, AVOIDS DIRECT COMMENT ON POLISH STRIKES

Beijing reported the Polish strikes in late July and since mid-August has regularly noted developments and government measures to deal with them, revealing the increasing gravity of the situation. Beijing has avoided comment, perhaps uncertain about the full import and likely outcome of the situation. It obviously has reason to be concerned both by the danger of Soviet intervention and by the domestic implications--in a period of experimentation and reform in China--of such major disturbances among workers in a communist country.

SOVIET THREAT In reporting statements on the crisis by Polish leaders, Beijing has ignored their veiled warning of the possibility of Soviet intervention if the workers do not limit their demands. However, a RENMIN RIBAO article of 19 August, in citing then Premier Babiuch's speech of the 15th, highlighted his statement that "Poland is capable of solving these problems by itself." The Soviet issue came up directly in a 23 August XINHUA report on Secretary Muskie's remarks the previous day. XINHUA cited the Secretary's expression of concern about events in Poland and noted that a State Department spokesman, when questioned by a correspondent whether the statement was intended to warn the Russians to stay out, had responded that he would not interpret that statement but that it should be taken "seriously at face value." The Polish situation has not been raised in Beijing comment on the anniversary of the 20 August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia--an event which was the major milestone defining China's present perceptions of the global Soviet threat. However, a XINHUA report on Stockholm ceremonies marking the Czech anniversary noted that they were dedicated to support of the Polish workers.

DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS Beijing has been remarkably frank in reporting, both to foreign and domestic audiences, the more extreme demands by the Polish workers. For example, RENMIN RIBAO on 19 August reported that striking workers had called for the right to strike, freedom of speech and press, the release of political prisoners, the right to form independent trade unions, strike pay, higher wages, better food supplies, and abolition of special privileges for communist party members and police. XINHUA reports have also cited Polish leaders' statements that some of the demands can be met but not those challenging the basic system.

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The deterioration of the situation in Poland, despite Warsaw's efforts at economic reform, must seriously concern Beijing leaders and may well affect their own debate on reforms. Parallels between the Polish and Chinese situations were reflected, for example, in a 28 July XINHUA report describing Warsaw reforms before the strikes which strongly resemble some of China's recent measures. The report emphasized that "certain results" have been achieved even though further "tremendous efforts" were still required to truly solve the economic crisis, including the serious foreign trade deficit--also a matter of concern to China.

The central issue of trade union independence from the party is being discussed in China in the context of broader debate regarding greater separation of government and party functions and an increased role for nonparty organizations. For example, a 9 August article in GONGREN RIBAO (a trade union mouthpiece which had not mentioned the Polish strikes as of 11 August) warned that Chinese trade unions should take up their "proper role" of "independent and responsible" representation of workers' "democratic rights and material interests," in order to prevent contradictions between workers and management from "piling up mountain-high," which would result in discontent and problems in factories.

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IRAN-USSR

ALLEGED U.S. INVASION PLANS DRAW LOW-LEVEL MOSCOW RESPONSE

Recent U.S. press speculation about the possibility of future U.S. military action against Iran has elicited from Moscow only a low-level media response, much like its reaction to similar speculation before the hostage rescue attempt in April. There has been no authoritative Soviet comment, no warning of possible Soviet intervention, and no public recollection of President Brezhnev's November 1978 declaration that foreign interference in Iran would affect USSR security interests.

Soviet media have given U.S. columnist Jack Anderson's articles detailing purported plans for a U.S. invasion of Iran the broad attention routinely accorded such suggestions of U.S. pressure against the Tehran government since last fall. TASS dispatches from the United States, replayed by Moscow press and radio, have quoted at length from Anderson's columns, presenting them as fact. Limited low-level comment on his charges has sought in characteristic fashion to arouse apprehension in the region of the broader repercussions of any U.S. military action.

The only Soviet central press comment on the issue came in a 21 August PRAVDA article, attributed to that paper's correspondent Yevgeniy Rusakov, warning that Washington's "policy of military blackmail and threats against Iran and other countries in the region is fraught with a serious threat to peace in southwest Asia and beyond its borders." In a similar tone, a routine Moscow radio commentary by Yuriy Soltan, broadcast on the same day in English, Persian, Arabic, and several other languages, charged the United States with planning a "dangerous provocation" in southwest Asia and observed that if the U.S. "military machine is put into action it is very unlikely that the armed conflict will be limited to Iran alone."

BACKGROUND Moscow's commentary surrounding the U.S. hostage rescue attempt last April suggests that current Soviet media warnings of the possible repercussions of any U.S. military action have little significance. In the weeks before the rescue attempt, Soviet media were using even stronger language than they are now to warn of the possible broader consequences of any U.S. military action. A Soltan radio commentary three days before the attempt charged that U.S. action against Iran could escalate into a "wide international

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conflict" and accused the Administration of "pushing the world into war." Following the attempt, however, Moscow restricted itself to routine propaganda designed to exploit Iranian distrust of the United States. The only authoritative response at the time came in cautious remarks by Foreign Minister Gromyko, who told a questioner at a Paris press conference that the USSR opposed "forcible" measures against Iran by the United States and favored a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Brezhnev's November 1978 warning linking foreign interference in Iran with Soviet security interests has been invoked sparingly by Moscow in the two years since, more to curry favor with Tehran than to warn the United States against direct intervention. The warning has been recalled at least three times in routine commentary since the American hostages were taken in Tehran, in all cases in order to claim credit for inhibiting earlier U.S. plans for intervention. In fact, however, Soviet media did not recall the Brezhnev statement or issue any other direct warning to Washington in connection with the April effort to rescue the hostages.

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CHINA

ALLEGORICAL ARTICLES ATTACK HUA GUOFENG'S POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

Historical articles in the Beijing press have drawn lessons from the feudal past to support major revisions in China's governing system pressed by CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and others for implementation at the upcoming National People's Congress and the CCP congress at the turn of the year. Articles in the first week of August describing the intrigues of eunuchs in ancient court politics allegorically buttressed the contention that China must banish autocratic rule to prevent the repetition of past errors in leadership. Implicitly the articles questioned not only the propriety of the scope of power held by CCP Chairman and Premier Hua Guofeng but also the legitimacy of his receiving power directly from Mao Zedong. They add to evidence that Hua is opposing reform moves that will undercut his position.

The articles, published in the 4 August RENMIN RIBAO and the 5 August GUANGMING RIBAO, made no reference to recent political events but depicted the elaborate intrigues and dictatorial power of eunuchs in Chinese history in a fashion that posed obvious parallels with the abuses of power in the last years of Mao's life. In the context of other recent PRC comment urging the removal of the influences of ancient political traditions from the present ruling system, the articles seem clearly aimed at supporting far-reaching political changes favored by Deng Xiaoping, including greater distribution of authority, fixed terms of office for high officials, and reforms in the process of selecting leaders.* The changes are intended to end longstanding political practices that Deng and his followers see as impediments to modernization and effective party rule, such as lifetime tenure and special privileges for officials, autocratic and patriarchal leadership, the personality cult, and nepotism. They would require that Hua Guofeng surrender at least one of the three posts he currently holds--premier, CCP chairman, and chairman of the Military Commission--a collection of positions and potential power unprecedented in PRC history.

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* PRC comment on China's feudal legacy is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 July 1980, pages 9-12.

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The two articles depicted the emperors of ancient China, symbolizing Mao, as the pawns of the eunuchs--the leftist "gang of four," Lin Biao, and Kang Sheng--who were ignoring and arbitrarily punishing government ministers and bringing the nation to ruin. The articles clearly rejected the notion that such a pattern was an aberration, stating firmly that "the emergence of the eunuchs' dictatorial power in Chinese feudal society was a natural product of the autocratic government" and thus defended the contention that such abuses in modern China can be avoided only through far-reaching reforms to control abuse of authority. The RENMIN RIBAO article underscored the importance of reform with the warning that "the dictatorial powers of the eunuchs usually led to the downfall of the feudal dynasties."

In addition to building a case for reform, the articles implicitly raised questions about Hua Guofeng's political legitimacy by pointing to the danger that leaders might be placed in power through irregular means. The GUANGMING RIBAO article deplored the fact that eunuchs could "put an emperor on the throne or remove him as they wished"--a complaint which, by analogy, could also raise questions about the role of current leaders, such as Vice Chairman Ye Jianying, in Hua's rise to power. Even more pointedly, an anecdote in the same article seemed almost to mirror Hua's ascension through the personal intervention of Mao. It recalled the eunuch Gao Lishi, who was the "most trusted eunuch" of an emperor who "led a fast life in the palace and left government affairs to Gao." "Showing his deep confidence in Gao Lishi," the article noted, "the emperor said he could sleep soundly while Gao was on duty." The statement attributed to the emperor comes remarkably close to duplicating Mao's widely publicized expression of confidence in Hua in 1976--"With you in charge I am at ease"--that became the early justification for Hua's leadership. The article then noted Gao's extralegal means of gaining authority were "how the eunuchs' dictatorial power took shape," implying that failure to repudiate Hua's rise to power would perpetuate the discredited system.

PRECONGRESS POLITICKING

The use of allegorical articles to attack Hua and his backers suggests that his status remains the center of controversy before the National People's Congress and the 12th Party Congress, scheduled for late this year or early 1981. According to PRC officials interviewed by foreign reporters, the NPC is expected to accept Hua's resignation as premier in favor of Zhao Ziyang. But Hua, unlike other leaders expected to resign posts, has not publicly acquiesced in these plans despite obvious opportunities to do so--most recently in a written interview with a Yugoslav journalist aired by XINHUA on 10 August. By recalling the weak base of Hua's legitimacy, the articles serve to undermine support for Hua during the upcoming meetings and lay the groundwork for moves to unseat him from his posts at the head of the party and its military commission.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 18-24 AUGUST 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,123 items)			Beijing (637 items)		
Presidential Directive 59 on U.S. Nuclear Strategy	6%	(--)	Presidential Candidate Reagan's China Policy	10%	(--)
CPSU CC Approval of Crimea Meetings	5%	(--)	Vice-Presidential Candidate George Bush in PRC	4%	(--)
Afghanistan			Vietnam		
National Day	4%	(--)	Vietnamese-Kampuchean Dispute	3%	(2%)
Situation	3%	(3%)	Former SRV Official Hoang Van Hoan Speech	3%	(--)
Brezhnev Crimea Meeting MPR's Tsedenbal	4%	(6%)	Jordan Parliamentary Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)
Romania's Liberation Anniversary	3%	(--)			
Alleged U.S. Plans for Attack on Iran	2%	(--)			

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Settlement of Polish strike crisis:
  Warsaw cautiously optimistic
  Moscow reaction guarded
- Beijing on Governor Reagan's China Policy

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4 SEPTEMBER 1980
FB TM 80-036

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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POLAND

Warsaw has been cautiously optimistic in its initial publicity on the 31 August settlement of the lengthy strike in the Gdansk-Szczecin coastal region, evincing satisfaction that the crisis is over, while pointing out that difficulties remain to be overcome. Polish media have fully publicized the details of the settlement, including the unprecedented agreements regarding free trade unions, taking pains to point out at the same time that the workers recognize the leading role of the communist party in Polish society. Moscow has shown disapproval of the settlement by refraining from publicizing any details of the free trade union agreement and by withholding any praise of the Polish regime's handling of the crisis. Soviet media have also seized on and embellished Polish media warnings that "antisocialist forces" are still trying to exploit the situation, an accusation that could be used to undermine the credibility of the Polish workers movement, and hence ultimately the legitimacy of the settlement reached with it.

WARSAW WELCOMES SETTLEMENT, WARNS OF DIFFICULT TIMES AHEAD

Polish comment has endorsed the strike agreement in restrained terms, stressing that the unprecedented concessions were a necessary step and warning at the same time that implementation of the settlement will be a complex task. Warsaw radio's press review on 1 September observed that although the negotiations in Gdansk and Szczecin were "not easy," they had been successful, and added that "all commentators" note that despite the conflicts, Poles are united by responsibility for the country's fate. TRYBUNA LUDU on the 1st commented that the settlement had achieved "what we all want, . . . calm, work, and normal life above all," and that implementation of the changes must be carried out "cautiously." Two days later the nonparty daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY warned that for the changes to be carried out, "there has to be time" and public discussion "in accordance with the Constitution. Also on the 3d, the trade union daily GLOS PRACY declared that all aspects of the trade union question were open for discussion, except one--the role of the party as the "supreme and only" guarantor of workers rights.

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SETTLEMENT TERMS Warsaw radio and PAP on the 1st summarized at length the apparently identical Gdansk and Szczecin strike agreements, the texts of which were to be published in ZYCIE WARSZAWY and GLOS PRACY the next day. Stressing that the new trade unions would be both independent and in harmony with the existing trade union system, Warsaw radio reported that "in creating new, independent, and self-governing trade unions, the interfactory strike committee states that it will adhere to the principles in the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic." The radio added that the new unions do not intend to play the role of a political party but recognize the PZPR's leading role and will not undermine "the established system of international alliances."

The agreement, in turn, stated that the government "will guarantee and ensure full respect for the independence and self-government of the new trade unions." Further underscoring the new unions' independence, the agreement specified that they "will not be part of the association represented by the Central Council of Trade Unions" and that "the right to strike will be guaranteed" in the new trade union bill now being drafted. On other controversial issues, the reported agreement listed types of published materials that will still be subject to censorship--such as those injurious to the interests of the state and public morals--rather than those that will be exempted. It provided for more access to the media by the Catholic Church, an inquiry into dismissals from work of persons involved in the 1970 and 1976 strikes, and the freeing of all political prisoners.

"ANTISOCIALIST FORCES" A subordinate but persistent theme in Polish commentary since the beginning of the crisis has been the charge that "antisocialist" elements have been attempting to exploit the troubles by gaining influence over the workers movement and using it to the detriment of Poland and socialism. That notion had been advanced in Polish commentary even before Gierek mentioned it in his 18 August speech to the nation, it reemerged sporadically in the media as the crisis developed in the next two weeks, and it has resurfaced since the settlement was achieved. While the charge clearly lends itself to use by conservative political forces to discredit the workers movement, it also appears to have been used during the crisis by supporters of the strike movement to warn workers against pushing their demands too far. Whatever the uses to which the charge has thus far been put, the suggestion that the workers are in some way linked with outright enemies of the Polish state is potentially damaging to the settlement and is not likely to be neglected in the futu. by those who wish to reverse the developments of recent days in Po and.

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MOSCOW STRESSES CONTINUED DANGER FROM "ANTISOCIALIST" FORCES

Moscow has made it clear in its initial reaction to the Polish settlement that it is dissatisfied with the results but does not intend any forceful action to revise them. It has shown particular sensitivity over the free trade union issue, both by obscuring the details of the Polish agreement on this question and by stressing the necessity for the communist party's role as the unchallenged leader of the working class. It has also picked up and embellished Polish statements on the continuing danger from "antisocialist" elements bent on subverting the country's communist system.

Intent on shielding the Soviet domestic audience from the details of the agreement on independent trade unions, both foreign and domestic Moscow reports on the Polish settlement have said only that there was an agreement on "a series of socioeconomic matters" that enabled the resumption of work in Gdansk, Szczecin, and other areas of the country. Moscow's most authoritative commentary in the wake of the agreement--a Petrov article in PRAVDA on 1 September--did not even note that a settlement had been reached and work had resumed. A Glazunov commentary, broadcast to foreign audiences on the 2d, simply repeated the vague TASS and domestic media reports on an agreement on "socioeconomic matters."

Soviet comment has drawn from the Polish press warnings that the party's role as the sole representative of the workers is being eroded by "antisocialist" forces, which are attempting to exploit the workers movement. Thus the Petrov PRAVDA article observed at the outset that "the Polish press is at present devoting attention to the fact that the antisocialist elements are not letting up" in their efforts to exploit the situation in order to "aggravate both political and economic difficulties." In a veiled allusion to the free trade union issue, Petrov charged that the antisocialist elements in Poland want to "destroy the link between the party and the working class." IZVESTIYA on the 2d carried a TASS commentary under the heading "Dangerous Intrigues," which reviewed at length an article in the 30-31 August TRYBUNA LUDU assailing dissidents Kuron and Michnik for providing grist for the antisocialist mills abroad and for trying to steer the workers' "correct" economic demands into political channels. And the Glazunov talk portrayed the Polish press as "speaking anxiously" about the continuing antisocialist threat.

Soviet media have documented their charges that Polish antisocialists are receiving foreign support by citing recent statements by President Carter and Governor Reagan in support of the Polish strikers and by denouncing financial assistance for their cause from Western

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trade unions. The latter issue was raised in a Moscow broadcast to Poland on the 3d, which said such sums were supporting those working at "undermining the foundations of the socialist system in Poland." Similarly, a Kornilov commentary carried by TASS on the 4th, which denounced the French Socialist Party's sympathy for the Polish strikers, stressed that the Western trade unions' financial aid is "in no way intended for Polish trade unions, which truly represent" the Polish workers, but for "antisocialist" forces--a transparent implication that the new independent trade unions are antisocialist. The Glazunov commentary branded as "hypocrisy" a recent statement by President Carter voicing concern for the rights of the Polish trade unions.

MOSCOW ON GIEREK Moscow's treatment of PZPR First Secretary Edward Gierek during the strike crisis has been guarded and circumspect, presumably reflecting the USSR's concern to keep its options open with regard to any future developments in the Polish leadership situation. TASS and PRAVDA quoted Gierek's self-critical admission, in his 18 August address, that an important role in Poland's current economic problems had been played by his regime's "mistakes in economic policy." TASS also reported the Polish leader's similarly self-critical remarks in his speech at the 24 August PZPR plenum, at which a major personnel shakeup was carried out, including the rehabilitation of Gierek's chief rival, Stefan Olszowski. TASS, in a report attributed to PAP, quoted Gierek to the effect that the new appointees included individuals who had earlier perceived the growing irregularities in economic management and tried to correct them but "whose voices we had not heeded in time." The PRAVDA report of this speech softened Gierek's self-criticism somewhat by dropping his remark that the rehabilitated persons' voices had not been heeded. On 30 August TASS reported a statement by U.S. communist leader Gus Hall, already publicized by East Berlin, that the Polish strikes had resulted from "weaknesses in the leadership."

Even before the current crisis, there had been indications that Moscow was seeking to maintain a degree of freedom of maneuver with regard to Gierek. For example, the Soviet representatives at the 22 July National Day reception at the Polish Embassy in Moscow were of a lower rank this year than in recent years. Also, in this year's series of Crimea meetings between Brezhnev and East European leaders, the term "unanimity"--a feature of the reports on the Soviet leader's talks with all the other orthodox bloc visitors--did not appear in the account of his 31 July meeting with Poland's Gierek.

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EAST EUROPEANS REFLECT CAUTION, CONCERN OVER SETTLEMENT

Moscow's East European allies have reacted cautiously, while reflecting varying levels of concern, in their initial treatment of the Polish strike settlement. Poland's two immediate neighbors, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, have gone to the greatest lengths to imply disapproval of the concessions, while Bulgaria and Hungary have taken a more restrained approach. The independent-minded Romanians and Yugoslavs have obliquely cautioned Moscow against interfering in Poland. Thus far, only Belgrade and Budapest have reported explicitly that free trade unions have been authorized, although several other countries referred broadly to a new trade union arrangement.

GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA The most critical treatment of the Polish situation has come from East Berlin and Prague. In addition to attacking Western comment on the Polish settlement, East Germany cited remarks by U.S. communist Gus Hall, who blamed Polish leadership "weaknesses" and "deformation of socialist methods" for the unrest. It apparently also took liberties in reporting on the Petrov PRAVDA article, subtly revising one passage to imply dissatisfaction with the regime's acceptance of the demands. While the PRAVDA version reported that Polish Government commissions have "practically accepted for consideration the demands put forward by the workers' representatives," the East German party daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 2 September stated that the commissions have "practically accepted the demands which had been put forward" and made several other omissions, leaving it unclear whether the demands were from workers' representatives or "antisocialist elements."*

Prague, for its part, has issued a heavy volume of reports, mostly citing Polish sources, calling Warsaw's attention to its socialist and alliance obligations. The party daily RUDE PRAVO on 1 and 3 September implied it had reservations about the settlement when it cited foreign sources disparaging "so-called free trade unions" and expressing doubts about the regime's ability to fulfill all the approved economic demands. A 31 August Prague television commentary hinted at Warsaw's international responsibilities when it used the anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland as an object lesson on the importance of Poland's alliance with the USSR.

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* East Berlin's altering of the Petrov article recalls its similar editing of a speech by Brezhnev last October, when it sharpened a warning by the Soviet leader to Bonn about missile deployment.

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BULGARIA, HUNGARY Sofia and Budapest, each of which has been relatively untroubled by labor unrest, have been more restrained in their treatment of the Polish events. The Bulgarian party daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO on 31 August, in the most candid Soviet bloc report on the trade union arrangement, cited PAP to the effect that the agreement provides a "satisfactory solution" to the problem of the reorganization of the trade unions and that "the new trade unions will have a socialist character." The next day RABOTNICHESKO DELO reported the "great satisfaction" of the Polish people with the settlement agreement, a point which generally has been ignored by other Soviet bloc countries. Hungary has generally steered clear of controversial political issues in its reportage of the Polish events. However, Budapest radio on 1 September appeared to reflect at least grudging acceptance of the agreement when it cited TRYBUNA LUDU as saying that the pact effectively restricts the activities of opponents of socialist Poland.

ROMANIA Bucharest delivered a thinly veiled warning to Moscow in its first comment on the Polish situation, a SCINTEIA article on 28 August, when it declared that Poland is "fully capable and has the inalienable right to solve by itself, with no outside interference, the internal problems that have emerged." The article also expressed disapproval of strikes as a method of solving problems. Bucharest reflected concern over the implications of free trade unions in a later SCINTEIA article, reported by AGERPRES on 31 August, which defended Romania's single, party-controlled union and stressed its continuing responsiveness to workers' concerns.

YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade has continued to issue the most extensive reportage from East Europe on the Polish situation, including the content of the trade union agreement, and it has cautioned Moscow against comment which could be construed as interference. The clearest Yugoslav warning on this subject came in a report by outspoken commentator Milika Sundic, carried by Belgrade and Zagreb radios on 1 September. Portraying the settlement as a victory for all Poles, Sundic asserted that it would "not be a wise thing if anyone else, apart from the Poles themselves, were to impose his own interpretation" on what has happened. He specifically warned against attempts, both within and "outside" Poland, to "ascribe to the strikers something they neither wished nor wanted," adding that any further attempt to do this "is something that one has to be afraid of." Other comment, reflecting Yugoslavia's own workers self-management system, has portrayed favorably the new "self-managing" Polish trade unions as demonstrating a trend toward a more democratic kind of Polish socialism. Thus TANJUG on 31 August defended the Polish workers' demands to reform the system and asserted that "obsolete social relations of the Polish model of socialism required new forms of socialist democracy of which there had been none in practice."

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C H I N A - U. S. - U S S R

PRC REJECTS REAGAN CHINA POLICY, FOCUSES ON STRATEGIC GOALS

Beijing's authoritative rejection of Governor Reagan's formal statement on his support for "official" U.S. relations with Taiwan has reflected with remarkable clarity China's fundamental interests and concerns in the Sino-U.S. relationship. Addressing the implications of what it portrayed as a policy that would inevitably harm Sino-U.S. relations, a 28 August RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article stressed that Beijing's ties with Washington are of importance not because of any one-sided gains for China but because of the central role they play in the mutual aim of opposing the Soviet Union. While directly criticizing Governor Reagan's interpretation of the Taiwan Relations Act and condemning the Act itself, the article suggested that Beijing has been willing to mute its views on the legislation only as long as it was confident that the U.S. Administration would not violate the basic principles of the Sino-U.S. agreement normalizing relations. The article was emphatic in its arguments but seemed deliberately couched in language aimed at persuading more than condemning and at leaving open a door for further dialogue.

The 28 August Commentator article was the first authoritative Chinese press comment on Governor Reagan's China policy since a similar article appeared in RENMIN RIBAO on 14 June. Beijing apparently felt compelled to state its position formally after deciding that the 25 August Reagan-Bush press conference had failed to reveal any fundamental shift in Governor Reagan's policies following lower level PRC press criticism and Chinese consultations with vice-presidential candidate Bush during his 20-23 August visit to Beijing. Evaluating the implications of Governor Reagan's "erroneous" policy, Commentator warned that, if implemented, "it would inevitably lead to grave retrogression" in bilateral relations and have a "serious adverse effect" on strategic cooperation.

STRATEGIC CONNECTION

The Commentator article was unusually explicit regarding the deep interlocking connection the PRC sees between the bilateral and strategic aspects of the Sino-U.S. relationship. It stated that Beijing views Washington's China policy as "one of the most important criteria" for judging U.S.

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foreign policy and strategic decisionmaking, since the common "struggle against hegemonism" would be seriously harmed by "any action detrimental to Sino-U.S. relations." Therefore, the article suggested, Governor Reagan's staunch anti-Soviet posture--often cited favorably by Beijing during the primary campaign--and his pledge to cooperate with all countries against Soviet aggression would amount to nothing but "empty talk" unless he revised his stand on the Taiwan question.

TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT The article reacted strongly to Governor Reagan's position on the Taiwan Relations Act. Providing the clearest public Chinese statement yet on the subject, Commentator declared that China could not accept a policy that completely ignored the principles of the 1979 joint communique on Sino-U.S. normalization of relations and was based solely on the "so-called" Taiwan Relations Act. The article maintained that a "mere domestic U.S. act" can "in no way" provide a juridical basis for Sino-U.S. relations. In a protracted assault on the document--Beijing's only authoritative comment since Foreign Minister Huang Hua first criticized the provisions of the bill then before the Congress at a 16 March meeting with Ambassador Woodcock--Commentator stated that "many parts" of the Taiwan Relations Act contravene the principles of normalization and amount to continued unacceptable U.S. interference in China's internal affairs. The latter objection also had been raised in a 15 July XINHUA article which had charged that the Republican Party platform's pledge to give "priority consideration to Taiwan's defense requirements" and oppose the use of force to alter Taiwan's status constituted such interference.

The 28 August article strongly implied that Beijing, despite its opposition to the Taiwan Relations Act, has not forcefully raised the issue--since the Act was passed by Congress in late March 1979--only because President Carter had promised to "act in a manner consistent with" the normalization communique and the U.S. Government had "taken some positive actions" to promote "considerable progress" in Sino-U.S. relations. Portraying the development of a new situation, the article maintained that Governor Reagan is attempting to impose on China a U.S. domestic act and "has gone even farther" than the provisions of the Act permit by insisting on restoring "official" ties between the United States and Taiwan. Therein, said Commentator, lies the danger of retrogression in Sino-U.S. relations.

FUTURE RELATIONS While clearly stating Beijing's opposition to Governor Reagan's policies, the 28 August Commentator article was far less strident than a nonauthoritative 19 August RENMIN RIBAO commentary on the eve of Ambassador Bush's visit to China. The earlier commentary had argued bitterly that Governor Reagan's "absurd" policy amounted to "sheer deception,"

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which would "destroy" the "basic principle" of normalization, and it implied that his program would even result in a rupture in relations.* The 28 August Commentator was devoid of personal invective and more ambiguous than the commentary regarding the "retrogression" that might occur in relations with the United States.

It seems likely that the relative restraint of the Commentator article was calculated, at least in part, to avoid closing all doors to an accommodation of Sino-U.S. interests should Governor Reagan be elected. The article left open the suggestion that he might shift his position when it noted that his policy had become a source of "grave difficulties" for him--a notion put forward by Beijing in June and stressed thereafter in its reporting on the presidential campaign. It concluded on a tentative note: "Whither goes Reagan, we shall wait and see."

Beijing may also be concerned that it would hurt its case if it were perceived to be meddling in the U.S. election. A 23 August XINHUA correspondents commentary seemed to be attempting to counter charges of favoritism by expressing China's willingness to work for improved relations with the United States "irrespective of partisanship." A 24 August RENMIN RIBAO signed article responded bitterly to Senator Goldwater's allegation of such interference, deriding the senator for having "turned things upside down" and maintaining that China's protest against Governor Reagan's "shocking interference" in Chinese affairs was only "necessary and proper."

BACKGROUND Beijing media since June have closely followed Governor Reagan's position on the desirability of official U.S. relations with Taiwan. Chinese warnings against such a policy reached a peak on the eve of vice-presidential candidate Bush's 20-23 August visit to China, which Beijing appeared to view as a tactic to pressure it into acquiescing to Governor Reagan's position. During the visit Beijing signaled continuing problems by describing Ambassador Bush's discussions with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping as "serious and frank." Beijing's view of the results of the trip were summed up in a 23 August XINHUA commentary that bluntly stated that Ambassador Bush had "failed to reassure China." While not normally an authoritative vehicle, such XINHUA commentaries have been used to provide quasi-official Chinese evaluations of important foreign visits.

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* The 19 August commentary is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August 1980, pages 6-7.

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MOSCOW CLAIMS BEIJING, REAGAN ACCORD ON SOVIET POLICIES

Moscow has exploited Chinese criticism of Governor Reagan to score propaganda points against Beijing's Taiwan policy. However, despite its concern over what it sees as the Carter Administration's tilt toward China in the last two years, Moscow has shown no sign of sympathy for the Republican ticket because of its stance on the Sino-U.S. relationship.

Soviet media focused on evidence of agreement between Beijing and Ambassador Bush during his visit on a platform of anti-Sovietism rather than on their discord over Taiwan. Moscow radio's 25 August report to the domestic audience on the visit professed puzzlement at Beijing's apparent displeasure, maintaining that Ambassador Bush had been "at pains to display to the Chinese the pearls of anti-Sovietism embodied in the Republican platform." A TASS commentary on the 24th, attacking Ambassador Bush's remarks about the USSR during his visit, concluded that "they can remain calm in Beijing."

A TASS commentary on 3 September, taking note of China's continuing criticism of Governor Reagan, assailed Beijing's position on the "two Chinas" question. TASS dismissed what it called China's protracted "anti-Reagan campaign" as an effort to hide from the Chinese people the fact that a "sell-out" of their countrymen in Taiwan had been a condition for rapprochement with the United States. The response from the Republican candidates, TASS concluded, demonstrates that China can hope for no more from Washington than "junior partner" status.

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USSR-IRAN

USSR CHIDES IRAN ON AFGHAN ISSUE, MUTES BILATERAL DIFFERENCES

Soviet irritation with Iran's opposition to the Afghan regime has been registered at the highest level with an implicit rebuke from Soviet President Brezhnev. And both Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko have again pressed for "understandings" between Afghanistan and its neighbors to reduce tensions in the area. At the same time, Moscow continues to try to mute public exchanges with Tehran over contentious bilateral issues. A Gromyko response to complaints about Soviet policies from his Iranian counterpart explained that since Iran had published its views, the Soviet Union was replying so that "uninformed people" in Iran would not be "misled." But the Gromyko letter was broadcast only to Persian audiences and given no other publicity in Soviet media.

BREZHNEV REMONSTRANCE Brezhnev briefly touched on Iran in the course of a general review of the situation in Asia for his Kazakh audience in Alma-Ata on 29 August. He offered pro forma criticism of the United States for using Iran as a "pretext" for worsening the international situation and accelerating the arms race. Although he called the economic blockade of Iran and the U.S. military buildup in the area "inadmissible," he did not go on to recall his November 1978 warning that interference--especially military--in Iranian affairs would be regarded as affecting Soviet security interests.

Brezhnev did use some of the language of his November 1978 PRAVDA interview when he again supported the Iranian people's right to decide themselves "by which road they are to advance." But he pointedly chided the Iranians for not observing that principle in their relations with their neighbors. Other states, he said, "and primarily its neighbors, have the right to expect the same approach from the leaders of Iran." A Persian-language commentary broadcast two days later underscored Brezhnev's message. It asserted that the inalienable right of the Iranian people to decide their own path was also the obvious right of other nations, "including the people of Afghanistan."

GROMYKO REBUTTAL The Soviet Foreign Minister contemptuously dismissed outgoing Iranian Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh's "irresponsible behavior" and "misrepresentation" of

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Soviet policy and insisted that the USSR's position on Afghanistan was "completely clear" and needed no explanation. In his letter, as reported in a Persian broadcast on the 28th, Gromyko stressed that only the Afghan people and their government could settle their domestic affairs. Implicitly supporting the Afghan Government's proposal of last May for talks with neighboring Iran and Pakistan, as Brezhnev did in his Alma-Ata speech, Gromyko in effect pressed Tehran to recognize the Kabul regime. Iran, he said, could play a part in overcoming tensions by declaring its readiness to hold talks with the "legal government" of Afghanistan.

As for the differences between Moscow and Tehran over the respective diplomatic representations, Gromyko implied that the Soviet Government was in no hurry to accommodate Iran. He said both countries were "studying practical issues" such as the "number of personnel in organizations related to both countries and their consulates." But he indicated that the Soviet side would not be ready to negotiate outstanding problems until "both sides" expressed their "good will and desire to find an acceptable solution."

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CHINA-VIETNAM

BEIJING STEPS UP PRESSURE, CALLS FOR OVERTHROW OF SRV LEADERSHIP

Beijing used the occasion of the 35th Vietnamese National Day to put further pressure on the SRV, raising the contention again that China has the right to "counterattack" if provoked and calling directly for a "second revolution" to overthrow the Vietnamese leadership. Beijing surfaced yet another Vietnamese official who had defected to China and linked the overthrow of the Le Duan regime with improving Sino-Vietnamese relations, which suggests it is writing off a rapproachment with the current SRV Government.

RECEPTION FOR SRV DEFECTORS

Premier-designate Zhao Ziyang hosted a 2 September SRV National Day banquet honoring Vietnamese defectors to China--former Vietnamese Communist Party Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan and former South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government Justice Minister Truong Nhu Tang. At the banquet Zhao proposed a toast "to the victory of the second revolution" and to the friendship of the Chinese and Vietnamese people. His remarks, echoing the main themes of a speech Hoan had published to mark the anniversary, gave the impression that China is fostering an opposition force to challenge the current Hanoi regime. Hoan and Tang also toasted the "second revolution" according to the XINHUA account of the banquet.

ANNIVERSARY MESSAGES

Beijing's national day greetings were also consistent with a Chinese commitment to undermine Hanoi. This year's message differed from last year's pledge to "strive to maintain Sino-Vietnamese friendship" by stressing that the Chinese people will continue "to strive tirelessly to restore and develop" Sino-Vietnamese friendship. In the context of other anniversary comment, it seems clear that Beijing is convinced the restoration and development of friendly relations will require the overthrow of the Le Duan leadership. A message calling for the "overcoming of all difficulties in restoring and developing friendly relations" was also sent this year by the China-Vietnam Friendship Association--a group that had not been involved in Vietnamese National Day activities since 1977 when it hosted a reception.

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HOANG VAN HOAN SPEECH AND POETRY

Hoan's speech had originally been given during a visit to Yunnan in January and publicized by XINHUA on 1 February for the 50th anniversary of the Vietnamese Communist Party.* The new version of the speech, released by XINHUA on 15 August and broadcast almost daily in Beijing's Vietnamese service, uses much harsher rhetoric than the original in characterizing Vietnam's internal situation and strengthens the call to overthrow the Le Duan regime and restore friendly relations with China by calling this the "most important task of the Vietnamese revolution." Beijing has also announced that 40 of Hoan's poems, repeating the theme of Sino-Vietnamese people's friendship, would be translated into Chinese and published to commemorate Vietnam's 35th anniversary. According to XINHUA accounts of 1 and 2 September, the preface, written by Hu Qiaomu, member of the CCP Secretariat and prominent theorist, suggests that the poetry be read together with the poems of Ho Chi Minh because they show that the hearts of great Vietnamese revolutionary leaders are close to the Chinese people. Hu also says that traditional Sino-Vietnamese friendship will "sweep away all obstacles in its course" and that the Vietnamese people will eventually "overthrow the new oppressors and become the masters of their own destiny."

While both versions of the Hoan speech strongly condemn various SRV policies, the latest account goes further in describing the conditions that justify revolt. It even compares the present "dictatorial" leadership unfavorably with the South Vietnamese regimes of Diem and Thieu, saying that at least under Thieu the people "dared to comment on this and that" whereas they have now come under the "absolute control" of the secret police. The original section on the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship has been expanded to show more convincingly that the SRV leaders have "betrayed the national interest" by making the country "purely an appendage" of a "foreign power."

Hoan's revised speech warns that China not only "will not tolerate" Hanoi's repeated provocations forever, but also will not "refrain from striking back." The Chinese warning, conveyed indirectly through Hoan, is in keeping with PRC statements reflecting a potentially more belligerent policy toward Vietnam since the SRV incursion into Thailand in June, although Chinese media in recent months have not reported any PRC leader declaring that China reserves the right to teach Vietnam a "second lesson."** In response to the SRV incursion

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* The earlier version of the speech is examined in the TRENDS of 13 February 1980, pages 12-13.

** Beijing's warning to Hanoi following the SRV incursion into Thailand is discussed in the TRENDS of 2 July 1980, pages 10-13. Chinese warnings following increased reports of border incidents are covered in the TRENDS of 9 July 1980, pages 6-8.

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into Thailand, Chinese media renewed dormant authoritative pledges to take Thailand's side against Vietnam and heightened attention to SRV provocations along the Sino-Vietnamese border.

In addition, Hoan's revised speech--unlike the earlier versions--refers to the uprisings of national minorities in a manner suggesting that Beijing may be contemplating more active support of ethnic tribal insurgency. Hoan specifically noted that the Rhades and Khmers, because of unequal treatment and ethnic discrimination, "have risen in defiance, overtly or covertly, of Le Duan and company." In January and May of this year, Beijing had reported armed rebellion by minorities in Vietnam but made no mention of the groups involved and attributed the information to the PRC-based clandestine radio Voice of Democratic Kampuchea or to foreign sources.* Beijing's renewed attention to Vietnamese insurgents comes in the wake of Chinese reports beginning in mid-July of activities of the Lao National Liberation Front and other Laotian resistance forces inside Laos.

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* Treatment of the Vietnamese central highlands resistance movement by VODK is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 January 1980, pages 33-34.

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U S S R

PRAVDA HINTS AT LABOR UNREST, NATIONALITY TENSIONS IN ABKHAZIA

Signs of labor unrest and nationalist tensions have resurfaced in Abkhazia, an autonomous republic in Soviet Georgia long noted for its national assertiveness. A PRAVDA account of an editor's visit to the region contained many references to complaints about problems allegedly created by local troublemakers. Earlier this summer reports of an extensive shakeup of local officials and a series of high-level inspection tours of the area had suggested that something was amiss in Abkhazia. The recent disturbances may have been connected with the broader public discontent over food shortages and working conditions, which, according to Western news reports, resulted in work stoppages in several places in the Soviet Union during May and June.

LOCAL AGITATION The PRAVDA article, published on 16 August, depicted a restive situation in Abkhazia that was being aggravated by local agitators. A foreman of the Tkvarcheli power station, for example, informed the editor that "loafers and parasites" had been complaining that the local population was being "treated badly." He also referred to an "orator" who had been trying to stir up the area's miners. The editor reported other "slanderers" and "demagogues" who had been busy "collecting and spreading rumors and absurdities." The situation was compounded, according to the editor, by weak-kneed party leaders who were afraid to take a strong stand against the agitators. He cited one example of a party official who strongly condemned subversive activities at an aktiv meeting but then joined others in supporting "slanderers" in another forum.

Although the editor did not specify the cause of the current tensions, he indicated that economic problems were high on the agenda of official concerns. Noting that almost half the able-bodied population was without work in some areas of the autonomous republic, he reported that half a billion rubles were slated for investment in the Abkhazian economy during the "next few years." Abkhazia's economic woes were also exposed in an 18 March SOVETSKAYA ABKHAZIYA article which reported that in recent years the area had not once fulfilled its plan for labor productivity and that currently this indicator was well below the national average.

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LEADERSHIP MOVES Reports in the local press indicate that Georgian leaders have been paying close attention to the situation in Abkhazia during the past several months. Georgian party chief Shevardnadze recently completed a three-day tour of Abkhazia, during which he displayed particular concern for local living and working conditions, as well as for local cultural sensitivities, according to reports in the 13-15 and 17 August ZARYA VOSTOKA. Georgian Second Secretary Kolbin had visited Abkhazia on three reported occasions since early June, personally overseeing a broad leadership shakeup and looking into local grievances. On a visit to the coal mining center of Tkvarcheli, for example, Kolbin and other top republic officials attended an aktiv meeting that discussed efforts to improve housing, industry, and cultural facilities, and they inspected local workers' living and working conditions, according to a report in 27 July ZARYA VOSTOKA.

Kolbin's visits to Abkhazia appear to have been intended in part to supervise leadership changes in the autonomous republic. A shakeup was apparently initiated in early June, when Kolbin attended a meeting of the Abkhazian obkom that called for a "radical restructuring" of party cadres. The session "severely criticized" party workers in the autonomous republic's three principle gorkoms and in two of its five raykoms, and within a little more than a month the Abkhazian obkom and all but one of the censured party organizations reported changes in their top leaderships. The shakeup in Gagra gorkom was personally supervised by Kolbin during a return visit to Abkhazia, according to a report in 6 July ZARYA VOSTOKA.

BACKGROUND There has been a long history of tensions between the Abkhazians and the Georgian leadership, which reached a peak in 1978 when new local constitutions were being discussed. At that time Abkhazian leaders appealed to Moscow to transfer their autonomous republic from Georgia to the RSFSR, complaining of discrimination and the use of Georgian as an official language.* The Soviet leaders were concerned enough over this unrest to dispatch CPSU Central Committee Secretary Kapitonov to deal personally with the situation. Kapitonov acknowledged the legitimacy of many of the Abkhazians' complaints and promised them broad economic and cultural concessions, including their own university and television station. As the recent PRAVDA article noted, these are rather remarkable achievements for a group of only "83,000 persons."

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* These events are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 June 1978, pages 15-16, and 21 June 1978, pages 12-13.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 25-31 AUGUST 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,089 items)			Beijing (712 items)		
Kazakhstan Anniversary	18%	(--)	Presidential Candidate Reagan's China Policy	11%	(10%)
Brezhnev 28 August Speech	3%	(--)			
Brezhnev 29 August Speech	10%	(--)	Vice-Presidential Candidate George Bush in PRC	3%	(4%)
Soviet Proposal for Talks on Nuclear Missiles in Europe	4%	(--)			
			Kampuchea	7%	(3%)
Crimea Meetings	3%	(5%)	Soviet, Vietnamese Attempt To Unseat Democratic Kampuchea From UN	3%	(--)
Polish Situation	3%	(--)			
Brezhnev Speech at Soviet-Vietnamese Soyuz 37 Award Ceremony	3%	(--)	Hua Guofeng Meeting With Sihanouk	3%	(--)
			Palestine Al-Fatah Delegation in PRC	4%	(2%)
UNGA Session on Economic Issues	3%	(--)			
			Fifth National People's Congress Third Session	4%	(--)
Afghan Situation	3%	(3%)			
			Fifth Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee Third Session	3%	(--)

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CORRECTION TO THE 27 AUGUST 1980 TRENDS

In the 27 August 1980 TRENDS, page 3, the last sentence in the first paragraph of the article entitled "Soviet Concern Appears To Sharpen as Deadlock Continues" should read as follows: "In all cases except the latter, it published briefer accounts in the domestic media, presumably to shield the public from information deemed to be unduly alarming or disturbing."

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Polish leadership change:
  Kania support for strike settlement
  Soviet opposition to free trade unions

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

Regular FBIS analysis of Soviet media materials was first published in April 1947 in a weekly mimeographed report entitled SURVEY OF USSR RADIO BROADCASTS. A companion SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS was instituted in October 1950, and both SURVEYS appeared after that date on a fortnightly basis. Also in October 1950 a weekly TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS was instituted, providing a capsule two-page summary of material elaborated in the USSR SURVEY; a counterpart two-page PEKING TRENDS was begun two years later.

In July 1958 the four publications were amalgamated into two to provide a single fortnightly SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA and a single weekly three-page TRENDS, in both instances expanding the sources to encompass the communist world.

In early 1965 the page limitation on the TRENDS was lifted, primarily to allow comprehensive coverage of the Vietnam war. With the gradual expansion of the TRENDS in other areas, in April 1970 the biweekly SURVEY was discontinued. TRENDS is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue.

The declassified FBIS SURVEYS and TRENDS are available in microform copies under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1968

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to current date

A contents page appears at the beginning of all issues of the SURVEYS and of each issue of the TRENDS after November 1969. To facilitate research, all contents pages are duplicated on a separate reel or fiche labeled "Contents." The briefer issues of the earlier TRENDS contain no contents pages and can best be search by date.

Much, but not all of the documentary material from communist media referred to in these publications appears in textual form in the various FBIS Daily Reports. Hence the analysis publications may serve as a shortcut to the location of significant documentary items. Both the TRENDS and SURVEYS contain information on volume and audience targeting of radio propaganda that cannot be gleaned from the Daily Reports.

Users are invited to cite the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as the source of information and interpretive comment in these publications.

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POLAND

The uncertainties clouding Poland's political future have been compounded by the sudden ouster of party leader Gierek and the elevation of the relatively obscure Stanislaw Kania to the post of party first secretary. The implications of the shift are ambiguous: some signs suggest that it signals an intention to put the brakes on concessions to the workers; others that it portends an intention to carry forward the reform settlement under a leadership capable of restoring and maintaining strong party morale. One qualification of the new leader that is not likely to have been underestimated by the Polish Politburo in his selection is that he is evidently acceptable to the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev made this clear immediately in a greetings message praising Kania personally and expressing confidence that he will help to preserve intact Poland's communist structure and its status in the Soviet bloc.

NEW LEADER KANIA PLEDGES STABILITY, ADHERENCE TO STRIKE ACCORDS

The new promotions in the Polish leadership apparently reflect an effort to strike a balance between the need to restore discipline and morale in the party and the need to demonstrate the regime's continued commitment to reform. Although there is little public evidence on the policy orientations of the new appointees, it is obvious that Kania, with his background as overseer of the police and the church, fits the role of skilled troubleshooter. The two party leaders raised to full Politburo status--Barcikowski and Zabinski--appear to be the tokens of the regime's loyalty to the strike settlement, the former having been the government's chief negotiator with the Szczecin strikers and the latter having spoken out in favor of the settlement at the Sejm session. The three new party secretaries--Kurowski, Grabski, and Wojtecki--appear to bring economic expertise particularly appropriate to the new problems posed by the settlement. Their biographies, carried by PAP on the 6th, feature backgrounds as experts in one or another field of administering the national economy.

In his initial public statement as party leader--a plenum speech on 5 September read on radio and television by an announcer--Kania pledged himself unequivocally to a faithful implementation of the

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agreements with the strikers. He also went out of his way to endorse the legitimacy of the strikers' grievances, bluntly accepting the regime's responsibility for "distortions and mistakes" in social and economic policy. On the trade union issue, he promised both a "renewal" of the existing trade union system and an acceptance of the "new trade unions," specifying that he would hold the workers to their promise that the new organizations would be loyal to socialism and the party. Showing the mailed fist beneath the velvet glove, Kania also alluded to the "antisocialist forces" who, he said, wish to exploit the present troubles for their own purposes. He promised to "defend decisively the cause of socialism and the vital interests of the peoples' state." Kania repeated the main points of his plenum speech in visits to Gdansk and Katowice on the 8th and 9th, respectively.

Pledges to carry out the strike agreements, combined with affirmations of loyalty to the Soviet Union, were the main feature of speeches by Premier Pinkowski and other participants in a debate in the Polish Sejm on 5 September, immediately preceding Gierek's ouster. The PAP report on the debate noted that Pinkowski "confirmed the pledges made by the government to the strike committees." It similarly cited new PZPR Politburo member Andrzej Zabinski as asserting that the party "is in favor of a full realization of the pledges made by the government to the strikers." Zabinski and other speakers were also said to have criticized the regime's past censorship policies as being too stringent.

Concurrently with the top leadership change, Warsaw media have warned of the dangers in the country's current situation. A Warsaw radio commentary on the 7th, in deploring the continued sporadic strikes and persisting tensions in the country, warned that new strikes and further demands--even "justified" ones--could jeopardize the agreements already arrived at with the strikers. And an article in the weekly KULTURA, reported by PAP on the 6th, called for vigilance against elements who want to exploit the strike situation in order to damage Poland's communist system and its "position in the socialist world." It added meaningfully that anyone who attacks the communist party's leading role "is playing with the national interests."

Other Warsaw comment suggests uneasiness and uncertainty over the workability of two different trade union systems--the official and the independent. Thus the PAP report on the 5 September Sejm debate included a statement by one participant deploring the likelihood of a "split" in the country's trade union movement and another expressing doubt whether authorization of free trade unions and the right to strike "will safeguard us from the emergence of distortions." Also on the 5th, TRYBUNA LUDU's editorial pleaded for cooperation between the two

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systems, noting that "no matter what the final organizational structure of trade unionism in the individual enterprises," the party wants "cooperation and not rivalry" among all unions. The need for continued trade union unity under the new setup was similarly underscored by new PZPR leader Kania during his Katowice visit on the 9th.

MOSCOW SUPPORTS NEW POLISH LEADERSHIP, SOUNDS TOUGHER NOTE

Brezhnev's greetings message to Kania on the 6th contained strong evidence that the Soviet Union was reassured by the change of leadership in Warsaw. More personal in its focus than the comparable message to Gierek in 1970, Brezhnev's telegram assessed Kania's behavior during the crisis as "showing principle, courage, and a high awareness of . . . communist duty." It also praised the new Polish leader as a defender of the party's leading role in Polish society and as a statesman who stood for "indissoluble friendship" with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

In its continuing reportage and comment on Polish events, Moscow appears to be adopting a more expressly hostile attitude toward the leaders of the Polish strike movement, evidently counting on discrediting the settlement by portraying them as motivated by "antisocialist" goals. This has been most notable with regard to the free trade union issue, clearly the most objectionable part of the Polish settlement from Moscow's viewpoint. In its most direct attack on the strike leaders, Moscow domestic radio on the 7th picked up a Vienna KURIER article which alleged that the strikes in the Gdansk region had been prepared long in advance and that strike leader Walesa had been illegally organizing "his free trade unions of the Baltic coast" for two years. Moscow has continued to avoid acknowledging that the Polish leadership has in fact agreed to the establishment of free trade unions, typically skipping over the issue or obscuring it in evasive language. In its reporting on Premier Pinkowski's report to the Sejm--which included two paragraphs on the trade union issue and on the government's commitment to "worker self-management"--TASS noted only that he "dwelt on the role of trade unions" and that he then declared: "We shall categorically oppose all attempts of the antisocialist forces to undermine our system . . . ."

Moscow has also continued to portray the trade union issue as one that has attracted the interest of international forces dedicated to exploiting the present crisis to the detriment of Poland and socialism. A 6 September PRAVDA article by A. Petrov bracketed President Carter and Secretary of Labor Marshall with U.S. labor union leaders Kirkland and Fraser as public supporters of "urgent financial" aid to "antisocialist groups in Poland," who are

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exploiting the strikes for "political" purposes. The article warned that U.S. leaders are "profoundly mistaken" if they think interference in Poland's internal affairs will "go unnoticed."

EAST EUROPEANS GREET KANIA, CONTINUE VARIED REACTIONS

Greetings messages to the new Polish party leader from Moscow's East European allies have expressed support for his efforts to solve the country's problems and strengthen socialism but have stopped short of the effusive praise for Kania in the Soviet message. East Germany and Czechoslovakia have continued to issue the sharpest warnings about internal and external threats to the Polish regime. The more moderate Hungarian position was voiced in a speech by party Politburo member and Secretary Ferenc Havasi on 6 September, who expressed confidence that the Poles can solve their own problems. Yugoslavia has continued its extensive coverage of the Polish situation, warning against any outside interference and portraying the leadership change as part of an effort by the party to regain the workers' trust. In Albania's first authoritative comment on the situation, a lengthy ZERI I POPULLIT editorial on the 7th criticized both the Polish regime and the workers' demands and called for "genuine" revolutionary changes.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW REMAINS VAGUE ON SCOPE, AGENDA OF ARMS TALKS OFFER

Moscow has provided few new details in the last two months on its 4 July offer to begin talks on limiting medium-range missiles in Europe together with U.S. forward-based systems (FBS). Soviet officials have been adamant in their demand that FBS be included in the negotiations but have otherwise professed flexibility on the scope and agenda of talks. A note of defensiveness in Moscow's public rationale for its new offer on negotiations suggests that the decision to drop preconditions demanded since last December has met with some misunderstanding, if not opposition, at home.

NEGOTIATING AGENDA Considering the detail with which Soviet officials described the threat allegedly posed by U.S. FBS when they first proposed medium-range arms talks last year, Moscow's commentary on the new proposal is notable for its vagueness in this regard.* Eschewing discussion of specific systems, Soviet officials have said that particulars concerning the scope, agenda, and definitions should be raised once the talks begin. Two of Moscow's chief spokesmen on the FBS issue last fall--Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the Central Committee International Department, and Lev Semeyko, USA and Canada Institute section chief--have said that the "many questions" raised by the West are properly the subject of negotiations. Semeyko, writing in London's THE GUARDIAN on 18 August, said such questions include the "definition of medium-range weapons and of the [term] medium-range itself" and ways to "reduce the swollen nuclear potentials" of the two sides. "The taste of a pudding lies in the eating," Moscow radio quoted Zagladin as saying on 27 July, "so let's get down to negotiations in earnest."

Moscow has said even less about which Soviet systems it is prepared to include in the negotiations, and commentary has not made it clear whether weapons other than Soviet missiles will be considered negotiable. Public references generally adhere to the narrow

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* Soviet commentary on U.S. forward-based systems since last fall is reviewed in detail in the 13 August 1980 FBIS SPECIAL MEMORANDUM entitled "Soviet Public Statements on U.S. Forward-Based Systems Since The June 1979 Vienna Summit."

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language of the official offer to discuss "medium-range nuclear missile weapons" and U.S. FBS, with an occasional reference to the more sweeping terms "medium-range nuclear weapons" or "means." In his PRAVDA interview last November, Soviet President Brezhnev used the broader language in calling for negotiations to limit medium-range nuclear "means" on both sides without singling out missile systems. At that time second-echelon regime officials implied that at least the Backfire bomber was among other Soviet systems Moscow was willing to discuss.

Tempering their flexibility on other aspects of the talks, Soviet officials have reacted sharply to suggestions in the West that the United States is balking over the inclusion of FBS on the agenda. CPSU Central Committee International Information Department Chief Leonid Zamyatin affirmed in a 30 June Moscow television interview that the Soviet Union considered these two issues part of a "single proposal" that could not be "broken into some kinds of parts."

EXPLANATION OF NEW PROPOSAL

Soviet officials and commentators have been at pains since mid-July to explain how the new offer of negotiations squares with Moscow's earlier position that NATO must first rescind its December decision on deploying new U.S. missiles in Europe. The 4 July joint party-government statement on FRG Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow attempted to gloss over the turnabout in Moscow's position by maintaining that the earlier proposal was still on the table. Moscow's defensiveness on this question was apparent in subsequent radio and press commentaries which endeavored to show that Moscow has not acceded to the West's terms for talks. An authoritative 15 July PRAVDA editorial article attempted to set the record straight by explaining that Moscow still preferred to proceed from the Brezhnev proposal of last October--reducing Soviet medium-range weapons if NATO dropped its new missile plans--but that since this possibility was now "blocked" by NATO's December decision, it was offering a new "variant." The editorial article denied that the new offer meant Moscow was "reconciled" to the NATO decision and was now entering talks on terms set by the West--a question posed directly by a Soviet reader to the trade union daily TRUD on 22 July. There is a "principled difference" between the latest Soviet proposal and the positions of the West, PRAVDA maintained--pointing to its insistence on the inclusion of U.S. FBS--and it is a "waste of effort" to attempt to prove the opposite.

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BRIEF

AFGHANISTAN: Soviet Paper Mentions "Combat" Duty

Moscow still has not explicitly acknowledged that Soviet troops in Afghanistan have a combat role, but a vague reference to "combat duties" appeared in a letter published in the 3 September KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. In his letter, a private described the life of his unit in Afghanistan in the usual generalities--helping "our friends" rebuff aggression and participating in solidarity rallies with Afghan youth. But in conclusion he said that after enjoying a concert by a group from Moscow, "we went back to our combat duties," and he expressed the hope that "shots will soon die down" in Afghanistan. The expression "svoy boyevoy naryad" may also be translated as "general military duties"; but given its use in the Afghan context, Soviet readers may give it the more martial connotation. Moscow's only known reference to casualties had appeared in the same paper on 13 June in a letter in which a mother mentioned the wounding of her son in Afghanistan without explaining how that had occurred.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 1-7 SEPTEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,232 items)		
Polish Situation	12%	(3%)
Reaction to Brezhnev 29 August Alma-Ata Speech	7%	(10%)
Socialist Republic of Vietnam 35th Anniversary	5%	(--)
Anniversary of Japanese Surrender After WW II	4%	(--)

Beijing (702 items)		
Fifth National People's Congress Third Session	25%	(4%)
Vietnam	12%	(--)
Vietnamese 25 August Foreign Ministry Memo	6%	(--)
Socialist Republic of Vietnam 35th Anniversary	3%	(--)
Japanese Foreign Minister Ito in PRC	6%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Soviet caution on Turkish coup
- Poland's neighbors on labor problems

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FBIS ANALYSES OF COMMUNIST MEDIA

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TURKEY

MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO TURKISH COUP, ACTIONS OF MILITARY

Moscow, in its sparse, circumspect reaction to the 12 September military takeover in Turkey, has appeared to welcome the prospect that the new regime will restore a measure of stability to a country that Soviet media had been depicting as on the verge of civil war. Showing its customary public caution toward internal developments in a country with which it seeks to cultivate relations, the Soviet Union typically seized on the new regime's expression of interest in maintaining ties with its neighbors. Thus far it has made only a passing allusion to any U.S. association with the military's action, calling it "extremely noteworthy" that first word of the takeover came from U.S. Department of State.

Moscow has offered little comment on the coup in Turkey and its generally factual reportage has for the most part been drawn from Ankara radio accounts. The Soviet Union was similarly circumspect following the last military intervention in 1971. TASS reports on the 12th appeared to justify the removal of Prime Minister Demirel's government by noting that the move had been preceded by a long period of instability and that the military leaders had "repeatedly" warned the politicians of the need to put an end to anarchy and terror. TASS noted without comment that all political activity had been banned and that the parliament, the government, and all political parties and trade unions had been dissolved.

Depicting the coup as aimed primarily at bickering politicians and extremist elements involved in terrorist activities, Moscow has avoided any specific mention of the military's moves against leftist political and trade union leaders. PRAVDA's Ankara correspondent, Aleksandr Filipov, reported on the 13th that the leaders of the "bourgeois organizations which struggle for power"--Demirel, Ecevit of the opposition Republican People's Party, and Erbakan of the "clerical" National Salvation Party--had been placed in the "protective custody" of the army, "but not arrested." Reflecting Moscow's long-held contention that the wave of violence that has plagued Turkey was perpetrated by extremists on the left and right, Filipov observed that after the military clampdown on extremist organizations, peace and order had been maintained and that "not a single clash between the troops and the population" had been registered. Filipov described the military government as "temporary in character" and added that the Turkish armed forces

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would hand over power to a civilian administration "as soon as the reasons for political instability in that country are removed."

Filipov refrained from playing up the country's links to the West and its membership in NATO--ties which Moscow has long portrayed as the root of Turkey's political, economic, and social problems. He went no further than to note that the military leadership had pledged to honor Turkey's international obligations and to remain faithful to its alliances and treaties, "including NATO." At the same time, he cited General Evren, the new Turkish head of state, as saying that Turkey was "fully resolved" to develop economic, social, and cultural ties with all states, and "first and foremost with its neighbors."

TURKISH COMMUNIST CLANDESTINE RADIO ASSAILS MILITARY TAKEOVER

The Turkish-language clandestine radio "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" (VOTCP) promptly denounced the 12 September military takeover in Turkey and called for unity of domestic forces in opposition to the "pro-American junta." A Turkish Communist Party (TCP) Central Committee statement, broadcast the day after the coup, appealed for resistance to the new regime by all patriotic elements, including soldiers and "anti-American religious masses." The statement and other comment contended that the coup was inspired by the United States and pressed the radio's traditional attacks on Ankara's ties with Washington and NATO. The older Turkish-language clandestine "Our Radio" similarly had claimed that the United States was behind the events in March 1971, when the military last unseated a Justice Party government led by Demirel.*

ALLEGATIONS OF U.S. ROLE

In keeping with the clandestine radios' long-standing and predominant theme that all of Turkey's ills result from the country's ties to the United States and NATO, the TCP statement was at pains to

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* "Our Radio" began broadcasting from East Europe in the late 1950's, when clandestine broadcasts to Greece and Iran were also initiated. The VOTCP was inaugurated in 1968 with broadcasts to Turkish emigrant workers to Germany and began broadcasting to Turkey in late 1974. Technical evidence suggests both radios use facilities in East Germany. "Our Radio" generally repeats VOTCP-originated material.

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demonstrate a U.S. link with the coup. The statement attributed to the U.S. State Department the first announcement of the takeover and asserted that the coup had been orchestrated by Washington. As further evidence of American complicity, it pointed to the "return from Washington" of Turkey's air force commander and the arrival in Ankara of NATO's southeast flank commander "one day prior to the coup." Implying that the takeover did not have wide support among Turkish military leaders, the TCP claimed that pro-American and pro-NATO generals--"recently promoted within the army"--had seized control through the chain of command, "which is in the hands of the Pentagon." The statement professed to see a contradiction between the military leadership's expressed loyalty to the country's Ataturkist principles and its adherence to NATO and the United States. It called NATO "the greatest threat to our national sovereignty" and warned that Turkey's bilateral agreements with the United States endangered Turkey's relations with "neighboring countries."

CRITICISM OF MILITARY, APPEALS TO LEFTIST FORCES

The TCP statement rejected the military's contention that the takeover was necessary to put an end to terrorism. Martial law provisions, it said, had already provided the generals with the appropriate channels and authority to confront this problem. The statement in effect said the military was in league with the extreme rightwing National Action Party (NAP) and the conservative Justice Party (JP), which the clandestine radios have vehemently assailed for years. Thus the statement ridiculed the military's "pretensions" to be just as much opposed to the NAP and the JP as it is to the leftists and said the generals had adopted the "reactionary and antipeople policies" of the government it had replaced and had abolished the democratic freedoms to which the NAP was "strongly" opposed.

In repeating the customary appeal for unity of leftist and other anti-American forces, the TCP made a notable addition to the list of approved companions in struggle. Along with the "leftwing" of the Republican People's Party (RPP), the Turkish Labor Party, the Turkish Socialist Workers Party, and the Kurdish "democrats," VOTCP for the first time appealed for cooperation from elements of the National Salvation Party--a fundamentalist Muslim party, whose followers have been spurred to greater activity by the Islamic revolution in Iran.

The TCP statement also offered some unusual advice to the disparate elements opposed to the "junta." It urged them to abandon their differences and unite in resistance; they should not "bow down to organizational restrictions," it said, but should "establish new clandestine organizations in accordance with the new conditions." The VOTCP has provided no further guidance, other than to counsel calm and to express implicit approval of factory workers' slowdowns as a method

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of continuing the struggle. Nor have the clandestine radios been known in the past to give explicit directives to party members and other leftist elements in Turkey beyond appeals for the formation of a united democratic front, advocacy of strikes, and occasional calls for demonstrations at funerals of assassinated leftists.

EARLIER COMMENT VOTCP had drawn attention to the reappearance of Turkey's military on the political stage last January, when the radio strongly criticized a military memorandum warning the country's squabbling political parties to reach a consensus on measures to combat terrorism and economic chaos. The radio had portrayed the "ultimatum"--made public in a 2 January statement by then president Koruturk--as a threat to Turkey's parliamentary institutions and an initial step toward achieving, "by means of the bayonet," a JP-RPP coalition desired by "imperialism and collaborationist bourgeois circles." In July the radio had warned of the possibility of a coup, again charging the United States and "NATO bosses" with applying economic, military, and political pressures on Turkey in preparation for the seizure of power by "their most loyal lackeys" in the army.

Comment throughout the year repeatedly assailed U.S.-Turkish ties, and the U.S.-Turkish defense and economic cooperation agreement was attacked as "running completely counter" to the Soviet-Turkish "political document" signed in June 1978. VOTCP portrayed the deteriorating economic situation as resulting from the "bankrupt" policies of the Demirel regime and its collaborators in "monopolist" business circles and maintained that the escalating violence and political assassinations occurred with the approval of the government and "fascist elements" within the armed forces. The radio applauded parliament's no-confidence vote ousting the Turkish foreign minister in early September as a reflection of widespread popular discontent with the Demirel government and its "pro-imperialist, antipeople" policy. Claiming that Ankara was preparing to allow U-2 flights over Turkish territory, VOTCP said Turkish foreign policy had in effect frozen Ankara's "neighborly" relations and economic cooperation with its "friend in need, the Soviet Union."

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USSR-EAST EUROPE

POLAND'S NEIGHBORS SHOW CONCERN OVER WORKERS' COMPLAINTS

Since the onset of the Polish labor unrest, Poland's communist neighbors have shown signs of concern over their own workers' complaints and the ability of official bodies such as trade unions to deal with them. There have been various public indications in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and East Germany of heightened attention to labor conditions. Signs of concern have appeared also in the Soviet republic of Lithuania, a region of the USSR adjacent to Poland and linked to it by close cultural and religious ties. Taken together, these projections of official responsiveness suggest a stepped-up effort to minimize workers' discontent and possibly to forestall broader demands such as those that emerged in Poland.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA The earliest signs of concern from the area came from Czechoslovakia, which issued an unusual number of articles urging party and trade union officials to be more responsive to workers' complaints. Declaring that "the people's broad participation in management is an absolute must," an editorial in the party daily RUDE PRAVO on 23 August called on party groups to discuss problems with workers "frankly, truthfully, and openly, without embellishment." Another editorial in that paper two days later criticized the work of some party factory committees as "negligible and too formal." It insisted that party groups "must not ignore warnings about shortcomings" from workers, not only about work conditions but also about such broader topics as the supply situation in stores. The paper on the 25th also carried an article specifically on trade unions, urging them to play a more active and effective role in aiding workers within the framework of existing labor laws. The article noted there were "still a considerable number of violations of socialist legality in labor relations," criticized some trade union bodies for a "serious lack of knowledge" about the labor code, and said it was a "priority task" for them to make better use of their legal authority.

ROMANIA Romania demonstrated concern over the possible impact of the Polish events in an unusual article justifying its own party-dominated trade unions and in publicizing new steps to increase workers' living standards. Bucharest's defense of its trade union system came in a 31 August SCINTEIA article marking the 36th anniversary of its unified trade union organization, an event that had been ignored by the party paper on last year's more significant quinquennial. The article said that the trade unions, "under the

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leadership of the party bodies and organizations," are a "main lever" of workers' power. It added that the party should further improve the trade unions' activity and "strengthen their links with the masses of working people." On 9 September, the party's policymaking Political Executive Committee announced the diversion of more than 1 billion dollars of defense and state administration funds in the 1980 budget into "raising the people's standard of living" and improving the economy.

EAST GERMANY East Germany hinted concern over workers' discontent at a meeting of trade union executives on 3 September, three days after the Polish agreements allowing free trade unions. In a speech reported by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 4th trade union chief Harry Tisch placed notable emphasis on the importance of heeding workers' proposals. He said that workers have put forward more than a million proposals to improve work and living conditions and raise productivity and asserted that "it is the task of every trade union executive to ensure that every initiative and proposal is used." He also lauded a socialist competition campaign for its role in "developing the creative initiative of the working people."

LITHUANIA There is also evidence that Lithuanian authorities may be taking steps to forestall or minimize the possible disquieting effect of the Polish events on Lithuanian workers. A plenum of the Lithuanian Central Committee, held during the height of the Polish crisis, reflected leadership concern over the workers and labor matters. Although the circumstances prompting the plenum are unclear, First Secretary Grishyavichus' decision to hold it at this time, even at the cost of absenting himself from the Alma-Ata observances of the 60th anniversary of Kazakhstan--where all the other republic first secretaries had gathered with Brezhnev--strongly suggested that the meeting was concerned with topical matters that could not easily be postponed.

The clearest indication that the business of the plenum included discussion of possible labor unrest was provided by Second Secretary Dybenko, who spoke on the topic of workers' letters and focused a large part of his speech on problems of workers' grievances and trade unions. Dybenko stressed the need to be more attentive to workers' complaints in letters and paid particular attention to the shortcomings of Lithuania's trade unions, which the letters were said to have revealed. Dybenko attributed many of the existing labor problems to the ineffectiveness of the local trade unions, which he censured for failing to defend workers' rights and which he called upon to be more responsive to their memberships. He cited the unions' indifference to illegal firing of workers and other cases of arbitrary personnel actions as examples and reported that such violations had been increasing. This situation, Dybenko complained, is a result of the fact that many labor organizations are not sufficiently independent,

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but are "under the thumb of overzealous administrators." To remedy this situation, he called for the "radical improvement" of the trade union council's legislative inspectorate and urged party leaders and plant managers to eliminate the causes for potential conflicts by b more responsive to workers' needs.

WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS IN GDR COINCIDE WITH POLISH CRISIS

East German television treatment of the Warsaw Pact military exercises on the Baltic coast during the Polish labor crisis called unusual attention to the gathering of military might close to Poland's border. Although the exercises had been planned long in advance, the GDR appeared to be using them to exert pressures on both sides in the Polish labor controversy, in effect warning them that their freedom of maneuver was limited. The "Comradeship in Arms" maneuvers were held in the coastal region adjacent to the Gdansk-Szczecin area, which was the center of the Polish labor unrest, and for the first time in 10 years included contingents from all Pact members.

East German television gave unusually extensive coverage to the "combat" operations during the exercises, including the showing of amphibious landings on the Baltic coast and the landing of paratroops and equipment airlifted from the USSR. Television coverage of previous Pact maneuvers had featured ceremonial events but given only limited publicity to the actual combat operations during the games. At the same time, the initial announcement of the latest exercises on 15 August--at the height of the Polish strikes--was in line with past practice of announcing Pact maneuvers three to four weeks in advance, and the rhetoric surrounding the games was generally routine with no direct allusions to the Polish crisis. Pact commander Kulikov, at the windup parade on the 12th repeated standard claims that the exercises had shown the Pact's combat unity and readiness to defend socialist achievements.

That the East Europeans were sensitive to the demonstrative aspects of the Baltic exercises was evident from a Budapest radio commentary on 27 August. The talk insisted that the locale and composition of Warsaw Pact exercises are planned "years ahead" and that the latest games cannot be regarded, "even from a hostile point of view, as a show of force or a threat."

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USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW PORTRAYS CLOSE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RACE

Soviet comment on the U.S. presidential election campaign has settled since the nominating conventions into a familiar pattern, accusing both major candidates of leaning to the right and dismissing as insignificant their differences over foreign policy. Soviet commentators are now portraying the race as a dead heat.

Moscow is dispensing criticism of the two major candidates more evenly than earlier in the summer, when Soviet commentators claimed to find signs of moderation in Governor Reagan's traditional foreign policy positions. Moscow's more critical treatment of the governor was typified in an article by a senior TASS official in a recent issue of the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM (ABROAD). The article claimed that "American commentators" feared Governor Reagan would adopt "an even more bellicose" foreign policy than the present Administration. At the same time, commentators have not spared President Carter, maintaining that his recent statements on defense policy demonstrate his effort to be a "bigger Reagan than Reagan himself."

Soviet commentary continues to suggest that Congressman Anderson has no chance of becoming President, but Moscow has been paying more attention to his campaign. In recent weeks, Soviet media have credited the congressman with a "realistic" foreign policy and highlighted favorably his statements on arms control and defense issues. A PRAVDA report on 1 September went so far as to suggest that U.S. voters, "seeing no choice between Reagan and Carter," are turning increasingly toward Anderson as the liberal candidate.

Moscow has retreated from its earlier suggestions that Governor Reagan was the clear favorite in the presidential race. Oleg Anichkin, a Central Committee International Information Department official, told Soviet listeners on a 5 September domestic radio program that U.S. polls now show Governor Reagan and President Carter running a close race. Anichkin predicted that by November the two candidates' chances will be "roughly equal."

Soviet media have played down the candidates' exchanges over Carter Administration disclosures about the Stealth aircraft program and ignored altogether the charge that Moscow has benefited from the revelations. Only two commentaries are known to have discussed the

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Stealth issue since TASS on 23 August reported Secretary Brown's press conference on the new technology. A 4 September article in the Moscow daily SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (SOVIET RUSSIA) treated the controversy as an ordinary case of election-year campaigning without acknowledging the details of Governor Reagan's charges against the Administration.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 8-14 SEPTEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,241 items)			Beijing (824 items)		
Socialist Republic of Vietnam 35th Anniversary	5%	(5%)	Fifth National People's Congress Third Session	25%	(25%)
Brezhnev-Kosygin Greetings to Bulgaria on 36th Liberation Anniversary	4%	(--)	New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon in PRC	11%	(--)
			Kampuchea	8%	(2%)
Brezhnev-Kosygin Greetings to DPRK on 32d Foundation Anniversary	4%	(--)	Khieu Samphan Interview With PRC Reporters	3%	(--)
			Kampuchean-Vietnamese Dispute	3%	(--)
			Fifth Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Soviet caution on Iranian-Iraqi conflict
- Moscow, Warsaw on post-strike developments
- Hardline Gromyko UN speech

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24 SEPTEMBER 1980
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U S S R - I R A N - I R A Q

MOSCOW AVOIDS TAKING SIDES, ACCUSES U.S. OF RAISING TENSIONS

Maintaining a low profile on the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, Moscow has adopted a neutral public stance and attempted to capitalize on both sides' hostility toward the United States. In his annual UN General Assembly address on the 23d, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko confined himself to standard charges of U.S. "violence" against Iran and "threats" against the sovereignty of all countries of the region, with no mention of the dispute. Initial Soviet press comment has portrayed U.S. policies as heightening tensions in the region, stressed the common "anti-imperialist" interests of both Iran and Iraq, and indirectly advised them to compose their differences through peaceful talks. Soviet coverage of the fighting has continued to be limited to brief reports attributed to Iraqi and Iranian sources and the Western press, and Moscow radio's Persian and Arabic services have carried only sparse, vague comment on the dispute. Moscow has evenhandedly reported recent Soviet-Iraqi and Soviet-Iranian contacts, providing no details.

PRESS CALLS FOR "NO INTERFERENCE"

Not until the fighting intensified did comment appear in the central press, with both IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA carrying articles entitled "Who Benefits From the Conflict?" An Aleksey Leonidov IZVESTIYA article, as carried by TASS on the 23d, and an article on the 24th by PRAVDA's Yuriy Glukhov both called for peaceful resolution of Iranian-Iraqi differences by the parties themselves, without outside interference. Leonidov urged both sides to manifest "good will and political wisdom" and look for a way out of the crisis situation, and he concluded that "disputable questions" could be resolved through talks that took into consideration the "just interests" of both parties. Glukhov remarked that the differences between the two countries were causing "serious concern and deep regret" among their friends. Leonidov, referring briefly to the background of the dispute as a "vestige of the past," noted that Iraq had declared that Iran had not fulfilled the two countries' 1975 agreement, which envisaged "settlement of territorial problems." He charged "U.S. imperialism" with deliberately raising tension in the area to facilitate the seizure of "oil sources of other peoples."

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SOVIET CONTACTS WITH IRAQ, IRAN

Moscow predictably provided no details on its diplomatic contacts with the two sides over the past few days. Reporting Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 'Aziz's 22 September meeting in Moscow with CPSU Central Committee Secretary Boris Ponomarev and Deputy Foreign Minister Maltsev, TASS said only that they had discussed "topical questions of the present international situation and the situation in the Near and Middle East." The following day, TASS reported that Iranian Ambassador to the USSR Mokri had discussed "certain questions" of Soviet-Iranian relations and the situation in the region in a meeting with Maltsev and a vice president of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Western media accounts of Mokri's subsequent press conference in Moscow left it unclear precisely what the Iranian ambassador was told when he again raised the issue of Soviet arms deliveries to Iraq. Iranian President Bani-Sadr, in a 23 September press conference reported by Tehran radio the following day, said both the Soviet Union and the United States had "claimed" they had not rendered any assistance to Iraq. Suggesting Iranian skepticism, Bani-Sadr added that he had told the Soviet ambassador that day that "your assistance to aggressive Iraq is proof of your enmity toward us."

Moscow has maintained its usual reticence on the question of arms sales, and neither Moscow nor Baghdad has been heard to mention the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi friendship and cooperation treaty in the current crisis. But Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has twice hinted publicly at Iraqi dissatisfaction with past Soviet parsimony in the matter of supply of arms and ammunition--in a late July press conference and again in a 17 September speech to Iraq's National Assembly. Arms sales in today's world, he told the assembly, are "not governed purely by trade considerations," but are also often governed by "the strategy and political considerations of the source country." It was a "reality," he said, that Iraq virtually ran out of ammunition during its 1975 confrontation with the country's Kurds. Implying that this "grave shortage of war materiel" was a major factor in Iraq's acquiescence to the 1975 agreement with Iran, Saddam Husayn went on to announce Iraq's abrogation of that agreement.

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USSR-POLAND

Following its initial favorable reaction to the 5 September leadership change in Warsaw, Moscow has continued to manifest support for the Kania regime by portraying the latter as endeavoring to "normalize" the situation in the face of economic difficulties and pressures from "anti-socialist" forces at home and abroad. At the same time, Moscow has kept the door open for a withdrawal of support by indicating that it opposes the idea of free trade unions and that it expects the Warsaw regime to ensure continued party control in this area. Meanwhile, Poland has moved cautiously in dealing with the new unions, endeavoring to establish a measure of control by issuing regulations for their registration--a move that has led to new strains between Warsaw and the former strikers.

MOSCOW SHOWS SUPPORT FOR KANIA REGIME'S "NORMALIZATION" EFFORTS

Recent comment in Soviet media has been guardedly optimistic, emphasizing progress toward a return of stability in Poland through the efforts of the Kania regime, supported by loyal workers and rank-and-file party members. The favorable references to new PZPR First Secretary Kania in the Soviet comment contrast with Moscow's studied avoidance of the name of Kania's predecessor, Gierek, in its comment on the ongoing Polish strikes last month.

Beginning with Brezhnev's warm support for Kania in his congratulatory message of 5 September, Moscow has projected a generally favorable assessment of the new Polish leader in reportage and comment portraying the gradual restoration of stability in Poland. A Warsaw correspondent's dispatch in IZVESTIYA on 13 September, for example, approvingly cited Kania's praise for the "millions" of Polish workers who stayed on the job during the strikes. The dispatch declared that "the Polish people are now resolving complex and difficult problems in a period of intense work" and that they cannot be diverted from "their chosen socialist path." Similarly, TASS on the 17th reported a PRAVDA correspondent as describing "the fruitful process of settling and normalizing the situation that is now taking place in Poland," led by Kania with the support of the workers. In another TASS report the same day, the weekly NEW TIMES correspondent was quoted as saying that "the mounting pace of normalization of life is a characteristic feature

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of Poland these days." The report pointedly noted that the party and government efforts to overcome present difficulties are being carried out "with the active participation of the Central Council of Trade Unions"--the beleaguered official Polish trade union organization.

Even some Soviet commentary that has reflected a more ominous interpretation of the developments in Poland has avoided blaming the Kania regime for any of the adverse phenomena noted, focusing the blame instead on "antisocialist force ." For example, an "A. Petrov" article in PRAVDA on the 20th, while taking a more threatening posture in denouncing Western support for "antisocialists" in Poland, still featured support for Kania at the outset, portraying him as leading a nationwide drive to normalize and stabilize the situation.

POLISH-LANGUAGE BROADCASTS

Radio Moscow's broadcasts to Polish audiences since 24 August have followed normal programming practices of the radio's international service and do not appear to have been slanted specifically for Polish consumption. Most of the items on Polish developments carried in the Polish-language service have been broadcast in other languages as well. And the programs in Polish include numerous reports on world events in general, with no particular focus on the situation in Poland.

Items on the Polish crisis began to appear in the Polish service on 24 August, some five days after Moscow had begun to report on the Polish events in broadcasts to other audiences. Since then, Moscow's broadcasts to Poland have carried such items as the following: a report on TRYBUNA LUDU's 23-24 August editorial on the strike situation, the 27 August TASS commentary on the crisis, a report on the end of the strikes on 31 August, a report on the Polish leadership change on 5 September, and articles this month by "A. Petrov" in PRAVDA charging Western interference in Poland. Recently the broadcasts have included reports on Soviet correspondents' dispatches from Poland and items on speeches by Polish leaders at meetings during the poststrike "normalization" period.

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WARSAW DEALS CAUTIOUSLY WITH INDEPENDENT TRADE UNION ISSUE

The agreement to establish independent trade unions has clearly posed more difficult problems for the Polish regime than any other aspect of the 31 August settlement. While the Polish authorities, from Kania on down, have repeatedly professed their intention to honor the agreement, they have exhibited great uncertainty in explaining how it is to be implemented. In the absence of clear signals from the top, the Polish media have been sounding an uncertain trumpet, neither denouncing nor praising the new unions, but taking care to remind all concerned that Poland is a "socialist" state and that the regime will never recognize any "antisocialist" group. In the meantime, the issue of how the new trade union agreement will be implemented may be settled by the new registration procedure, which appears to have set the stage for a test of the regime's intentions--and possibly of the workers' will.

The registration requirements, embodied in a State Council decree, were published in TRYBUNA LUDU on 15 September. The 11-paragraph decree specified that the new unions are to be registered with "the Voivodship Court in Warsaw," that their written applications must include the names and addresses of the members of their leading bodies, that their statutes must not conflict with the Polish Constitution, and that the Warsaw Voivodship Court may cancel a union's registration if its structure or activities "conflict with the laws in force."

A critical test of the new arrangements may come with the registration of the new national independent union formed in Gdansk on 17 September. The initial steps in this process suggest that both sides are working for a satisfactory outcome. Warsaw radio on the 24th reported that Gdansk strike leader Lech Walesa and other worker representatives had been received by deputy premiers Jagielski, Barcikowski, and Kopec and had filed with the Warsaw Voivodship Court an application for registration of the statutes of their national union--"the independent self-governing trade union, Solidarnosc (Solidarity), with headquarters in Gdansk." Judging by reports concerning earlier applications, the court's decisions should be forthcoming in the near future.

Other reports on the initial registrations reflect confusion on the part of officials as to how the new procedures are supposed to work. A PAP interview on the 23d with the judge heading the registering office indicated there were no clear guidelines on the status of unions which leave the CRZZ, the official trade union organization. The judge said that the 15 September regulations apply only to "newly formed" unions, 13 of which have applied so far, and that the status of "old" unions that decide to leave the CRZZ and become independent is "not fully clear." He added that "the question" of registering the "old" unions would be dealt with in the government's proposed new trade union law, now being drafted.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

GROMYKO UNYIELDING ON U.S. CULPABILITY FOR CURRENT TENSIONS

Sharp attacks on U.S. foreign policy were the centerpiece of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's 23 September address before the UN General Assembly.

Speaking on the 23d anniversary of his first appearance before the United Nations as foreign minister, Gromyko set aside his usual diplomatic discretion on this occasion to recite the litany of Soviet complaints against U.S. policy that has dominated Soviet statements since the beginning of the Afghan crisis. Gromyko accused the United States of, among other things, preparing for nuclear war, destabilizing Southeast Asia, violating Cuban sovereignty, and obstructing the reunification of Korea. While reiterating Moscow's support for SALT II, Gromyko attacked the United States for delaying ratification of the treaty and for undermining its intent by developing new missile systems not subject to "appropriate verification."

Gromyko's remarks on East-West security issues were equally unyielding. As usual he introduced a new General Assembly initiative--this year proposing "urgent measures" for reducing the danger of war--and recounted those Moscow had offered in previous years. One new element in this year's initiative is a proposal for a one-year moratorium on nuclear testing for all nuclear powers pending the completion of the current U.S.-UK-USSR negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. But Gromyko had nothing new to offer on concrete arms control negotiations such as SALT and MBFR or on Eurostrategic arms. He professed impatience to receive a Western reply to the latest Soviet proposal to begin talks on medium-range nuclear missiles and U.S. forward-based systems in Europe. He suggested that any "lack of clarity" in the West regarding the proposal could be removed through consultation but that Moscow was not prepared for negotiations "just to kill time."

One of the few nuances in his address was what appears to be a response to Paris' announcement in June that France was considering whether it should acquire neutron weapons. Gromyko asserted that Moscow's 1978 pledge to forgo neutron weapons if the United States did likewise applied as well to the development of such devices by "any other state"--leaving unclear whether Moscow would produce them if France did but the United States did not.

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PRC-KAMPUCHEA

BEIJING MANIFESTS CONCERN OVER IMPENDING UN DECISIONS

Beijing envinced serious concern over upcoming UN General Assembly decisions on Kampuchea in a series of authoritative RENMIN RIBAO Commentator articles. The articles denounced USSR-SRV efforts to legitimize the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and stressed that UN actions, particularly the credentials fight over the seating of a Kampuchean representative, must be viewed as strategic efforts to contain Soviet and Vietnamese aggression. Beijing has attempted to make a vote to seat the Democratic Kampuchean (DK) UN representative more palatable by publicizing DK Prime Minister Khieu Samphan's assurances that earlier domestic policy errors have been rectified. It has also tried to ensure that the ASEAN proposal for an international conference on Kampuchea will focus on steps to obtain the withdrawal of SRV forces.

Beijing gave high-level attention to Kampuchea-related UN issues in RENMIN RIBAO Commentator articles on 31 August and 3 and 5 September, responding to an SRV Foreign Ministry memorandum of 27 August proposing steps to reduce tensions in Southeast Asia; on 13 September, criticizing talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and SRV Foreign Minister Thach; and on 24 September, explaining a PRC Foreign Ministry note that rejected a Hanoi proposal for renewing PRC-SRV talks. Last year, Beijing's effort to support the DK regime in the UN General Assembly session was limited to nonauthoritative XINHUA commentaries which put more stress on arguments for the legitimacy of Kampuchea's seating than on the strategic questions involved.

STRATEGIC ISSUES The first three Commentator articles stressed the larger strategic significance of the Kampuchean issue by portraying recent Soviet and SRV military and diplomatic moves in the area as "naked coercion" of Thailand and other ASEAN countries to accept as a "fait accompli" the SRV occupation of Kampuchea through the "puppet" Heng Samrin regime. In Commentator's domino theory, this would complete the first step in Hanoi's efforts to create an "empire" throughout Southeast Asia using the "Kampuchean model"--a model also useful to the USSR in South Asia. Specifically, Commentator argued, Vietnam was increasing its military forces along the Thai border--backed by Soviet advisers and equipment--and was threatening an invasion

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while making duplicitous offers to negotiate for peace in order to secure ASEAN agreement to talk with the Heng Samrin regime and to deflect attention from the real issue--the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. The 13 September Commentator article claimed that the 7-12 September Gromyko-Thach talks had launched this new "double-barreled military and diplomatic offensive" against ASEAN and that the USSR and SRV were determined to create "still greater chaos and instability in this area."

Commentator charged on 24 September that the SRV's offer to renew talks with the PRC was a similar ploy to mask its military operations in the Thai-Kampuchea border areas and distract attention from its occupation of Kampuchea. The previous day's PRC Foreign Ministry note rejecting the SRV request, Commentator said, constituted a "merciless exposure" of the Vietnamese "propaganda stunt in anticipation of what will happen at the current session of the UN General Assembly session." Both the 13 and 24 September Commentator articles stressed that the only solution to the Kampuchean problem could come through the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea in accordance with last year's UNGA resolution.

BEIJING RESPONSE TO ASEAN PROPOSAL

Beijing's concern that the issue of Vietnamese troop withdrawal remain foremost was made clear in its reaction to the ASEAN proposal, to be tabled at the United Nations, for an international meeting on Kampuchea in early 1981. Beijing's first comment on the proposal came in a 15 September XINHUA account of talks between Premier Zhao Ziyang and Kenyan President Daniel Moi.* XINHUA reported Zhao as saying, in a statement consistent with PRC views on similar past proposals, that China "was not opposed" to convening such a meeting but that its purpose must be to carry out the 34th General Assembly resolution. He said that a meeting would be "meaningless" if Vietnam had no intention of withdrawing its troops, and he insisted that, as a token of sincerity, Vietnam must begin withdrawing troops before any meeting began. Moreover, he said, the meeting should first set a time limit for the withdrawal of all troops, provide for supervision of the withdrawal, and adopt "feasible measures" to insure Kampuchea's self-determination without foreign interference.

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* Western press accounts said Zhao had earlier discussed China's stand on the conference with New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon on the 12th, but there was no mention of the PRC position in Chinese media accounts of that meeting.

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Inasmuch as ASEAN's proposal had not been formally presented at the time of Zhao's statement, Beijing apparently had hopes of influencing the final form of the proposal. Since Zhao's declaration, Chinese media discussion of the proposal has focused on the demand that Vietnamese troops be withdrawn. While aware that Hanoi will reject that demand, Beijing has taken advantage of the proposal to make a show of unity with ASEAN and to retain initiative on the troop withdrawal question.

IMPORTANCE OF DK SEAT

According to the Commentator articles, the heart of Moscow's and Hanoi's strategy to legitimize their aggression was the seating of the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin government in the United Nations or, barring that, the vacating of Kampuchea's seat. To "continue safeguarding" the DK seat at the current session is a matter of "profound significance," Commentator said, because the decision on whether or not to support Democratic Kampuchea "bears on the overall strategic question of whether or not Soviet aggression and expansion should be contained in Kampuchea."

Additional lower level media comment has buttressed Beijing's argument. Thus, a 17 September Ji Ying commentary said that "support for Democratic Kampuchea by the international community does not mean endorsing its past policies," but that not supporting it would be "tantamount to recognizing military aggression and interference in other countries' internal affairs." Such a course, claimed Ji, would "bring grave chaos to the international community." A XINHUA report of 16 September, citing Secretary of State Muskie's announcement that the United States would support ASEAN's position on continued seating of Democratic Kampuchea, implicitly accepted the same approach when it quoted him as saying that the U.S. decision "in no way implies any support or recognition of the Democratic Kampuchea regime."

POLISHING THE DK IMAGE

As part of its effort to mobilize support for the DK regime, the PRC has taken new steps to refurbish its tattered image. On 11 September XINHUA English service carried an excerpt of an interview with DK Prime Minister Khieu Samphan calling attention to past mistakes, including forced labor which resulted in death, forced evacuation of the cities, disruption of schools, and other "excesses and serious mistakes." Khieu claimed that these excesses had been corrected, resulting in increased popular support as the DK-sponsored resistance gained momentum. Thus far, Khieu's admissions of error and claims of repentance have not been broadcast over VODK or in Beijing's Cambodian-language service, strengthening the impression that they are intended for foreign consumption rather than to garner domestic Kampuchean support.

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USSR

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN TASHKENT TARNISHED BY ARAB BOYCOTT

Soviet efforts to promote ties with the Muslim world by staging an international Muslim conference in Tashkent from 9 to 12 September appear to have been frustrated by the boycott staged by many Islamic states protesting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Until the boycott, conference organizers had been expecting representatives from about 70 countries, but reports on the session now reveal that fewer than half that number were represented. Despite this disappointment, Soviet broadcasts to the Muslim world have widely publicized the event--pegged to the commencement of the 15th century of the Hegira--as testimony to the Soviet Union's benevolent attitude toward Islamic interests. At the same time, Soviet citizens received virtually no news about the conference through their domestic media, which underscores the fact that the conference was staged purely for an international audience.

As late as mid-July, representatives of the Muslim Religious Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which hosted the conference, were still expressing confidence in broadcasts to the Muslim world that delegations from about 70 states would be present. In early August, however, the Saudi-based Muslim World League called for a boycott of the meeting as an expression of solidarity with Muslims fighting the Afghan regime. Later that month, another Soviet spokesman for the conference reported on Moscow radio's Arabic service that more than 30 countries had accepted invitations. Soviet reports on the conference confirm that figure but are reticent on exactly which nations attended.* For example, the communique issued by the conference failed to specify the participants, unlike a similar document released by the conference held in Dushanbe in September 1979 to prepare for the Tashkent meeting. None of the reports from the current conference mentioned the presence of such Muslim states as Bangladesh, India, Iran, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia, all of which had sent representatives to Dushanbe.

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* Various Soviet reports have noted the presence of delegates from the following countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Cyprus Ethiopia, Ghana, Jordan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, and Yemen. Other reports also noted the presence of delegates from Austria, Finland, Japan, and Kuwait.

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Despite the boycott, Soviet authorities made great efforts to impress their foreign guests. It appears more than coincidental that two other large meetings were scheduled at the same time, bringing to Tashkent leading experts and propagandists on Soviet Muslim culture. One was a gathering of 500 Turkic scholars, which, according to a report in the 9 September PRAVDA VOSTOKA, discussed among other things historical and ethnic ties among Turkic peoples. The other, reported in PRAVDA VOSTKA on 10 September, was a gathering of Soviet Central Asian political lecturers. These meetings may have been used to demonstrate to the Muslim conference delegates the importance the USSR attaches to Muslim culture. In the same vein, reports on the conference emphasized the recent restoration of many mosques and the publication of a new edition of the Koran and other religious writings to celebrate the 1,400th anniversary of the Hegira.

While widely proclaiming Soviet respect for Islam to the rest of the world, Moscow has continued its traditional reticence on religious topics at home. The only acknowledgment of the Muslim conference in the local press was a terse two-sentence announcement appearing in PRAVDA VOSTOKA and the Uzbek-language daily SOVET OZBEKISTANI on 10 September. The event was also apparently ignored by the Moscow central press and domestic radio. This treatment contrasts sharply with the broad coverage usually given to other international gatherings on less sensitive topics, such as the international film festival held in Tashkent in May, which was prominently featured each day in the local press and widely publicized by Soviet central media.

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NATIONAL UNITY PROMOTED IN CELEBRATION OF KULIKOVO ANNIVERSARY

The main speech marking the Soviet Union's celebration of the 600th anniversary of the historic 14th century Russian victory over the Mongol-Tatar forces at Kulikovo contained some notable changes of imagery and vocabulary evidently calculated to enhance the symbolism of the battle as a triumph of national unity led by Moscow. Academician B.A. Rybakov, speaking at the major anniversary meeting in Moscow, carefully avoided naming the Tatars or Mongols as the enemy in the engagement and went out of his way to insinuate the idea that the historical conqueror, Gengis Khan, was somehow identified with the Chinese. The manipulation seemed aimed at adjusting the nationalistic rhetoric that has long been used to celebrate the epic of Kulikovo in order to accommodate the needs of a nationality policy aimed at promoting the Soviet Union as a brotherhood of all its diverse peoples, including the Tatars. The importance of the meeting was underscored by the presence of candidate Politburo member Solomentsev and CPSU Secretary Kapitonov.

Rybakov's effort to obscure the role of the Tatars at Kulikovo contrasts sharply with the standard official historiography of this battle. His speech, reported in PRAVDA on 9 September, carefully avoided terming the period of Russia's domination as the time of the Tatar or Mongol yoke--the traditional descriptions--but used such phrases as the "khan's" or "horde's yoke." This vaguer terminology apparently represents a deliberate departure from the language of previous standardized accounts of the battle, typified by the article in the SOVIET MILITARY ENCYCLOPEDIA published in 1977, which repeatedly identify the enemy as the Mongols or Tatars. On the single occasion Rybakov did acknowledge the role of the Tatars, he stressed instead their subsequent relations with the Russians, stating that after Kulikovo they became "neighbors."

Blurring the role of the Tatars at Kulikovo, Rybakov gratuitously linked one of the main historical figures of the period to the Chinese. In a parenthetical remark, Rybakov labeled the 13th century conqueror of Russia, Gengis Khan, the "historical ideal of the Maoists." While Soviet writers have previously associated Gengis Khan with the Chinese, the reference seems unusually polemical in this context. The uninformed reader could draw the conclusion from Rybakov's speech that it was not the Tatars whom the Russians defeated at Kulikovo, but the Chinese.

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In addition to manipulating symbols, Rybakov indulged in some direct didacticism to stress the importance of unity for the historical fortunes of the people of Russia. Russia was conquered in the 13th century, he pointed out, because it was "fragmented" and its princes were "struck down by turn." He maintained that the emergence of Moscow's leadership marked a turning point that led to a "triumph of the idea of unity" at Kulikovo. The relevance of this historical event for the Soviet Union today, Rybakov said, lies in the fact that present-day Soviet citizens and the "entire cohesive family of Soviet peoples" share the ideas of unity and independence that inspired the Russian soldiers at Kulikovo.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 15-21 SEPTEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,205 items)			Beijing (885 items)		
Soviet-Cuban Soyuz-38 Space Mission	8%	(--)	Italian President Pertini in PRC	12%	(--)
UNGA Session	7%	(--)	Kenyan President Moi in PRC	12%	(--)
Gromyko-Castro 17 September Meeting, Havana	3%	(--)	Vietnamese-Kampuchean Dispute	4%	(3%)
Afghan Situation	3%	(1%)	S. Korean Kim Tae-chung Sentence	3%	(--)
			New Zealand Prime Minister in PRC	3%	(11%)
			Fifth National People's Congress Third Session	3%	(25%)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Warsaw criticism of strike leaders
- USSR, East Europe on Polish tensions
- Brezhnev on need to end Iraq-Iran conflict

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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POLAND-USSR

REGIME CRITICIZES WALESA IN WARNING AGAINST EXCESSIVE DEMANDS

The Polish leadership has begun showing the stick as well as the carrot as it gropes for ways to restore the country's normal economic activity without upsetting the precarious modus vivendi it has secured from the workers. Pressure on the workers was reflected in a TRYBUNA LUDU article criticizing union leader Walesa for failing to acknowledge the unions' responsibility for the country's economic viability and in a speech by Politburo member Barcikowski roundly denouncing the union leaders for their planned nationwide protest strike on 3 October. These signs of stiffening by the leadership stand against the background of repeated warnings by regime spokesmen that the failure of the workers to cooperate in the restoration of full economic activity will lead to a collapse of the strike settlement and ultimately to chaos.

TRYBUNA LUDU's criticism of Walesa came in an article on the 26th commenting on the union leader's press conference in Warsaw two days earlier, following his registration of the new national independent trade union Solidarnosc (Solidarity). While giving Walesa high marks for a number of his remarks, particularly his assurances of trust in the government's commitment to the new agreements, the article took him to task for failing to acknowledge the unions' responsibility for the economic viability of the country. The paper said Walesa was "evasive" on such subjects as poor labor productivity, the shortage of goods, and inflation. It complained that Walesa had limited the responsibility of trade unions to wage questions. The article seemed to challenge Walesa's characterization of the trade unions as "comanagers" of the country, asking rhetorically if only one member of the team, the government, was to worry about production, while the other, the unions, had nothing to do but shout "Give!"

While Politburo member Barcikowski did not mention Walesa directly in his speech, on Warsaw television on the 30th, he angrily denounced "those responsible" for the plans of the Gdansk union to call a nationwide strike on 3 October. Barcikowski noted that the leaders of the planned strike--reportedly a protest against the government's failure to carry out its commitment to grant a new round of wage increases by the end of September--had informed

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"foreign propaganda media" about their new strike plans but "did not even take the trouble" to inform the government about them, thus breaking the agreements signed on 31 August. Barcikowski viewed the strike decision as evidence that the Gdansk union leaders want to "push us into chaos, which would be dangerous" for the country and its "security." Charging in effect that dissidents are playing an increasingly influential role in the free trade unions, the speaker called on these unions to "politically declare themselves in such a way that this will counteract the infiltration" of their leadership by "antisocialist" persons.

Barcikowski's speech came a day after Warsaw radio had announced that new wage increases were to begin by the end of October and two days after Walesa had announced that a nationwide strike would be called to protest the government's dilatoriness in this matter. The wage increase announcement took pains to point out that the hike was "another" in a series of increases that were being implemented "consistently" in the wake of the strike settlement and that the entire schedule of wage increases would be completed "much earlier" than expected, probably at the start of next year.

EARLIER CRITICISMS While the current criticism of the Gdansk union leadership is the most direct since the crisis began, there have been other slaps at Walesa, couched in terms of secondhand reports, and many generalized complaints about excessive demands by union leaders. Reports widely publicized in the Western press concerning Walesa's long apprenticeship as a union activist in the Baltic area have been replayed in Poland in a way apparently calculated to suggest that such activities are somehow discreditable. Moreover, there have been pinpricks directed at Walesa's effectiveness as a union leader. A Gdansk radio commentary on 23 September, for example, complained that work productivity had worsened rather than improved since the strike settlement and contrasted this state of affairs with Walesa's promise during the strike that the workers' efforts to make up the losses from the strike would "amaze the world."

Complaints about excessive demands by union leaders have been a recurrent theme in leadership statements since the beginning of the crisis. Thus PZPR First Secretary Kania, in his first speech as party leader on 5 September, asserted that the country's already serious economic difficulties had been further compounded by the strikes themselves as well as by the "new commitments in the sphere of wages and allowances." More pointedly, in addressing a Gdansk voivodship party meeting three days later, Kania denounced

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"illusory demagogic slogans, illusions that it is possible to distribute more than is created" and, in an obvious reference to the strike settlement, asserted that the "best programmatic solutions" are useless without hard work. Similarly, Stefan Olszowski, who was reinstated as PZPR Politburo member and secretary during the strikes, warned the new unions in a speech on the 19th that their assertion of "even the most justified demands" without participation in the work that "creates the material guarantee for fulfilling these demands . . . does not take into account the realities of life."

MOSCOW, EAST EUROPE SHOW CONTINUING CONCERN, VOICE NEW WARNINGS

Soviet and East European reaction to the situation in Poland continues to show the mixture of concern and restraint that has characterized Soviet bloc commentary on the crisis from the outset. Moscow's latest major commentary, an article by the pseudonymous A. Petrov--the fourth in as many weeks--again charged the West with interfering in Polish affairs and warned against further violations. Along with this, Moscow has fired the first shots in what may become an ideological barrage against the spread of the new independent Polish trade union model to other East European countries, arguing that trade unions in a socialist state must be closely tied in with the party and other state institutions--an interpretation seemingly calculated to ensure conformity with party interests. The East Europeans have shown notable defensiveness about their own trade union organizations and have taken measures to promote them as effective representatives of the workers' interests.

As compared with the previous Petrov articles, the latest one published in PRAVDA on 27 September, marked a further escalation of the warning rhetoric characteristic of these commentaries. It included a reminder that Poland's independence and status in world affairs depended on the fact that its borders were "guarded by the united might of the member states of the Warsaw Pact"--a theme which Moscow has occasionally picked up from Polish commentary but has avoided stating directly in its own commentaries on the crisis.

Although the thrust of the Petrov article was aimed at the West, the author clearly indicated that the enemies he discerned in the West have collaborators in Poland itself. While referring to these enemies only in the most general terms, Petrov suggested that they

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had insinuated themselves into the workers movement and that they were working to prevent the reestablishment of normal conditions in Poland. This situation, the article said, constitutes a "watershed" in the crisis and confronts Poles with the necessity of lining up either as "patriots of socialist Poland" or as its "enemies--either overt or covert." Unlike the previous Petrov article on 20 September--the only other one published during the period of Kania's leadership--the present one did not signal Moscow's confidence in the ability of the Polish leaders to bring the crisis to a successful conclusion.

Moscow's ideological pronouncement on free trade unions came in a review of a new compilation of Lenin's writings published in PRAVDA on 25 September over the signature of G. Alekseyev. While the review suggested that Lenin accepted the idea of "free trade unions" in principle, it went on to define the role of trade unions in a socialist society in a way seemingly calculated to ensure their compatibility with socialist objectives. Endorsing the proposition that the trade union's function is to defend the workers' rights and interests, the review pointed out that this function is also shared by the state and by economic leaders. In what was clearly intended to be the bottom line of his commentary, the reviewer cited Lenin as saying that trade unions will be able to fulfill their task "only in close collaboration with and under the direct leadership of the party of the working class."

EAST EUROPE

Czechoslovakia has issued the sharpest and most explicit warnings about the Polish trade unions, repeatedly portraying them as part of a Western-supported effort to undermine socialism in Poland. In one of the most critical articles, the party weekly TRIBUNA on 17 September stressed the dangers inherent in allowing free trade unions and loosening media censorship and charged that Walesa "does not intend to fulfill the adopted agreements, among which recognition of the party's leading role assumes a prominent place." The need for Poland to remain vigilant against Western-backed "antisocialist forces" also was stressed by CPCZ Presidium members Vasil Bilak, Josef Korcak, and Jozef Lenart on 12, 20 and 27 September respectively. Bilak declared that Czechoslovakia "cannot be indifferent" to Poland's fate and emphasized the need to ensure that "socialist gains are not devalued." Lenart criticized Western politicians who encourage Polish workers to strike and "call for 'free' unions, for pluralism."

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The Hungarians, by contrast, have taken a characteristically moderate position. In a speech on 26 September, Hungarian party leader Kadar avoided any mention of antisocialist forces or Western designs on Poland and asserted that Poland's problems "must be solved by the Polish people themselves." Similarly, in a freewheeling interview with the West German weekly DER SPIEGEL on 22 September, Peter Renyi, party Central Committee member and deputy chief editor of NEPSZABADSAG, asserted that the Polish situation was "strictly an internal affair" and that the strike leaders "so far have stayed within a certain framework."

All the East European countries, wich the possible exception of Bulgaria, by now have shown signs of domestic sensitivity over the effectiveness of their official trade unions. In recent weeks these signs have continued in Romania and have appeared for the first time in Hungary and Yugoslavia. A Hungarian trade union leadership meeting on 29 September, reported by MTI the next day, maintained that "the general opinion of workers" is that they have become "more effective in the life of the workplace," and it added that the authority and influence of the trade unions have increased. Yugoslav party Presidium member Branko Mikulic on 21 September seemed intent on promoting greater activism in the relatively controlled Yugoslav trade unions, criticizing some organizations for failing to take more initiatives. Mikulic's comments came shortly after trade union official Mika Spiljak, in an interview with BORBA on the 19th, had sharply criticized existing wage controls and urged that they be revised. From Bucharest, Romanian leader Ceausescu on the 26th seemed to rule out the formation of new trade union bodies when he defended Romanian leadership bodies as the "genuine representative" of the working class and said that in Romania "we already have enough democratic bodies, from top to bottom."

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USSR-IRAN-IRAQ

BREZHNEV WARNS OF "IMPERIALIST" GAINS, ASKS SIDES TO NEGOTIATE

Soviet President Brezhnev, offering Moscow's first authoritative comment on the conflict between Iraq and Iran, has sought to maintain a neutral stance while railing at U.S. actions and intentions in the region. Brezhnev's insinuations that Washington is attempting to benefit from the conflict picked up the theme that has dominated lower level Soviet comment. He went further, however, in his expression of concern over the economic consequences of continued fighting and his advice to the parties to reach a settlement immediately, even if not all issues could be resolved at this time.

ATTACKS ON U.S. Speaking at a 30 September dinner for the visiting Indian president, Brezhnev contrived to suggest that the United States was responsible for the fighting between Iraq and Iran when he expressed incredulity that the conflict "simply was a tragic misunderstanding." He stopped short of directly blaming the United States, adding only that "some people" were trying to benefit from the conflict. Brezhnev went on to charge such "people" with trying to establish control over Middle East oil and again turn Iran into a "gendarme post of imperialism."

Similarly, Soviet commentary has focused on the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region and the alleged danger posed by "international" or unilateral U.S. action to ensure the security of oil exports. For example, PRAVDA's Yuriy Glukhov in a 26 September article cautioned that the "adventurism" seen in U.S. foreign policy "on frequent occasions" might reappear in the present crisis. Along the lines of Brezhnev's 29 August remarks concerning U.S. "pressure" on Iran, Glukhov termed interference in the Iranian-Iraqi conflict "inadmissible." Other comment has alleged that U.S. claims of neutrality are no more than a propaganda cover; and comment broadcast to the region has played up Western press reports on U.S. military contingency planning for the Persian Gulf area, asserting that the actions which American leaders are "currently talking about" threaten the countries in the area and peace throughout the world.

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RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT Brezhnev deplored the damage to the "two neighbor countries, which are friendly to the Soviet Union," pointing out that neither stood to gain from mutual destruction, bloodshed, and "undermining each other's economy." Repeating earlier calls for talks between the parties, Brezhnev said the Soviet Union hoped Iran and Iraq would settle "disputable issues" between themselves at the negotiating table. Brezhnev went on to suggest that Baghdad and Tehran should "settle in the spirit of concord what can be settled now, but put off until tomorrow, when a settlement may become easier, what they cannot settle today."

Moscow has offered no explicit endorsement of various mediation efforts, although media treatment has suggested varying degrees of preference. The unanimous 28 September UN Security Council resolution calling on the sides to settle their disputes peacefully was reported factually; approving reports on Cuban and Palestinian attempts to sort out the dispute have been broadcast to both sides, in Persian and Arabic; Pakistani President Ziaul Haq's good will mission in his capacity as Islamic Conference chairman was dismissed in a perfunctory TASS report on the 28th. Moscow has included in Persian-language newscasts several items noting Iraqi interest in various mediation proposals, perhaps as a subtle reminder to Tehran that it should moderate its uncompromising stand. Moscow radio's Persian service has continued to focus on U.S. opposition to the Khomeyni regime and has reiterated the Soviet Union's desire for good relations with both parties to the dispute.

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U. S. - U S S R

GROMYKO-MUSKIE TALKS FAIL TO SOFTEN SOVIET CRITICISM OF U.S.

Secretary of State Muskie's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York had no moderating effect on Moscow's critical assessment of the Carter Administration. Moscow has suggested their exchange was strained and has portrayed Gromyko as bluntly lecturing his American counterpart on U.S. responsibility for the "complications" in U.S.-Soviet relations. Commentators appear skeptical that the bilateral talks on European arms issues agreed upon during the Gromyko-Muskie meeting will help restart the East-West arms dialogue or lead to full-scale negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons.

Soviet handling of the 25 September Gromyko-Muskie meeting underscored Moscow's unrelieved displeasure with U.S. policy. Judging from the TASS account, Gromyko forcefully expressed the same complaints to Secretary Muskie that he had outlined in his General Assembly address. Gromyko charged, according to TASS, that the United States was departing from the "fundamental principles" that constitute the "only" basis for U.S.-Soviet relations, and this in turn had led to a "dangerous exacerbation" of the international situation.

Moscow's treatment of the meeting also suggested that U.S.-Soviet relations have deteriorated since the first Gromyko-Muskie meeting in Vienna in May. The New York talks, like those in Vienna, drew only perfunctory coverage, but TASS failed to reiterate its previous characterization of such talks as "necessary" or both sides' expression of interest in further discussion. While the Vienna meeting was reported to have resulted in a "frank" exchange of views, TASS offered no description of the tenor of the New York encounter.

ARMS TALKS Moscow has been notably cautious in assessing the U.S.-Soviet agreement--announced at the end of the Gromyko-Muskie meeting--to begin a "practical discussion" on future arms limitation talks in Geneva in mid-October. Soviet comment has clearly implied that the two sides continue to disagree on the scope of these talks and has avoided suggesting that the

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Geneva discussions signal U.S. acceptance of Moscow's July offer to begin negotiating limits on medium-range nuclear missiles and U.S. forward-based systems in Europe. Soviet Central Committee official Oleg Anichkin stressed the differing attitudes in a 28 September commentary. While crediting the Americans with wanting to "start exchanging views," Anichkin declared that "an exchange of views is not the same as talks." Noting that the United States and some of its NATO allies still object to linking the issue of medium-range weapons with U.S. forward-based systems, Anichkin defended Moscow's stance as consistent with the principles of equality and equal security and expressed the hope that the chance for an agreement would not "be swept aside by events."

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P R C - U. S.

PRC REDUCES ATTENTION TO ELECTION, STRESSES UNPREDICTABILITY

Beijing has sharply reduced attention to the U.S. presidential campaign in the past month, following an outpouring of comment expressing concern over Republican presidential candidate Reagan's views on the issue of Taiwan. The reportage and commentary that Beijing has offered has stressed the unpredictability and closeness of the presidential race.

Chinese media have not commented on Governor Reagan's position on the Taiwan issue since the 28 August RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article authoritatively summed up Beijing's view that a shift in policy on Taiwan such as he had suggested would result in serious consequences for both Sino-U.S. ties and strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union.* Beijing apparently felt that the questions raised by Governor Reagan about Taiwan and the Sino-U.S. relationship demanded comment. Since then, however, it has attempted to maintain a lower profile on the election campaign, avoiding the impression of interference in U.S. domestic affairs. Comment on the campaign in September has been confined to a long RENMIN RIBAO analysis of election trends by Wang Fei on the 17th, a brief 21 September XINHUA dispatch on the Anderson-Reagan debate, and a XINHUA dispatch on the 30th discussing the difficulties involved in predicting the outcome of the election.

Those few commentaries have all stressed the closeness of the presidential election. The Wang Fei article, for example, described the campaign as a "turbulent sea that is treacherous and constantly changing." It observed that while factors such as publicity surrounding the Democratic convention, improvements in the economic situation, and Governor Reagan's own "blunders" have helped President Carter pull even in the public opinion polls, Governor Reagan has "effectively" countered the President's gains by switching from a strategy of "passive defense" to "active offense" in the campaign and may "still" win the election. Beijing's uncertainty over the outcome of the election was similarly reflected in the XINHUA account of the 21 September debate between Governor Reagan and Congressman Anderson. XINHUA observed that "to foreign observers" the debate was "but another bewilderment following the maneuvers and countermaneuvers in the long, protracted, and perplexing American election campaign."

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* For a discussion of Beijing's reactions to Governor Reagan's statements on Taiwan, see the TRENDS of 4 September 1980, pages 7-9; 20 August 1980, pages 6-7; and 18 June 1980, pages 7-9.

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The paucity of Chinese attention to the election campaign at this stage--which Wang Fei characterized as the most "exciting and dramatic"--contrasts with the steady attention the election had previously received.* In the months of the party primary campaigns leading up to the party conventions, Chinese media regularly carried reports on the results of all of the state primaries, together with background items on the various candidates and long analyses of various domestic and foreign policy issues involved in the campaign.

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* Beijing's coverage of the U.S. election campaign was previously discussed in the FBIS Special Memorandum "Moscow, Beijing on the U.S. Presidential Campaign," dated 25 July 1980.

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CHINA

PRC PREPARES TO OPEN TRIALS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION CLIQUES

Another milestone has been reached in China's political struggles, with the announcement that preparations have been completed for the trials of surviving leaders of Lin Biao's 1971 conspiracy and the radical "gang of four." The trials are an important step in party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping's efforts to regulate political conflict through permanent and universally applied legal institutions and practices. The legal prosecution of political opponents is a major departure from Chinese communist tradition, however, and many problems may arise as the trials are held in Beijing and similar proceedings are begun against radicals at lower levels.

Formal court prosecution of the groups led by Jiang Qing and Lin Biao was approved at a 26-29 September session of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee. The meeting heard a report on the investigation of the two groups by the PRC's chief procurator, Huang Huoqing, and approved his request to form a special court and procuratorate to prosecute the cases. The date for the trials was not disclosed by Huang or subsequent Beijing reporting.

According to Huang, the special court will try 10 "principal" conspirators. In addition to the gang of four, they are: Chen Boda--Mao Zedong's former secretary and chief editor of the party's ideological journal HONGQI--and Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qui Huizuo and Jiang Tengjiao--all PLA officers and, except for Jiang, full or alternate members of the CCP Politburo when they were arrested following Lin Biao's abortive flight out of China in 1971.

The 10 will be tried on four counts: sedition and conspiracy to overthrow the government and party, attempts to frame and persecute leaders, persecution and suppression of officials and ordinary citizens, and plotting to murder Mao and "engineer an armed rebellion." The two groups apparently will be tried separately in the two tribunals established under the special court, with the military defendants' cases to be heard in the tribunal headed by PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Xiuquan. Huang announced that the trials would be open to invited guests.

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POLITICAL IMPACT The impending trials are important to Deng Xiaoping and others in the Chinese leadership who have sought in the past two years to secure legal condemnation of the purged radicals and to regulate all political conflict within a strictly and universally applied structure of legal institutions and practices. Beijing has contrasted the trials of the radicals according to hard evidence with the radicals' own use of such methods as "forced confessions" against their opponents, and it has carefully pointed out that the defendants will be tried for crimes defined in state legal codes rather than for mistakes in work. The trials are thus clearly intended to support Deng's contention that everyone is equal before the law and to reinforce prohibitions against the practice, common during the Cultural Revolution, of condemning political opponents as criminals without due process of law.

These principles of political practice have been underlined in Beijing comment on the impending trials. A RENMIN RIBAO editorial on 30 September hailed the trials as crucial in building confidence in the permanence and rigor of PRC legal institutions, once seriously undermined by the radicals' "deliberate confusion of the line of demarcation between crimes and errors" and disregard for legal process. While observing that the party has completely discredited the radicals in previous campaigns, a Beijing radio commentary on the 28th noted that such measures "cannot replace legal sanctions." Unless their crimes are handled "according to the law," the commentary argued, it will be "impossible to assuage the public indignation, to comfort the souls of the thousands upon thousands of people who were persecuted to death, and to demonstrate the dignity of the socialist legal system."

In the context of such impassioned condemnation, there may be pressure to execute the radicals, although the death penalty is not mandatory for their crimes under the criminal law approved in 1979. Such a penalty would break a longstanding practice in Chinese communist politics of destroying the political careers of high-level opponents but not executing them. The possible imposition of the death penalty has already appeared to be a controversial issue. In October 1979, during a press conference, then Premier Hua Guofeng stated his own view that the gang should not be sentenced to death. According to a Western press service account of XINHUA director Zeng Tao's 29 September press conference on the trial, Zeng refused to rule out the possibility, however.

LOWER LEVEL TRIALS In paving the way for parallel legal proceedings against followers of Lin Biao and the gang of four at lower levels of the party and army, the trials represent an important triumph for Deng Xiaoping and others who have argued that

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failure to deal clearly with the radical leaders and their followers throughout the party apparatus would in the long run jeopardize the current political reforms and modernization effort. In his report to the NPC Standing Committee session, Huang Huoqing mentioned that lower level prosecutions will soon begin separately in appropriate courts. Among those likely to be tried, for example, are the provincial leaders purged into political limbo since the 1976 fall of the gang of four and those military commanders at various levels who were linked to Lin Biao's 1971 attempt to wrest power from Mao Zedong.

The effort to delineate sharply between "counterrevolutionary crimes" and mistakes in work and line may run into difficulty when applied to radical followers at lower levels, however. Radical defendants in those courts will probably argue, as they have in the past, that they were merely implementing the party's line as they understood it, especially during the Cultural Revolution. That argument is bolstered by frequent past admissions, repeated in the 30 September RENMIN RIBAO editorial, that the party itself was guilty of "serious mistakes" during the period. How Beijing distinguishes between criminal acts and simple errors in the Beijing trials will be pivotal in establishing precedents for handling cases at lower levels.

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BRIEFS

AFGHANISTAN: New Law on Evasion of Military Duty

An Afghan "Law on Offenses Against the Draft"--promulgated on 6 September and broadcast three weeks later by Kabul radio--has provided the most direct admission by the Karmal government of the difficulties it has experienced with its armed forces. There has been no Soviet media acknowledgment of this measure, which represents a carrot-and-stick approach to the problem of saving the disintegrating Afghan army. The law establishes severe penalties for a variety of crimes, including failure to report (one to four years), desertion (four to 15 years or execution), self-mutilation to avoid carrying out military duties (two to eight years), and agitation for the surrender of an entire unit (execution). The law also extends the jurisdiction of the military courts to employees of the Interior Ministry--dominated until last July's government reorganization by Babrak Karmal's opponents in the Khalq faction of the People's Democratic Party--and to the various government information services. However, the law provides two escape clauses: First, it allows anyone now in violation of its provisions one month from the date of promulgation to return to his unit without penalty; second, it gives the military courts the authority to postpone a trial "until the end of the war" and to allow accused violators to expiate their guilt by service in combat units.

PYONGYANG: Terms for Abrogation of USSR, PRC Security Pacts

North Korea has taken special pains to overcome any misunderstanding caused by recent Japanese press reports claiming that President Kim Il-song in a 14 September interview had offered to abrogate DPRK defense treaties with the PRC and USSR in return for a DPRK-U.S. peace treaty. The stand attributed to Kim in the interview--not reported by Pyongyang--amounted to a departure from North Korea's longstanding position that the treaties will be dissolved only when reunification is achieved and when South Korea terminates its treaties with its allies. According to Japanese reports, on the day of the Kim interview, the head of the Korean Workers Party International Department explained to Japanese reporters that Kim had merely reaffirmed the standard North Korean position. Evidently convinced that confusion on the issue had not been cleared away, however, Kim Il-song used a 24 September meeting with an ASAHI SHIMBUN delegation to reiterate fully the standard DPRK line. This time Pyongyang itself called attention to its unchanged position on the treaties when the clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification radio on 29 September carried the ASAHI account of Kim's remarks.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADC..ST STATISTICS 22-28 SEPTEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,500 items)			Beijing (808 items)		
World Parliament of Peoples for Peace Conference, Sofia	13%	(--)	Norwegian Prime Minister Nordli in PRC	13%	(--)
Brezhnev Greetings	4%	(--)			
			UNGA 35th Session	8%	(1%)
UNGA 35th Session	12%	(7%)	Huang Hua Speech	4%	(--)
Gromyko Speech	5%	(--)			
			Iran-Iraq Conflict	4%	(--)
Soviet-Cuban-Soyuz-38 Space Mission	7%	(8%)			
			PRC Foreign Ministry Note on Resumption of Talks With SRV	3%	(--)
Iran-Iraq Conflict	4%	(--)			
Gromyko Meeting With U.S. Secretary of State Muskie	3%	(--)	Kampuchean UN Question	3%	(1%)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Brezhnev on nonintervention in Gulf
- Polish plenum, party purge
- Sino-Soviet relations

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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USSR-IRAN-IRAQ

BREZHNEV URGES POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, NO OUTSIDE INTERVENTION

Soviet President Brezhnev for the first time has pledged that the Soviet Union will not intervene in the conflict between Iraq and Iran and has repeated his appeal of the previous week for the two parties to settle their dispute peacefully. Moscow continues to insinuate that the United States is attempting to exploit the conflict for its own aims; it has refrained from suggesting that Soviet security interests are threatened.

Speaking at an 8 October Kremlin dinner for Syrian President al-Asad, Brezhnev promised that the Soviet Union is "not going to intervene" in the Iraq-Iran conflict, and he called for a "hands off" attitude by others. Brezhnev led into his remarks on the Iraqi-Iranian situation by explaining that the just-signed Soviet-Syrian friendship and cooperation treaty aims at helping improve the situation in the Middle East. The treaty, he said, is "in the name of peace, not war," and he added the traditional assurance that the document is "not directed against third countries."

Addressing the "dangerous intrigues and militaristic machinations of imperialists" in connection with the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, Brezhnev charged that imperialism aimed at striking a blow at "Arab unity" and at using the two warring sides for its own aims. The Soviet Union, he asserted, "has given and will continue to give a strong rebuff" to such a policy.

With an eye to Western concerns over possible closure of the Persian Gulf to shipping as a result of the conflict, Brezhnev defined the Gulf as the "sphere of vital interests" of the Gulf states alone and asserted that outsiders have no right to meddle in these states' affairs or act as self-styled guardians. His language is reminiscent of that of a March 1968 TASS statement protesting alleged U.S. and British attempts to dictate to Persian Gulf states. At that time, TASS asserted that "the peoples of those countries, and they alone, have the right to determine their fate." The 1968 TASS statement had also inserted the element of Soviet security in charging that "neocolonialist" plans were directed against the security of the USSR's southern

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borders. The Soviet security aspect has not been raised in the context of the current conflict, nor has recent commentary recalled Brezhnev's November 1978 warning that the Soviet Union would regard foreign interference in Iran as affecting the USSR's security interests.

Prior to Brezhnev's speech, Soviet formulations on the USSR's proximity to the Gulf region had been revived in two recent articles--in RED STAR on 5 October and LITERARY GAZETTE on the 1st--but with no particular emphasis and no mention of Soviet security interests. RED STAR, accusing the United States of "playing with fire," had attributed interest in the region to "transatlantic imperialist circles" greedy for the area's oil and aware of its "relative nearness to the Soviet Union's southern borders."

Brezhnev may have been alluding to the issue of access to Gulf oil when he ambiguously remarked that only by keeping in mind that there should be no outside interference could the problems of the region be settled justly "in the interests of peaceful cooperation of states, whether in the sphere of policy or economy." This remark is much less specific than his 22 February expression of qualified Soviet understanding for U.S. interest in the security of oil supply routes.

Brezhnev's statement last February had been followed later that month by a proposal, advanced in a TASS commentary by Nikolay Portugalov, for an "all-European conference" to discuss "oil communications security and equal commercial access" to Gulf oil sources. This suggestion is known to have been broached only twice since by Soviet commentators, both times in articles in West European publications. Most recently, a brief reference to the idea of a conference, with no mention of the Portugalov proposal, was made by Soviet energy expert Boris Rachkov in a 24 June article in the Bonn publication ENERGIE-REPORT. Aside from Portugalov's suggestion, Soviet media from time to time have recalled the USSR's longstanding "initiative" for a European conference on "cooperation in energy"--for example, in a mid-September TASS commentary on the September 1980 World Energy Conference congress in Munich--but Moscow has not linked any such conclave directly or indirectly to a Gulf oil security undertaking.

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POLAND-USSR

KANIA RENEWS COMMITMENT TO REFORM; PRO-GIEREK FIGURES PURGED

This week's PZPR plenum provided mixed signals on Poland's immediate political future. First Secretary Kania gave renewed assurances of his commitment to reform, but his prescriptions for political and economic renewal seemed likely to require time and patience, commodities clearly in short supply. Kania also gave his support--if not, indeed, his leadership--to the plenum's ouster from the Central Committee of six members of former First Secretary Gierek's entourage, an action that reinforces his commitment to the reform course and escalates the pressure on other members of the leadership to get in step. Moscow has maintained a reserved public position on Kania's leadership, providing selective publicity for his report to the plenum and delaying, unaccountably, the publication of his response to Brezhnev's message last month congratulating him on his appointment.

A central theme of Kania's long and comprehensive report to the 4-6 October plenum was the need for changes in behavior and institutions to "guarantee" the successful implementation of the party's commitment to reform. He indicated that not even the Politburo itself should be exempt from such guarantees, declaring that "we must institutionally . . . define the duties" of the Politburo and Secretariat, as well as those of the first secretary himself. He stressed the need to curtail party interference in spheres better left to government and administrative organs and in this connection called for enhancing the power of the Sejm to make decisions involving large-scale investments. Kania gave evidence of what appears to be a characteristic moderation in insisting on the need for gradualism in implementing the projected reforms "so as not to demolish but transform" the present social and economic structure of the country.

On the new trade unions, Kania repeated his earlier expressed support and sought to explain how he could reconcile this position with his parallel view that the trade union movement should not be divided. His explanation was that the declarations by the new union leaders of loyalty to the party and the country's socialist commitments amounted to an acceptance of the political unity of

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the two union organizations and thus provided a basis for cooperation between the two. By contrast, his remarks on the 3 October protest strike were sharply critical of the new union leadership--by far the sharpest he has uttered since coming to public prominence. He accused the strike leaders of duplicity in first saying they wanted to call it off and then changing their minds. He said the strikes were "worsening, even ruining" the country's economy and went so far as to use the sensitive code words "enemies of socialism" in discussing the responsibility for the strikes.

While supporting the purge of former Gierek regime figures from the Central Committee, Kania indicated that he wished to forestall a witch hunt with its inevitable embitterment of internal politics. In a remarkable show of moderation, he went so far as to remind the Central Committee that "we were all helping" to create the conditions in party leadership that led to the crisis. "Let us evaluate the past," he advised, "but let us direct the main attention to the burning needs of the present day." In his concluding speech on the 6th, Kania made another call for moderation in dealing with internal party divisions. Those who merely "failed" in leadership, he said, should retain the right to participate in party activity, but those guilty of "moral and ethical" offenses will face legal action.

CALLS FOR FURTHER PURGE

The moderation shown by Kania was not matched by other plenum speakers. Reinstated Politburo member and Secretary Stefan Olszowski--a leading reformer heading the motions commission, which issued the purge resolution--urged that the purge of the former leadership be carried out "without leniency and ambiguity." Another reinstated figure, party secretary Tadeusz Grabski, said he was "ashamed of the names" of those who formerly had enjoyed the party's trust but who had "disgraced the party in the eyes of the nation and the world." Veteran party conservative Mieczyslaw Moczar, head of the governmental Supreme Chamber of Control, bluntly noted that the population had "fully approved" of Gierek's removal as party leader and wanted the party to go further in purging both corrupt and "slippery and servile" persons. Former Katowice party leader and Politburo member Grudzien picked up a disclaimer that Kania himself had expressed in his first speech as party leader a month before, when he said that the party did not need a "leader," and turned it into a curiously ambiguous compliment to the new first secretary. What the party needs, said Grudzien, is a "modest, just, exacting, and courageous first secretary rather than a leader." The apparent readiness to push the purge movement

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further reflected in some of the plenum speeches was expressed by party spokesman Jozef Klasa at a news conference on the 7th, in which he said that the party is now working on the "serious settling of accounts with all those responsible for the crisis."

SOVIET RESERVE Moscow has given normal publicity to the plenum and Kania's leadership but has refrained recently from expressly indicating support, as the 20 September A. Petrov article did in referring to Kania's efforts to "normalize" the situation. Possibly also indicative of Soviet reserve toward Kania is Moscow's curiously belated publication of Kania's response to Brezhnev's 6 September congratulatory message. Kania's message of thanks was not made public by Moscow until 1 October. In earlier comparable cases--those involving Husak in 1969, Honecker in 1971, and Gierek in 1970--the interval between the sending of a Soviet congratulatory message and publication of the bloc leaders' message of thanks was about a week or less.

Moscow has been evincing continuing concern about the evolution of the trade union issue in Poland. A number of Soviet spokesmen recently have been taking the position that the legitimate grievances of the workers, in Poland and elsewhere, should be the concern of the trade unions but that the established official trade unions are perfectly capable of fulfilling this function provided they are appropriately reformed. This view was expressed by the Soviet trade union chief and like-minded speakers at the meeting of the WFTU Council in Moscow. Similarly, a 7 October TRUD report from Gdansk observed that although Poland's unions had been weakened, measures were now under way to restore them to their proper function. Although the author warned against antisocialist tendencies, he expressed confidence that local trade union officials were now determined to make their unions more representative of the interests of the working class.

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PRC-USSR

CHINESE COMPLAINTS RECONFIRM ANTI-SOVIET HARDLINE POSTURE

A recent, unusual spate of Chinese attention to alleged Soviet provocations does not appear to signal a significant increase in bilateral tensions. On three occasions in the past two and a half months Beijing has publicized incidents involving Soviet harassment or subversion. The publicity seems calculated to warn Moscow that it will gain nothing through pressure tactics and, at the same time, to assure other audiences at home and abroad that Beijing will not modify the tough anti-Soviet policies it has followed since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan last December.

On 6 October the PRC Foreign Ministry made a "strong protest" to the USSR against an "incident of bloodshed" allegedly perpetrated a day earlier by Soviet military personnel just inside the Sino-Soviet border in Inner Mongolia. This complaint followed a 25 August Foreign Ministry protest over the harassment of two Chinese diplomats in the USSR and earlier XINHUA announcements regarding the treatment of Soviet spies captured between 1974 and 1979. Thus far Moscow has not publicly mentioned any of these matters. The last previously publicized border incidents were protested in a similar fashion in PRC Foreign Ministry notes in July 1979 and May 1978.

CHINESE PROTESTS The 6 October PRC Foreign Ministry protest note--released by XINHUA on the same day it was delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Beijing--claimed that on the 5th a unit of four Soviet armed personnel in a motorboat crossed the Ergune River and "intruded" into Chinese territory at Jilalin (an undisputed section of the border) in Ergune Youqi (Ergune West Banner), Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. They "tried to kidnap" a Chinese herdsman and, according to the note, encountering resistance, "shot him dead." The Soviet unit was then engaged by a group of Chinese frontier guards; in the exchange of fire one of the Soviets was killed before the others withdrew across the border. The protest note accused the Soviet side of creating "another incident of bloodshed," ignoring "repeated warnings" by the PRC, and demanded that Moscow "stop all armed provocations." It is not clear whether the other

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"provocations" referred to the last border incident protested on 24 July 1979 in a similar tone, or to incidents since that time.*

The current note followed a somewhat sterner protest delivered to the Soviet Embassy six weeks earlier. A 25 August Foreign Ministry note expressed "great indignation" over a "flagrant" and "despicable" Soviet attempt to coerce a Chinese diplomat in the USSR to cooperate with the Soviet Committee for State Security. The note described the incident as "seriously" violating the norms of international law, called upon Moscow to guarantee it would not recur, and warned that Moscow would be held fully responsible for all "grave" consequences. Such developments are unlikely by themselves to significantly exacerbate already existing tensions in Sino-Soviet relations.

SOVIET "PRESSURE TACTICS" The latest PRC note of protest charged that the Soviet Union was attempting to "profit from creating border tension" and warned that its efforts would certainly fail. While this exact language was not used in previous border protests, the same implication of ulterior motives was raised in July 1979, when the protest note suggested that the border incident had been deliberately created to affect the upcoming bilateral negotiations.

In recent comment on the spy cases, Beijing similarly accused Moscow of using "intriguing tactics." Beijing announced on 16 August the execution of a spy arrested on 3 July 1979 and sentenced on 20 July 1980 in one of two public trials of Soviet spies in Harbin. A 21 July RENMIN RIBAO Commentary article on the trials had mentioned a third spy case and denounced Soviet acts of "subversion and sabotage," linking them to the military threat posed by the presence of Soviet troops along the border. The spy cases, the article said, were "by no means accidental" but a part of the "sinister activities" of Soviet hegemonism.

POLICY CONTINUITY Beijing's unusual attention to alleged Soviet pressure on China serves not only to rebuke Moscow but also to strengthen the general argument of Deng Xiaoping and his associates that the USSR cannot be trusted, but must be opposed at every turn. The RENMIN RIBAO commentary on the spies urged the Chinese people to "raise their vigilance" as they continue to work for modernization. For the foreign audience, the recent protests bolster reassurances by high-level leaders to foreign visitors that the major personnel and policy changes initiated in the recent session of the National People's Congress will not result in any change in Chinese foreign policy.

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* The 24 July 1979 PRC Foreign Ministry note of protest is discussed in the TRENDS of 25 July 1979, pages 1-2.

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SINO-SOVIET STALEMATE REFLECTED IN PRC ANNIVERSARY TREATMENT

Moscow's pro forma observance of the PRC's 31st National Day anniversary reflected the adverse impact of Moscow's Afghan policies on prospects for improving Sino-Soviet ties. Preliminary talks between the two sides at this time last year had contributed to the guardedly hopeful treatment Soviet media accorded the PRC's 30th anniversary, but such sentiment disappeared after China canceled further talks in January as a protest against Moscow's intervention.

In keeping with the restrained but diplomatically correct pattern Moscow has used over the past decade, the Soviet Government marked PRC National Day with a state-to-state message, unsigned by any Soviet leader, extending congratulations and best wishes to the "Chinese people"--without mentioning the Chinese leadership. The Soviet message typically included a routine restatement of Soviet desire for improved bilateral relations.

Moscow's terse formal message set the tone for a more extensive exposition of the unyielding Soviet posture toward China in an anniversary commentary on Moscow's Mandarin service by the deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Far East Institute, Vladimir Krivtsov. Krivtsov recapitulated standard Soviet assertions about the valuable assistance the Soviet Union gave the PRC during its first decade, held Moscow blameless for the deterioration of bilateral relations beginning with the early 1960's, and expressed Soviet hopes for goodwill "eventually" from the Chinese side that would permit normalization of relations.

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USSR

KIRILENKO, CHERNENKO COMPETE IN PRECONGRESS IMAGE-BUILDING

There are signs that the approach of the 26th CPSU Congress may be stimulating increased efforts to boost the stature of two of the main candidates to succeed Brezhnev--Central Committee secretaries Andrey Kirilenko and Konstantin Chernenko. New books by Kirilenko and Chernenko have been reviewed by PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA in ways calculated to promote both leaders as authorities in key fields--Kirilenko as an economic leader and Chernenko as a party manager.

The connection with the congress was especially apparent in regard to Kirilenko's new book, which is a second, updated version of the collection of his speeches and articles issued in 1976. The first edition was published on the occasion of his 70th birthday, but there was no such special occasion to explain the appearance of the new edition, announced by PRAVDA on 26 August. Long, unsigned editorial reviews in IZVESTIYA on 9 September and PRAVDA on 13 September linked the book's publication with preparations for the 26th congress, suggesting a deliberate attempt to boost his stature prior to the event. The PRAVDA review stated that in looking forward to the congress, party members would turn to party decisions and to speeches by Brezhnev and other leaders, including the speeches by Kirilenko in this collection. IZVESTIYA declared that the book, "issued during the period of active preparations" for the congress, would help people understand recent developments as they approach the congress. The two reviews, following past patterns, portrayed him as a leading authority on economic policy and an important figure in international affairs, especially in economic relations with bloc countries.

The book by Chernenko, "Questions of the Work of the Party and State Apparatus," is a new, specially written work instead of a collection of speeches. Reviews of the book in IZVESTIYA on 2 September and PRAVDA on 4 October present Chernenko as an authority on managing the party and state apparatus and on cadre policy. IZVESTIYA described the book as an "important aid" for propagandists and those studying party and Soviet history. Chernenko has produced a number of books in the past year--mostly compilations of documents under his editorship--which also have been used to establish his credentials as an authority in cadre affairs and management. Although there is still no published

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collection of Chernenko's speeches,* party study guides refer students to his books as if they were on a level with the collections of speeches by other leaders. For example, an October 1979 PARTY LIFE article on norms of party life referred readers to the published works of Brezhnev, Suslov, Kosygin, Kirilenko, Chernenko, and Ponomarev.

Chernenko's prominence continues to be displayed in a variety of other forms. In recent months his name has appeared on virtually all important obituaries--even those of figures with whom he had no conceivable connection--according him a status previously enjoyed only by senior leaders Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, and Kirilenko. As in 1978 and 1979, he was featured with Brezhnev and several visiting bloc leaders in central press photos of the Crimea summit talks during July and August. He was inexplicably included in the 27 August PRAVDA photo of award presentations for cosmonauts. He addressed an unusual high-level Central Committee conference on cadres and the work of the party apparat in late May. His campaign to induce party organizations to pay more attention to letters from workers continues, and more regional party committees are holding plenums to discuss the subject. Chernenko has continued to develop his image as a leader involved in foreign policy; most recently he wrote an article for the August MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN (International Affairs) on the fifth anniversary of the Helsinki Conference.

The image-building, especially on subjects such as cadre work, may reflect some contention over who is to supervise the upcoming regional party elections preparatory to the 26th congress--a potentially vital opportunity to build support for the coming succession struggle. Kirilenko has apparently supervised such organizational work for previous party congresses, but the fact that Chernenko already supervises certain spheres of Central Committee work and appears to be laying claim to authority on cadre questions raises the possibility that he may be allotted a major role in preparations for the congress. The suggestions in the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA reviews that Kirilenko's collection of speeches has been published as a guide for party officials during preparations for the congress may reflect attempts to ensure that Kirilenko will again play a key role in these preparations.

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* With the 17 September PRAVDA announcement of the publication of a collection of speeches by freshman Politburo member Tikhonov, Chernenko becomes the only member of the 14-man Politburo lacking this honor.

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BRIEF

USSR-IRAN: Soviet Publication of Gilan-Russian Dictionary

Soviet academic interest in various Iranian ethnic groups has been pointed up by the USSR Academy of Sciences' recent publication of a Gilan-Russian/Russian-Gilan dictionary. Gilan, spoken by just under 2 million people in northwest Iran, is closely related to modern Persian; but, perhaps in an effort to differentiate between the two languages, the dictionary provides a Latinized alphabet, in contrast with the Arabic script of modern Persian. The book notes that it is only the second Gilan dictionary in existence; the first, Gilan-Persian, was published in Tehran in 1954. According to the new dictionary's preface, it was developed on the basis of interviews with Gilanis now living in Moscow and supplements a Gilan grammar published in 1971. The Gilan nationality in the past gave support to various Soviet-oriented leftwing movements in Iran: Gilan was the scene of the short-lived Gilan Republic in 1920-21--the first attempt to establish an indigenous soviet republic in a Muslim country--and the Gilans were one of the chief sources of recruitment for the Iranian communist Tudeh Party in the late 1940's. The dictionary is one of several scholarly Soviet works in the past year focusing on various Iranian ethnic groups in the Soviet-Iranian border region, including several works on the Kurds and a book on the Assyrians, a small group living on the shores of Lake Urmiya.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 29 SEPTEMBER - 5 OCTOBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,271 items)		
Indian President Reddy in USSR	13%	(--)
Outer Space	11%	(8%)
Soviet-Cuban Soyuz-38 Space Mission	6%	(7%)
Soviet Salyut-6 Space Mission	3%	(--)
Iran-Iraq Conflict	6%	(4%)
UNGA 35th Session	4%	(12%)

Beijing (648 items)		
Sec Gen of Venezuela's Social Christian Party Fernandez in PRC	5%	(--)
UNGA 35th Session	5%	(8%)
Sec Gen of Zambia's United National Independent Party Mainza Chona in PRC	3%	(--)
PRC National Day	3%	(--)
PRC Trial of "Gang of Four"	3%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- PRC concern over U.S. China policy
- USSR-Syrian treaty
- October Revolution Slogans

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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C H I N A - U.S.

CHINA PROTESTS U.S.-TAIWAN ACCORD, FEARS CHANGE OF U.S. POLICY

China's official protest of an agreement on diplomatic immunity between organizations coordinating U.S.-Taiwan relations has underlined earlier evidence that Beijing is extremely concerned about what it fears is a reversal in U.S. policy toward China. The agreement was protested in a PRC Foreign Ministry note, and authoritative press comment for the first time has accused the Administration of breaking commitments made in normalizing PRC-U.S. relations. The fact that the Administration cited the Taiwan Relations Act to justify the agreement apparently was a major factor in Beijing's judgment that the Administration's adherence to the normalization agreement was in doubt and that a formal representation was necessary. Beijing's handling of private and public protests on the issue over the last two weeks indicates that it is attempting to elicit U.S. Government steps to accommodate Chinese concerns and put the PRC-U.S. relationship bacl on track.

CHINESE PROTEST — XINHUA reported that on 15 October the PRC Foreign Ministry presented a note to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing protesting a 2 October agreement between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA).* Breaking with usual precedent, however, Beijing media have not yet publicized the content of the note. The XINHUA report also revealed two prior representations, in Beijing and Washington, on the issue over the past two weeks.

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* Since the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1972, Beijing is not known previously to have publicized any official "note" of protest to the United States and, aside from authoritative statements denouncing U.S. actions in Vietnam, has reported authoritative statements concerning the United States on only three occasions: an October 1975 Foreign Ministry Information Department spokesman statement denouncing the opening of an office for representatives of the Dalai Lama in New York; an interview earlier in 1975 with a Foreign Ministry spokesman who protested the cancellation of a PRC cultural visit; and a report in March 1979 that Foreign Minister Huang Hua had made an oral statement to Ambassador Woodcock about the draft Taiwan Relations Act.

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During the same period XINHUA criticized the agreement in reportage on 3 October, and it was denounced in an authoritative RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article on the 9th. This series of carefully calibrated steps suggests that Beijing is reacting firmly but cautiously in the hope that it will not be forced to take even stronger measures.

The Commentator article, which the party paper carried prominently on its front page on 9 October, clearly indicated that Beijing considers the agreement between AIT and CCNAA a breach of the PRC-U.S. normalization agreement. The article maintained that the agreement "actually accords an official status to the two organizations," pointing out that it is contrary to U.S. diplomatic practice to grant diplomatic privileges to unofficial organizations and that Taipei itself has equated the privileges conferred by the agreement to those accompanying official relations. The Administration's endorsement of the agreement, the article stated, means that it is "now breaking its own commitment and going counter to the principles" incorporated into the accord normalizing PRC-U.S. relations.

The Commentator article expressed particular concern over the Administration's justification of the AIT-CCNAA agreement on the basis of the Taiwan Relations Act, concluding that the Administration is now attempting "to impose" the Act on China as the "legal basis for handling Sino-American relations." Similarly, XINHUA's initial report on the AIT-CCNAA agreement called the Administration's justification in terms of the Taiwan Relations Act "indeed surprising." After recalling that the U.S. Government had "repeatedly" claimed that Washington's relations with Taiwan remain unofficial, the 3 October report observed that the Administration now has "publicly swallowed its own words."

While the Commentator article warned of no specific consequences, it made it clear that the Administration's "endorsement" of the AIT-CCNAA agreement, if allowed to stand, will affect bilateral relations. Beijing, the Commentator article noted, "definitely will not depart from principle and tolerate 'two Chinas' activities by any quarter in the United States." The Administration's "inadvisable move" in endorsing the AIT-CCNAA agreement, it added, "is bound to be detrimental to continuing the development of relations between China and the United States."

At the same time, however, the Commentator article indicated that neither stalemate nor regression in relations is inevitable if the Administration modifies its position. Pointing to the convergence of strategic interests that both sides share in opposing the

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Soviet Union, the Commentator article declared that Washington faces "a question of major strategic importance" in choosing "whether to pursue these relations further or to reverse them."

The Chinese have put forth their case with measured restraint calculated at each step to leave the door open to resolution of the problem. Beijing chose not only to withhold the content of the note, but also to present it as a "protest" rather than a "strong protest." This treatment contrasts with usual practice, including, for example, Foreign Ministry communications to Japan at both lower and higher levels from 1974 through 1978 over a dispute involving the contested East Sea Continental Shelf. The Commentator article also reflected Beijing's effort at moderation. While firm in stating the Chinese position, its language was more restrained than in Commentator articles this summer denouncing Governor Reagan's support for official relations with Taiwan.* Moreover the Commentator article did not mention the recent U.S. transfer of naval vessels to Taipei--a sensitive issue that had been raised in earlier, lower level domestic Chinese reports on the AIT-CCNAA agreement.

RECORD OF BEIJING CONCERN PRC concern over trends in U.S. attitudes toward Taiwan since normalization and over the implications of the Taiwan Relations Act in particular have surfaced clearly and persistently over the past year and a half. When commenting on the views of U.S. politicians outside the Administration, Beijing has focused on its central concern that the Administration continue to adhere to the normalization communique as the sole legal basis for Sino-U.S. relations:

+ In March 1979 XINHUA reported statements indicating that the Administration would uphold the normalization agreement at the same time it publicized an earlier warning by PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua that draft versions of the Taiwan Relations Act contained points that clearly contravened the PRC-U.S. normalization agreement. Subsequently Beijing made no formal public protest when Congress finally passed the Act and the President signed it into law.

+ In October last year Beijing positively reported Administration opposition to efforts by Senator Goldwater and others to appeal the Administration's abrogation of the 1954 U.S.-ROC defense

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* The 14 June and 28 August RENMIN RIBAO Commentator articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 18 June 1980, pages 7-9 and 4 September 1980, pages 7-9.

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pact. At the same time, XINHUA noted with clear irritation the activities of a "small number of people" on the U.S. political scene to promote a resumption of official ties with Taipei.

+ Chinese media this summer favorably reported Administration statements reaffirming the normalization agreement as the foundation of PRC-U.S. relations around the time when 14 June and 28 August RENMIN RIBAO Commentator articles criticized Governor Reagan's statements on Taiwan. The Commentator articles complained that Governor Reagan had ignored the normalization agreement in calling for official relations with Taipei on the basis of the Taiwan Relations Act and warned of the possibility of "grave retrogression" in PRC-U.S. relations.

EVIDENCE OF DOMESTIC CHINESE PRESSURE — Given the centrality of the U.S.-China relationship to PRC foreign policy and the nationalistic sentiments involved, the Taiwan issue is a sensitive pressure point for Chinese policymakers. While evidence of major disagreement within the leadership on the matter has not surfaced, there are signs of serious concern within the elite over future U.S. handling of the issue:

+ Party Vice Chairman Li Xiannian, who has been most conspicuous among Chinese leaders in expressing doubts about the U.S. intention to adhere to the terms of the original normalization accord, made these concerns explicit on 28 August, in the wake of the Reagan episode. XINHUA highlighted Li's warning that Sino-American relations "must be handled within the context" of the normalization agreement and not "the so-called U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act" and his hope that PRC-U.S. relations will "continue to develop and not become bogged down, let alone backslide."

+ In a 7 September address to the National Peoples Congress (NPC), then Premier Hua Guofeng devoted most of a short section on foreign policy to Taiwan. He reiterated Beijing's conviction that reunification of Taiwan with the PRC is an "irrevocable historical trend" and pointedly stated that China's "immutable position" on one China is "a basic principle governing the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and all other countries."

+ Chinese media comment on U.S. policy has consistently portrayed the Chinese people as concerned over the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. For example, the 9 October Commentator article referred to the

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"intense indignation" aroused in China by the U.S. Government endorsement of the AIT-CCNAA accord. Similarly, in reporting on government meetings in Beijing in early September, XINHUA quoted delegates to the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference expressing their opposition to any "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" policies.

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USSR-SYRIA

ANTICIPATED TREATY SIGNED DURING AL-ASAD VISIT TO MOSCOW

In signing a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union during his visit to Moscow last week, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad abandoned his long resistance to a treaty relationship, apparently motivated by concern to ensure increased military assistance. Damascus has been hinting since last spring at a change in its position on the matter of a treaty, at the same time signaling its interest in military aid. Moscow, typically silent on this subject, has routinely hailed the "important political significance" of the document, which Soviet President Brezhnev characterized as raising bilateral relations to a "new, higher level."

While Damascus has clearly indicated interest in increased Soviet military supplies, the documents signed during al-Asad's visit were couched in the usual generalities. The military article of the treaty--which virtually replicates passages in treaties with Iraq, South Yemen, Angola, and Mozambique--declares that the sides will continue to cooperate in the military field "on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them in the interests of strengthening their defense capacity." The communique on the visit, like the one issued on al-Asad's October visit last year, noted the sides' discussion of "further Soviet assistance to Syria in strengthening its defense potential" and the adoption of "relevant decisions."

Moscow has not acknowledged the extension of Syrian Defense Minister Tlas' stay in Moscow to obtain--according to a Lebanese press report--"sophisticated weapons and vehicles" and a commitment to the "date of their imminent arrival in Syria." Damascus for some time has implicitly linked the military supply question with a prospective treaty. In May Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam had referred to Soviet military aid and gone on to remark that Syria was then discussing ways of developing its relations with the USSR on a "qualitative level." Two days before al-Asad's visit to Moscow, Khaddam was reported by Damascus radio as saying the Soviet Union "offers substantial aid as a result of putting relations within a framework," and a TISHRIN editorial on the 8th observed that "we can be nearly certain" that the Soviet Union realizes the "urgent necessity" of a "strategic balance" between Syria and Israel. After the visit a Damascus radio commentary on the 10th offered the optimistic view that as a result of the treaty "balance in the region will shortly be achieved."

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The Syrian-Soviet treaty, like earlier Soviet treaties with several Third World countries, including Iraq, also calls for consultations between the two sides in the event of situations "jeopardizing peace or security of one of the parties." The document goes a step further by adding to the list of situations hypothetically requiring consultations a broad category of threats to peace "in the whole world." Repeating a formulation from previous Soviet-Syrian communiques, the current communique notes the Syrian and Soviet leaders' recognition of the importance of "regular personal meetings" and their pledge to "strengthen political relations."

Neither side addressed the implications of the treaty should the proposed Syrian-Libyan union materialize. The communique noted only that al-Asad, in his discussions with the Soviet leaders, spoke about Syria's and Libya's "intention" to "travel the path of unification." The Soviet side cautiously--if not skeptically--confined itself to "evaluating highly" the Syrian and Libyan leaders' "determination" to "act in concert with a view to achieving unity between them."

Both sides were also predictably silent on the implications of their new treaty relationship vis-a-vis Iraq. Although Brezhnev in his dinner speech pledged nonintervention in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, the dispute was not mentioned by al-Asad or broached in the communique on the visit.*

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* Brezhnev's remarks on the Iraqi-Iranian conflict are discussed in the TRENDS of 8 October 1980, pages 1-2.

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USSR-ISLAM

ACADEMICIAN SEES SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN "ISLAMIC UPSURGE"

The Soviet Union's leading academic spokesman on Islamic affairs has offered a prescription for a more supple and differentiated Soviet approach to the Islamic world. Writing in the August issue of the prestigious journal PROBLEMS OF PHILSOPHY, Yevgeniy Primakov advocated that the Soviet Union discard the stereotypes of antireligious propaganda in adapting to the current "upsurge" of Islam. He rejected the view that the Islamic upsurge is purely a religious phenomenon undifferentiated and necessarily reactionary and anti-Soviet. Primakov argued instead that it is the product of political and economic conditions and that its manifestations can best be analyzed according to categories suggested by Marxist-Leninist nationality theory.

DIVERSITY IN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

According to Primakov, the Islamic movement is not one whole but a collection of movements with vastly different ideas. Each of the movements should be analyzed separately to discover its social class roots and precise ideology rather than considered all together. In general, however, he suggested that it is possible to distinguish two basic tendencies in the Islamic movement: the progressive or petty bourgeois and the reactionary or bourgeois group. The task of Soviet scholars--and, by implication, Soviet leaders--is to distinguish the first from the second and, following Lenin, to support the first as far as it will go. While Primakov did not supply specific guidelines on which Islamic leaders should be supported and which opposed, he implied that there is much in the thinking of the Islamic leadership of Iran that can and should be encouraged. He also suggested that while the general tendency will be for the Islamic movement to move to the right, Soviet action and support can redirect it.

POLITIZATION OF ISLAM

Primakov disparaged Western attempts to interpret Islam's current political role in the Middle East and suggested that what was required was a sophisticated application of Leninist nationality theory. This theory, according to Primakov, will allow Soviet scholars to

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distinguish between progressive and reactionary features of the Islamic movement. He held that Islam has retained--and in certain instances even increased--its influence on political life because of its specific features and because of the pattern of capitalist development in much of the Muslim world. As a religion, he maintained, Islam is distinguished by the high degree of religiosity of its adherents, more than 1,300 years of continuous influence on society, and a large number of specific injunctions for the regulation of corporate life--all factors contributing to a situation in which, "in the eyes of believers, Islam is more than a religious system; it is a 'way of life.'"

The underlying cause of the current Islamic "upsurge," Primakov suggested, is to be found in the specific aspects of the rise of capitalism in the Muslim world. Most of these countries were part of the colonial empires of non-Muslim states, he noted, and consequently it was entirely natural for Islam to become part of the ideology of the national liberation movements. Moreover, the impoverishment of the petty bourgeoisie, the weakness of the working class, and the desire of the native bourgeoisie to find a common language with the masses and to throw up a "barrier against communism" have all contributed to the Islamic upsurge.

Holding that the "politization" of Islam has meant that it is now being employed by different groups for their own political purposes and that it is undergoing a significant internal change, Primakov complained that Soviet scholars have investigated this first consequence but have ignored the second. He emphasized that it is precisely in this sphere that the most important developments have occurred. Primakov argued that there has been a dramatic change in the relationship between the purely religious and the social elements of Islam in the course of its recent history. In the past, he maintained, Islamic leaders did not advance serious social programs when they participated in political action, but now they do. This change was viewed as critical by Primakov because some of these programs are progressive and deserving of support and some of them are not. As an example, Primakov discussed the work of Iranian President Bani-Sadr on the "Islamic polity" and "Islamic economy" to demonstrate that just as the class base of the Islamic movement is a mixture of the petty bourgeois and working classes, so too are its ideas.

THEORETICAL INNOVATIONS

By discussing the Muslim upsurge in terms of Soviet theory on nationality and national liberation, Primakov offered what is for the Soviets a new conception of Islam:

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+ He suggested that Islam is a suprahistorical ideological system that will not necessarily be overcome in the course of historical development.

+ He argued that Islam is more than a religion, that it is an entire social world and requires analysis at that level.

+ He specified that Islam and the national liberation movements of oppressed nations have a similar theoretical standing and may enjoy a symbiotic relationship.

Although these points stand more or less in opposition to current Soviet conceptions, they hark back to the 1920 discussions at the Second Congress of the Comintern, when Lenin made remarkable concessions about the Sarekat Islam, a religious-cum-national movement in the Dutch East Indies. To ensure that no one missed the point, Primakov made two explicit references to the Sarekat Islam episode and quoted Lenin to the effect that "although our cause does not accord in every respect with that of Sarekat Islam, that cannot be an obstacle to the joint antiimperialist struggle."

ISLAM AND SOVIET ORIENTAL STUDIES

As Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Primakov supervises the largest body of Soviet scholars working on Islam. During the past decade, Soviet discussions of Islam have been moving in the directions suggested by Primakov in this article, but he is the first to put them into a general ideological framework and to raise the academic discussion to the political level. It may be indicative of Soviet leadership interest in and support for Primakov's position that on 10 October Boris Ponomarev encouraged work on the subject at a ceremony awarding the Institute the Order of the Red Banner.

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USSR

ANNIVERSARY SLOGANS STREAMLINED, REFLECT CURRENT POLICIES

> The CPSU slogans published for the forthcoming October Revolution anniversary employ a notably sparser rhetorical style than that which has been the norm in recent years. Many of the longer slogans have been trimmed down, and standardized phrases ornamenting others have been largely eliminated. The substantive changes, as usual, reflect already emergent policy trends instead of signaling new departures.

The streamlining of the slogans, which was also evident in this year's May Day set, appears to reflect the effort of Soviet leaders since 1978 to improve the quality and effectiveness of Soviet public communications. Brezhnev has alluded repeatedly to the issue, describing in trenchant language the defects he hopes to see corrected. At the November 1978 Central Committee plenum, for example, Brezhnev complained that propaganda was frequently "overburdened with general phrases that say nothing to the mind or heart." He repeated his message to the November 1979 plenum, calling for franker discussion of the issues with less "ostentation" and "political jabber." These ideas were officially adopted by the CPSU in its April 1979 resolution on ideology, which called for an end to "empty talk," "propaganda cliches," and "pseudoscientific language."

Among the substantive changes, the more notable include a new emphasis on welfare goals in the slogan on trade unions and a renewed emphasis on the hardline tone in slogans relating to the United States and East-West issues, reflected also in the May Day slogans this year:

+ The slogan on trade unions substituted the injunction to work for "improving the people's working and everyday living conditions" for an earlier appeal to "support socialist competition."

+ Slogans on the United States included a new condemnation of the "aggressive U.S. nuclear policy" and of U.S. intentions toward Cuba, as well as a reiteration of the attack on U.S. missiles in Europe, introduced in May. The new list also omitted support for detente--a concept which has been consistently featured in the slogans during the 1970's.

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KOMMUNIST CALLS FOR CREATION OF NATIONWIDE POLLING SERVICE

The use of public opinion studies in support of policymaking in the Soviet Union has been given a new boost by a recent KOMMUNIST editorial proposing the establishment of a national polling service to provide periodic samples of public opinion on key questions of domestic and foreign policy. The editorial is the latest in a series of signs that party leaders are again paying attention to the claims of sociology, some apparently viewing the science as a useful political tool, others apparently fearing it as a threat to the party's traditional monopoly on information. Even as new organizational units for studying public opinion have begun to proliferate throughout the party, conservative forces have been taking measures to ensure that these activities remain under the control of the party's ideological authorities.

While the editorial, in a September KOMMUNIST (No. 13), dealt with many aspects of sociological research, its most striking part is a call for creating an effective "system of mass polling" that would produce results with "such a degree of reliability and representativeness" that they could become a "reliable aid" for party leaders and state administrators. Arguing that systematic "sampling" of public opinion was needed not only to make propaganda effective but also to guide the leadership in decisionmaking, it declared that "consideration of public opinion in administering society" was one of the "most important" features of the Soviet system. The editorial echoed other recent proposals for an increased role for sociology, notably a radical argument by R.A. Safarov appearing in a late 1979 issue of SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES (No. 4) according to which party leadership decisions must be closely guided by the results of polls.*

PARTY DEBATE The role of sociology in party work has long been a subject of controversy, and the recent advances in public opinion research have been accompanied by new signs of division over the subject. The advocates of public opinion research have picked up support at high party levels, most clearly

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* See the TRENDS of 23 January 1980, pages 10-12.

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from Central Committee Secretary Chernenko, who has repeatedly advocated that public views be given more consideration in decisionmaking. In a May 1979 PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM article, Chernenko announced that a new "group" had been created in the CPSU Central Committee to analyze public opinion and conduct sociological studies. In this and more recent articles he has argued that up-to-date information on the attitudes of the public is vital to administering the country, and he has developed a campaign to force party officials to pay increased attention to letters and complaints from the public.

On the other side of the issue, party officials have expressed some concern over the new stress on empirical social studies, evidently viewing it as a threat to the party apparat and its traditional ways of doing business. At the mid-1979 ideology plenums several republic first secretaries appeared to share the concern, voiced by the Lithuanian first secretary in the 17 May 1979 SOVETSKAYA LITVA, that sociologists often lack "a clear political goal" in their research. Central Committee Secretary Suslov voiced the same sentiment in a March 1980 KOMMUNIST (No. 4) article, in which he complained that sociologists were prone to slip into "pragmatism" and "empiricism." Suslov's complaints expressed exactly the charges raised by conservatives against sociologists during the early 1970's, when they chastised the latter for trespassing on the territory of party ideologists.

CONFLICTING TRENDS The controversy over use of sociology has also been reflected in the establishment of new bodies to conduct public opinion research in recent years. Despite the crackdown on sociology in the early 1970's, which temporarily discouraged party officials from using public opinion data, renewed interest in this subject developed, and some party organs began creating "public opinion councils." Although originating at the local level, this trend has been approved and stimulated by the Central Committee, which in a major 26 April 1979 decree on ideology called for party organizations up and down the line to study public opinion and to use sociological research. At the same time, the decree, perhaps reflecting conservatives' apprehensions at the uncontrolled proliferation of local sociolcgical units, sought to bring these units into the more traditional framework of party control by establishing a network of "ideological commissions" to supervise them.

Prior to the decree, in the late 1970's, party organs at various levels set up units to conduct public opinion surveys, some designed to provide information for party decisionmaking and others designed more narrowly to aid in improving ideological work:

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+ In 1975 Georgia created a "public opinion council" in its Central Committee to help find effective ways of combating corruption and other entrenched social ills, and the republic leadership has credited this council with a significant role in decisionmaking in recent years.

+ In March 1978, according to Safarov's article, the Moscow City Party Committee created "councils to study public opinion" in all its rayon party committees and other local party committees, although statements in Moscow papers suggest that these are limited to improving propaganda work.

+ The Chernigov Oblast Party Committee created a 35-member "council to study public opinion" in 1978, according to oblast ideology secretary V. Polovets, writing in a July 1980 issue of POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA. He specified that it was both to inform party leaders and to aid in improving ideological work.

+ Another form of sociological unit--a "sociological service"--was created in January 1979 under the Stavropol Kray Party Committee with the aim of providing local party leaders with information on rural attitudes, according to an article by Stavropol Secretary A. Korobeynikov in the 18 September 1980 RURAL LIFE.

Apparently attempting to bring these units under the control of the traditional ideological organs, the April 1979 CPSU decree ordered party committees at all levels to "activate" the work of "ideological commissions" and to place coordination of all local ideological work in the hands of these commissions. These commissions, which in many areas did not exist or had fallen into neglect, had to be reorganized to include organs like the public opinion councils or created anew after the decree. Judging by the description of these new commissions appearing in occasional press articles, they are run by the local Agitprop and ideological officials, and sociologists are confined to a very subordinate role under the regular ideological bureaucracy. For example:

+ In Estonia, which in 1979 became the first republic to create a republic-level ideological commission, the commission is headed by the Central Committee ideology secretary, with the Agitprop head as deputy chairman, and the chiefs of other major ideological establishments--other Central Committee sections, the Academy of Sciences, the writers union, the party history institute, and committee on publishing--as members, according to a 21 February 1980 SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA account of the commission's first meeting.

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+ In Dnepropetrovsk, according to oblast ideology secretary I. Vasilyev writing in a June 1980 POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA, there are "functional groups" in the city and rayon ideological commissions to study public opinion and make sociological studies.

+ In Rostov, according to an August 1980 PARTY LIFE (No. 15) editorial, a group to study public opinion exists among the four sections and three "working groups" of the oblast party committee's ideological commission.

By no means all party organizations have created ideological commission which suggests some disagreement over this form. The August 1980 PARTY LIFE editorial (No. 15) noted that they still exist only in "many" oblast party committees and "most" rayon and city party committees. Georgia and Azerbaijan, the two republics with the most firmly established public opinion councils and a more reformist inclination in ideological matters, have not submerged their public opinion councils in such commissions but keep them directly subordinate to the republic bureaus and secretariats. The Azerbaijan Central Committee not only did not abolish its longtime Council for Sociological Research after the April 1979 decree but ordered its reactivation in an Azerbaijan decree reported in the 24 June 1979 BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY. The Georgian Central Committee also continues to operate its Public Opinion Council, giving it extensive publicity and allowing it to supervise similar local activities.

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BRIEFS

USSR-CHINA: Soviet Foreign Ministry Note on Border Incident

Moscow has played down the 5 October clash on the eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet border as it has similar incidents in the past. A 9 October Soviet Foreign Ministry note complained about the incident only after Beijing had publicized its own protest note three days earlier. Soviet domestic and foreign media have carried accounts of the Soviet note but have made no further reference to the incident. The Soviet note seemed designed primarily to set forth Moscow's version of events. It characterized as a fabrication Beijing's claim that Soviet troops had intruded on PRC territory and accused Chinese troops of ambushing a group of unarmed Soviet fishermen on the Argun River. Moscow demanded that Beijing punish those responsible and take "measures to guarantee a normal situation on the border."

USSR: New CPSU Position for Japanese Affairs

Continuing a longstanding trend toward specialization in the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, the head of the department's Japan sector, I.I. Kovalenko, has been elevated to a newly created position as deputy department head--evidently for Japan. Kovalenko was identified in his new position in an 18 September PRAVDA report on a ceremony for a visiting Japanese politician. Several other deputy positions with apparent regional responsibilities have been created in the department in recent years, perhaps reflecting growing Soviet interest and involvement in the Third World. In 1975 Middle East specialist V.P. Rumyantsev--who died the following year--became a deputy department head; in 1976 Latin American specialist K.N. Brutents became a deputy head; and in 1978 African specialist P.I. Manchkha was named a deputy. In previous years one deputy, R.A. Ulyanovskiy, appeared responsible for Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Ulyanovskiy is still identified as a deputy head, although some of his duties apparently have been divided among the newcomers. The other present members of the top echelon of the department--First Deputy Head V.V. Zagladin and Deputy Heads V.S. Shaposhnikov and A.S. Chernyayev--specialize mainly in Europe and North America.

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CHINA: Unusual Treatment of Huang Hua UNGA Speech

In an unusual departure from normal practice, Chinese media for the first time have reported only excerpts of this year's annual PRC statement to the UN General Assembly, which was delivered by Foreign Minister and newly appointed Vice Premier Huang Hua on 24 September. Each year since 1971, when the PRC was first seated in the United Nations, the Chinese news agency XINHUA had transmitted the full text of the annual address. This year XINHUA and the party paper published only lengthy excerpts of Huang's speech, on 24 and 25 September respectively. The speech--Beijing's most comprehensive foreign policy statement since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--appeared to break no new ground on Beijing's longstanding foreign policy positions; and the excerpts seemed intended merely to highlight its major points.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 6-12 OCTOBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,460 items)			Beijing (708 items)		
Syrian President Asad in USSR	13%	(--)	Malaysian Parliamentary Delegation in PRC	6%	(--)
Salyut-6 Space Mission	5%	(3%)	Korean Workers Party Sixth Congress and 34th Anniversary	6%	(--)
GDR 31st National Day	4%	(--)	U.S.-Taiwan Diplomatic Immunity Agreement	4%	(--)
USSR Constitution Third Anniversary	3%	(--)	PRC Foreign Ministry Protest Note on Soviet Border Provocations	4%	(--)
Indian President Reddy in USSR	3%	(13%)	UNGA 35th Session	3%	(5%)
			Former Nepal PM Bista in PRC	3%	(--)

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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U.S.-USSR

Moscow appears to be pessimistic about any rapid improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations following the November election but continues to keep alive the prospect of renewed dialog with Washington on arms control and trade issues. Moscow's low expectations for the immediate term have been apparent in its failure to find promise in the Carter Administration's renewed commitment to an early ratification of the SALT II treaty and in its pessimistic commentary on the opening in Geneva of U.S.-Soviet discussions on limiting European theater strategic arms. A continued focus on relations with the West, however, has been apparent in recent remarks by President Brezhnev and in Moscow's renewed professions of commitment to the SALT II treaty as it was signed in Vienna in June 1979.

BREZHNEV CONDEMNS U.S. POLICY, SUSTAINS PROSPECT OF DIALOGUE

Moscow publicized three statements by President Brezhnev on East-West relations last week within a period of four days. His remarks on current U.S. policy at a 16 October Kremlin dinner for visiting Afghanistan President Babrak Karmal, perhaps befitting the occasion, were sharply critical. PRAVDA on the 17th quoted Brezhnev as asserting that U.S. imperialism "is again apparently embarking on the path of a new 'cold war.'" "Feverish" military preparations and even "eulogy of nuclear war," he claimed, are now dominating political discourse in Washington. Although speaking on the eve of the first round of U.S.-Soviet discussions on limiting European theater strategic arms, Brezhnev said nothing about those negotiations or the prospects for arms control.

Brezhnev seemed to have a different purpose in mind earlier in the week, when on two separate occasions he made a point of evoking the continued feasibility of an East-West dialogue including the United States. Brezhnev used the occasion of a 13 October ceremony in the Kremlin, in which he was awarded the "Golden Mercury" prize for his contribution to broadening international economic ties, to reiterate his support for a policy of expanding East-West trade. According to TASS, Brezhnev quoted Lenin's assertion that "regular trade relations between the Soviet republic and all the capitalist countries in the world are certain to continue developing."

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Soviet reporting on Brezhnev's meeting in the Kremlin the next day with U.S. industrialist Armand Hammer appeared even more pointedly designed to keep alive the prospect of an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. The TASS account, published in Moscow papers on 15 October, reported Brezhnev as emphasizing the importance of halting the "dangerous" drift in U.S.-Soviet relations "before it is too late." Brezhnev maintained that steps by Washington to "resume constructive interaction" with Moscow--"primarily" on questions of arms control--would find a "positive response" in the Soviet Union. A TASS report published the same day giving Hammer's account of his discussions with Brezhnev added a few details of the conversation. According to TASS, Brezhnev told Hammer that the USSR was ready for cooperation on "all questions of interstate relations" and that he was convinced "there are forces in the United States which want normalization of relations with the Soviet Union."

MOSCOW RENEWS SUPPORT FOR SALT II TREATY AS NEGOTIATED

Since July Moscow has reaffirmed its commitment to SALT II as originally signed and backed away from its intimations last spring that the treaty might have to be renegotiated if ratification is further delayed. Despite this apparent shift of posture, however, Moscow has avoided suggesting that it sees any prospect of early ratification. Recent Carter Administration statements in support of the Vienna treaty and its speedy ratification, for example, are being treated at least for now as the result of electoral opportunism rather than as an important development in U.S. policy on SALT.

SUPPORT FOR SALT II Moscow authoritatively reaffirmed its commitment to the SALT II treaty in Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's annual UN address on 23 September. Gromyko pledged Soviet readiness both to ratify the SALT treaty and to comply "strictly" with all its provisions following ratification. Soviet commentators have seconded Gromyko's support for SALT II, with IZVESTIYA political observer Stanislav Kondrashov describing the treaty on 17 October as a document "of the greatest importance" for present and future U.S.-Soviet relations.

Last spring a number of Soviet commentators and low-level officials sought to suggest that time was running out on the ratification process. Noting pointedly that certain provisions of the treaty and its protocol were in danger of being "outdated," they singled out limits on U.S. cruise missiles by way of example. In late June a member of the Central Committee's International Information Department even warned that "new talks might be needed about certain points" in the treaty.

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The timing of Moscow's shift away from suggesting that SALT II was in danger suggests a possible connection with the Soviet proposal of 4 July for U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles in Europe and U.S. forward-based systems. The last Soviet commentary to mention the perishability of the SALT treaty came only two days later. The new Soviet proposal itself appeared to reconfirm the Soviet commitment to the Vienna treaty by linking implementation of any agreements reached in the European theater negotiations to the prior ratification of SALT II.

SALT AND THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Moscow has taken note of statements on SALT in the U.S. presidential election campaign but has chosen so far to play down their significance. Soviet media, for instance, have reported liberally in recent weeks on Administration statements contrasting the President's support for SALT II with Governor Reagan's pledge to scrap the treaty in favor of renewed talks. But they have consistently portrayed the Administration's stance as tied more to transient electoral considerations than to a sincere commitment to the SALT treaty. A Moscow domestic radio commentary on 20 October reported that President Carter had decided to seek Senate ratification of the treaty in 1981 "regardless of the situation in Afghanistan," but it dismissed both President Carter's statement and Governor Reagan's assertion that he would rather move on immediately to SALT III as examples of a single phenomenon--sacrificing the aims of SALT to "the ambitions of politicians."

SOVIETS STRESS U.S. FORWARD SYSTEMS AS GENEVA ARMS TALKS OPEN

The signal feature of Soviet media commentary keyed to the opening of U.S.-Soviet discussions in Geneva on negotiations to limit European theater strategic forces has been a forceful restatement of Moscow's demand for the inclusion of U.S. forward-based systems (FBS) on the agenda. Since Soviet commentators are treating the inclusion of forward systems as the determining factor in the success of the talks even as they portray the Carter Administration as hoping to exclude them, Moscow appears to be preparing for a slow start.

The new negotiations are receiving media treatment virtually identical to that earlier accorded by Moscow to SALT I and SALT II. Reportage has been limited to brief TASS accounts of each session, which note only that the delegations met, with no characterization of the results. The talks thus far have been excluded from Moscow's routine media criticism of U.S. defense and arms control policy. In the only official comment, the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers "noted with satisfaction" that

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the talks had begun. The communique issued at the end of the foreign ministers' 19-20 October Warsaw meeting, according to the TASS account, also expressed support for the Soviet stance linking FBS to the discussions.

Soviet commentary anticipating the opening of talks seemed intent on suggesting that the talks will be difficult and on maintaining that responsibility for progress rests with the U.S. side. IZVESTIYA's political observer Nikolay Polyanov, in a commentary broadcast on 15 October, said there is "no doubt" that U.S. forward bases should become a "mandatory" element in the negotiations. The Geneva talks will show, Polyanov asserted, whether the United States will "sincerely and seriously" approach such a dialogue. An earlier commentary on the 11th on Moscow radio's international service went so far as to express open pessimism regarding the prospects for the talks, given U.S. views on the FBS issue. In light of the Administration's reported hopes to exclude FBS from the discussions, the commentary said, "one can understand why the American press is so pessimistic over the possible results."

The most substantial Soviet comment on the opening of discussions came in a 17 October TASS commentary attributed to Aleksey Platonov, a name that has appeared under articles on SALT in PRAVDA. In the spirit of Soviet statements on the opening of previous SALT sessions, Platonov professed Moscow's sincere intentions in approaching the talks while expressing hope for a similarly constructive approach from Washington. While presenting his arguments more diplomatically, he showed no more flexibility on the FBS issue than other commentators. The Soviet Union, he said, "cannot and will not ignore" the role that U.S. FBS play in the European strategic balance. Hewing closely to the 15 July PRAVDA editorial article on the Soviet negotiating position, Platonov recited Moscow's official view of the advantages the United States derives from its forward bases in Europe. An extensive network of land bases allows the United States to substantially increase its air forces in West Europe within a "brief period," he noted, while the use of "advanced bases" allows U.S. submarines to "considerably enhance" their ability to "remain at combat positions."

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POLAND-USSR

NEW UNION REFUSES TO ACCEPT REGIME DEMANDS ON REGISTRATION

Warsaw has provided its own picture of the new flareup of tensions between the regime and workers over the registration of the national Solidarity trade union. In reporting on the dispute, the media have portrayed the government as having required nothing more than it has of other unions already registered and have claimed that the union leaders were being unnecessarily combative in refusing to accede to government demands. Polish media are not known to have mentioned the threat of a new nationwide strike--a tactic advocated by some union leaders, according to Western press reports.

The government's side of the registration issue was presented in a statement of the Warsaw voivodship court--the union registering authority--carried by Warsaw radio on the 19th. The statement complained that the statutes of the new union did not contain specific acknowledgments of the union's acceptance of the Polish Constitution, the party's leading role, the socialist system, and the country's alliances. It noted that 12 other unions whose registration applications had been approved had accepted these obligations in their statutes. The court spokesman rejected Solidarity's contention that such stipulations need not be stated in the statutes because they were already contained in the 31 August strike settlement, as well as the argument that the issue, being "political," did not come properly within the purview of the court. The statement also complained that Solidarity's statutes contain "a whole chapter" on the right to strike and that they bar communist party and enterprise officials from being elected to positions in the new union.

Commentaries and reports on the evolving situation have further underscored the regime's exasperation with the union's position. TRYBUNA LUDU on the 18th denounced "political adventurists" in the trade union movement, saying that "rabid advocates of saying no and nothing but no" have made their presence felt in some unions. In a similar vein, Rakowski, chief editor of the weekly POLITYKA, writing in the government daily ZYCIE WARSAWY on the 21st, called on Solidarity to stop setting "impossible conditions"

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and reminded the union that acceptance of compromise solutions "is not a betrayal of ideals." In the meantime, routine level reports have continued to hint at the existence of more subversive influences on the trade union movement by alluding to the activities of "antisocialist" forces both within the country and abroad.

MOSCOW CITES BLOC LEADERS ON POLAND, MAINTAINS RESERVE

> Moscow has refrained from authoritative comment on the Polish situation in recent weeks, apparently to give the Kania regime time to work out its problems with the obstreperous Solidarity trade union. Soviet media have kept up pressure on the Polish regime, however, by replaying tough statements by East European leaders, as a reminder that Poland's neighbors expect "socialist" control to be maintained in that country, and by drawing attention in routine reportage to Polish complaints of alleged Western efforts to exploit the current difficulties.

GDR leader Honecker's remarks on Poland in Gera on 13 October were reported at length by TASS and in PRAVDA on the 16th. The paper reported Honecker's assertion that "the socialist GDR cannot remain indifferent to the fate" of Poland and will oppose any Western interference in that country and his warning: "Let the counterrevolution know that the sphere of its domination lies west of the Elbe and Werra"--the GDR's own western border. Honecker also said that "Poland is and remains a socialist country"--giving the remark the force of a pledge by adding the words: "We, together with our friends, will make sure of that." The added words were picked up in East Berlin's recorded broadcast of the speech but were omitted from various edited versions of the speech subsequently carried by East German and Soviet media.

Earlier, PRAVDA on the 9th reproduced in full remarks on Poland by Czechoslovak party and state leader Husak at a CPCZ plenum. It reported Husak as voicing confidence that "the Polish communists and fraternal Polish people" would have sufficient strength to surmount the present difficulties and "repel the onslaught" of internal and external enemies of socialism. Similarly, TASS on the 18th reported a prediction by Romania's

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Ceausescu at an RCP plenum that the Polish party and people "will firmly counteract various antisocialist manifestations" and preserve the country's "independence and sovereignty." The TASS report, however, omitted his critical assertion that the crisis would not have arisen if the Warsaw regime had moved earlier against the antisocialists.

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USSR

DOCTRINE ON COLLECTIVITY AIRED AS CONGRESS APPROACHES

The sensitive issue of collective leadership has again been raised in the Soviet press as preliminary preparations get under way for the 26th CPSU Congress, scheduled for February 1981. An article in the party's historical journal recently argued that collective leadership is an essential principle of party life and warned against leaders who place themselves above the collective. Although couched in routine formulas, the article may reflect concern in the party lest decisions connected with the forthcoming congress be too tightly controlled by Brezhnev.

The subject of collective leadership was addressed in an article in the September issue of VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS (QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY), attributed to an obscure author, P.I. Nikolayev, who is not known to have previously dealt with the issue. Holding up Lenin as the model for a top party leader, the article argued that Lenin, despite enjoying "unlimited trust," had never allowed himself to decide questions singlehandedly for collegial organs "of which he was a member or leader." It insisted that there must be a "free exchange of opinions" in "every leading party collective" and that "no one must try to force his views" on his colleagues or "rise above the collective." While acknowledging the need for individual leaders, it assailed any "glorification of particular leaders" and declared that a "cult of personality and violations of intraparty democracy associated with it cannot be tolerated."

Lengthy articles stressing collectivity above the need for a strong leader--even those repeating relatively routine formulas like Nikolayev's--have become rarities since 1970, when Brezhnev established his predominate role. The last such article was one by A. Vodolazskiy in the August 1979 KOMMUNIST.* The relevance of that article to the political maneuvering then under way was more striking than in the present case. It appeared in the more authoritative party theoretical journal and contained more clearly polemical formulations. Moreover, the article seemed to mirror the conflict in the Brezhnev-Kirilenko relationship at the time. It was published when Kirilenko was reemerging from several months of eclipse apparently forced by Brezhnev, and it contained criticisms that seemed to apply to Brezhnev's moves against Kirilenko.

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* See the TRENDS of 19 September 1979, pages 1-5.

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BRIEFS

USSR: New Belorussian Party Chief

The vacancy in the Belorussian leadership created by the accidental death earlier this month of First Secretary Petr Masherov has been filled by 63-year-old native son Tikhon Kiselev, deputy minister of the USSR since 1978. Kiselev was named to the new post on 16 October by a plenum of the Belorussian Central Committee attended by the CPSU cadres secretary, Kapitonov, and five days later at the CPSU plenum was elevated to candidate member of the Politburo. Although Kiselev rose within the Belorussian party organization under the patronage of his former boss, ex-Politburo member and USSR First Deputy Premier Kirill Mazurov, he was clearly unaffected by the latter's ouster from the leadership in November 1978. He was named a month later to succeed Mazurov as light industry supervisor in the Council of Ministers. Disenchantment in Moscow with the Mazurov-Masherov leadership was hinted at most recently by the failure of any Politburo member to attend Masherov's funeral and the decision to bypass Masherov's deputies in filling the post of first secretary. Although Kiselev outranked other possible candidates for the post of Belorussian party chief, other recently elected republic first secretaries have all been drawn directly from the local leadership. Whether Kiselev will use his new position to depart from the policies of the Mazurov-Masherov group, which has run the republic since the days of Khrushchev, remains to be seen.

YUGOSLAVIA: Rotation of LCY Presidium President

Tito's successors have reaffirmed their dedication to collective leadership in selecting Lazar Mojsov to replace Stevan Doronjski as Yugoslav party Presidium President for the coming year. The selection, made at an LCY Presidium session on 20 October, conforms to the requirements of the Presidium's new leadership arrangements, adopted last June after Tito's death, which call for the highest party position to be filled each year by a representative from a different one of the country's eight regions--like the system followed for Yugoslavia's collective state Presidency. The choice of Mojsov, a Macedonian, improves the ethnic balance in the Yugoslav leadership, which has had an unusually large number of ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins in key positions, including outgoing Presidium President Doronjski, a Serb from Vojvodina. While the Presidium technically could have

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selected another Serb under the new rotational plan, the choice of a Macedonian presumably sits better with Croats and Slovenes. Before becoming an LCY Presidium member in June 1979, Mojsov served as Yugoslav ambassador to the United Nations and President of the UN General Assembly (1977-78), where he was a vigorous proponent of Belgrade's nonaligned foreign policy. As a Macedonian, Mojsov occasionally has criticized neighboring Bulgaria for alleged territorial designs on Yugoslav Macedonia. Sofia has taken pains not to exacerbate the Macedonia issue since Tito's death.

USSR-ZIMBABWE: Moscow Silent on Mugabe's Invitation

Moscow has yet to respond publicly to Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's reported invitation to open a Soviet Embassy in Salisbury. According to Salisbury radio on 14 October, Mugabe revealed at a press conference upon his return that day from the North Korean party congress, with a brief stopover in Beijing, that he had already extended the invitation, but he did not specify when. Moscow radio's African service had reported almost six months earlier that an agreement to exchange ambassadors had been reached during Politburo Candidate Member Sharaf Rashidov's visit last April to attend Zimbabwe's independence ceremonies. Despite that announcement, Mugabe hitherto has not allowed the USSR--a strong supporter during the guerrilla war of Mugabe's rival, Joshua Nkomo--to send an ambassador. Moscow has shown signs of increasing frustration at its lack of representation in Salisbury, most recently in a broadcast in both major Zimbabwean languages on 16 October--two days after Mugabe's invitation had been reported by Salisbury. The broadcast featured a commentary by a member of Nkomo's ZAPU party, who complained of the Mugabe government's exclusion of the Soviets, whereas Washington, London, and Bonn--"who supplied our enemy with weapons and against whom we fought"--promptly opened embassies last spring.

Moscow has been cautious but correct in its public support of the Zimbabwean regime since independence, despite the lesser role accorded Nkomo and the delay in exchanging ambassadors. Soviet commentators have emphasized the domestic problems and external dangers that have yet to be overcome and have shown concern over Washington's relatively cordial relations with Mugabe. They have avoided direct criticism of Mugabe, however, and have generally professed support for his moderate policies.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 13-19 OCTOBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,521 items)			Beijing (884 items)		
Afghan PM Karmal in USSR	12%	(--)	French President Giscard in PRC	17%	(--)
Presentation of Golden Mercury Award to Brezhnev	4%	(--)	Korean Workers Party Sixth Congress and 34th Anniversary	8%	(6%)
Salyut-6 Space Mission	4%	(5%)	Zimbabwean PM Mugabe in PRC	5%	(--)
International Cooperative Alliance 27th Congress	4%	(--)	Reaffirmation of Democratic Kampuchean Seat in UN	3%	(--)
Iran-Iraq Conflict	3%	(2%)	Iran-Iraq Conflict	4%	(3%)
UNGA 35th Session	3%	(--)	PRC Foreign Ministry Protest on U.S.-Taiwan Diplomatic Immunity Agreement	3%	(4%)
U.S. Businessman Armand Hammer Meeting With Brezhnev	3%	(--)			

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- Moscow, Beijing on U.S. presidential race
- Brezhnev position after leadership changes
- Soviet, bloc concern over events in Poland
- Brezhnev on Gulf security, U.S. naval moves

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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U.S.-USSR-CHINA

Moscow and Beijing have avoided any explicit public show of preference for either leading U.S. presidential candidate during the final stages of the election campaign and have refrained from predicting the probable outcome on 4 November. Soviet comment has adopted the posture that there are no essential differences between the foreign policies advocated by President Carter and Governor Reagan. Beijing responded forcefully during the campaign with objections to the policies of both candidates toward Taiwan, but it has not pressed this issue in recent days and has avoided suggesting that it favors the foreign policy line of either contender.

MOSCOW INSISTS CARTER-REAGAN DIFFERENCES ARE INCONSEQUENTIAL

Through the final weeks of the U.S. election campaign, Moscow has sustained its criticism of both major presidential candidates and dismissed their differences on foreign policy as inconsequential. Soviet accounts of U.S. businessman Armand Hammer's recent meeting with President Brezhnev did not acknowledge what Hammer subsequently described to the Western press as the Soviet leader's expression of "high regard" for President Carter. Two recent Soviet commentaries were openly pessimistic about the near-term prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations regardless of who is elected president.

Moscow's failure to find any significance in the two leading candidates' differing positions on the SALT II treaty best illustrates its attempt to avoid taking sides in the presidential race. While continuing to insist on the vital importance of the ratification of the SALT II treaty, Moscow has dismissed President Carter's renewed support for the treaty as inspired by electoral considerations and has reported Governor Reagan's pledge to scrap the document with scarcely a word in rejoinder. A 29 October Moscow domestic radio commentary on the presidential debate of the previous day clearly demonstrated the Soviet posture of equal hostility to both candidates on the SALT II issue. The commentary reported no details of the candidates' statements on SALT II and accused each of trying to use the treaty "for his own interests."

While Moscow has made little of Governor Reagan's opposition to SALT II, some clear expressions of distaste for his foreign policy have emerged in commentary in recent weeks. The

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19 September issue of the foreign affairs weekly NOVOYE VREMYA (NEW TIMES) published an unflattering portrait of the Republican challenger. While reporting that he had been described as "competent and pragmatic" during his term as governor of California, NOVOYE VREMYA described the governor as a shallow-thinking, rightwing oversimplifier bent on an arms race. USA and Canada Institute official A.A. Kokoshin, in an article in the October issue of the Institute's journal, SShA (USA), offered an unfavorable view of the governor's probable foreign policies, suggesting through an implicit comparison of the Republican and Democratic platforms that a Reagan administration might be even less desirable than President Carter's. Kokoshin acknowledged more frankly than has been the norm in Soviet media some of the foreign policy positions Governor Reagan has adopted during the campaign. He reported, for instance, that Governor Reagan had called for a "blockade" of Cuba in response to Soviet actions in Afghanistan and alleged that the governor and his advisers were demanding 10-percent annual increases in the defense budget as opposed to the 5-percent increases the Democrats project.

While Moscow has been reticent to discuss publicly its view of the near-term prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations, two recent references to this issue suggest a mood of pessimism concerning the outlook following the election. In his SShA article, Kokoshin concluded that "some time" would be required before the U.S. foreign policy establishment returned to a "more sober conception" of the world. In a 17 October overview of the U.S. campaign, IZVESTIYA's senior political observer Stanislav Kondrashov maintained that the current bellicose mood in the United States should not be attributed to the two presidential candidates but to the assiduous cultivation of "militarism" by U.S. antidetente forces over a period of several years. Kondrashov predicted several years of increased U.S. defense spending no matter who is elected president.

BEIJING CONTINUES TO STRESS ELECTION'S UNPREDICTABILITY

A flurry of Beijing commentary wrapping up issues and trends in the final stages of the U.S. presidential election campaign has taken note of indications that President Carter's prospects have improved but has continued to stress that the election outcome is unpredictable.* A newsletter by RENMIN RIBAO reporter Wang Fei,

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* Beijing's previous coverage of the U.S. election campaign is discussed in the 25 July 1980 FBIS Special Memorandum "Moscow, Beijing on the U.S. Presidential Campaign," and the TRENDS of 1 October 1980, pages 10-11.

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published in the party paper on 23 October, observed that "at this critical moment" in the campaign the President has significantly narrowed Governor Reagan's earlier projected lead in electoral votes, largely as a result of his "fierce attacks" against Reagan on the issues of "war and peace." A discussion of the election campaign broadcast by Beijing radio the day before, however, cited NBC and WALL STREET JOURNAL predictions that Reagan would win the election.

Both the 22 October Beijing radio discussion and the RENMIN RIBAO analysis the following day emphasized the changeability and "drastic fluctuations" of the campaign thus far, and both suggested that the 28 October debate between the President and Governor Reagan would have a "tremendous impact" on the outcome. In that regard, a long 26 October XINHUA analysis of positions taken by President Carter and Governor Reagan on various issues observed that there are only minor differences between the two main candidates, despite the "multitude of speeches and fierce wrangles" of the "long and noisy campaign." Notably, the analysis of the candidates' views on China policy summarized only Governor Reagan's view on "upgrading relations with Taiwan," which China had criticized authoritatively in June and August. It said nothing about the Administration's criticism of Reagan's view or about Beijing's protest over the Administration's endorsement of an agreement this month granting diplomatic privileges to unofficial organizations coordinating relations between Washington and Taiwan.*

The flurry of Beijing commentary at the close of the campaign comes after a month and a half of reduced election coverage. During the early stages of the campaign, Chinese media produced a steady stream of commentaries and discussions of the main trends and issues, but media attention flagged at the end of August, following Beijing's sharp public criticism of Governor Reagan's views on relations with China during and after the visit to Beijing by vice-presidential candidate George Bush. The fluctuations in campaign coverage appeared to reflect Beijing's sensitivity to the charge that it was interfering in U.S. domestic politics.

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* See the TRENDS of 16 October 1980, pages 1-5.

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U S S R

LEADERSHIP CHANGES STRENGTHEN BREZHNEV, AGRICULTURE

The 21 October CPSU Central Committee plenum and subsequent Supreme Soviet session produced leadership changes that will strengthen CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev's position as the 26th party congress draws near. The appointment of First Deputy Premier Nikolay Tikhonov as premier puts a longtime Brezhnev protege at the head of the government in place of retiring Premier Aleksey Kosygin, who frequently has been at odds with Brezhnev over policy matters. The promotion of agricultural supervisor Mikhail Gorbachev to full member of the Politburo should further increase Brezhnev's authority, as well as strengthen agricultural interests during the final drafting of the new five-year plan. In his plenum speech, Brezhnev pressed again for ministerial reorganization--something apparently long resisted by Kosygin--and announced that the Politburo had already decided to begin such a reorganization in the agricultural sector.

KOSYGIN RESIGNATION The circumstances of Kosygin's resignation suggest that it may not have been completely voluntary. Although he has clearly been ill, his request for retirement on grounds of health was not received, according to Brezhnev's account of the event at the Supreme Soviet, until 22 October--raising the possibility that it was prompted by some action at the Central Committee plenum the day before or that it had been requested by the plenum. Moreover, despite Kosygin's 16 years as premier and second-ranking leader, Brezhnev read Kosygin's request to the Supreme Soviet without a single word of praise for his service--a slight that was only partially mitigated by a brief announcement on 24 October that Brezhnev had sent a letter to Kosygin thanking him on behalf of the leadership for his many years of fruitful work. The cool treatment of Kosygin was similar to that given to former First Deputy Premier and Politburo member Mazurov--admittedly a less distinguished figure--who resigned under a cloud in 1978. It differed dramatically from that accorded to former President Mikoyan, whom Brezhnev warmly praised on his retirement in 1965. In contrast to his treatment of Kosygin, Brezhnev praised his successor Tikhonov,

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expressing confidence that he would be able to handle the post. Kosygin's letter requested release from the Politburo as well as from the premiership, but no action was announced on the former request, and he apparently remains a lameduck member for the time being.

New Premier Tikhonov has strong ties to Brezhnev, and his appointment should facilitate Brezhnev's domination of the government. In addition to being Brezhnev's old crony from Dnepropetrovsk, Tikhonov came in for praise in Brezhnev's memoirs and has risen rapidly in recent years--while Kosygin has faded--to first deputy premier in September 1976, to Politburo candidate member in November 1978, and to full member in November 1979. Tikhonov has long been a leading spokesman for heavy industry interests--in contrast to Kosygin, who has usually been a spokesman for consumer goods. Tikhonov's successor as first deputy premier, I.V. Arkhipov, shares with Brezhnev and Tikhonov long career ties with the metallurgy industry and served in Dnepropetrovsk in the 1930's.

Brezhnev's apparent desire to surround himself with compatible figures was clearly illustrated by a secondary appointment--that of V.N. Makeyev as deputy premier. Long first secretary of Moscow's Bauman rayon--Brezhnev's electoral district--Makeyev's main claim to public recognition has been his introduction of Brezhnev each time the latter gave an election speech between 1970 and 1975. Thus the flowery rhetoric that served to elevate Brezhnev above his colleagues in the highly stylized eulogies that mark the electoral publicity came from the lips of Makeyev during those years. Having apparently caught Brezhnev's attention by his competent handling of this duty, Makeyev in early 1976 was promoted to Moscow ideology secretary and then to city second secretary.

AGRICULTURE The main policy concern of the yearend sessions was clearly the strengthening of agriculture, which was the main subject of Brezhnev's plenum speech, as well as the apparent target of several organizational measures. Brezhnev used his speech to reinforce agriculture's claims on investments in the five-year plan presently being prepared. Stressing the urgent need to improve food supplies for the public--a need recently underscored by events in Poland--Brezhnev admitted "difficulties" in supplying enough meat and milk and stated that "therefore it is important to continue to allocate large capital investments and material resources to agriculture." Organizational moves supportive of the agricultural sector included the following:

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+ The plenum promoted Agriculture Secretary and Politburo candidate member Gorbachev to full member of the Politburo. A figure with full Politburo status has clearly been needed to supervise the jumble of agricultural agencies, and Gorbachev has lacked that level of authority since becoming national agricultural leader in November 1978.

+ Brezhnev announced that the Politburo had recently adopted a decision to create an agroindustrial food complex to plan, finance, and manage agriculture and related industries "as a single whole." Such a complex would probably be headed by Gorbachev and would clearly strengthen agriculture's hold on resources.

+ Brezhnev announced formation of a new Agricultural Machine-building Section in the Central Committee, making this sector independent of the Machinebuilding Section.

+ The longtime head of the Tractor and Agricultural Machine-building Ministry, I.F. Sinitsyn, was sent into retirement a few days before the plenum, according to the 12 October IZVESTIYA, and Brezhnev in his plenum speech assailed the ministry for its poor work.

INDUSTRIAL PRIORITIES Brezhnev was unclear on the subject of industrial priorities, but Gosplan Chairman Baybakov indicated that the projected growth rate for the industries of Group B (consumer goods) would slightly exceed that for the industries of Group A (heavy industry) for the next annual plan--thus perpetuating the approximate balance that was established in this year's plan. Brezhnev appeared to favor consumer goods in saying that rapid development of Group B is of "paramount" importance both politically and economically, in calling for a long-term program of consumer goods production, and in urging heavy industry and defense plants to continue their contributions to consumer goods output. But he failed to back this endorsement with specific proposals concerning investment levels. This failure may reflect a pessimistic estimate regarding overall growth rates, since statements at the Supreme Soviet indicated that industrial investments across the board would be lower than in the 1980 plan. Gosplan Chairman Baybakov at the Supreme Soviet session stated that in the 1981 plan, Group B would grow at 4.2 percent and Group A at 4.1 percent. These figures, while indicating a slight tilt toward consumer goods, also mark a lowering of goals. The 1980 plan had called for 4.5 percent growth for both A and B.

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MINISTERIAL REFORM One effect of Kosygin's departure from the leadership will be to remove a roadblock from the program of ministerial reform that Brezhnev has long promoted and Kosygin has appeared to oppose. Since the mid-1970's Brezhnev again and again has called for an overhaul of the ministerial structure to place real authority in supraministerial organs that would supervise groups of related ministries, improve coordination, and ensure better planning. In his plenum speech, Brezhnev raised the subject again, urging the Council of Ministers to complete plans for organizational changes before the party congress so that they might be incorporated into the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan. While Kosygin had consistently avoided calling for ministerial reorganization, or had spoken of administrative reform in only vague terms, his successor, Tikhonov, had specifically endorsed Brezhnev's proposal in a May 1979 KOMMUNIST article. Brezhnev's announcement that the Politburo has just created an agroindustrial complex indicates that one of these new groupings has already been created and suggests that now, with Kosygin out of the way, more may be created in the near future.

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USSR-EAST EUROPE

Moscow has not commented on the crisis in Poland provoked by the dispute over the registration of the Solidarity union and the threat by union leaders to call a strike on 12 November if the issue is not resolved to their satisfaction. Soviet concern has been clearly demonstrated, however, by the dispatch of Politburo member Kirilenko to Czechoslovakia, where he and his hosts have put on a show of unity in support of a policy of firmness. In the meantime, East Germany has sought to insulate itself from the Polish virus by initiating an agreement with Poland to restrict travel between the two countries.

KIRILENKO VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA HEIGHTENS PRESSURE ON POLAND

In a move apparently designed to heighten pressure on the Polish Government to show firmness in the present crisis, the Soviet Union sent senior Politburo member Kirilenko to Czechoslovakia on 22-26 October for a demonstration of Soviet bloc solidarity. Both Kirilenko and his hosts have used the occasion to portray the crisis as a threat to party rule in Poland, implying that the workers' movement was being exploited by outright enemies of Poland and socialism. While the Soviet media have provided extensive reports on the visit, they continue to observe the moratorium on direct commentary on the Polish crisis adopted in October--apparently to give Polish leader Kania a period of grace to establish his authority.

In his speeches in Czechoslovakia, Kirilenko has referred repeatedly to the theme of foreign interference in Poland. Thus in a Bratislava speech on the 23d he charged that the imperialists are trying to "hamper" the socialist countries' development, "interfere" in their internal affairs, and "undermine the very foundations of the socialist system." The next day, obviously with Poland's problems in view, Kirilenko asserted in Plzen that "our class adversaries" are repeatedly testing the socialist community's strength as they "exploit difficulties that arise in the course of socialist construction." In opposing the class enemy, he added, "we have on our side" Marxist-Leninist theory and the socialist countries' "fraternal mutual assistance." The report on 25 October talks between the Soviet visitor and CSSR party and state leader

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Husak included an oblique reference to the 1968 events, which may have been intended to convey an admonitory message to the Poles. In affirming the correctness of the CSSR's ties with Moscow it referred to "the historic experiences paid for dearly" by the Czechoslovak people.

Kirilenko is playing a familiar role in acting as an emissary to East Europe. His last similar trip--which also seemed designed to demonstrate bloc solidarity--was to Hungary in October 1979, some two weeks after Brezhnev's Berlin proposal for talks on armaments in Europe. Kirilenko also visited Sofia in 1978 and attended party congresses in Prague and Budapest in 1976 and 1980.

GDR AND POLAND ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

East Berlin and Warsaw on 28 October announced that the two countries have agreed on new restrictions on private travel between the two countries. The agreement, which the announcement specified was "on the proposal of the GDR," says that effective 30 October citizens traveling to the opposite country must have a "confirmed invitation" from their host before they can cross the border. While sharply curtailing private travel, the curbs do not apply to business or transit travel, tourist groups, or Poles employed in the GDR, according to the announcement.

The GDR has become more outspoken in recent weeks in attacking the Polish reforms, joining Czechoslovakia in the East European vanguard on this issue. GDR party and state leader Honecker, in a speech on the 13th, delivered the strongest statement to date by a top East European leader on the Polish situation. He warned of the danger of counterrevolution there and served notice that the Soviet bloc would not permit Poland to depart from the socialist road.

The new travel restrictions triggered a prompt negative reaction from their prime target, Polish Solidarity union leader Lech Walesa. According to DPA on the 29th, Walesa said his union would try to get the decision reversed during its scheduled talks with Premier Pinkowski in Warsaw on the 31st and he reiterated his union's threat of a strike on 12 November if the talks fail.

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USSR-PERSIAN GULF

The Iran-Iraq conflict has prompted renewed calls from Moscow for limits on naval activity in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf and, most recently, a statement by President Brezhnev linking Soviet advocacy of free navigation on the high seas specifically to U.S. concerns for security of passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Soviet reporting on the Iran-Iraq fighting remains neutral while beginning to suggest the probability of extended conflict.

BREZHNEV DECRIES U.S. FLEET ACTIVITY, ENDORSES FREE PASSAGE

In a 27 October address, Brezhnev indicated that the Soviet Union shares with the United States a concern for free navigation of the seas but maintained that the increase in U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf area does not serve this objective. Brezhnev's third pronouncement within a month on events in the Gulf, in a speech at a Kremlin dinner for visiting Ethiopian head of state Mengistu, sharply criticized what he termed Washington's propensity to move around naval fleets "on any occasion" and to accelerate military activity in "places where restraint is more appropriate." In an echo of his 22 February election speech, Brezhnev conveyed an appreciation that the United States might have legitimate concern for the security of sea passage in the oil-rich region. He maintained, however, that such security could best be obtained through a reduction of naval forces in the area. Placing the problem in a context that would ensure Soviet involvement in consideration of the security problems of the region, Brezhnev went on to recall the Warsaw Pact's suggestion last spring for "lowering and limiting military activity where major sea lanes pass." This proposal, Brezhnev held, offers a "realistic" way to ease U.S. apprehensions over the security of "major sea communication lines, including the Strait of Hormuz," and holds "special importance" now.

Brezhnev's statement appeared to give sharper regional focus to the Warsaw Pact proposal, which was in fact rather ill defined. The 15 May declaration of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee meeting had proposed that all states "start examining" the question of limiting military activity in "major sea lanes"

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but included the Persian Gulf only at the end of a list of oceans and seas to which the proposal applied. Until the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq conflict, the proposal had received little subsequent attention in Soviet media.

Recent Soviet commentary on the Persian Gulf oil question has continued to include both denunciations of the United States for its alleged desire to control Gulf resources and less propagandistic discussions of the issue that implicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of U.S. oil supply concerns. A 26 October article in the Ministry of Defense daily KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) accused the United States of seeking to control oil production and distribution in the Gulf and noted pointedly that Washington is establishing a military presence in a region "close to the southern borders of the USSR." In contrast, the 26 October version of Moscow domestic radio's weekly foreign affairs roundtable program explained why the United States believes it cannot "ignore the oil factor." The United States acquires little of its oil from Iran and Iraq, one observer remarked, but is concerned to ensure the flow of raw materials to Europe and Japan. Moreover, the "interdependence" of the international and domestic fuel markets means that developments in foreign oil-producing regions--as well as their impact on the U.S. electorate--must be taken into account in Washington.

MOSCOW SUSTAINS NEUTRAL POSTURE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Moscow continues to seek middle ground publicly on the Iran-Iraq war. Its posture from the beginning has been to report details of the conflict drawn from the claims of both sides, to give favorable coverage to mediation efforts, and to warn Baghdad and Tehran against the intentions of the United States. Neither side has been denounced for being at fault in the conflict; both are still identified positively as anti-imperialist forces.

Recent Soviet reporting has begun to suggest the probability of an extended conflict. One of the most comprehensive accounts of the fighting to appear thus far, in the 26 October issue of the Ministry of Defense daily KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR), cited recent developments in the conflict in an effort to make this point. The Iraqi advance has been slower than expected, the paper suggested, and the Iranian resistance "far greater." The article maintained that "the declared aims of the hostilities" are changing in a way that will complicate the picture. The Iraqi press is now publishing maps designating Khuzestan as Iraqi territory, the article reported, while Tehran has announced that the struggle will continue until all Iraqi personnel are expelled from "the territory Iran considers its own."

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Periodic TASS reports and newscasts on Moscow's Persian-language service have highlighted various mediation attempts. Most of the Persian-language comment, while occasionally appealing for an end to the fighting, has focused on criticism of the United States. A 21 October commentary, for example, asserted that "people in Iran" did not believe President Carter's remarks supporting an "independent" Iran because this "sweet talk" has "nothing in common" with Washington's policy.

Comment on the hostage question in recent weeks has been sparse. A mid-October Persian-language radio commentary devoted primarily to Afghanistan leader Karmal's visit to the USSR maintained that Washington is unwilling to "recognize Iran's demands" and accused the United States of trying to force Iran to "surrender to American imperialism." Also worthy of note was a 21 October domestic radio foreign affairs program that offered an assessment of U.S. policy toward Tehran at variance with the usual propaganda line that the hostage issue is only a pretext for U.S. military buildup in the region. One of the program's commentators maintained that U.S. officials were less concerned about halting the Iran-Iraq conflict than about settling U.S.-Iran relations, "particularly the fate of the U.S. hostages."

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW REITERATES WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONS DURING KARMAL VISIT

Afghan President Babrak Karmal's recent visit to the Soviet Union produced no substantive announcements or policy shifts but served to reinforce Moscow's public commitment to the Karmal regime. Statements on the conflict in Afghanistan during the visit reaffirmed the standard position that Soviet troops will remain in the country until it is no longer threatened by outside aggression. Consultations between Karmal's large entourage and their Soviet counterparts may have been used to work out new policy directions, but none have been announced.

Karmal was given full honors normally accorded to a visiting chief of state during his first official visit to the Soviet Union, from 15 to 24 October. He was met at the airport by the Soviet leadership, conferred briefly with Leonid Brezhnev, and attended a state dinner in his honor. After concluding these official activities on 16 October, Karmal spent most of his time viewing tourist attractions in Moscow, Tbilisi, and Leningrad. He ended his official visit on 24 October but remained in Moscow, reportedly for rest and medical treatment. No date has been announced for his return to Kabul.

RESTATEMENT OF SETTLEMENT CONDITIONS

After a brief meeting which TASS on the 16th characterized as taking place "in an atmosphere of cordiality and complete mutual understanding," Karmal and Brezhnev spoke at a state dinner. Both men stressed that the Soviet Union was the "great friend" of the Afghan people, that it would never desert them, that the revolutionary changes in Afghanistan were "irreversible," and that any attempts at outside interference were doomed to failure. They called for a political settlement on the basis of the Afghan Government's 14 May proposals, for the cessation of all hostilities against both the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Karmal government, and for "effective" guarantees against future aggression. Once these conditions have been met, Karmal and Brezhnev stressed, there can be discussions concerning the timetable for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces now in Afghanistan. The 18 October joint statement, which PRAVDA

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characterized as "the final document" of the talks, repeated all these conditions word for word. The statement declared that talks between the two sides had taken place in an atmosphere of "cordiality, comradely frankness, and full mutual understanding" and that both sides had "stressed full identity of views on all issues discussed."

NEGOTIATIONS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL

While Karmal toured Tbilisi and Leningrad, his large entourage remained in Moscow for talks with Soviet officials. No new agreements have been announced, but the discussions probably reflected the chief responsibilities of the four most senior members on the Afghan side: party affairs (Party Secretary Saleh Mohammad Ziray), cultural policy (Education Minister Anahita Ratzebad), foreign relations (Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost), and military matters (Defense Minister Mohammad Rafi). Each of these officials was accompanied by a deputy, and the defense minister brought an extensive staff. All of these officials returned to Kabul on 24 October, following the end of the official visit.

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PRC-FRANCE

PRC-FRENCH DIFFERENCES SURFACE DURING GISCARD VISIT

Despite Beijing's best efforts to project a broad Sino-French consensus on international issues during President Giscard's visit to China, differences between Beijing and Paris over policy toward the Soviet Union were apparent. Beijing's long-standing anxiety over West European disunity in opposing Moscow has been reflected more frequently in Beijing comment since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and has often focused on French policies.

President Giscard's 15-18 October Beijing visit, the first top-level Sino-French contact since then Premier Hua Guofeng's visit to Paris last year, included talks with newly appointed Premier Zhao Ziyang on 15 and 17 October, as well as courtesy meetings with party Chairman Hua Guofeng on the 16th and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping on the 17th. The visit produced a Sino-French agreement on the opening of a new consulate in each country, as well as an agreement "in principle" on China's import of French atomic powerplants--an accord which had been originally negotiated in 1978 and stalled because of Chinese financing difficulties. XINHUA on 22 October called the latter agreement "an important breakthrough in economic and trade relations."

STRATEGIC ISSUES Beijing throughout the visit appeared to go out of its way to stress a parallelism in Chinese and French views on international issues in an attempt to put the best face possible on persisting underlying differences over tactics toward the Soviet Union. XINHUA's correspondent report, summing up the results of the visit on the 22d, declared that the "wide-ranging and detailed" talks during the visit "revealed that both sides share common or similar views on numerous world issues" and both praised as a "major achievement" both sides' "understanding" of the need "to work to check aggression and expansion and to safeguard stability and peace in today's multipolar world." Earlier, in his banquet speech welcoming Giscard on the 15th, Zhao Ziyang suggested optimistically that Beijing and Paris had drawn closer together since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Zhao asserted that "the common cause of safeguarding national independence and world peace" in "the new historical

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conditions of today" has provided Beijing and Paris "with more common language." XINHUA's 17 October report on the final session of talks between Zhao and Giscard also observed that both sides had expressed "common or similar views on many points" and highlighted their agreement to hold ministerial consultations "whenever necessary" on "major international issues."

That differences over policy toward the Soviet Union persist, however, was apparent both in XINHUA's final evaluation of the visit and in the obvious deference to the French position reflected in Beijing's restrained criticism of Moscow. The 22 October XINHUA report on the visit observed that despite a broad similarity of views, Beijing and Paris "still retain differences in the views on such issues as how to deal effectively with aggression and expansion." While emphasizing agreement between the two sides, XINHUA reports specifically claimed only that both "feel uneasy about the further deterioration of the international situation in the past year."

While Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union during the Giscard visit were more forceful than during Hua's visit to Paris last year, they were more restrained than statements made during Italian President Pertini's visit to Beijing last month. Beijing's moderation of its public stance in deference to French sensitivities about the Soviets was apparent, for example, in the contrasting tone of editorial comment and speeches during the Italian and French visits. The RENMIN RIBAO editorial on 15 October welcoming Giscard praised France's opposition to "superpower monopoly in international affairs and power politics" and its denunciation of the invasion of Afghanistan and Kampuchea by "outside forces"; in welcoming Pertini on 18 September RENMIN RIBAO highly praised Italy's "strong denunciation of the Soviet Union's barbarous incursion into Afghanistan" and its support for Democratic Kampuchean representation at the United Nations. Similarly, in his banquet speech welcoming Giscard, Zhao Ziyang referred to Moscow only indirectly, warning that "the hegemonists'" invasion of Afghanistan and support for the subjugation of Kampuchea ultimately challenge Europe itself; in making the same point in welcoming Pertini, National People's Congress Vice Chairman Peng Zhen had attacked Moscow and Hanoi by name.

BACKGROUND Chinese differences with Paris over policy toward the Soviet Union reflect longstanding Chinese concerns over the strength of West European unity, both among the European governments themselves and with the United States in NATO, against Soviet expansionism. That France, in particular, has been at the focus of these concerns has been apparent from the ambivalent

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treatment of France's independent foreign policy in Chinese media in recent years, and particularly since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Chinese reporting on Giscard's meeting with Soviet President Brezhnev last May reflected Beijing's dismay over what Beijing perceived to be a major rift in the unanimity of the West European reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Subsequently, Chinese commentary praised Giscard's and FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's call, following their meeting in Bonn last July, for "a powerful and independent Europe" as "correctly reflecting the present realities in Europe" in the face of relentless Soviet pressure. At the same time, however, it betrayed Chinese anxieties that the call might harm West European strategic cooperation with the United States. Beijing reports have been highly favorable toward France's efforts to strengthen its national defense and have praised its development of a neutron bomb.

Beijing concerns over the implications of France's independent defense policies were raised pointedly in a XINHUA article on 14 October, the day before Giscard's arrival in China. The report praised at length several French steps to improve its national defense in the context of the "menace of Soviet expansionism" but also cited Paris' conclusion that French security is directly related to its neighbors' and that therefore France must pursue its "independent defense" together with efforts to strengthen cooperation with its allies.

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CHINA

FORMERLY BANNED TABLOID AIRS SENSITIVE POLITICAL ISSUES

Recent articles in a newly available Beijing cultural newspaper, back in print only this year after being banned during the Cultural Revolution, may reflect discussion of sensitive issues in party history. Some of the articles seem to address questions concerning Mao's leadership of the party over the last two decades of his life and may thus tie in with preparations for an authoritative reassessment of Mao and his career at the forthcoming 12th CCP Congress.

The articles have appeared in a column in the BEIJING WANBAO, a daily tabloid devoted to cultural and intellectual activities in the capital. Entitled "Words of the Hundred Schools," the column is ostensibly a forum for debate by local academic and intellectual figures on fine points of philology, literature, and history as well as current events. It resembles a column entitled "Hundred Schools Contend," which has appeared regularly since January of this year in the more staid, nationally oriented intellectual daily GUANGMING RIBAO. Just as summaries of broader academic debates appearing in the GUANGMING RIBAO columns often appear to bear on current political policy questions, so the articles in the BEIJING WANBAO column seem pointedly addressed to current political issues.

REASSESSMENT OF MAO — Two recent articles in particular have seemed related to efforts to reassess Mao's leadership of the party in the later years of his life. An article in the 11 September BEIJING WANBAO appeared to argue that Mao should be called to public account for his role in eliminating his political opposition. The article began by noting that the tomb of Yue Fei, a 12th century military leader whose heroic defense of the Southern Song dynasty against northern invaders had been undermined by treachery at the imperial court, had recently been restored along with statues of the court politicians who betrayed Yue; the traitors now knelt in posthumous submission before the tomb. The author then recalled from his youth historical accounts which implicated not only the treacherous court politicians but the reigning emperor himself in Yue's demise. Declaring that "in our socialist state there should be no taboos" and "we must restore the real facts of history," the author concluded that the emperor himself should "kneel down before Yue Fei's grave" in acknowledgment of his complicity with the court politicians in bringing about Yue's death.

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The emperor unmistakably symbolizes Mao Zedong. There is no other apparent motive behind the author's pointed focus on the emperor's role in Yue's death, purporting to correct the historical record. In fact the implication of the Southern Song Emperor Gaozong in Yue's death has been a standard feature of PRC historical accounts for a number of years. The device used in the BEIJING WANPAO has at least two precedents--in a long article in the December 1979 issue of LISHI YANJIU, the historical journal of the Academy of Social Sciences' institutes of history, and in a long, provocative reevaluation of Yue Fei by a Hangzhou University professor in GUANGMING RIBAO in February of that year. The motive in both cases seemed the same.

It is not as clear whom Yue Fei represents. The most plausible figures in the contemporary period are Peng Dehuai, purged in 1959 for opposing Mao's Great Leap policies, or Liu Shaoqi, the highest level victim of the Cultural Revolution. Yue Fei traditionally has exemplified the brave military leader who heroically defended China against foreign invasion. This image invites identification with Peng Dehuai, a renowned military leader both before 1949 and as commander of Chinese forces in Korea. At the same time, academic controversy before and during the Cultural Revolution over the circumstances of Yue's death seemed to reflect controversy between Mao and a group of leaders purportedly led by Liu Shaoqi over the fundamental orientation of Chinese foreign policy.

Recent political commentary has been evasive with respect to Mao's role in the purges of both Peng and Liu. The substance of Peng's critique of the Great Leap--itself still a highly controversial topic--has been acknowledged directly in the press, but Mao's counterattack on Peng's opposition has not been addressed in so many words. Similarly, while Liu Shaoqi's demise during the Cultural Revolution has been ascribed directly to the treachery of Lin Biao, the "gang of four," and particularly Kang Sheng in commentary since Liu's rehabilitation last spring, Mao has been connected with Liu's death only remotely and in very indirect terms.

Not long after the appearance of the 11 September BEIJING WANBAO article on the Yue Fei episode, a second article in the tabloid pointedly recalled another historical instance in which a leader did away with a high-level subordinate. Thus on 27 September Zhang Nan, a regular contributor to the BEIJING WANBAO column, addressed the ostensibly historical problem of why the famed fourth century A.D. military and political leader Cao Cao executed an aide and his associates. The author contended that Cao Cao did not eliminate these officials simply out of jealousy, as traditional historians would have it, but for "deep-seated" political reasons.

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Cao Cao's motives, the article said, had "something to do with the political stand" of one of Cao Cao's sons, whom Cao Cao had at one point considered to be his heir but had later disowned. Cao Cao's disinherited heir and others associated with him had opposed Cao Cao's efforts to establish an independent dynasty and longed to restore relations with the Han court and to acknowledge the suzerainty of the court, against which Cao Cao had rebelled. In disowning his originally intended successor and in executing those associated with him, the article stated, Cao Cao was attempting to ensure the continuity of his anti-Han policies in his kingdom after his death.

Translated into contemporary terms, the article may have sought to suggest that Mao launched the Cultural Revolution because he believed that Liu Shaoqi--his one-time heir apparent--fundamentally disagreed with his anti-Soviet course and would conspire with others in the leadership to overthrow the newly chosen heir and reverse Maoist policies. Failure to consider such political motives in analyzing Cao Cao's behavior, the article argued, would be tantamount to "simplifying a complicated history." The likely translation: failure to take political motives into account in analyzing Mao's career would be equally wrong.

BACKGROUND The BEIJING WANBAO's "Words of the Hundred Schools" column has been carrying articles since June re-evaluating the careers of imperial leaders in China's past. An early column in this series, appearing on 21 June, asserted that the succession of the Yongzheng Emperor in the 18th century--a long-standing topic of sharp dispute among Chinese scholars--was clearly what the emperor's predecessor wanted and was therefore legitimate. The article, ascribed to Ji Gang, went on to highlight the positive aspects of the emperor's reign. Ji's article appears to have drawn dissent among BEIJING WANBAO's readers: Ji defended his views in July, and a column signed by Liao Mosha on 23 August asserted that China's emperors are fair game for critical reassessment. Columns evaluating the reigns of various emperors have appeared periodically in the "Words of the Hundred Schools" column since then. Ji Gang wrote on 18 September on the "ossification" of the Kangxi emperor--the Mao-like father of the Yongzheng emperor he had discussed in June.

BEIJING WANBAO's informality and lack of authoritative status has made the tabloid a convenient forum for such indirect sniping at Mao in the context of the party's precongress assessment of Mao's later years. The tabloid had played a similar role in party politics in the years before the Cultural Revolution, frequently carrying partisan attacks on Mao and his policies in

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allegorical or literary guise. The best known of these attacks was "Night Chats at Yanshan"--a series of satirical attacks on Mao by Deng To, a Beijing party and propaganda leader who was bitterly denounced during the Cultural Revolution, together with the historian and Beijing party leader Wu Han and Liao Mosha, as the famous "Three Family Village."

In reporting the reappearance of BEIJING WANBAO early this year, XINHUA pointedly recalled the paper's role in pre-Cultural Revolution politics. On 15 January XINHUA noted that Lin Biao and the "gang of four," in attacking Deng To and trying to ban the paper during the Cultural Revolution, had been trying to overthrow the former Beijing party committee under Peng Zhen. XINHUA observed that in its heyday the paper, "although small," had been "quite influential." Describing the paper's planned contents in its new incarnation, XINHUA cited BEIJING WANBAO's current deputy editor as saying he would "try our best to make the paper colorful and rich in content."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 20-26 OCTOBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,370 items)			Beijing (700 items)		
USSR Supreme Soviet Session	8%	(--)	Burmese President U Ne Win in PRC	9%	(--)
Brezhnev Address at CPSU CC Plenum	7%	(--)	Chinese People's Volunteers 30th Anniversary of Entry Into Korean War	4%	(--)
Afghan PM Karmal in USSR	7%	(12%)			
USSR 1981 Budget	3%	(--)	Resolution To Convene International Conference on Kampuchea	3%	(--)
Kirilenko in Czechoslovakia	3%	(--)			
			Afghan PM Karmal in USSR	3%	(--)

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Initial USSR comment on U.S. election
- Soviet posture on East-West arms talks

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

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U. S. - U S S R

MOSCOW FINDS PROMISE IN RESULTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Its first commentaries on the U.S. presidential election suggest that Moscow will publicly hold out the prospect of repairing U.S.-Soviet relations under President-elect Reagan. Commentaries on 5 November from Moscow radio's domestic and international service and from the official news agency TASS chose to interpret the President-elect's decisive victory as largely a rejection by the American public of President Carter's "turn away from detente" in foreign policy.

Moscow's decision to find promise in the results was most apparent in the TASS commentary's assessment of the causes of President Carter's defeat and of trends in election rhetoric at the close of the campaign. TASS maintained that the "greatest damage" to the President was inflicted by his change in policy on detente and nuclear strategy. The news agency went on to say that the candidates' shift in the final stages from "competition in bellicosity" to "assurances of their peacefulness" demonstrates "vividly" the aspirations of the American public for peace. TASS specified that Moscow envisions an improvement of relations on the basis of the document governing "basic principles" of mutual relations signed by President Brezhnev and former President Nixon during the May 1972 summit.

Moscow's publicly hopeful interpretation of the election is consistent with its rejection during the campaign of what it characterized as President Carter's efforts to portray himself as the peace candidate. This tactic was most clearly illustrated in the efforts of Soviet media to play down President Carter's support for SALT II and Governor Reagan's opposition to it despite Moscow's continuing calls for ratification of the treaty. Notwithstanding Moscow's optimistic play of the election results, Soviet foreign policy observers have said the present "military fever" in the United States is likely to outlast the election.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

MOSCOW EYES PROSPECTS FOR GENEVA, MADRID NEGOTIATIONS

Despite gloomy expressions of pessimism about trends in U.S. policy, Moscow's public statements continue to evoke the viability of East-West arms control dialogue. Soviet leaders have greeted the opening of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on limiting European strategic arms with expressions of satisfaction that have obscured the tentative nature of the talks. Soviet commentary on preparations for the Madrid CSCE review conference continues to speak of the prospects for a subsequent European conference on disarmament while scrupulously avoiding the suggestion raised in Western reports that East-West disagreement at the preparatory sessions could prevent the Madrid conference from convening as scheduled.

GENEVA ARMS TALKS Although Soviet media greeted the start of U.S.-Soviet talks on European strategic arms last month with commentary skeptical of their immediate prospects, Moscow's authoritative statements since have adopted a more positive tone. President Brezhnev's first comments came at a 27 October Kremlin dinner for visiting Ethiopian leader Mengistu. Brezhnev seemed pleased that the arms negotiation process had been restarted, and he glossed over the officially preliminary status of the talks. We are satisfied that "Soviet-American talks on curbing the nuclear arms race in Europe" have begun at last, he said, adding that the USSR "will contribute to their success." Brezhnev reaffirmed the Soviet stance that the results of the negotiations can be implemented only when SALT II is ratified, but he did not go on to cite the other basic component of the Soviet position--that medium-range missiles must be addressed "simultaneously and in organic connection with" U.S. forward-based strategic systems (FBS).

USSR Armed Forces General Staff official Lt. Gen. Nikolay Chervov took a similarly positive view of the opening of negotiations, in an interview for the 22 October Bulgarian party daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO, which was not published in the USSR. Chervov characterized the start of the talks as a "hopeful" sign that NATO leaders may have regained their "commonsense" and begun to assess "constructively" the problems of the military balance in Europe. Unlike Brezhnev, Chervov did emphasize the importance of including U.S. FBS in the negotiations.

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MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE Soviet reporting on the upcoming CSCE review session in Madrid has clearly conveyed Moscow's insistence that military security issues be discussed while revealing no undue concern over the prospect of having to defend the Soviet record on human rights or the Afghanistan intervention. The importance Moscow attaches to the CSCE forum was apparent in the attention it received at the 19-20 October Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting in Warsaw. The communique from that meeting said that a "decision" by Madrid to convene a conference on "military detente and disarmament" would be of "special importance" for the continuation of the CSCE process. The document went on to suggest that despite some differences between the sides over conference modalities, there were good prospects for "bringing the positions closer together."

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USSR-IRAN-IRAQ

Moscow continues to maintain a neutral posture in the conflict between Iran and Iraq and has given only sparse, low-level coverage to developments in the U.S. hostage situation. Since the 2 November vote in the Majlis, Iran's parliament, setting conditions for the release of the hostages, Moscow has pointed out obstacles Washington faces in attempting to meet Tehran's terms.

The clandestine radio "National Voice of Iran"--based in the Soviet city of Baku but purporting to represent the views of the Iranian people--has been as restrained as possible in its criticism of Baghdad for the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, attempting to place the blame for the fighting on Washington. The radio's comment on the hostage issue has adapted to the shifts in Tehran's position while warning against any compromise that might give the United States influence in Iran.

MOSCOW POINTS UP PROBLEMS IN ARRANGING HOSTAGE RELEASE

Moscow's most detailed treatment of the hostage issue since the 2 November Majlis decision came in a TASS Washington dispatch two days later, broadcast to Iran as an unattributed commentary on the 5th. The commentary focused on the question of whether Washington would meet Iran's conditions for the return of the hostages--a U.S. promise not to interfere in Iran, the unfreezing of Iranian assets, the cancellation of claims and sanctions against Iran, and the return of the property of the shah and his family. It cited the "opinion of American lawyers" and the number of claims against Iranian assets in the United States as reasons why the Administration will "hardly be able to meet" the Majlis' demand for the dropping of all financial claims against Iran. While charging the Administration with only "pretending" not to know the extent and location of the late shah's wealth, the report also observed that returning the former Iranian monarch's funds, now "in the safes of foreign, including American, banks," will be "even more difficult." A routine-level Savchenko commentary, broadcast in Persian to Iran on 4 November, recalled the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran a year earlier and declared, in line with periodic Soviet pronouncements on the hostage question, that the United States could have secured the release of the hostages "a long time ago" had it accepted Iran's "just demands."

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NVOI ATTACKS U.S. FOR WAR WITH IRAQ, PLOTS OVER HOSTAGES

The clandestine radio "National Voice of Iran" (NVOI) has been attempting a delicate balancing act since the start of the conflict between Iran and Iraq in September. In an effort to stay in line with popular Iranian views while refraining from inciting Baghdad, the radio has condemned the Iraqi invasion but has sought to place virtually all the blame for it upon the United States. Both Iraq and Iran have been portrayed by the radio as victims of a war plotted in Washington; Baghdad's leaders have been criticized only mildly for initiating the war. Harsher criticism has been directed at Iranian officials who allegedly favor a "compromise" with the United States--an exchange of the American hostages for spare parts--which would restore U.S. influence in Iran.

CONFLICT WITH IRAQ NVOI's first reaction to the Iraqi assault came in a 24 September commentary criticizing Iraq's "incorrect attitude" and urging the defense of Iranian territorial integrity. Pressing themes that have dominated subsequent comment, the radio maintained that only Washington stood to gain from the fighting and called for efforts to reach a peaceful solution. The commentary drew heavily from Iranian President Bani-Sadr's press conference of the previous day in discussing the origin of the conflict, but it did not repeat his harsh criticism of the Baghdad government or his personal attack on Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. While citing Bani-Sadr's statement that the Soviet Union had said it did not approve of the Iraqi attack, the commentary predictably ignored his observation that Soviet assistance to Iraq demonstrated Moscow's enmity toward Iran.

NVOI has continued to call for an end to the conflict and issue warnings against the United States. A commentary on 7 October, for example, urged the leaders of Iraq and Iran "to search for ways to resolve points of differences and end the warfare," adding that the "first step" should be the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and that Iran could negotiate only when "the last Iraqi soldier has left our homeland's soil." The commentary invoked a call by Soviet President Brezhnev for a negotiated settlement and asked rhetorically whether Baghdad would "listen to this call of reason." On the following day, an NVOI commentary focused on the alleged U.S. threat, claiming that Washington had conspired to provoke war, and, in NVOI's strongest attack on Baghdad, declared that "it must be said with deep regret that the Iraqi regime, in the present circumstances, nas been transformed into a tool for the implementation of the provocations and plots of U.S. imperialism."

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Expanding NVOI's warnings about alleged U.S. machinations, a 1 November commentary charged that Washington hoped to keep the Iranian Government preoccupied with the war in order to give "counterrevolutionary" elements inside and outside Iran an opportunity to gain strength and strike at the Tehran regime. The broadcast expressed particular concern that this situation might lead to the suppression of "true leftist forces."

U.S. HOSTAGES NVOI comment on the U.S. hostages has taken pains to warn against an agreement on their return that might lead to an improvement in relations between Tehran and Washington. Adapting as usual to positions taken by Ayatollah Khomeyni, the radio endorsed the conditions for the release of the hostages he proposed and the Majlis adopted. NVOI's overriding concern was reflected in a 24 October commentary that warned of a conspiracy between Washington and "some circles" in Tehran to use the hostage release to "revive" the U.S. position in Iran. The commentary, in this context, particularly attacked the suggestion that Washington could supply spare parts for Iran's military--an arrangement which could lead to Iranian dependency on the United States in the current wartime situation. Even if the hostages are released, the commentary insisted, this should only be "in exchange for the legitimate demands of our nation" and would "in no way pave the road for normalizing relations."

This same line was pressed in a 26 October commentary that assailed "obsequious 'moderates'" in Tehran who wish, through the release of the hostages, to bring about the "return of U.S. imperialism to Iran." The radio also attacked these elements for "maligning Iran's close friend and ally, the USSR." A commentary the following day argued that the United States wants "Iran, not the hostages," and advised listeners to view the hostage question within the context of Khomeyni's identification of "world-devouring U.S. imperialism" as Iran's number one enemy. The 2 November Majlis decision on the conditions for the release of the hostages drew an NVOI commentary on the following day, which stressed that the solution of the hostage issue should not lead to a rapprochement with the United States.

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BRIEFS

PRC-USSR: Chinese Failure To Greet New Soviet Premier

In a departure from Beijing's normal conduct of its state relations with the USSR, Chinese media have failed to publicize a message greeting Nikolay Tikhonov on his appointment as Soviet premier on 23 October. In the past, Beijing has greeted high-level Soviet state officials promptly after their appointment. In 1977, for example, Beijing Russian-language broadcasts to the Soviet Union carried a National People's Congress Standing Committee greetings message to Leonid Brezhnev six days after his election as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. In 1964 XINHUA transmitted a Chinese leadership message to Aleksey Kosygin, as well as to Brezhnev and Nikolay Podgornyy, only one day after Moscow had announced their appointments to the highest Soviet state and party posts. Notwithstanding Beijing's failure to greet Tikhonov, Chinese media promptly reported his appointment. XINHUA commentary has suggested that the Soviet leadership changes represent a political victory for Brezhnev following a long struggle with Kosygin over domestic affairs.

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Increased Factionalism in Afghan Party

The leaders of both factions of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan increased their public activities during President Babrak Karmal's stay in the Soviet Union, from 14 October to 5 November. Media attention to their speeches and public appearances may reflect continuing Soviet efforts to encourage greater cooperation and unity between Karmal's Parchamites and the opposition Khalqis. Most of the leaders of the two groups accompanied Karmal to Moscow but returned to Kabul on 24 October at the end of the official visit. Karmal remained in the USSR for 11 more days "for a brief rest and a course of treatment," according to TASS English on 5 November. Neither Moscow nor Kabul has reported any talks between Karmal and Soviet officials during this period. (The only reference to Karmal's activities between 24 October and his departure from the USSR was in a report in a Kabul broadcast on 31 October that he had sent a congratulatory telegram to the President of Algeria.) During his absence from Afghanistan, both Kabul and Moscow gave extensive coverage to the speeches and activities of both Karmal's Parchamite allies--Deputy Prime Minister Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand, Education Minister Anahita Ratebzad, and Defense Minister Mohammad Rafi--and to his Khalqi rivals--Party Secretary Saleh Mohammad Ziray and General Abdul Qader. Another leader of the Khalqi faction, Communications Minister Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, is visiting Cuba. Kabul has reported the trip, but Moscow has not mentioned it.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 27 OCTOBER - 2 NOVEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,423 items)			Beijing (829 items)		
Ethiopian President Mengistu in USSR	15%	(--)	Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon in PRC	18%	(1%)
Polish First Secretary Kania in USSR	6%	(--)	Netherlands Prime Minister Andreas van Agt in PRC	15%	(--)
Polish-USSR Joint Communique	6%	(--)			
UN Disarmament Week	4%	(--)	UN Resolution To Convene International Conference on Kampuchea	3%	(3%)
Brezhnev Greetings on Algerian Revolution Anniversary	3%	(--)			
USSR 1981 Budget	3%	(--)			
International Conference of Solidarity With the Anti-Imperialist Struggle of the Peoples of the Persian Gulf, Nicosia	3%	(--)			

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- USSR, PRC caution on Reagan victory
- Moscow, East Europe on Polish labor problems
- Chinese subversion in Indochina

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14 NOVEMBER 1980
FB TM 80-046

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U.S. ELECTIONS

The public response in both Moscow and Beijing to the election of Governor Reagan has been cautious and correct. Both have muted their earlier public objections to his foreign policy orientation. Moscow has held out the prospect of dialogue with the new U.S. administration despite misgivings over a perceived shift to the right in the American political spectrum. Beijing, finding promise in that same conservative turn, has shown satisfaction at the possibility of a tougher U.S. approach to the USSR.

MOSCOW SEES POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVED TIES IN REAGAN VICTORY

In the wake of the U.S. elections, Moscow has assumed a posture that holds open the prospect of repairing U.S.-Soviet ties. Premier Nikolay Tikhonov's harsh criticism of U.S. foreign policy on 6 November and Soviet commentators' assertions that the U.S. elections demonstrate a shift to the right suggest that the Soviet leadership has no illusions about dramatic improvements. But Moscow has kept its options open by characterizing the election as a rejection of the Carter Administration's policies toward the USSR and by reassuring its domestic audience about the President-elect's probable impact on U.S. policy. Moscow has been publicly ambiguous on the status of SALT II since the election, although the 12 November joint communique on USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko's Kremlin discussions with Italian Foreign Minister Colombo reaffirmed the "paramount significance" of the treaty.

The only authoritative reaction to the election beyond President Brezhnev's pro forma congratulatory message came in Tikhonov's 6 November address in the Kremlin. Tikhonov professed Soviet interest in cooperating with the United States and expressed the hope that the new administration will "exhibit a constructive approach to questions of relations between our countries." His diplomatically correct remarks on bilateral relations were almost overshadowed, however, by his searing indictment of U.S. foreign policy, including its purported efforts "to solve international problems from positions of strength."

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JUDGMENT DEFERRED Comments in Soviet media thus far on the President-elect's probable course in office have reflected Moscow's decision to withhold judgment. The Soviet trade union daily TRUD on 11 November remarked that since the presidential term does not begin until next year, "it is still early" to make predictions about the new President's domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, while Soviet commentators during the campaign inveighed evenhandedly against both Governor Reagan and President Carter, they have adopted a more reassuring tone on the President-elect since the election. They have seen a trend toward moderation in the Governor's statements at the close of the campaign, alleged that his policies will be determined more by "objective" factors like the balance of power than by personal proclivity, and asserted that election rhetoric is an uncertain guide to the actions of a sitting president. Soviet media have further nourished hopes for a normalization of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue by interpreting the presidential election as in part a rejection by the public of President Carter's alleged turn from detente.

With the exception of the language in the Soviet-Italian communique, Moscow's recent public statements have projected a willingness to negotiate with the new administration while leaving undefined the status of SALT II. Premier Tikhonov declared Moscow's continuing interest in agreements "reducing or prohibiting" strategic arms in his 6 November speech but did not mention the SALT treaty. Moreover, Soviet media reported Governor Reagan's expressions of willingness to negotiate on arms control in the final stages of the campaign while offering no direct rejoinder to his expressed rejection of SALT II. PRAVDA's New York correspondent took the same approach in a postelection analysis by reporting that the President-elect had come out "against a nuclear catastrophe and 'for talks with the Russians'" in the 28 October televised debate without mentioning his remarks in the debate on the SALT treaty. Moscow so far has ignored the President-elect's statements on U.S.-Soviet negotiations since the election, including his expressed support for the principle of "linkage" between arms limitation talks and Soviet international behavior.

CONSERVATIVE TREND Soviet foreign policy observers made clear during the campaign that they saw the prospect of persisting negative trends in U.S. policy. The first deputy head of the Central Committee's International Department, Vadim Zagladin, declared on Hungarian television last July that some people expected the hard line in U.S. policy to prevail for perhaps five to seven years--the time required for the United

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States to develop new types of armaments and "obtain self-assurance." This perspective was reinforced on 17 October by IZVESTIYA political observer Stanislav Kondrashov. He predicted several years of increased defense spending, regardless of who was elected President, because of the successful cultivation of "militarism" in the United States by forces hostile to detente.

PRC CAUTIOUS ON TAIWAN, HOPES FOR STABLE STRATEGIC POLICIES

Beijing greeted Governor Reagan's election with cautious optimism and implicitly conveyed its hope that the new administration will not allow differences over the Taiwan question to impair a developing PRC-U.S. relationship that it considers of vital strategic importance. Portraying the election outcome as the product of a broad conservative shift in U.S. politics, Chinese comment has suggested that more realistic foreign policies will emerge from the new administration, particularly in U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

Governor Reagan's victory was promptly reported by Beijing within six hours of President Carter's concession speech. The election results were analyzed in a steady stream of Chinese comment, continuing the unusually heavy attention Beijing has given U.S. political developments throughout the year. By contrast, in 1972 and 1976 the presidential elections prompted only single XINHUA dispatches reporting the results.

TAIWAN ISSUE Beijing's concerns over the new administration's attitudes on the Taiwan question were conveyed implicitly in a PRC Foreign Ministry Information Department statement, released to Western reporters in Beijing on 5 November and subsequently broadcast internationally over Beijing radio. Observing that PRC-U.S. relations are "very significant to the peace and stability of the world," the statement recalled that relations between the two countries have progressed under both Republican and Democratic administrations in the past and expressed hope that the new U.S. administration will "abide by the principles" incorporated into the 1972 Shanghai communique and the 1979 communique normalizing relations. Similar concerns were conveyed by Premier Zhao Ziyang in his congratulatory greetings to President-elect Reagan on 7 November and by Vice Premier Yao Yilin in remarks to Japanese journalists on the same day.

Beijing's low-key but pointed emphasis on the necessity of upholding the principles of the normalization communique goes to the heart of persistent PRC concerns that the President-elect has yet to embrace the normalization accord as the basis for Sino-U.S. relations

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rather than the Taiwan Relations Act, a document whose legitimacy Beijing has consistently rejected. Beijing comment last August on Governor Reagan's campaign statements on the Taiwan issue sharply and authoritatively protested the President-elect's views on this point and declared that whatever bilateral and strategic advantages accrue from PRC-U.S. relations, Beijing will not compromise on issues of principle relating to territorial sovereignty. In the only reference to Governor Reagan's views on China policy in current commentary, a RENMIN RIBAO analysis of the election results on 6 November recalled with cautious optimism, as PRC comment since August has done occasionally, that since the public controversy over his position on the Taiwan issue, the President-elect has moderated his views and repeatedly pledged to continue the development of friendly relations with the PRC.

EVALUATION OF NEW ADMINISTRATION

Chinese commentary has attributed Governor Reagan's election to a strong U.S. trend toward conservatism produced by persistent difficulties in the American economy and accelerated by anxiety over the decline of U.S. power and prestige abroad in the face of relentless Soviet expansionism. Beijing had cited the same causes to explain what it viewed as a marked rightward shift in the Carter Administration's foreign policies in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Typical of the election comment on this theme, a 9 November XINHUA analysis declared that Governor Reagan's landslide victory resulted from "a tremendous explosion of the American people's sense of frustration" with the country's domestic and international problems. The party paper RENMIN RIBAO on the 6th similarly laid the President-elect's success to his articulation of an ideological and social "trend toward conservative ideas" among the electorate in response to U.S. domestic and foreign problems.

In attributing Governor Reagan's victory to the American people's "deep frustrations and anxieties," Beijing comment has also observed that the U.S. electorate appears to hope for pragmatic, consistently executed policies that soundly address the realities of U.S. problems. President Carter has been faulted on this score. The 9 November XINHUA commentary, for example, suggested that the President had moved closer to Governor Reagan's positions during the campaign, but "neither firmly nor timely enough," and had continued in his statements to suggest that his administration was managing "business as usual while the Soviet Union continued its aggression and expansion." An earlier XINHUA commentary on the election results, datelined 5 November, cited U.S. press opinion that a change in administration alone would not solve difficulties that require sound, consistently implemented policies. Some PRC

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comment, in this regard, has pointedly praised President-elect Reagan's ability to be "pragmatic and flexible" in applying his conservative ideological bent, traits that Beijing undoubtedly hopes a new administration will bring to bear on Sino-U.S. relations.

Beijing has reported favorably on President-elect Reagan's statements since his election. XINHUA's 7 November account of Governor Reagan's press conference on the 6th, for example, highlighted his intention to link progress in strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union to other aspects of Soviet behavior abroad. XINHUA also reported with implicit favor his desire to renegotiate the SALT II treaty--an agreement viewed by Beijing as abandoning vital U.S. strategic interests--and his pledge to strengthen ties with traditional American allies in West Europe.

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POLAND-USSR

The obligation of the unions to cooperate with the government in restoring Poland's political stability and economic health is a central theme of regime commentary on the 10 November Supreme Court decision averting a new showdown with the Solidarity union. Warsaw media and regime spokesmen have presented the decision as a victory for "commonsense," but they have tempered this praise with solemn warnings that a longterm solution of the crisis will depend upon a resumption of normal labor output. Such warnings are consistent with the tougher public stance taken by the Polish leadership before the Supreme Court decision--a line that emerged amid increased warnings and criticism directed at Poland from the Soviet Union and other East European countries.

REGIME PRAISES COURT DECISION, STRESSES UNION OBLIGATIONS

In its initial comment on the Supreme Court decision, Warsaw has stressed the theme that the success of the compact reaffirmed by the decision depends on the willingness of the unions to fulfill their responsibilities. Thus Premier Pinkowski, in a speech to party activists in Lodz on the 11th, voiced "satisfaction" over the decision and welcomed Solidarity's help in solving the country's "difficulties"; at the same time he stressed the need for calm and order and warned about elements trying to "exploit" the present situation. The premier also included in his speech the proviso that there must not be "any doubts" about where Solidarity stands regarding support for the socialist system. This sober optimism was also apparent in press comment. TRYBUNA LUDU on the 11th observed that the court ruling had removed "an important obstacle" in the way of normalization of the country and had "put an end to the disputes" over registration of the union--disputes that involved passions, tensions, and misunderstandings. ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the same day cautioned that while the decision gives "us another chance in our messy reality," there can be no "renewal" in the country without the resumption of normal work.

Other statements issued immediately after the decision sought to cast the event in the most positive light possible. A PAP commen-

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sense" which demonstrated the government's respect for the autonomy and independence of trade unions. The commentary asserted that the Solidarity union had agreed to inclusion of the annex on the party's leading role "of its own accord and under no pressure." The Solidarity union itself was similarly positive in its statement issued shortly after the ruling. As reported by Warsaw radio on the 10th, the statement termed the court action a solution in which "prudence and sense of responsibility for the destiny of the country have prevailed." In a clear allusion to the union's threat of a strike, now averted, the statement said the court decision had "made it possible to remove the threat of an extremely serious social conflict."

EARLIER TOUGHENING OF REGIME STAND

Before the Supreme Court decision, the regime had indicated a growing determination to reaffirm its authority in the face of the Solidarity union's strike ultimatum. PZPR First Secretary Kania, in a major speech in Krakow on 5 November, asserted that while the right to strike was guaranteed by the Gdansk strike settlement, this right "is dangerously abused" through the threat of "various mass strikes," which are "leading our economy to veritable ruin." Implicitly citing the danger of foreign intervention, Kania attacked those who oppose "our alliances" and thus heighten the danger of civil war and counterrevolution and added that anyone "hitting at socialism is hitting at the independent existence" of Poland. Politburo member and Secretary Barcikowski, in his 6 November keynote address on the October Revolution anniversary, warned that the country's economy could not be improved while "certain centers encourage strikes" and further weaken the country's already weak labor discipline.

The tough regime stance continued up to the day of the court decision. PZPR Secretary Grabski wrote in TRYBUNA LUDU on the 10th that the use of the right to strike "as an instrument of political pressure is a flagrant abuse" of this right. And the military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI the same day delivered a broad attack on the "antisocialist" dissident movement, pointedly recalling that the dissidents had taken part in the work of the coastal interfactory strike committee--the nucleus of the Solidarity union.

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SOVIET UNION, BLOC NEIGHBORS KEEP PRESSURE ON POLAND

Warsaw's tougher stance in the period preceding the court decision paralleled increased Soviet bloc pressures on the Poles, including the 30 October visit to Moscow by Kania and Pinkowski, in which the Warsaw regime was presumably urged to stand firm in the crisis. After the Moscow visit, the Soviet media broke their month-long moratorium on direct commentary on Poland with a hard hitting broadcast to East Europe warning that Western radios were interfering in Polish events as they did in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Prague has kept up a drumfire of criticism and warnings directed at Poland, and the GDR and Romania have also made clear their disapproval of the Polish reforms.

SOVIET POSTURE Moscow's public posture toward Poland squares both with its officially proclaimed policy of noninterference and with its somewhat contradictory objectives in Poland. Moscow clearly wishes to give the new regime every opportunity to deal with the current crisis; on the other hand, it does not wish to endorse specific policies which could become troublesome precedents for other East European countries. Thus Moscow is continuing to avoid authoritative comment on the Polish developments, while selectively reporting Polish statements to draw favorable attention to the general objectives of the Polish Government and leaving unmentioned developments it disapproves. It has acknowledged the fact of strikes in Poland only indirectly in reporting on Polish statements. It has failed to report the 10 November Supreme Court decision, and it has publicized subsequent Polish statements on the issue in such a way as to avoid mention of the event.

The pattern of selective reporting unaccompanied by authoritative commentary had been breached during September by a series of A. Petrov articles attacking outside interference in Poland. The less authoritative Soviet commentary by V. Serov broadcast to East Europe on 3 November was in the same vein, directed at tarring the Polish reformers with the same suspect associations. It identified the Western radios--RFE and Radio Liberty--as primary agents of this interference, and it said their programs contained "direct as well as concealed instructions for the enemies of socialism in Poland." There has been no further commentary along these lines.

PRAGUE COMMENT Two days after the Moscow commentary by Serov had drawn a parallel between the Polish and past East European crises, Prague repeated the theme in a 5 November article in the trade union daily PRACE, which cited foreign anti-communist support in the past for "counterrevolutionary situations" in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and "also now in Poland." On the 10th, the day of the Polish court decision, Prague's party daily

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RUDE PRAVO issued an appeal to communists in the new Polish trade unions that was reminiscent of Moscow's support for "healthy" forces in Czechoslovakia in the 1968 crisis. The paper, as reported by Prague radio, in citing the concern of "a number of our Polish friends" over the presence of "hostile" elements in the new trade unions, stressed that "the communists" in these unions should take the lead in exposing these elements and expelling them from their ranks.

Reacting to the Polish Supreme Court action, a Prague television commentary on the 10th quoted "observers" to the effect that the days ahead would not see any "marked improvement in the situation or a dying down of emotions and a reduction of overall tension." Prague radio on the same day used the occasion for a new attack on the Solidarity union. It asserted that Solidarity should not interpret the court decision as a "good will" gesture but as a demand for an answer to the question: "Just how far does Solidarity want to go in stretching its demands?" Another hint of pressure was contained in the communique marking the 12 November visit of Hungary's Kadar to Czechoslovakia, which announced that the two leaders had discussed Poland.

GDR, ROMANIA Earlier the East Germans and Romanians had made their disapproval of the reforms abundantly clear. In the most ominous statement from any Soviet bloc source, GDR party and state leader Honecker asserted on 13 October that "we, together with our friends, will make sure" that Poland remains in the socialist camp. Later that month, East Berlin took steps to insulate the country from the Polish liberal influence by initiating an agreement with Warsaw to restrict travel between the two countries--a step which signaled a sharp increase in tension between the two countries.

Romanian party and state leader Ceausescu, in a mid-October RCP plenum speech, declared that the crisis would not have arisen if the Warsaw regime had moved earlier against the antisocialist forces. As if to urge Warsaw to take a tougher stand, Ceausescu predicted that the Polish regime would firmly counteract "antisocialist manifestations" and preserve the country's independence and sovereignty.

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INDOCHINA-CHINA

Vietnam's party leaders appear to be facing widespread disaffection over domestic and, most strikingly, foreign policies. In unusually frank terms, Hanoi has called for greater vigilance against alleged Chinese efforts to fan popular dissatisfaction through psychological warfare tactics aimed at undermining party policies. Hanoi's revelations came just before a Beijing report on the surfacing of a new Indochinese united front organization uniting anti-Vietnamese resistance movements operating not only in Kampuchea but also in Laos and Vietnam itself, and on the heels of a report on an attempted coup in Vietnam.

Hanoi has also claimed that Beijing has intensified border provocations along with subversion in a comprehensive policy to apply pressure on Vietnam. Beijing has not recently drawn particular attention to problems along its border with Vietnam.

HANOI HITS BEIJING FOR EXACERBATING PARTY DISAFFECTION

The October issue of the party's theoretical journal, CONG SAN, featured an editorial and an article signed by Thu Huong,* which painted a bleak picture of a troubled Vietnam faced with widespread disaffection within and outside the party on a number of key issues, including foreign policy. The more authoritative editorial revealed that cadre recalcitrance is responsible for an apparent general failure to implement party policy in three main areas: economic reform, the struggle against the Chinese, and solidarity with the Soviet Union, Laos, and Kampuchea. In the past Hanoi has often been critical of the chronic problem of backsliding on party policies on the economy and on socialization in the south; but the editorial is unusual for its admission of contention over foreign policy issues. Both articles specifically

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* A propagandis. with the pseudonym "Thu Huong"--Autumn Scent--was identified in 1964 as the announcer of the Voice of Vietnam radio program for American military forces in Vietnam and became known as "Hanoi Hannah." The October CONG SAN article is Thu Huong's first known contribution to the party theoretical journal.

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discussed the perennial problems of cadre performance in domestic affairs, but they provided no details on the exact nature of cadre disaffection with national defense and foreign policy issues.

The disaffection implied in the editorial on key foreign policy issues raises the possibility that Hanoi's present policy of confrontation with Beijing, its tilt toward Moscow, and its operations in Kampuchea and Laos may have aroused misgivings in the higher reaches of the party. However, neither the editorial nor the signed article offered any specific information to substantiate that view, creating instead an image of correct party decisions going astray because of incorrect interpretations and opposition at lower levels.

Both the tone and the attention given the CONG SAN items suggest that the problem of "confused and vacillating" cadres who are losing their "will to fight" is widespread and serious. Both were aired by Hanoi domestic radio, and the Thu Huong article, which focused on alleged Chinese attempts to exploit the situation, was published in the party paper NHAN DAN as well, treatment reserved for CONG SAN articles which Hanoi chooses to spotlight.

The CONG SAN items were broadcast in the wake of a 28 October report by the Democratic Kampuchean radio "Voice of Democratic Kampuchea" (VODK) of a coup attempt by middle-level Vietnamese cadres and Western news reports on the forthcoming formation of an anti-Vietnamese Indochinese front.* This context serves to sharpen the argument made in the articles that China not only has exacerbated Hanoi's perennial domestic economic problems but has created new difficulties for the regime through psychological warfare activities and subversion. The editorial noted that the party's ideological organs have not been able to counter the "cunning maneuvers" of the "new enemy" and emphasized that ideological struggle must be directed against Beijing. The Thu Huong article charged that China's "hostile and sabotage activities are the main, direct cause" of the difficulties "now prevalent in our country." It also revealed that China's efforts are being aided by "many" Vietnamese cadres who "overlook" the dangers of Chinese "psychological warfare allegations," as well as by a "few comrades" who have served as the "psychological warfare mouthpieces of the enemy."

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* See the article "Beijing Notes Surfacing of Anti-Vietnamese Indochinese Front" in this issue of the TRENDS.

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The new expressions of Vietnamese concern over Chinese efforts to capitalize on difficulties and shortcomings in Vietnam contrast with Hanoi's treatment of the defection of former Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan to Beijing in July 1979. Hanoi had ignored Hoan's defection until it was reported by Western news agencies in August and then gave it only minimal attention. Hanoi dismissed the defection and Hoan's subsequent remarks in Beijing as having "no effect on party-people solidarity" in Vietnam. Similarly, Hanoi predicted at the time that Chinese efforts to use Hoan to sow division between the Vietnamese people and the party would be of "no avail."

By contrast, the current comment from Hanoi suggests that Beijing has had a measure of success in seeking to subvert Vietnamese party policies. The Thu Huong article alleged that China has increased its psychological warfare activities, including spreading false rumors, exploiting difficulties, criticizing the party's line, policies, and leadership at all levels, and inciting opposition.

Hanoi has routinely charged Beijing with inciting ethnic minorities along the Sino-Vietnamese border, but the Thu Huong article implied that Beijing is supporting opposition elements in the south. The article said that Beijing is assisting efforts to revive the old neocolonialist society through its "henchmen and the remnant reactionary elements in Vietnam." In August a commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on Chinese subversion efforts in Southeast Asia had charged for the first time that Beijing was attempting to revive the "CIA's FULRO"--the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races. Hanoi has thus far ignored a 29 October AFP report that an anti-Vietnamese Indochinese front comprised of Democratic Kampuchean and other Kampuchean resistance elements, Lao resistance groups, and FULRO is in the offing.

BEIJING NOTES SURFACING OF ANTI-VIETNAMESE INDOCHINESE FRONT

Chinese publicity for reports on the forthcoming establishment of a united front of Indochinese forces came in Beijing radio broadcasts in Lao and Vietnamese on 3 and 5 November, respectively. Citing a 29 October Bangkok dispatch by the French news agency AFP, the Beijing radio broadcasts reported claims of a Lao National Liberation United Front "communique" that "the oppressed people of Indochina will soon be organized in a common Indochinese united front." The broadcasts noted AFP's speculation that the emerging Indochinese front would unite not only the Lao National Liberation Front, but also Democratic Kampuchean and Khmer Serei resistance forces in Kampuchea and those of United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO) in Vietnam.

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Repeating the AFP dispatch almost verbatim, the Beijing broadcasts included its statement that Thai officials have recently monitored transmis ions by a new insurgent radio operating on behalf of a "Vietnamese liberation front." However, Beijing radio excised AFP's assertion that the new transmissions are originating in China itself and that broadcasts by the Democratic Kampuchean mouthpiece "Voice of Democratic Kampuchea" (VODK) also emanate from China.

BACKGROUND Chinese media attention to insurgencies operating separately in Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam has escalated gradually over the past year and a half. This trend appears to reflect both Beijing's conviction that Vietnam's leaders will not change their attitude toward China and its high appraisal of the value of publicity for such purported insurgent activities as a tactical instrument of pressure against Hanoi.

Chinese media opened direct attacks on the Vietnamese leadership in July last year by publicizing denunciations of Le Duan by defecting former VCP Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan. Open Chinese support for insurrection in Vietnam commenced at the time of the VCP anniversary last February with Chinese media publicity for Hoan's calls for a "second revolution" in Vietnam.* Subsequently Chinese media began to report periodically and regularly on insurgent activities, particularly in the Mekong Delta and the Central Highlands in southern Vietnam. On 26 September this year, Chinese media began relaying reports by the VODK--which had reported insurgent activities in southern Vietnam for more than a year--on battle successes by FULRO guerrillas. FULRO--an organization noted for its resistance to communism during the Vietnam war--was not mentioned by name, however, until the recent broadcasts.

Chinese media attention to insurgent activities in Laos was foreshadowed in June this year by media comment attacking Vietnamese repression in that country and predicting that popular resistance would soon arise. XINHUA in July began to carry periodic accounts of attacks on Vietnamese forces in Laos by guerrillas of the "Lao National Liberation Front," citing both Thai press sources and VODK. XINHUA itself reported on 17 October that the Lao National Liberation United Front had been established a month earlier in southern Laos "by some anti-Vietnamese organizations" and that the front's purpose was "to strengthen resistance against Vietnamese occupation troops in Laos." Citing a "political declaration" of

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* Recent efforts to put greater pressure on Hanoi by calling for the overthrow of the SRV leadership and publicizing antigovernment insurgent activity in the SRV are discussed in the 4 September 1980 TRENDS, pages 13-15.

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the newly surfaced Lao front, XINHUA noted that the Lao organization "is ready to cooperate and fight shoulder to shoulder with the fighting organizations of all oppressed Indochinese people inside and outside Indochina."

While Beijing has consistently identified the Democratic Kampuchean forces as the mainstay of Kampuchean resistance to Vietnam, authoritative comment since February 1979--soon after the fall of Phnom Penh--has repeatedly urged the Khmer Rouge leadership to expand its support under a broad united front of anti-Vietnamese "patriotic forces," a body which was publicly inaugurated in September last year. In December Beijing media for the first time mentioned Democratic Kampuchean forces cooperating with Khmer Serei resistance groups in Kampuchea, and in April this year XINHUA favorably reported the first congress of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front under the noncommunist leader Son Sann as a complement to Democratic Kampuchean resistance to Vietnam.

HANOI CLAIMS INTENSIFICATION OF CHINESE BORDER PROVOCATIONS

Vietnam has linked Beijing's alleged subversion efforts to a series of intensified provocations along the Sino-Vietnamese border, seeing them, in a 13 November radio broadcast, as part of a concerted plan to "oppose Vietnam from all directions and fronts." Hanoi's claim of new tension along the border was also reflected in its monthly communique on the border situation, which documented an apparent trend toward more serious and larger scale incidents with the Chinese. The communique contained Hanoi's first assertion in nine months that Chinese forces had occupied Vietnamese territory.

The 5 November communique issued by the SRV Committee to Investigate PRC War Crimes, in detailing October's incidents, claimed for the first time since last December that Chinese forces had occupied areas of Vietnamese territory.* According to the communique, clashes through the first 14 days of October had resulted in Chinese occupation of several Vietnamese mountain peaks and on the 15th in the occupation of Xin Man village in Ha Tuyen Province. The latter incident was the focus of an 18 October SRV Foreign Ministry protest note, Hanoi's second note on border incidents in October. Hanoi had last used a Foreign Ministry note to protest Chinese provocations in early July.

Underscoring its allegations of larger and more serious incidents, the 5 November communique stated that the 57 land incidents in October had included attacks by regiment- and battalion-size

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* See the 4 January 1980 TRENDS, pages 13-15.

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Chinese units. In contrast, PRC War Crimes Committee communiques for the past nine months, including those reporting land incidents totaling around 200 a month, have only reported actions by Chinese forces at the company and platoon levels. In addition, the latest communique reflected an increase in the intensity of Chinese cross-border shelling--2,000 shells and rockets in one incident compared with the highest enumerated figure in the past nine months of 600 mortar shells in one incident--and in the number of Vietnamese civilian casualties.

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USSR-ETHIOPIA

MENGISTU VISIT STRESSES ECONOMIC TIES, REGIONAL SECURITY

Moscow's coverage of Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam's recent visit highlighted economic assistance and regional security issues. Mengistu may have been pressing a claim to military assistance as well through his sharp attack on the U.S. military presence in East Africa and the Persian Gulf during the visit. Moscow's own criticism of U.S. policy was tempered by President Brezhnev's profession of interest in mutual efforts to limit arms and ensure free navigation in the region.

BILATERAL ISSUES Mengistu's 27 October - 10 November visit, his first in two years, produced no dramatic developments in Soviet-Ethiopian relations. His large delegation of economic, military and party officials was accorded full official honors in Moscow, including an arrival ceremony at the airport attended by Brezhnev and most of the Moscow-based Politburo. At the conclusion of the talks on 10 November, Brezhnev and Mengistu signed a joint statement which routinely characterized the atmosphere of the talks as one of "friendship and mutual understanding."

Moscow reported that economic topics were the major focus of formal talks between Brezhnev and Mengistu on the 27th and 28th. TASS on 28 October highlighted Brezhnev's pledge to aid Ethiopian economic, social, and cultural development. Mengistu's apparent interest in economic matters was underscored by his tour of industrial and agricultural facilities in Volgograd and Alma-Ata following the initial talks in Moscow. Upon his return to Moscow on 5 November, Mengistu brought a top planning and development official, Addis Tedla, to another round of talks with Soviet Premier Tikhonov. The concluding joint statement announced agreements on several protocols governing economic and technical cooperation.

Soviet media reported without elaboration on a separate meeting of the two countries' defense ministers on 29 October. The TASS account said that Ethiopian Defense Minister Tesfaye Gebre Kidan and USSR Defense Minister Ustinov--the only Moscow-based Politburo member absent from the airport reception and Kremlin dinner for Mengistu on the 27th--had a "friendly conversation" covering "questions of mutual interest." The joint statement made no mention of military cooperation or assistance.

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U.S.-SOMALIA DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT

Mengistu's visit revealed differing perspectives in Moscow and Addis Ababa on the U.S.-Somali agreement reached last summer permitting the United States to use Somali naval facilities. Last September Addis Ababa reacted promptly and vigorously to the accord with a resolution accusing the United States of "taking up an assault position" against Ethiopia. Mengistu pressed that point of view in a 27 October Kremlin dinner speech, published in PRAVDA the following day, which warned that the U.S.-Somali agreement threatened to provoke a conflict that could "engulf areas beyond the limits of our region." American policy, Mengistu went on to suggest, could "plunge" the world into a new war.

Mengistu's bleak view of U.S. policy was only partially endorsed in Soviet statements during the visit. Brezhnev's speech at the Kremlin dinner repeated Soviet charges that the United States is heightening tension through its military activities in the area, but he did not mention the U.S.-Somali agreement. Brezhnev used the occasion, moreover, to profess his concern for freedom of navigation in the troubled region and his satisfaction at the start of the U.S.-Soviet Geneva talks on nuclear weapons in Europe.* Subsequent Soviet commentary has replayed this last point from Brezhnev's speech. Ethiopian concerns were reflected more clearly in the joint statement, which condemned the U.S.-Somali agreement and called the U.S. decision to establish a rapid deployment force a "direct threat to the security of the countries of the region" and a "grave danger" to world peace.

ETHIOPIA'S SOCIALIST PATH

The Mengistu visit brought further expressions of support from Moscow for steps the Ethiopian regime has recently taken to institutionalize the Marxist-Leninist course it proclaimed in 1976. According to TASS on 27 October, Brezhnev hailed the formation last December of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) and offered further cooperation with Addis Ababa on "questions of party organization and development." The presence of COPWE ideological and organizational officials in the Ethiopian delegation suggests that party development was a topic of separate discussion.

Consistent with Moscow's traditional views on the measures required to consolidate a socialist revolution, Soviet media have long pressed Mengistu to establish a unified "vanguard" workers party in Ethiopia.

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* Brezhnev's remarks on regional security issues are discussed in the 29 October 1980 TRENDS, pages 10-11.

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During his visit to Addis Ababa in September 1979, former Premier Kosygin applauded Mengistu's announced intention to begin the formation of such a party. Two months later, however, internal opposition apparently prompted Mengistu to settle for the organizing commission as a partial measure. Although Brezhnev has endorsed the commission, Soviet commentators have been quick to add the caveat that COPWE is just a first step.

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USSR

REGIONAL LEADERS CITE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN APPEALS FOR FUNDS

The growing significance of demographic trends in the national-regional politics of the Soviet Union has again been thrown into relief by the speeches of some local leaders at the October session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Representatives of regions with rapid population growth trends cited the fact to appeal for increased allocations. A spokesman for a region with declining trends cited growing labor shortages as a reason for plant modernization. While the importance of such trends for the Soviet economy has been documented by Soviet experts for years, the open use of demographic data as a means of exerting political leverage on behalf of affected regional areas appears to be a relatively novel phenomenon.

Representatives of the two republics with the fastest population growth, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, made the most direct use of demographic arguments to support appeals for additional allocations. One of the Uzbek representatives, K.G. Sadykov, claiming that his republic held a "leading role" in the population growth of the USSR, asserted in the 26 October IZVESTIYA account of his speech that per capita living space in the republic would decline by 1985 unless additional allocations for housing were made in the new five-year plan. Another Uzbek representative, First Deputy Premier T.N. Osetrov, described the republic's housing situation as "extremely acute" in the 25 October PRAVDA VOSTOKA account of his speech. He called upon Gosplan to review its allocations to Uzbekistan. The Tajik trade union chief, A. Khaydarov, also cited his republic's "rapid population growth" in calling for additional investments in light industry to help achieve full employment, according to the report of his remarks in the 26 October IZVESTIYA.

The other side of the coin--manpower shortages due to population trends--was stressed by Estonian Gosplan Chairman G.A. Tynspoeg. According to the 25 October SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, he attributed Estonia's current difficulty in fulfilling its plan to the fact that a "significant part" of the workforce was reaching retirement age and going on pension. To make up for this labor shortage, which he said would continue in the next plan period, he requested additional funds for modernizing plants, a solution

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many Estonians would find preferable to an influx of workers from other republics. Estonian concern over labor shortages had also been reflected at the 1976 session of the Supreme Soviet, when Premier Klauson called for additional funds for agricultural machinery to offset manpower shortages.

Other republic spokesmen also alluded to demographic factors, but in a more routine, usual way. Representatives from Minsk and Kishinev, for example, both complained that housing and social facilities were inadequate for the rapidly growing populations of those cities and requested that the plan's allocations be reexamined. Additional funds for social services were also requested by Kirgiz Premier S.I. Ibraimov for the mountain areas of his republic to help arrest their continued depopulation. Apparently reflecting a similar exodus from the rural areas of his republic, Belorussian Gosplan chief V.A. Gvozdev cited "the unfavorable demographic situation" in the republic in requesting that additional industries be located in Belorussia's small- and medium-size cities.

BACKGROUND Many of the demographic factors raised at the recent Supreme Soviet session had been aired previously in Soviet professional literature, and some Gosplan officials had already been suggesting that regional policies based on demographic considerations should play a central role in planning. In early 1979, for example, V. Kirichenko, director of Gosplan's Scientific Research Institute of Economics, frankly discussed the regional aspects of the Soviet Union's labor problems in the February issue of Gosplan's journal PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO, where he called for the restriction of new industrial construction in areas suffering from labor shortages. An even stronger case for regional planning was made in the September 1980 issue of PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO by E. Voronin, Gosplan deputy department chief, who proposed that all new capital investment in central areas be limited to technical improvements and that all new industries be located in regions with high rates of population growth. He suggested that the continued location of new industries in labor-deficit areas, would only result in drawing manpower from existing plants and create new problems of labor discipline. He also cautioned that planners must pay increased attention to local conditions in building new industries, since some factories recently built in Central Asia have been able to find sufficient numbers of workers only by attracting them from areas of the country already experiencing labor shortages.

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BRIEF

PRC-USSR: Beijing's October Revolution Greetings to Moscow

The language used in the annual Chinese greetings to the USSR on the October Revolution anniversary suggests that Beijing has not ruled out the possibility of reconvening its political talks with Moscow but that it has not done so because of Soviet actions abroad. The Chinese greetings, sent as usual by the National People's Congress Standing Committee and the PRC State Council to their Soviet counterparts and broadcast in Beijing's Russian-language service, stated that the interests of both countries demand "proper settlement of unresolved questions" between the two sides and "elimination of obstacles to the normalization . . . and improvement of relations between the two countries." Beijing first used this same language in April 1979 in proposing the political talks with Moscow and used it consistently thereafter in justifying the talks. At the same time, the message this year dropped the declaration, included in all Chinese greetings on this occasion in the past decade, that "differences of principle" between the two sides need not obstruct normalization of state relations between them. During the Sino-Soviet talks last fall, Beijing had identified Soviet "hegemonism" abroad as one such "principled difference." When Beijing broke off the talks in January this year, it cited Soviet "hegemonic" intervention in Afghanistan as the reason for the suspension. Beijing's observance of this year's October Revolution anniversary in other respects closely paralleled past Chinese practice.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 3-9 NOVEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,067 items)			Beijing (655 items)		
October Revolution Anniversary	27%	(--)	Yugoslavia Premier Djuranovic in PRC	17%	(--)
Tikhonov 6 November Speech	7%	(--)			
Brezhnev 7 November Speech	6%	(--)			
			U.S. Presidential Election	11%	(--)
U.S. Presidential Election	7%	(--)	Reagan Election Victory	10%	(--)
Salyut-6 Space Mission	6%	(--)	SRV-Kampuchean Dispute	4%	(1%)
Awards Presentation to Cosmonauts Popov, Ryumin	3%	(--)			
Supreme Soviet Discussion of USSR-Syria Friendship Treaty	3%	(--)			

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio c tput, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

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  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

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+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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USSR-POLAND

THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: MOSCOW MEDIA ON THE POLISH CRISIS

In keeping with its official posture of noninterference in the Polish crisis, Moscow has been remarkably tight-lipped about developments in Poland since last summer. No political leader has commented directly on the subject in public. The media have provided little Soviet-originated comment.

With the notable exception of a series of authoritative articles signed by "A. Petrov" in September—all polemical in tone and focused on alleged Western interference in Poland--the Soviet media have confined themselves mainly to selective news reports and occasional summaries of Polish statements. Moscow's most authoritative comment on the Polish situation to date--a 15 November statement on Moscow television's Studio Nine program by CPSU Central Committee International Information Department Head Leonid Zamyatin--does not appear to have signaled any change in Moscow's position on substantive issues. In the meantime, Moscow has shielded the Soviet public from Western news on the Polish events through the jamming of Russian-language broadcasts from the West.

On other specific issues, Moscow has:

+ Avoided specific endorsement of Polish Government policies while indicating general support for the Kania regime.

+ Obscured the developments leading to the formation of the new Polish trade unions and avoided mentioning the name of the Solidarity union.

+ Refrained from reporting the nature and magnitude of the strikes in Poland, although occasionally acknowledging indirectly that strikes have occurred.

POLISH LEADERSHIP Moscow's attitude toward the Polish authorities has been supportive but cool, apparently calculated to encourage the Poles without giving them the impression that they have a blank check. As early as the communique on the 31 July meeting in the Crimea between Gierek and Brezhnev, Moscow offered sympathy but less than full support. In congratulating Gierek's successor, Kania, on 6 September, Brezhnev combined warm praise for the new leader with an unmistakable demand that Kania get the situation under control, especially by reasserting the communist party's leading role.

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While a number of Soviet commentaries in mid-September, including the 20 September Petrov article in PRAVDA, strongly and explicitly supported Kania in his efforts to "normalize" the situation in the country, this support was absent from the last Petrov article in the series, on 27 September. Apparently anticipating the impending showdown over the registration of the Solidarity union, this article warned that a "watershed" had been reached in the crisis, with the Poles having the choice to line up either as patriots or as enemies of "socialist Poland."

Qualified Soviet support for the Kania regime was also apparent in the communique on the 30 October Moscow talks between Kania and Premier Pinkowski and their Soviet counterparts, Brezhnev and Tikhonov, a meeting presumably intended to strengthen the regime's hand in its negotiations with the Solidarity union the next day. While the document cited Kania as reporting on his efforts to stabilize the situation, Brezhnev was reported as voicing confidence, not in Kania personally but in the ability of "the communists and working people of fraternal Poland" to solve the "acute" problems facing the country.

That Moscow remains reluctant to show full support for Kania is suggested by Zamyatin's 15 November statement. Judging by the TASS report, Zamyatin did not mention Kania. Implicitly faulting the Polish leadership performance, he noted that "not the entire Polish working class" has understood the complexity of the situation and "the whole danger" facing the country.

TRADE UNIONS Soviet treatment of the trade union issue in Poland has been studiously vague. On the one hand, Moscow has sought to shield the Soviet population from the potentially disturbing spectacle of a free trade union movement in a communist country. On the other, it has felt constrained to make known its own opposition to the more extensive claims of the Polish trade union leaders as a means of counteracting any temptations in other East European countries to emulate the Polish example. Thus it has sought to draw a veil over the events concerning the trade union issue actually taking place in Poland while issuing generalized declarations on the role of trade unions in theoretical terms. An article on Lenin's views on the role of trade unions, published in PRAVDA on 25 September, exemplified the latter effort.

On the Polish trade unions themselves, Moscow has provided no coherent reportage on the emergence of the crisis, the issues involved, or the current status of the free trade unions. Its references to these developments have come mainly in reports of the occasional allusions to these events contained in the statements of Polish leaders or in Polish media commentaries. Thus, in reporting speeches by PZPR First

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Secretary Kania of 5 September and 4 October, PRAVDA noted his references to the "new trade unions." There has been no Soviet reportage on the controversy over registration of the Solidarity union, including the landmark 10 November Polish Supreme Court decision upholding Solidarity's appeal regarding the wording of its charter. In the most pointed implicit allusion to the decision, Zamyatin remarked in his 15 November Moscow television statement that bourgeois propaganda is instigating "some groups" in Poland to form "some structural units," to give structural and legal form to the opposition existing in the country. The reference to a "legal" opposition was omitted in a Moscow broadcast of Zamyatin's remarks in Polish on the 16th.

POLISH STRIKES Soviet media publicized the Polish strikes in the early stages of the crisis but grew more reticent as the influence of the Solidarity free trade union grew. Thus PRAVDA in late August reported references by Gierek to the "work stoppages" and in early September Kania's mention, in his first speech as party leader, of the recent wave of strikes, which he said had not yet subsided. Evidently intent on obscuring the bargaining role of the embryo free trade unions, Soviet media were vague on the 31 August Polish strike settlement, noting only that "agreement on a number of socioeconomic questions" had made possible the resumption of work in Gdansk and other locations, where it had been "interrupted." The 1 September A. Petrov article in PRAVDA warned that anti-socialist elements were trying to continue the strikes but did not report that a settlement had been reached.

Subsequent Soviet comment--notably in further A. Petrov PRAVDA articles on 6, 20, and 27 September--did not mention the continuing, scattered strikes in the country. In a glaring omission, Soviet media accounts of the 4 October plenum speech by Kania entirely omitted his reference to the one-hour national protest strike carried out the previous day. No mention was made either of the threat to hold a new major strike if the legal controversy surrounding the registration of the Solidarity union should not be decided in its favor. Only after the 10 November court decision upholding Solidarity's appeal--a ruling presumably arousing new anxieties in Moscow--did Soviet media report Polish leadership warnings of new threatened strikes, though still without mentioning Solidarity in this connection.

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN

KARMAL STRESSES POLITICAL TASKS, DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET UNION

The immediate task of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is to put its own house in order, according to Afghan President Babrak Karmal. Reporting on his visit to the USSR in a speech to the Fourth Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee, Karmal reminded his listeners of Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union and demanded greater organizational unity and increased ideological purity from the PDPA ranks. For the first time Karmal publicly acknowledged the presence of Soviet advisers throughout his government, an admission all the more curious at a time when the Soviet role in Afghanistan is being discussed at the United Nations and at the CSCE review conference in Madrid.

DEPENDENCE ON MOSCOW In a 13 November speech to party activists--which he claimed was identical to his report to the Fourth Plenum two days earlier*--Karmal implied that unquestioning PDPA loyalty to Moscow was dictated both by international solidarity and by Afghanistan's almost total dependence on the USSR for military support, economic aid, and skilled technical and political advice. In praising Soviet military and economic assistance, Karmal noted that the Soviet Union is now responsible for 80 percent of the foreign aid received by Afghanistan. Lamenting the paucity of Afghan expertise, Karmal acknowledged the presence of Soviet "experts and advisers"--sent "at our request"--in "nearly all areas" of governmental and administrative machinery. Karmal repeatedly stressed the limitations on Afghan resources and pointedly reminded his audience that any improvement in their wages would have to come from Moscow.

ABUSES OF POWER Suggesting that the PDPA is thereby "obliged to be united," Karmal catalogued PDPA problems. Some spring from factionalism, which must be ended, he said. He implied that other errors, such as political irresponsibility, may arise from the Soviet presence. Karmal complained that some PDPA

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* Contrary to earlier practice, Karmal's plenum address was not broadcast. Plenum coverage was confined to an 11 November "press statement" which said the Karmal speech and other plenum materials would be published in the press.

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officials placed the burden of "practical work" on the Soviet advisers. The Soviet presence, he said, requires that Afghan leaders be even more responsible and learn from Soviet expertise. Anyone who does not, Karmal warned, could and would be removed regardless of personal ties or past services to the Afghan revolution.

MILITARY SITUATION Karmal's almost exclusive attention to party affairs contrasts with that given to military matters at the three previous Central Committee plenums since the December 1979 Soviet intervention. Karmal only briefly alluded to Kabul's 14 May conditions for a political settlement of the Afghan situation. But he did indicate that military and political conditions had improved in the east and southeast military zones, the areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border. These have been the site of the greatest infiltration of rebel forces from abroad and of the most frequent battles with the Islamic nationalist insurgents. Karmal's "positive appraisal" of the situation in the region, his general inattention to military matters, and the onset of the Afghan winter suggest that there may be a reduction in military activity in that region during the next few months.

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PRC-SOUTHEAST ASIA

BEIJING DEFLATES ASEAN INITIATIVES ON KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE

While attempting to maintain close solidarity against Vietnam, Beijing appears to be throwing cold water on efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote a political solution to the Kampuchea question. Beijing has tactfully but firmly deflected suggestions made during the recent China visits of Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew that the Democratic Kampuchean regime be discarded as the focus of anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea in favor of a more palatable alternative. Chinese statements during the visits at the same time reflected Beijing's continuing ambivalence toward the convening of an international conference on Kampuchea, as called for in the recent UN resolution on the Kampuchean problem.

Thai Prime Minister Prem's 27-30 October visit to Beijing and the 9-14 November visit of Singapore Prime Minister Lee closely followed passage of the ASEAN-sponsored UN resolution on 22 October. According to foreign media reporting, both Prem and Lee hoped during their China visits to sound Beijing out on efforts to seek alternatives to the Pol Pot government within the next year and to promote implementation of the UN resolution.

Reflecting Chinese concern to maintain solidarity with the ASEAN countries against Vietnam over the Kampuchean issue, Beijing received both leaders warmly, and Chinese leaders repeatedly expressed support for ASEAN's broader stand on the Kampuchean question. Throughout the visits, however, Chinese pessimism surfaced about the practical utility of the ASEAN initiatives to implement the specific provisions of the UN resolution and to find a more palatable alternative to the Pol Pot government. Beijing strongly underscored its longstanding views that a total Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea remains the key to any solution to the Kampuchean problem and that steps toward a political solution are harmful if they detract from that central concern.

During Prem's visit, XINHUA's 28 October report on the conclusion of the Thai leader's talks with PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang characterized their discussions as "sincere, cordial, and frank"--a formulation which conveys Beijing's desire to maintain close solidarity with Bangkok despite substantive disagreement on specific issues. While

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noting the Chinese premier's endorsement of the ASEAN-sponsored UN resolution, the XINHUA report also cited Zhao's statement during the talks that a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea is "the key to or the foundation for a solution to the Kampuchea question" and that "short of this, a political solution to the Kampuchea question would simply be out of the question."

A XINHUA correspondent's report on 31 October wrapping up the Prem visit observed that the Thai prime minister had "explained the views" of Thailand and ASEAN and "put forward a number of propositions" that were "discussed thoroughly." The report noted that Beijing remained ready to join the ASEAN states in carrying out the UN resolution. But, apparently dismissing efforts to find an alternative to the Pol Pot resistance, the XINHUA correspondent stated that only continued international support for "all the patriotic resistance forces in Kampuchea," together with pressure on Hanoi from the international community, will "achieve a political settlement of the Kampuchea issue." How Kampuchean internal political problems may be resolved "following Vietnam's withdrawal" is a matter for the Kampuchean people themselves, the correspondent stated, adding that as long as the Kampuchean people "abandon their old grievances against one another and work together for a solution," a new government that "wins the people's support and international sympathy" will not be difficult to establish. On 14 November, XINHUA cited Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi's comment on the Prem visit that while Bangkok and Beijing have "adopted an identical policy" on the issue of a "peaceful solution to the Kampuchean problem . . . there may be some differences with regard to the means to attain the aim."

During Lee Kwan Yew's visit, Chinese media reporting, while warm, was truncated in keeping with the absence of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Singapore. XINHUA's 10 November report on Lee's talks with Zhao Ziyang noted that th two leaders held discussions in a "sincere and friendly atmosphere" but had "a frank exchange of views" on the Southeast Asian and Kampuchean situations.

BACKGROUND Beijing in the past has expressed concern that efforts to promote "political solutions" to the Kampuchean issue may provide room for compromise on the central problem of securing Hanoi's withdrawal from Kampuchea. While hoping to avoid a strain in relations with ASEAN as far as possible, Beijing at the outset had expressed reservations about the incorporation of a call for an international conference on Kampuchea in the ASEAN draft

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resolution presented to the UN General Assembly.* XINHUA on 15 September, for example, had cited Zhao Ziyang's comment that China "is not opposed to convening an international meeting" on Kampuchea but that "if Vietnam has no intention to withdraw its troops at all, it is meaningless to convene such a meeting." PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua stated in his address to the United Nations on 24 September that while "it is understandable" for the international community to seek political settlements of the Kampuchean and Afghan questions, China remained opposed to any political solution that perpetuated Soviet and Vietnamese aggression in those states.

Beijing's authoritative reaction to the passage of the ASEAN-sponsored resolution, contained in a 26 October RENMIN RIBAO Commentator article, reiterated underlying Chinese concerns while pledging Beijing's support for ASEAN. While praising ASEAN's efforts, the Commentator article stressed that Hanoi's withdrawal from Kampuchea was still the key issue. The article maintained that prospects for the success of an international conference are "gloomy," noting that since Hanoi has paid no attention to previous UN resolutions on Kampuchea, there remains "little possibility of solving the Kampuchean problem through international meetings." To lay the foundation for a successful international conference, Commentator observed, "the pressing task now" is to step up all effective aid to all Kampuchean resistance forces in order to force Hanoi to change its position.

Regarding support for the Pol Pot regime, since February 1979, shortly after the fall of Phnom Penh, Beijing has called for support of all "patriotic forces" resisting the Vietnamese in Kampuchea, and for almost a year it has publicly recognized the contribution of Khmer nationalist Son Sann. Chinese comment at the same time, however, has stressed that Democratic Kampuchean forces remain the mainstay of the anti-Vietnamese resistance and that therefore there is no realistic alternative to support for the Pol Pot regime despite its past behavior.

During the recent UN debate on Kampuchea, Chinese commentary stressed that the issue in retaining Democratic Kampuchea's

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* Initial Chinese reservations about the ASEAN draft proposal on Kampuchea for the UN debate and comment on the necessity of upholding the Democratic Kampuchean seat in the United Nations are discussed in the TRENDS of 24 September, pages 7-9.

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seat in the United Nations is not so much Democratic Kampuchean legitimacy as opposition to the imposition of the Heng Samrin Phnom Penh regime by Vietnamese force. A vote to retain the Democratic Kampuchean seat, Beijing has argued, does not amount to an endorsement of the Pol Pot regime. Chinese commentary at the same time has persistently played up Democratic Kampuchean efforts to change discredited policies and win popular support. A Beijing radio commentary on 17 October, marking the first anniversary of the Democratic Kampuchean establishment of a broad national unity front, for example, observed that the new Democratic Kampuchean front's political program has "aroused tremendous echoes" throughout the country and that the Kampuchean people, and particularly "prestigious patriotic intellectuals," are rallying to the front's anti-Vietnamese cause and taking posts in it despite the Democratic Kampuchean Government's previous mistakes.

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USSR

SOVIET AZERBAIJANIS LINK CULTURE WITH IRANIAN CONATIONALS

Evidence continues to accumulate that the notion of an Azerbaijani cultural community--embracing both the Soviet and Iranian segments of the ethnic population--is being promoted by cultural activists in Soviet Azerbaijan. During the past year, two Azeri-language publications of the Soviet Azerbaijani Writers Union have been reporting extensively on cultural developments among their conationals in Iran since the fall of the shah, and similar themes have been publicized in Baku radio's Azeri-language broadcasts to Iran. Several of the local leaders of this cultural activism have long been identified with such activities and appear to be motivated primarily by ethnic self-assertiveness. Moscow's toleration of this cultural activism presently is based on the calculation that it may redound to the Soviet Union's credit in the Muslim world and possibly enhance its ability to influence an important Iranian minority population.

An active, prominent group of intellectuals centered in Baku have been the prime movers in promoting cultural ties between northern and southern Azerbaijan. Several of them have been identified with a special section of the Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences' Institute of Literature, which is devoted exclusively to the study and publication of southern Azerbaijani literature and is headed by Mirza Ibrahimov, former president of the republic and one of its leading literary figures.* Two publications of the Azerbaijani Writers Union have provided the principal forum for their writings--a monthly literary journal AZERBAYJAN and a weekly paper, published jointly with the republic's Ministry of Culture, ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT (LITERATURE AND FINE ARTS). Over the past year, items on southern Azerbaijan have appeared in almost every issue of these publications and included such topics as reports on Azeri-language materials published in Iran, excerpts of Azerbaijani cultural materials from Iranian journals, reports on literary activities in Iranian Azerbaijan, as well as numerous articles and poems on the subject of southern Azerbaijan by Soviet authors.

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* Ibrahimov's involvement in the question of southern Azerbaijan is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 July 1980, pages 17-19.

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These writings claim--directly or indirectly--that northern and southern Azerbaijan belong to a common cultural community and that a sense of cultural unity is shared on both sides of the border. The claim is made in open letters by Soviet writers addressed to their spiritual brothers in the Iranian part of Azerbaijan. It is reaffirmed by reports that southern readers have expressed interest in the materials published in the northern cultural organs and sympathy for the goals of cultural cross-fertilization. Finally, it is implied in the thematic content of much of the southern-originated literary work published in the Soviet Azerbaijani cultural organs. A principal theme in this literature is the importance of cultivating the Azeri language. As a poem in the 7 March ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT put it, the failure to know one's native language is an "impertinence to the fatherland."

Much of the material related to southern Azerbaijan appearing in the Soviet press is designed to encourage the Azerbaijanis' sense of cultural identity and appears to be equally relevant to Azerbaijanis living on the Soviet side of the frontier. Although such discussions are always raised in the Iranian context, their messages are couched in broader terms that know no political boundaries. The main theme running through this type of literature is that Azerbaijanis should be proud of their heritage and not lose touch with their cultural traditions, particularly with the Azeri language.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS While the cultivation of cultural ties between Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan obviously creates a potential for future Soviet political manipulation, the materials currently being published in Soviet Azerbaijan contain very few references to any political dimension of the claimed cultural affinity with the south and do not appear to be aimed at inciting aspirations for political unity. A few poems published in Baku have contained what appear to be gratuitous references to the political division between the two parts of Azerbaijan and may indeed represent protests against this division. In the February issue of AZERBAYJAN, for example, the Soviet poet Matlab Misir lamented the fact that the Araz River cuts Azerbaijan in half. Similarly, a poem by an Iranian author in the January issue of this journal referred to the political division of the community and suggested that such barriers should be eliminated. Statements like this have been rare, however, and are not representative of the bulk of the Soviet literature being written on the subject of southern Azerbaijan.

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BAKU RADIO Many of the themes promoting cultural ties between northern and southern Azerbaijan have also found their way into Baku radio's daily international broadcasts to Iran in the Azeri language. Although the largest part of each of its half-hour broadcasts is devoted to news reports that are similar in content to other Soviet broadcasts to the Middle East, part of each program is reserved for cultural themes that encourage Azerbaijanis living in Iran to develop a greater sense of cultural awareness. On 24 September, for example, Baku radio began a new program "Language Is a People's Wealth," which strongly emphasized the importance of the Azeri language and proclaimed that each language needs its own "homeland." The radio on 17 October reported that the Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences had recently published a book to help Azerbaijanis outside the Soviet Union learn the Azeri language.

In addition to Baku radio's daily broadcasts, the Baku-based clandestine radio "National Voice of Iran" (NVOI) broadcasts a 15-minute program twice daily to Iran in Azeri. NVOI's Azeri-language broadcasts repeat material previously broadcast by NVOI in Persian; none of NVOI's programming pertains specifically to Azerbaijan.

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BRIEF

PYONGYANG: Search for Improved Ties With Moscow

North Korean observance of the anniversary of the October Revolution was consistent with the practice over the past two years of marking major Soviet anniversaries with greater warmth, treatment which seems to signal Pyongyang's hope of improving its relations with Moscow. Kim Il-song's message to President Brezhnev offered his "warmest greetings," as it did in 1979, when the standard formulation of "warm" was upgraded. The more effusive greeting treats the Soviets more evenhandedly; Kim's messages to the Chinese have traditionally used the term "warmest." Kim also referred for the first time in his October Revolution message to the "great contribution" of the Soviet people to "the liberation of the peoples of many countries from the danger of fascist slavery in the period of the Second World War." This theme was also contained in Kim's message to Moscow last August on the occasion of the anniversary of Korean liberation, in which he broke with past practice and mentioned the Soviet contribution to Korean liberation.

The references contrast with the traditional policy of playing down the Soviet role in Korean liberation and seem to reflect an attempt to call attention to past examples of Korean-Soviet cooperation. Kim's remark in his October Revolution message that Korea "highly values" its relations with the Soviet Union had last appeared in his 1978 message to Brezhnev. The formulation has not appeared in his messages to Chinese leaders since Mao's death. The Korean leadership turnout at the annual Pyongyang meeting to mark the anniversary of the October Revolution was headed this year by two alternate members of the Political Bureau, a lower representation than those of the last two years, but higher than those of the 1975-76 low period in relations. Continuing a practice begun last year, the Korean speakers at both the Pyongyang meeting and the Soviet ambassador's banquet used the phrase "leadership of the CPSU headed by" Brezhnev, an honorific formulation regularly used by Pyongyang in references to China's party chief Hua Guofeng and some other communist party leaders.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 10-16 NOVEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,305 items)			Beijing (694 items)		
Finnish President Kekkonen in USSR	8%	(--)	Spanish CP Secretary General Carrillo in PRC	11%	(--)
CSCE Conference, Madrid	6%	(--)	Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in PRC	9%	(--)
Italian Foreign Minister Colombo in USSR	6%	(--)	Yugoslav Premier Djuranovic in PRC	5%	(17%)
Supreme Soviet Presidium Ratification of USSR-Syria Friendship Treaty	4%	(3%)	Reagan Election Victory	3%	(10%)
Ethiopian President Mengistu in USSR	4%	(--)	Thai Parliamentary Delegation in PRC	3%	(--)
Brezhnev's Forthcoming Visit to India	3%	(--)	Trial of Gang of Four	3%	(--)

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this issue includes . . .

- Soviet pressure on Poland
- Moscow on importance of arms dialogue

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
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POLAND-USSR-EAST EUROPE

Moscow has turned up the heat on Poland in recent days by bluntly underlining the conditional nature of its continuing support of the Kania regime. In a transparently deliberate escalation of pressure, a Soviet press and radio report from Poland explicitly attacked the Solidarity trade union for the first time and hinted strongly that a threatened railroad strike would be regarded by the Soviet Union as a potential security threat. Moscow has conveyed the message in its reportage on other developments that it expects the Kania regime to stiffen its resistance to Solidarity's encroachments on its authority and to place greater reliance on the more conservative elements in the country. In its occasional direct references to Kania and other Polish party and government officials, Moscow continues to present them in a positive light as struggling against forces of disorder in difficult but still manageable circumstances.

MOSCOW PRESSURES POLISH REGIME TO RESIST UNION ENCROACHMENTS

The direct criticism of Solidarity came in a 24 November report from Poland on a threatened railway strike. The initial report, carried by Moscow radio and by the Soviet press, was attributed to a Soviet Warsaw correspondent. It said that a call from "the new trade union organization Solidarity" for a warning strike by railway workers was seen in Warsaw as "proof of activity aimed at maintaining a state of tension in the country." An earlier explicit mention of the Solidarity union in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on 29 October was not directly critical of the union and was, moreover, attributed to the Polish press. The recent report also declared that a general transport strike being threatened by Solidarity could affect the "national interests and defense interests" of Poland and "disrupt rail transit links through Poland." Moscow previously had not linked the Polish labor unrest so specifically to Warsaw Pact security interests.

Coinciding with its attack on Solidarity, Moscow seized on a meeting of old line industrial trade unionists in Warsaw to suggest that they should continue to play an important role in the union structure in Poland. In its coverage of the meeting, held on 25 November, Moscow radio drew attention to complaints

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of old style unionists that the government was being discriminatory in apparently preferring to deal with Solidarity rather than with the old unions. In its account of a speech to the meeting by party chief Kania, Moscow highlighted aspects that appeared to express a critical attitude toward the role of Solidarity and deleted aspects that pointed in the other direction. For example, it represented Kania as insisting on the importance of the "unity" of the trade union movement, a code word for opposition to independent unions, and cited his criticisms of strike threats, including a threatened rail strike. But it ignored his favorable reference to the importance of a "partnership" between the government and Solidarity.

Another case of manipulation apparently also intended to draw favorable attention to the role of conservative forces in Poland concerned a veterans organization plenum on 3 November addressed by prominent hardline party leader Mieczyslaw Moczar. The meeting was duly reported in PRAVDA on 5 November in an article entitled "Main Conditions," which stressed the importance of reducing tensions in the country and getting the work force back on the job. Then, for no apparent reason except to milk the story for more dramatic effect, Moscow radio on the 20th and the Soviet trade union paper TRUD on the 21st carried new reports on the meeting. The TRUD report, headlined "Vital Alarm," quoted Moczar at greater length on the dangers posed by the crisis. He was reported to have denounced "dangerous" demands on the government, "irresponsible" actions by dissident elements, and the threat of "national catastrophe."

Despite its new pressure tactics on Poland, Moscow is continuing to present the Polish leaders in a positive light. To the extent that it reports on Polish Government statements and actions, it does so in a favorable vein, ignoring actions it regards as inappropriate. By contrast, in the late spring and summer of 1968, Moscow had openly criticized individual Czechoslovak leaders, publicly demonstrated support for conservative forces in the country, and bluntly ordered the Czechoslovak regime to set its affairs in order.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EAST GERMANY

Czechoslovakia and East Germany, which for months have been acting as Soviet surrogates in criticizing Polish developments, have continued their attacks on Solidarity and its leader Walesa in recent weeks. Prague has also taken new steps to quarantine itself from the Polish virus. On 20 November it announced an agreement restricting travel between Czechoslovakia and Poland. Similar restrictions between the GDR and Poland had been announced three weeks earlier. Also on 20 November, East German leader Honecker reassured the outgoing Polish envoy of the "firm solidarity and internationalist support" of the GDR for the Polish party's efforts to stabilize the country.

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SPILLOVER EFFECTS HINTED IN EAST EUROPE, SOVIET REPUBLICS

There is mounting evidence that the Polish events are having repercussions in neighboring countries and in the Soviet republics of Lithuania and Estonia. In most of the East European countries, as well as in the Soviet Union itself, official media and regime spokesmen have been insisting on the responsiveness of their own trade unions to workers' demands, reassuring their populations that their needs will be satisfied. In Lithuania officials apparently are trying to deal with potential worker discontent by showing unusually strong support for the local trade union organization. In Estonia popular resentments appear to have exploded into anti-Russian demonstrations.

East European spokesmen have been whistling in the dark recently, apparently hoping to exorcise the threat of infestation from Poland by proclaiming the virtures of their own trade union organizations. From Czechoslovakia, a sharp critic of the new Polish unions, party leader Husak on 19 November called the Czechoslovak unions "the foremost mass organization" of the workers and said they should "successfully fulfill their function in ensuring the interests of their members." East Germany, another critic of Polish developments, stressed the same theme in a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article on the 7th. Hungarian party Politburo and Secretariat rember Karoly Nemeth on 15 November described the Hungarian unions as working "independently" and "using their rights better and better and more consistently." In October the Hungarians had acknowledged that strikes had occurred in their country but said they were not explicitly forbidden under the laws. Romania on the 16th published lengthy theses for an upcoming trade unions congress, stressing the role of the unions in promoting the workers' interests. Even in the Soviet Union, trade union officials have found it expedient to define their responsibilities in broader terms. At their recent plenum, reported in the 14 November TRUD, trade union chief Shibayev called upon members to take a more active role in defending workers' legal rights and in improving their welfare.

In Lithuania signs of official concern over trade union questions can be traced back to an early stage in the Polish crisis, when First Secretary Grishyavichus absented himself from a ceremonial gathering of Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev, so that he could attend a republic party plenum on 27 August that was apparently concerned, in part at least, with worker discontent. Second Secretary Dybenko in his address to the plenum criticized the trade unions for toadying to management interests and neglecting

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the workers, and he demanded "radical improvement" in this regard. A recent Soviet news report suggests that worker discontent persists in Lithuania and that the local leadership is still trying to deal with the problem by demonstrating support for the workers. TASS reported on 20 November that a trade union committee in Vilnyus had exercised its "legal right" to demand the removal of an enterprise director for failing to meet the housing needs of his workers, even though a large amount of funds had been allocated for that purpose. The report said that the Lithuanian trade union chief, in commenting on the event, emphasized that management must not take any actions "affecting the interests of working people without their consent" and that the welfare of the workers is a trade union's primary responsibility. Lithuanian officials have also been careful to define the limits of trade union activity, warning in a 1 October SOVETSKAYA LITVA article that trade unions cannot replace the leading role of the party in a socialist society.

Statements in the Estonian press have indirectly acknowledged that serious public disorders have taken place in that republic. According to Western accounts of this unrest, there have been several large demonstrations in Tallinn and Tartu by youths protesting Russian domination of their republic, as well as a successful strike at a large plant in Tartu over wage issues. A short item in the 14 October SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA first confirmed the troubles in Tallinn by reporting that criminal proceedings were being brought against the "malicious hooligans" responsible for the "gross violations of public order" recently committed in that city. These "firebrands and instigators," it reported, were the source of "indignation and annoyance" to the local population. Estonian First Secretary Vayno also alluded to the disturbances during a visit to Tartu, reported in the 31 October SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA. He lectured local youth not to permit disruptions of "life and labor" and to rebuff manifestations of "bourgeois petty-mindedness," criticizing them for their "idleness" and attempts to "kill time."

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U S S R - U. S.

MOSCOW ENDORSES SALT II, ANTICIPATES ARMS TALKS

Moscow is keeping the door open to dialogue on arms limitation with the Reagan Administration despite the President-elect's public rejection of SALT II. Since the election Moscow has moved to reaffirm its continuing support for the treaty signed by Presidents Brezhnev and Carter in Vienna last year but has avoided categorical statements on the issues of renegotiation and Senate ratification. Soviet reporting on Brezhnev's remarks to Republican Senator Charles Percy in Moscow on 26 November clearly demonstrated the Soviet leaders' focus on the arms limitation process rather than on the SALT II treaty itself.

BREZHNEV-PERCY MEETING

President Brezhnev's reported remarks to Senator Percy called for improved U.S.-Soviet relations and mutual efforts at arms control. The TASS account of the meeting described Brezhnev as maintaining that there should be "no letup" in attempts to limit strategic arms, but the report did not mention SALT II. Brezhnev maintained, according to TASS, that success in efforts to limit strategic arms was the "heart of all international security." Brezhnev's reported remarks follow the pattern of other leadership statements since the election. Soviet Premier Tikhonov, in his October Revolution anniversary address on 6 November, expressed support for efforts to "reduce or prohibit" nuclear arms but ignored SALT II. President Brezhnev also failed to mention SALT in a 17 November speech in which he promised to respond favorably to "constructive steps" by the new Administration.

Other Soviet statements have continued to express support for the SALT treaty but in a manner that sustains the impression of flexibility. Soviet communiques with official visitors from Italy and Mozambique, on 12 and 23 November respectively, routinely cited the importance of an "early entry into force" of SALT II. Speculation in the West about Soviet flexibility, moreover, has drawn some carefully worded reaffirmations of support for the treaty from lower level Soviet spokesmen. But no Soviet official has repeated Moscow's warnings of a year ago that renegotiation of the treaty is "impossible" or that SALT II could "only enter into force in the form in which it was signed."

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COMMENTARY ON PRESIDENT-ELECT

Soviet commentary on the President-elect has taken its cue from Brezhnev's promise in his 17 November remarks not to "dwell" on what was said during the "heat of the election struggle." The media have eschewed direct criticism of Governor Reagan, emphasized the distinction between campaign rhetoric and White House policy, and pointed to what are described as signs of realism and moderation from the President-elect and his circle of advisers. Illustrative of this approach were the comments of Central Committee International Information Department official Oleg Anichkin on a 14 November domestic radio program. Anichkin noted that the President-elect is on record as supporting increased defense spending and U.S. military supremacy but maintained that "the closer Reagan has come to the White House the more moderate his enunciations have been; one can suppose that this process will continue."

GENEVA ARMS TALKS

Moscow's treatment of the month-long U.S.-Soviet talks on limiting medium-range nuclear arms in Europe similarly suggests a desire to keep alive the bilateral arms limitation dialogue. Soviet statements greeted the opening of talks in October with "satisfaction." Moscow has invested the forum with the trappings of full-scale negotiations, obscuring their officially preliminary nature. Soviet media accorded the talks the same correct treatment previously used for SALT II negotiations. They reported tersely on the individual meetings, made no reference to the substantive exchanges, and eschewed tendentious propaganda. The 17 November TASS dispatch on the close of the negotiations, published in PRAVDA the next day, conveyed the impression of a fruitful exchange conducted in a "businesslike" atmosphere.

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CHINA

BEIJING OPENS SHOW TRIALS OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION CLIQUES

Beijing's broad domestic and international publicity for the first political show trials in PRC history reveals China's motivations in prosecuting the radical leaders of the Cultural Revolution. The trials, on the one hand, have been presented as a vivid demonstration of the post-Mao leadership's commitment to maintaining political stability through strict, universal application of Chinese law. On the other hand, they are intended to promote the further repudiation of leftist elements in China and to provide graphic reassurance that the policies and attitudes of the Cultural Revolution years have been irreversibly abandoned. The handling of the trials of the cliques led by Lin Biao, Mao Zedong's onetime successor-designate, and Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, has also demonstrated that Beijing has not yet resolved sensitive issues concerning Mao's role in the Cultural Revolution and their implications for the current Chinese leadership.

Comment on the trials, which began on 20 November, has repeatedly stressed that they are evidence that the post-Mao leadership is committed to longterm political stability within a legal framework. "The era of lawlessness" of the Cultural Revolution period "is gone forever," an editorial in the party paper RENMIN RIBAO proclaimed on 22 November, adding that China "has now entered a new period of promoting socialist democracy and strengthening the socialist legal system."

Beijing has gone to great lengths to publicize each legal step leading to the prosecution of Lin Biao's surviving associates and the "gang of four." XINHUA reported on 6 November the Supreme People's Procuratorate's presentation of the formal indictment of the radicals to the courts established to try the cases, reported on 10 November the serving of the indictment on the accused radicals, and released the text of the indictment on the 20th. Chinese media at the same time have carried interviews with Chinese legal experts--broadcast both to domestic and international audiences--explaining the basic principles of socialist law applying to the radicals' prosecution, and regular media reports on each day's proceedings in the courts depict

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court prosecutors methodically attempting to substantiate each charge of the 48-count indictment as it applies to the separate defendants, a process suggesting that the trials will last several weeks.

In keeping with the aim of making the trials a showcase of China's adherence to universally-applied legality, Chinese media coverage of the trials has been heavy, despite Beijing's acknowledgement that most of the trial proceedings involve "state secrets" and therefore will not be publicized. Daily reporting on the deliberations has dominated Beijing radio's evening national hookup program, as well as the front pages of RENMIN RIBAO. Similar reporting has been broadcast widely in Beijing radio's foreign-language programs, and, initially at least, Beijing offered television footage of the trials to foreign audiences via satellite transmission.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS Aside from displaying China's commitment to political stability, the trials are intended as a major step toward the complete and final repudiation of the radical left and the Cultural Revolution. In this connection, they complement other Beijing moves--the posthumous exoneration last spring of Liu Shaoqi, the Cultural Revolution's leading victim, and the promise of an authoritative assessment of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution at the upcoming 12th party congress. These steps by the reform wing of the party leadership, under Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, seem aimed at reassuring party cadres in a still highly divided political environment of the permanence of the party's turn away from radical policies and politics. An 18 November RENMIN RIBAO commentary on the significance of the trials observed that the prosecution of the Cultural Revolution radicals will allow the people "to learn from this lesson so that our descendants will not have to go through the same sufferings again" and that the fastidious effort to prove the radicals' guilt is necessary to make their judgement "capable of standing tests at present and in the future."

That the trials have aroused controversy and political emotions in the country, nevertheless, is clear in media commentary on both preparations for the trial and its proceedings. Thus the 22 November RENMIN RIBAO editorial pointedly rebutted apparent criticism of the radicals' prosecution--perhaps by some of the defendants themselves but also probably from leftists remaining in the party--by enumerating the specific crimes laid to the radicals and by asking rhetorically whether such actions conceivably could be considered "mistakes in political line."

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In a clear acknowledgement of the potency of the remaining leftists entrenched at local levels in the country, moreover, at least one province has warned of the possibility of left-inspired violence and disruption sparked by the opening of the radical trials. Hefei radio on 14 November reported a conference of the Anhui party committee and provincial government that called on local public security units to be particularly vigilant for "sabotage activities" by "key followers" and "remaining forces" of the radicals to disrupt social order during the trials and for intensified propaganda efforts aimed at controlling "the ideological reaction among the masses inside and outside the party."

At the same time reporting on the trials has conveyed an unconcealed delight at the personal humiliation and repudiation of the Cultural Revolution leaders. RENMIN RIBAO's 21 November report on the opening of the trials, for example, focused on the overwhelming satisfaction with the trials on the part of the widows of Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, He Long, and other high-level victims of the Cultural Revolution. While media treatment of the behavior of the separate defendants in court may reflect the varying degrees to which they have submitted to the prosecution and may also foreshadow a final judgment of each's individual guilt and punishment, reporting on the trials has manifested a particular animus for Jiang Qing, perhaps beyond her status as an unrepentant "ringleader" of one of the two cliques. A 20 November XINHUA report on the opening of the trials recorded the entire courtroom's disgust at Jiang Qing's defiant posture and attitude, which drew on "acting techniques during her movie actress days," and recalled how she had "sneered" at the court's indictment.

LEADERSHIP ISSUES The effort to specify the radicals' crimes precisely inevitably involved sensitive issues in interpretation of the party's history over which the leadership has been sharply divided. While the indictment revealed for the first time a great body of details about highly sensitive events in the party's history over the Cultural Revolution years--and most notably about Lin Biao's alleged attempt to assassinate Mao in 1971--the indictment suggested no major advance in interpretation of the issues presumably under discussion for the authoritative assessment at the forthcoming party congress. In interviews with foreign journalists publicized by Chinese media before and during the trials, for example, Deng Xiaoping stated that Mao's "mistakes" in political judgment

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during the Cultural Revolution years would be separated clearly from the "counterrevolutionary crimes" of the radicals on trial. The indictment itself rarely refers to Mao: He figures most prominently as the object of Lin Biao's plot in 1971. He is mentioned again in conjunction with efforts by Jiang Qing and the rest of the gang of four to conspire against Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in 1974 on the eve of the Fourth National People's Congress--his opposition to their plot, as previously asserted in the press, is not repeated. He is not mentioned at all in any connection with the efforts of the radicals to overthrow the party and state leadership at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.

Party Chairman Hua Guofeng rarely figures into the indictment. He is not mentioned as a party and state leader persecuted in the early years of the Cultural Revolution. His superior on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Zhang Pinghua, is mentioned in this regard, and presumably Hua did not rank high enough to be named. However, the indictment also fails to recall the gang's efforts to undermine Hua's leadership in 1976--as alleged in press commentary frequently in the past. The legitimacy of Hua's appointment as acting premier in February 1976 is implicitly affirmed as part of the indictment's case for the prosecution of Zhang Chunqiao.

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USSR

CHERNENKO ACTS TO DEVELOP POLITICAL SUPPORT IN REPUBLICS

As the only Soviet succession candidate without regional bases of support, Central Committee Secretary Chernenko has been busily developing political ties with republic party organizations and appears to have scored some success, at least in Kirgizia and Georgia. In his latest move, Chernenko has used his new book, "Questions of the Work of the Party and State Apparat," to curry favor with Georgia's party leaders, and the Georgians have responded with a review boosting both Chernenko and his book. Whether or not such alliances of mutual esteem produce useable political leverage, the praise from Georgia and elsewhere stimulated by his book is helping to keep Chernenko in the limelight as the 26th CPSU Congress nears.

The development of ties between Chernenko and Georgian leaders should not be surprising in view of the fact that Georgia has been pioneering in the promotion of public opinion studies and public involvement in decisionmaking--the very themes that Chernenko has built into his personal political platform since 1979. His new book, according to the review in the 28 October issue of Georgia's ZARYA VOSTOKA, praises Georgia's innovations and declares that Georgian party work is typified by "creative searching" for the most effective methods. Reciprocating in kind, the review declared that Chernenko's views on key questions of party and state work will contribute to a further improvement of administration and predicted that the new book will become a handbook for officials at all levels. Although most reviews of this kind mention the author's name sparingly, this one focused on Chernenko personally, citing his name in almost every paragraph.

Chernenko appears to be trying to develop support in Georgia much as he had earlier in Kirgizia. He appointed former Kirgiz officials to lead his national campaign for more attention to citizens' letters and in August 1979 flew to Kirgizia to deliver a speech.* Kirgiz First Secretary Usubaliyev responded by enthusiastically boosting Chernenko's letters campaign and by lavishing

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* For more on the development of ties between Chernenko and Kirgizia, see the TRENDS of 12 September 1979, pages 14-15.

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unusual attention and praise on Chernenko. Usubaliyev cited Chernenko's speeches in his April 1979 plenum report, flattered Chernenko during his August visit, and cited yet another Chernenko speech in a May 1980 plenum report.

COMPETITION WITH KIRILENKO With the 26th CPSU Congress fast approaching, Chernenko appears to be outdistancing his colleague Kirilenko in winning publicity for his writings. Chernenko's new book was reviewed in the 2 September IZVESTIYA, the 4 October PRAVDA, an October PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN (No. 20), and a November KOMMUNIST (No. 16). Moreover, the PRAVDA review was reprinted on 9 October in three republic papers--in Lithuania, Turkmenistan, and Kirgizia--even though books by Politburo members other than Brezhnev usually are not reviewed locally. Such exceptional treatment had been accorded to other Chernenko writings earlier this year in Estonia and the Ukraine: The August KOMMUNIST ESTONII reprinted Chernenko's April VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS article on Lenin, and the September KOMMUNIST UKRAINY reviewed Chernenko's 1979 book on Lenin and cadres policy. Kirilenko, too, has a new book out--a new edition of his collected speeches--which was reviewed in September issues of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA,* but it has been ignored by the republic papers.

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* See the TRENDS of 8 October 1980, pages 9-10.

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BRIEFS

YUGOSLAVIA-BULGARIA: Improvement in Relations

Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Vrhovec's recent visit to Bulgaria, the first such visit in five years, continued Belgrade's efforts since Tito's death to resolve or minimize outstanding issues with its neighbors. The joint communique issued on the 17-20 November visit said that unresolved problems between the two sides "should not be an obstacle" to cooperation and should be resolved through "constructive dialogue." This position marks a change from Belgrade's previous stance that cooperation could take place only after Bulgaria recognized its Macedonian population as a distinct ethnic group. The improvement of Belgrade's ties with Sofia resulting from the visit, along with recent improvements in its relations with Albania, places Yugoslavia on relatively good terms with each of its seven neighbors for the first time in recent years. Belgrade has also reaffirmed its interest in good relations with the three big powers, including the Soviet Union, and has halted at least for the time being a slide in Soviet-Yugoslav relations that began in the mid-1970's. Belgrade's commitment to improving its international posture comes at a time when Tito's successors are grappling with pressing economic and other domestic problems.

USSR-MOZAMBIQUE: Mixed Results of Machel Visit

President Samora Machel's 17-22 November visit to the USSR produced new agreements on bilateral cooperation, but evidence persists of differences on current foreign policy issues. A joint statement released by TASS on 23 November said that Machel's talks with President Brezhnev had been characterized by an atmosphere of "friendship and complete mutual understanding" and that accords had been signed on interparty relations and economic, technical, and cultural cooperation.

The joint statement was more reserved in its support for Soviet positions on international questions than the communique issued two weeks earlier at the conclusion of Ethiopian chief of state Mengistu's visit, although both Ethiopia and Mozambique are Soviet treaty partners. Reflecting Maputo's ties with Beijing, the statement said nothing about China and failed to endorse the Vietnamese-backed government in Kampuchea. There were also noticeable differences on the question of Afghanistan. The statement declared solidarity with the "people" of Afghanistan, but unlike the Ethiopian communique, it offered no support to the Babrak Karmal government. Rather than accusing "imperialists" of meddling in Afghanistan, it condemned "all forms of outside interference."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 17-23 NOVEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,122 items)			Beijing (594 items)		
Mozambique President Machel in USSR	13%	(--)	Trial of Gang of Four	6%	(3%)
CSCE Conference, Madrid	5%	(6%)	UNGA Discussion on Afghan Issues	3%	(1%)
UNGA Discussion on Afghan Issues	3%	(--)	CSCE Conference, Madrid	3%	(2%)
PRC Trial of Gang of Four	3%	(--)			

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Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Polish reform, leadership changes
- Moscow cautious on Polish events
- Soviet views of President-elect Reagan

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

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POLAND-USSR

Kania's low-key straightforward performance at the just-completed party plenum seemed calculated to reassure his most important constituencies, the Polish public and the Soviet Union, that he is seriously committed both to restoring order and to implementing broad reforms. The changes in the party leadership bring to the Politburo a group of leaders with important popular followings to replace holdovers from the Gierek regime. The Soviet Union has been noncommital thus far, restricting its public reaction to a selective report of Kania's speech which stressed his criticism of Solidarity and his demand for a restoration of discipline in the work force and in society generally.

KANIA GIVES SOBER APPRAISAL OF CRISIS IN PZPR PLENUM SPEECH

Apparently intent on impressing both the Poles and Moscow with its realistic approach to the current crisis, PZPR First Secretary Stanislaw Kania at a 1 December party plenum session underscored his regime's continued commitment to reform and, at the same time, warned of dangers from the freewheeling activities of the Solidarity free trade union. Delivered in an atmosphere of heightened tensions, the speech was somewhat more subdued than the one Kania had given at the last PZPR plenum in early October, before the confrontation over the Solidarity union's registration documents. On relations with Moscow, the Polish leader expressed understanding of the Soviets' concern over the Polish situation and appreciation for their "trust" in his party's ability to surmount the crisis.

CRITICISM OF SOLIDARITY — Kania served notice in his strongest terms to date that he does not intend to relinquish political power to Solidarity, declaring that "in no state are there two ruling powers, and there cannot be in our state either." He added a new warning that antisocialist forces in the country, egged on by imperialist subversion, had "counterrevolutionary" aims in prolonging the crisis, a crisis which imperils Poland's "security." But he voiced confidence that the overwhelming majority of Solidarity adherents are not involved in this development and can be counted on not to support it. He noted positively that the country's hopes that tensions would subside with the registration of the new unions had been borne out in

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some instances. At the same time, however, he charged that Solidarity was continuing to show "great rashness in employing the threat of strikes," asserting in this connection that while strikes for needed wage increases may be justified, strikes for "prestige" or for "political" aims "cannot be excused in any way."

COMMITMENT TO REFORM Kania's reiterated commitment to reform of the party and society was similarly hedged by warnings of the dangers involved. He insisted that the regime had not agreed to reform simply to end the August strikes but was sincerely committed on this issue. But he also indicated that the party had been mistaken in counting on the "prudence" of society during this process and warned that "anarchy" can be easily aroused yet can be "very difficult to bridle" and that "it is high time to sober up." No one, he added, should count on the vacillation or leniency of the party and state in the "defense of the socialist cause." Showing concern also to avoid letting investigation of the past get out of hand, Kania stressed that the upcoming 10th anniversary of the December 1970 riots should be an occasion, not for divisive recriminations, but for united efforts to avoid any repetition of that "tragedy."

Kania apparently successfully resisted radical reformists' demands for a hasty convening of the proposed "extraordinary" PZPR congress, announcing that the congress would be held at the end of March or early April next year. In a comparable situation, an extraordinary party congress planned by the Czechoslovak reformers for September 1968 was forestalled by the Soviet intervention in August, although the day after the invasion a group of reformers held in secret what they termed an extraordinary CPCZ congress in Prague.

NEW POLITBURO MEMBERS The leadership changes announced at the plenum bring to the Politburo men with important popular followings in the country--Mieczyslaw Moczar, an old resistance fighter and symbol of national assertiveness in the party; Tadeusz Grabski, an outspoken liberal reformer; and Tadeusz Fiszbach, the Gdansk party leader who won national recognition as an architect of the August settlement. In effect the changes broaden the political spectrum of the leadership and make it more representative of the dominant political trends in the country. Further reinforcing the impression of a change in the character of the leadership was the formal removal of Gierek from the Central Committee and the removal of four of his former supporters--Kruczek, Karkoszka, Kowalczyk, and Werblan--from the Politburo.

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Moczar, a 67-year-old party veteran, gained notoriety in the late 1960's as the presumptive leader of an intrigue with anti-Semitic overtones apparently aimed at cutting down the influence of Moscow-trained intellectuals in the party to the benefit of native cadres, veterans of the war years in Poland. After a falling out with Gomulka, Moczar returned to the leadership briefly under Gierek but again left under a cloud in 1971. He regained a modest public position when he was named head of the war veterans organization in November of this year. Moczar's animosity toward Gierek was evident in his speech at the early October PZPR plenum, where he bluntly noted that the population had "fully approved" of Gierek's removal as party leader and urged a stepped-up purge of party elements associated with the former regime. Consistent with Kania's own position, Moczar warned, at a veterans organization session in November, that excessive demands on the government by dissident elements were leading the country toward a catastrophe--remarks that were approvingly publicized by Moscow.

Grabski gained national recognition as an outspoken reformer after a speech critical of Gierek's leadership in 1979. He was dropped from the Central Committee at the PZPR congress in February of this year and was restored to the Central Committee at the height of the August strikes. The 5 September plenum, which chose Kania as party leader, also named Grabski a party secretary.

Fiszbach gained national recognition as a liberal as a result of the August crisis. The Gdansk party organization, under Fiszbach's leadership, played a prime role in working out a settlement of the August strikes: it publicized the strikers' demands--publicly ignored at the time by the central regime--and induced the government to send a representative to sit at the negotiating table with the Gdansk interfactory strike committee led by Lech Walesa. The 45-year-old Fiszbach has been a Central Committee member since 1975.

DISGRACE OF GIEREK, JAROSZEWICZ The plenum adopted on the 2d a resolution on the "party responsibility" of Gierek and former Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz for "errors in sociopolitical and ideological policy." In dropping Gierek from the Central Committee, the resolution noted that the previous plenum in early October had not been able to examine Gierek because of his illness and that he was not participating in the present plenum either, "despite an invitation." The fallen leader's main fault was described as "favoring intrigues and the replacement of genuine democracy with appearances," including making decisions on his own while ignoring the Politburo and Secretariat.

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Jaroszewicz, whom Gierek had dismissed as premier and Politburo and Central Committee member at the February 1980 congress, was similarly charged in the plenum resolution with an autocratic leadership style, as well as with making rash decisions such as "forcing" the abortive rise in meat prices which triggered the June 1976 riots. The document said the Central Party Control Commission would consider the expulsion of Jaroszewicz from membership in the party and thoroughly examine the charges of "abuse of his position."

MOSCOW SIGNALS NO CHANGE IN CONDITIONAL SUPPORT OF KANIA

Moscow's initial reaction to the PZPR plenum--a selective report of Kania's speech--signals no change in the attitude of conditional support it has projected in recent weeks. By reporting the speech without comment, Moscow appears to be demonstrating its acceptance of at least some aspects of the Polish leadership's program. At the same time, it has indicated by the selective nature of its reporting--its stress on the tougher and more critical aspects of Kania's speech--and by other recent reports that it expects the Polish regime to take firm measures to bring the situation under control. The admonitory aspect of such Soviet reporting is far less direct and authoritative than that of the many official Soviet statements and PRAVDA articles that preceded the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Moscow's treatment of Kania's plenum speech, in a 3 December TASS report, portrayed the Polish leader as determined to take the necessary steps to end the labor unrest. As in previous heavily slanted Soviet reportage on Polish leaders' statements, TASS highlighted Kania's more hardline comments, such as those in which he warned against strikes and any encroachments by Solidarity on the government's authority. It ignored statements showing a more accommodating stance, like his assertion of the government's willingness to cooperate with Solidarity. The report also replayed Kania's expressions of appreciation to the Soviets both for material aid and for the "confidence" they have shown in Warsaw's ability to handle the crisis. Such hints of support for the Polish regime recall a 26 November LITERATURNAYA GAZETA article in which a Polish deputy foreign minister was quoted as saying that the Soviet leadership had clearly stated that the Polish problems were "Poland's domestic affair."

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On the eve of the plenum, Moscow similarly mixed hints of support for the Polish regime with statements implying the need for firmer measures. This stance was conveyed in a 30 November PRAVDA report on a Czechoslovak article that juxtaposed the current Polish crisis to the 1968 Czechoslovak events. The PRAVDA report cited concerns about "antisocialist aggressive trade unionism" in Poland, but it also portrayed the Polish communists as determined not to let matters get out of hand. Moscow has maintained pressure on the regime also by citing in PRAVDA statements of concern by the most conservative forces in Polish society, such as veterans and old-style trade unionists. Thus far, however, Moscow has not made any effort to generate a show of Soviet public support for these elements, as it did in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

While Moscow's attitude toward the latest Polish leadership changes remains to be clarified, it has favorably spotlighted one of the new appointees--Moczar--in recent weeks. Moscow gave unusual publicity to a Moczar speech before a veterans group early in November, citing his warnings about "dangerous" demands on the government and "irresponsible" actions by antisocialists. A 23 November PRAVDA report on a Sejm session also noted Moczar's remarks about restoring discipline in the Polish party and opposing those people who "insult communists, their friends and allies."

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USSR-U.S.

MOSCOW FINDS PROMISE, MUTES PROBLEMS IN REAGAN ELECTION

Moscow is exhibiting public equanimity, if not satisfaction, at the prospect of Governor Reagan's presidency. Soviet media continue to hold out the possibility of renewed bilateral dialogue and to play down any concerns Moscow may have about U.S. foreign and defense policy trends under the Reagan Administration. At the same time, a leading Soviet Americanologist, Georgiy Arbatov, has sounded a more cautious note on future relations in comments on Soviet television.

Moscow's intention to give the new President the benefit of the doubt on his policy toward the USSR has been apparent in the favorable reviews his budding Administration has received in Soviet commentary since the election. Central Committee official Oleg Anichkin on a 14 November domestic radio program asserted that the closer Governor Reagan approached the White House the more moderate his statements had become--a transformation Anichkin expected to continue. A 29 November article in the agricultural daily SELSKAYA ZHIZN declared that the utterances of "Reagan's intimates," including those on strategic arms limitations, show a "clear departure" from the hard line they were adopting earlier. The Soviet news agency TASS on 25 and 28 November replayed remarks by West German Chancellor Schmidt and Republican Senator Charles Percy that portrayed Governor Reagan as supporting a continuation of the SALT process.

Moscow's coverage of Senator Percy's late November visit to the Soviet capital revealed an apparent eagerness to initiate talks with the Reagan Administration. Even before Senator Percy had left for Moscow, TASS was reporting his assurances that the new Administration would be more consistent and reliable than the previous one, that it would attach great significance to strategic arms limitation, and that it would enjoy congressional support for any agreements it signed. Moscow publicly characterized the Senator's meetings with President Brezhnev, Defense Minister Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko as "businesslike." Its diplomatically correct reporting on the meetings offered a sharp contrast with the polemical media coverage of Gromyko's meeting with Secretary of State Muskie in New York last September. Although Moscow's official comment on the visit has been relatively circumspect, Soviet radio and television observer Valentin Zorin told Prague radio that Senator Percy had made "a much more moderate impression than could be expected" from the tenor of Republican statements during the campaign.

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ARBATOV'S ASSESSMENT

Arbatov's guarded comments on the incoming Administration were expressed in a 29 November appearance on Soviet television's "Studio Nine" program, often a forum for relatively candid discussion of sensitive issues. His assessment placed as much emphasis on uncertainties about the President-elect's policies as on the prospects. He agreed that there were chances for an improvement in relations and that Governor Reagan's statements during the campaign did show "the beginning of a shift to the center." But he recalled that many of the positions adopted by the President-elect and the Republicans during the campaign "could not but cause concern." "Many difficulties" stand in the way of normal relations, Arbatov concluded, and "it is wrong" to expect rapid improvement.

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USSR-SYRIA

MOSCOW HINTS SYRIA-JORDAN DISPUTE SHOULD BE SOLVED PEACEFULLY

Soviet concern over the Syrian-Jordanian border confrontation was suggested by the dispatch of CPSU Politburo alternate member Vasiliy Kuznetsov to Damascus to exchange instruments of ratification of the Syrian-Soviet treaty, a marked departure from previous handling of such ceremonies. Moscow's sparse, cautious reportage on the Damascus-Amman tensions has tilted toward its treaty partner, but Kuznetsov seemed to be cautioning his hosts when he advocated Arab unity and the peaceful settlement of conflicts.

The ostensible purpose of Kuznetsov's 1-3 December trip was to exchange ratification documents of the treaty signed in Moscow in October, but it seems likely that the trip was prompted by other considerations. The usual procedure for such ceremonies has been an exchange between a foreign ministry official and the resident ambassador or a minister visiting Moscow.*

Moscow gave virtually no details of Kuznetsov's "warm, friendly" meetings with Prime Minister al-Kasm and President al-Asad, but a Damascus radio report on the latter conversation said that they had discussed the situation in the region and international developments following al-Asad's October visit to the Soviet Union. Damascus reported that Kuznetsov had stressed the USSR's eagerness to "bolster Syria's position," and it claimed an identity of views on topics discussed, "including the Iraqi-Iranian war." In reporting on the meeting with al-Kasm, Moscow went no further than to say that bilateral cooperation and "the situation in the Middle East" had been discussed.

Avoiding any specifics on the various regional disputes, Kuznetsov's message, as reported by Moscow, seemed a reiteration of Soviet calls for peaceful resolution of conflicts. He noted in his speech at the exchange ceremony that the treaty signatories pledged, among other things, to settle outstanding issues by peaceful means.

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* The Indian and Somali ambassadors in Moscow and the Soviet ambassadors in Addis Ababa, Aden, and Kabul effected the ceremonial exchanges, and the Egyptian and Iraqi foreign ministers and the Mozambique development and planning minister participated in exchange ceremonies in Moscow.

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Calling attention to the importance of Arab unity, he routinely attributed to "imperialist forces" a desire to "sow discord, aggravate relations between Arab countries, and create seats of conflicts around problems which might be resolved by peaceful means."

TASS displayed a predisposition toward Damascus in a 1 December dispatch that reported Syrian press charges against unnamed "Arab regimes" for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which has "bases in neighboring countries." But the only part of the TASS dispatch broadcast in an Arabic-language newscast was a factual report about the concentration of forces on "both sides" of the border. TASS has also noted without comment Saudi efforts to prevent further deterioration of Syrian-Jordanian relations. In citing reported Jordanian requests to the United States for military supplies, TASS on the 2d contrived to put blame on Washington, charging that it was "pressuring" Amman in an effort to draw it into the Camp David process and was trying to create a "fictitious" settlement of the Palestinian problem through a federation of the West and East banks of the Jordan River.**

** This concept has overtones of King Husayn's March 1972 proposal for a federated Kingdom of Jordan with a Palestinian region on the West Bank, an idea Moscow had treated with reserve but had not rejected out of hand.

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P R C - U. S.

ATTACKS ON CLINE VIEWS BETRAY ANXIETY OVER REAGAN CHINA POLICY

Beijing's persisting anxieties over the incoming Administration's China policy were underscored in its sharp rebuttal of recent remarks by Ray Cline, adviser to President-elect Reagan. Beijing's firm but low-level response conveyed the leadership's resolve not to compromise what it believes to be essential issues of principle underlying PRC-U.S. normalization and its hope that the new Administration will not force a confrontation over the Taiwan question that will impair bilateral relations.

Beijing's sharpest statements came in a XINHUA dispatch on 2 December citing Mr. Cline's remarks in Taipei pledging the new Administration will implement the Taiwan Relations Act fully and suggesting the appointment of a presidential representative to Taipei. The XINHUA report warned that the attempt to "impose" the Taiwan Relations Act on the PRC "will never be accepted" and that the suggestion concerning a presidential representative to Taipei "goes too far" toward attributing "a certain official nature" to Washington's relations with Taiwan and therefore is "a very dangerous proposal."

The 2 December XINHUA dispatch acknowledged assurances by Reagan spokesmen that Mr. Cline's views may not be taken as representing those of the President-elect, but nevertheless referred to him as "Ronald Reagan's Asian affairs adviser." The report observed, moreover, that the policies to be adopted by the Reagan Administration in the future "cannot but arouse people's concern" and warned that if Mr. Cline's views are accepted by the new administration, they will "definitely lead to a retrogression" in PRC-U.S. relations and "create serious consequences."

Two days earlier, on 30 November, a report by XINHUA Washington correspondent Peng Di criticized remarks on China made by Mr. Cline in Singapore on the 26th, as well as comments by him in a Washington STAR article last October, before Governor Reagan's election. Peng maintained that his comments on the issue of Taiwan's reunification with the mainland demonstrated "flagrant interference in China's internal affairs" and ridiculed his statement that "the China card is a deuce" in Soviet-American strategic relations as an indication that he is "afraid of irritating the Kremlin." Peng cautiously avoided referring to

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him as an adviser to the President-elect's transition team, but Beijing implicitly made the connection by reporting with evident approval comments from the Thai press that the new Administration's Asia policies will be "a shambles" if they parallel Mr. Cline's views.

The sharpness of Beijing's reactions to Mr. Cline's statements manifests the acuteness of PRC concern that the incoming Reagan Administration has yet to embrace the 1979 communique normalizing PRC-U.S. diplomatic relations as the basis for bilateral relations rather than the Taiwan Relations Act, legislation whose legitimacy Beijing has steadfastly rejected. Beijing had sharply and authoritatively protested Governor Reagan's views on this point last August and firmly warned that it would not compromise on issues of principle regarding the Taiwan question, whatever benefits accrue from PRC-U.S. bilateral and strategic cooperation in other areas. Consistent with both Beijing's normal practice of ignoring public statements on U.S. China policy by public figures other than official spokesmen and its desire to maintain a lower profile regarding the U.S. election campaign after its authoritative August comments, Chinese media did not react to Mr. Cline's Washington STAR article when it first appeared.

Since Governor Reagan's election, Chinese media have cautiously and optimistically reported reassurances that the incoming Administration would take no steps to harm existing relations with Beijing, and XINHUA cited evidence from Mr. Cline's Southeast Asian tour to support this view. XINHUA on 21 November reported Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi's hopes on the eve of his talks with Mr. Cline that the new Administration would "be more realistic and continue to strengthen relations" with the PRC. On the 23d an "exclusive" XINHUA interview with Mr. Cline cited his assurances that President-elect Reagan will continue to strengthen cooperation with Beijing. Chinese media accounts of this earlier leg of the tour consistently referred to Mr. Cline as a "senior adviser" to the President-elect or as "chairman of the foreign policy advisory working group" for Governor Reagan.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

MOSCOW MOVES TOWARD POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF MADRID SESSION

Moscow appears to be setting the stage for a positive assessment of the initial Madrid CSCE review session and anticipating progress toward a European disarmament conference at the second session early next year. Soviet media have begun to take a more positive view of the proceedings in Madrid, despite the continuing Western attention to Soviet dissidents and Afghanistan, and have recently seen evidence of movement in the stance taken by the United States. The change in tone serves to confirm Moscow's continuing attachment to the CSCE process at a time of Western speculation about its response to the attacks on Soviet policy at Madrid.

Moscow's movement toward a positive assessment of the Madrid proceedings appears to date from the conference's shift to closed plenary sessions two weeks ago. During the preparatory sessions and the initial public meetings, Soviet reporting played up the "confrontationist" approach taken by delegates from the United States and certain other Western countries. More recently, Moscow has begun to suggest that there is a measure of common ground between the Eastern and Western approaches. A 29 November IZVESTIYA commentary on Madrid concluded that after a difficult start, most conference delegates now felt "muted optimism" about the ultimate outcome of the session.

Moscow's posture appears to derive in part from a belief that many West European delegates are committed to substantive progress on security issues. CPSU International Department First Deputy Chief Vadim Zagladin took this approach on a 29 November Soviet television program. Zagladin said that many West Europeans were surprised and unhappy over the initial tactics of the U.S. delegation and that despite "negative moments," constructive and useful work was "well underway" at Madrid. The head of the Soviet delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev, said at a 19 November press conference that Moscow had expected U.S. opposition to a subsequent European disarmament conference but noted that France, Sweden, and Finland, by contrast, had offered their own proposals in this regard. According to TASS, Ilichev said that various proposals have certain elements in common and that the task of a conference would be to find "mutually acceptable variants and solutions."

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U.S. POSITION The first positive comments on the U.S. approach at Madrid came in Soviet reporting on an unofficial 26 November meeting between Soviet delegates and American congressmen on the U.S. delegation. Moscow radio reports that day said that both sides, after an exchange of views, had noted the "businesslike nature" of the meeting. The 29 November IZVESTIYA article subsequently maintained that the U.S. delegates, responding to the "tacit disapproval" of the Western allies, had begun to "temper their outbursts" and to clarify their interest in attaining constructive results. Moscow's less pessimistic appraisal of the U.S. position could be related to anticipation of the impending change in command at the White House. An observer on the 23 November edition of Moscow domestic radio's "international observers roundtable" program pointedly embraced a suggestion--which he attributed to the Washington POST--that Madrid would offer the new Administration a forum to demonstrate its intentions on U.S.-Soviet relations.

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CHINA

BEIJING REVIVES STAGNANT ARMY RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN

Recent commentary in Beijing's military press suggests that the central party leadership has begun to renew its drive to improve PLA discipline and overcome persistent opposition in the army to liberal modernization policies. An army rectification campaign begun earlier this year apparently stagnated when its goals and tactics became the focus of wider leadership divisions over the thrust of the modernization policies and their side effects. The current, revitalized drive appears to reflect the priorities and concerns of party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping in those leadership debates.

Beijing's effort to revive and redirect the stagnant army rectification drive has been revealed in a series of circulars from the PLA's political guidance and disciplinary organs and in several commentaries appearing in the army paper JIEFANGJUN BAO since October. A PLA General Political Department circular, reported by XINHUA on 11 October, called for intensive efforts by the army to study the party leadership's rural policies. A mid-October directive by the army's Discipline Inspection Commission, reported by XINHUA on 1 November, called for renewed efforts throughout the PLA to "implement further" the "Guiding Principles on Political Life in the Party," a code of prescriptive behavior for the entire CCP membership and the focus of rectification efforts in the party at large since earlier this year.

On 10 November a JIEFANGJUN BAO commentary called for new efforts in the PLA's party apparatus to fall in line behind the party leadership's current policies and for organizational steps to ensure such allegiance. A Commentator article in the army paper on the 20th strongly reinforced the message of the 10 November commentary, and according to the party paper RENMIN RIBAO on the 21st, JIEFANGJUN BAO carried a long article attacking "feudal" practices in the army, and making them a major focus of rectification.

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EARLIER CAMPAIGN The current attention to the PLA's ideological and political problems appears to revive an effort announced at the beginning of this year to overcome persistent and deep-seated opposition--particularly within the PLA's party committee apparatus--to the party leadership's liberal policies and political reforms. The PLA General Political Department's guidelines for political work in the army in 1980, reported by XINHUA in December last year, had called for an education campaign to dispel misgivings about the party's policies and to retard corrosion of the army's discipline by "bourgeois" and "unhealthy" trends of thought in Chinese society at large. The guidelines also advocated organizational steps among the leading party organs in the PLA to improve discipline in the army overall and overcome the "chaotic situation" in many PLA units.

The campaign was distorted in subsequent comment in the military press that seemed to reflect persistent PLA opposition to the liberalizing thrust of party policies under Deng Xiaoping's guidance. Articles emphasized only one aspect of the guidelines--the need to resist the impact of social corrosion on army discipline--and expressed reservations about the other--the need to overcome resistance to the party's modernization policies. JIEFANGJUN BAO commentary in the early months of this year stressed the need for definite "limits" on efforts to "emancipate thought"--the catchphrase summarizing Deng's efforts to free party policy from the constraints of Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution doctrines--and expressed increased concern over the impact on the army of "bourgeois ideology" alive in Chinese society at large as a consequence of the party's policies themselves.

Contention over army rectification surfaced in the party leadership itself at the PLA General Political Department's conference on political work in April this year, where party Chairman Hua Guofeng gave a highly controversial speech. Restating his persistent concern over the past two years that the party's prestige and unity be upheld against "right erroneous" trends in Chinese society, Hua called for a campaign to "struggle against bourgeois ideology and promote proletarian ideology" in the army and traced the benefits and implications such a drive would have in improving order in society as a whole. Although General Political Department Director Wei Guoqing--concurrently a party Politburo member and a staunch supporter of Deng Xiaoping--expressed only weak enthusiasm for the campaign, Chinese media subsequently reported several military regions and districts inaugurating the campaign against "bourgeois ideology."

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By June, however, party leaders and press commentary reflecting views promoted by Deng strongly asserted that the main danger to the party as a whole is "feudal ideology"--a catchphrase summarizing a variety of party abuses and misbehavior that have been consistently associated with the Cultural Revolution left. The shifts in emphasis conformed with Deng Xiaoping's contention in the past two years that the main danger to the party is a "left erroneous trend" in the party itself and not the "side effects" of the party's liberal policies. Media reporting on the progress of the campaign to "eliminate bourgeois ideology and promote proletarian ideology" in the army dropped off sharply in the face of this strong reassertion of Deng Xiaoping's priorities in party rectification, and commentary on the aims of PLA political work virtually disappeared thereafter. Authoritative commentary on the PLA anniversary on 1 August, for example, mentioned only weakly the need to oppose both "feudal and bourgeois ideology."

DIRECTION OF CURRENT CAMPAIGN Recent JIEFANGJUN BAO comment clearly reflects an effort to direct PLA rectification toward goals defined by leaders like Deng Xiaoping. The article in the army paper reported in RENMIN RIBAO on 21 November, for example, observed that "feudal" influences in the PLA are particularly serious because of the peasant origins of the vast majority of the army's leading cadres. Noting that "some comrades" believe the "main concern" for political work in the army should be criticism of "bourgeois ideology" and "worry" that criticism of "feudal ideology" in the army will undermine its unity, discipline, and centralism, the article pointed out that the impact of "feudal" practices in the army are "much more profound and widespread than those of bourgeois ideology." Providing a measure of the strength of those in the army leadership who evidently believe differently, however, the article concluded only that criticism of "bourgeois ideology" and "feudal ideology" are "equally important and equally pressing."

Also reflecting Deng Xiaoping's priorities, the 20 November JIEFANGJUN BAO Commentator article reasserted the primacy of political reliability over other criteria in evaluating and promoting army cadres and readjusting leadership groups in the PLA. The article declared that evaluation of a cadre's adherence to the party's political and ideological lines since the Third Plenum is "the most fundamental yardstick" in PLA organizational work and warned that those who had "spoken out or worked against" the party's lines since then should not be retained in leadership groups. At the political work conference last April, Wei Guoqing had strongly emphasized the same considerations in the readjustment of the PLA's party apparatus, in contrast to Hua's emphasis on political education and ideological study campaigns. JIEFANGJUN BAO commentary at that time, however, did not seem to follow Wei's lead.

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The current redirection of rectification goals and tactics in the PLA's political apparatus seems to parallel renewed efforts to maintain the focus of rectification work in the CCP as a whole along lines prescribed by Deng Xiaoping earlier this year. RENMIN RIBAO's 1 July editorial on the party anniversary, for example, appeared similarly to balance leadership divisions in recognizing the main danger of "feudal ideology" to party work while acknowledging the corrosion of "bourgeois ideology" in the party and Chinese society. It evaluated organizational rectification as the most important and effective antidote while acknowledging the value of continued political and ideological education.

SHANXI PURGE HIGHLIGHTS PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP ADJUSTMENTS

Attempting to improve party work in two important provinces, Beijing moved in early November to change the top party leaderships in Shanxi and Guangdong. The replacement of Shanxi's party chief reflects longstanding central dissatisfaction with political work in the province, and the new party boss has a clear mandate to resolve persistent local political controversies disrupting stability there. The replacement of Guangdong's party leadership frees two veteran leaders to work in Beijing, but there is evidence of some central disappointment with progress in that province as well.

SHANXI The appointment of Huo Shilian as Shanxi CCP first secretary, reported by SHANXI RIBAO on 11 November and by XINHUA on the 12th, ends the long tenure of Wang Qian as provincial party chief. Wang is a veteran of Shanxi politics, having risen to the post of provincial party secretary as early as 1957 and to the provincial governorship in 1965. After his purge in the Cultural Revolution and subsequent rehabilitation in 1973, Wang was appointed first secretary of the Shanxi party organization in 1975. His appointment was one of a number of provincial leadership adjustments which seem to have been promoted by Deng Xiaoping, then presiding over the party Central Committee's work.

Wang's fall from political grace was signaled when he stopped appearing in public in Shanxi after March of this year. His removal seems to have stemmed from his failure to resolve a number of outstanding political problems in the province. With the province's model production brigade, Dazhai, under mounting attack in a national campaign, the brigade's position in the province was evidently a festering issue. In addition, Wang has been directly criticized for at least one instance when he resisted central political instructions for resolving a local political controversy.

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Central dissatisfaction with the general progress of the provincial party leadership's work was strongly implied both in Huo Shilian's appointment and in the substance of a speech Huo delivered at a major provincial work conference upon arriving in the province. A veteran leader with central experience as minister of agriculture and with long experience in Shanxi's neighboring provinces of Shaanxi and Ningxia, Huo comes to Taiyuan with clear central support to take firm command.

Implying serious shortcomings in the provincial party leadership's work, Huo Shilian's 9 November speech to a provincial party conference on economic work, as reported by SHANXI RIBAO on the 11th, called for rapid improvement in a number of politically touchy areas. Huo observed that the "ultraleftist stuff pushed by Dazhai" in the province had not been eliminated and that the work of "readjusting" leadership groups at various levels in the province had not proceeded far enough. Efforts to promote the campaign to study "practice as the sole criterion of truth" had been slighted in the province, according to Huo, and the work to investigate and reverse unjust political verdicts from the Cultural Revolution period had been impeded.

Central dissatisfaction with Wang apparently focused on Shanxi's failure to redress local political quarrels lingering from the Cultural Revolution. This problem was evident in local and national media treatment of the so-called Pu County armed rebellion--an issue Wang is now being accused of mishandling. The rebellion--an incident in 1977 in which Pu County leaders were arrested for allegedly stealing arms and ammunition for local political violence--received national press attention on 19 October 1980, when GUANGMING RIBAO reported that recalcitrant prefectural officials had blocked efforts by provincial party Second Secretary Lu Guibo to overturn the verdict on the Pu County leaders. A long article in SHANXI RIBAO on the same day, detailing the "whole truth" about the affair, acknowledged that prefectural officials had in fact impeded progress in the case because they had "strong backing." On 29 October the central party paper RENMIN RIBAO noted the failure to resolve the case and identified Wang, through an allusion to "the former principal responsible person of the Shanxi CCP Committee," as responsible for the obstruction. In his speech on 9 November Huo Shilian pointed to the Pu County affair as "a typical case" of poor investigation and verdict-reversal work in the province; and on 29 November RENMIN RIBAO reported the complete exoneration of the Pu County officials of crimes that were "a pure fabrication" concocted with Wang's support.

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GUANGDONG The press has presented the replacement of Guangdong's top party leaders as a more positive move than the changes in Shanxi, although there are oblique indications of central dissatisfaction with work in Guangdong as well. Guangzhou radio on 15 November reported Guangdong party chief Xi Zhongxun relaying a Central Committee circular relieving both him and Guangzhou municipal party chief Yang Shangkun of their local posts for transfer to central work in Beijing. The circular also named Liaoning CCP First Secretary Ren Zhongyi to replace Xi as provincial party chief, and Minister of Light Industry Liang Lingguang to replace Yang as head of Guangzhou's party organization. A 12 November Shenyang radio broadcast had earlier reported the promotion of Shenyang party head Guo Feng to the position of first party secretary in Liaoning, replacing Ren.

The transfer of Xi Zhongxun and Yang Shangkun to Beijing had been foreshadowed last September, when the third session of the National People's Congress (NPC) appointed both men as vice chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee and Yang as its secretary general. While these posts have in the past been honorific, no other provincial leaders served on the NPC Standing Committee, and it seemed likely that both men would receive other, more substantive posts. Since Xi's replacement in Guangdong, the communist-controlled press in Hong Kong has intimated that he will soon replace Lin Hujia as head of the Beijing municipal party committee, itself the object of press criticism in recent months.

That Xi leaves Guangdong with some measure of central dissatisfaction with his tenure there was suggested in Guangzhou radio's report on 22 November of a speech to a Guangdong party work conference on the 18th and 19th by Ren Zhongyi, conveying the views of "a leading central comrade" on work in the province. Ren--who in the past has been a vigorous provincial supporter of Deng Xiaoping's political campaigns and policy reforms--outlined the need for improvement in several areas of political and economic work in Guangdong which, he implied, had not met central expectations for the province as an advanced, specialized economic area.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 24-30 NOVEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,301 items)		
Yugoslav National Day	6%	(--)
Brezhnev-Tikhonov Greetings to Yugoslav Leaders	3%	(--)
Soyuz T-3 Manned Space Mission	4%	(--)
Brezhnev Meeting With U.S. Senator Percy	4%	(--)
CSCE Conference, Madrid	3%	(5%)
Brezhnev Greetings on International Day of Solidarity With Palestinian People	3%	(--)

Beijing (770 items)		
Romanian Prime Minister Verdet in PRC	14%	(--)
Spanish Communist Party Leader Carrillo in PRC	6%	(1%)
Trial of Gang of Four	5%	(6%)
Iran-Iraq Conflict	3%	(--)
Deng Xiaoping Interview With CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR	3%	(--)
DPRK Communist Party Delegation in PRC	3%	(1%)
Zhao Ziyang Greetings on International Day of Solidarity With Palestinian People	2%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Mixed Soviet signals on Poland

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10 DECEMBER 1980
FB TM 80-050

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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POLAND-USSR

Soviet media are not behaving as though a final decision has been taken to intervene militarily in Poland. A unique media item that seemed calculated to rationalize such an action--a TASS report from Poland on 8 December depicting local authorities under virtual siege by "counter-revolutionaries"--was quickly killed after limited initial dissemination, suggesting that the assumptions under which it had been issued had been superseded by events or by a subsequent decision. In general, the Soviet Union has keyed its commentary on Poland to the 5 December Warsaw Pact summit meeting, whose communique had indicated, among other things, that the allies had confidence in the Polish communists' ability to master the crisis. Polish spokesmen, apparently alarmed by indications of the military preparations of its neighbors, have also been expressing reassurances along this line as well as a sense of heightened concern.

MOSCOW GIVES MIXED SIGNALS REGARDING INTENTIONS TOWARD POLAND

Though lacking the trappings of an authoritative statement, the tone and message of the TASS dispatch were similar to some of the statements that emanated from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries before the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion. Billed simply as a TASS report from Warsaw, it purported to describe a breakdown of authority in a certain plant in Kielce. The events described, however, were presented as typical and conveyed the impression of a general collapse of authority in the country. It charged that "counterrevolutionary groups, acting under the guise of local Solidarity branches," had resorted to "open confrontation" with local party and administrative structures and were replacing union officials with persons of "antigovernment" leanings. It said that at the Iskra plant in Kielce, these forces had "arbitrarily dismissed the management and disarmed the plant's guards," and that workers disagreeing with them had "disappeared."

Despite the potentially grave implications of the TASS dispatch, its treatment by Soviet media and surrounding comment suggest that Soviet policy toward Poland is far less clearcut than its

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policy toward Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. The dispatch was not accompanied by a campaign further documenting the deterioration of the Polish situation and was not used to buttress the sort of authoritative comment that could be expected to be associated with a decision to intervene. Even more telling was the atypical Soviet media treatment of the dispatch itselt. The report was carried on the 8th by Moscow domestic radio and some foreign beams, but it was not published in the central press, as would normally be expected with such an item. An earlier, similar report--the TASS dispatch of 24 November carrying the first direct Soviet attack on the Solidarity union--was published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA the next day. The absence of such a followup in the present case suggests at least that the policy assumptions under which it was authorized were superseded by some unexplained event.

Further evidence of a Soviet desire to pause in the escalation of the crisis with Poland came on 10 December in a TASS dispatch from New Delhi, where President Brezhnev had been visiting since the 8th, quoting a Soviet spokesman as denying that Soviet troops had crossed into Poland. According to TASS, the spokesman asserted that such reports were "false from beginning to end" and an "ill-intentioned provocation." The spokesman was careful not to rule out the possibility of future intervention--a discrimination well calculated to relieve the Soviet Union of the onus of the current crisis while keeping the Poles uncertain about the Soviet Union's ultimate intentions.

WARSAW PACT SUMMIT The TASS dispatch was sharply inconsistent with the statement issued on the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Moscow on 5 December, which appeared to give Kania still more time to bring the situation under control. That statement reaffirmed the confidence of Poland's allies in the Polish communists' ability to overcome the crisis and continue to develop socialism. A similar vote of confidence had appeared in the statement on the Brezhnev-Kania talks of 30 October. Soviet commentaries on the meeting generally have been couched in reassuring terms, citing the expression of "confidence" and describing the meeting as marking a setback for Western speculation about Poland's future. Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov struck a sharper tone in a Moscow speech reported by TASS on 10 December. He paraphrased the language in the statement calling for "vigilance" with regard to aggressive imperialist ambitions against the socialist countries and added that this applied particularly to "socialist Poland."

Despite the double-edged nature of some of the language in the Moscow statement--its assurances of "fraternal solidarity and support," for example--it had none of the admonitory character

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of the statements issued in advance of the 1968 intervention. For instance, the letter of the "Warsaw Five" meeting, publicized on 17 July 1968, bluntly told the Czechoslovak regime that the situation had become "completely unacceptable," was "no longer your affair alone," and required immediate remedial steps. Similarly, the statement issued on the multilateral Bratislava meeting of 3 August 1968 declared the readiness of the Warsaw Pact countries to "defend socialist gains" and to "never allow anyone to drive a wedge between socialist states and to undermine the foundations of their socialist social systems." The Moscow meeting, nevertheless, was the first extraordinary Warsaw Pact leaders' session since 1968 and the first since that time to be publicly reported as discussing the internal affairs of a member country.

OTHER INDICATORS Other Soviet comment during the past week has suggested heightened pressure on Poland but, like the Soviet bloc leaders' statement, still appears to allow the Kania regime more time. Moscow radio's Polish service has devoted somewhat more time than it did earlier in the crisis to replaying reports on the Polish situation but has maintained its normal programming format. Among the recent signs of pressures have been:

+ Moscow's first direct attack on an official Polish institution. A foreign radio broadcast on 4 December criticized the Polish news agency INTERPRESS for organizing the showing of a "tendentious" film about the strikes.

+ Growing efforts to show an imminent danger to Poland from the West. Along with Ustinov's statements, these efforts have included a 3 December commentary over the ostensibly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress charging that the West had "smuggled specially trained agents into Poland" and was planning to stage a "fascist-type coup," as well as a Moscow radio commentary on the 9th accusing Washington of trying to whip up "military hysteria" over Poland among its NATO allies.

EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT Moscow's East European allies, like the Soviets, have been sending mixed signals following the Warsaw Pact summit. The two harshest critics of the Polish situation, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, approved the results of the summit--including the passage on confidence in the Polish communists--in high-level party meetings on 8 and 9 December respectively. At the same time, their party dailies on the 8th stressed the need for continued vigilance. Additionally, these two countries, as well as Bulgaria, replayed the 8 December TASS dispatch. In a 10 December SCINTEIA article on the summit, the independent-minded Romanians, who appeared to have scored some points in the wording of several passages on principles of relations in the Moscow statement, reasserted that Poland's problems "can and must be solved by the Poles themselves."

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Yugoslavia, which authoritatively warned against any interference in Poland in a Foreign Secretariat statement on the day of the summit, reiterated its concerns in a Zagreb radio commentary by Milika Sundic on the 9th. Stating that there is "still time to ponder the consequences of possible intervention in Poland," Sundic said that the information about troops on Poland's borders, if it contains any truth, is "alarming to the extreme." But he added that "we are inclined to think that no such decision has been made and that the Warsaw Treaty member countries will not decide to do so."

WARSAW SHOWS HEIGHTENED FEAR OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION

Clear signs of alarm have manifested themselves in Poland in recent days as speculation in the West has increasingly portrayed the stepped-up Soviet pressures as a prelude to actual intervention. This alarm was dramatically demonstrated by Warsaw's prompt refutation of the TASS report of "counterrevolutionary" conditions at the Kielce plant. Other signs have included appeals for public discipline issued by the Central Committee, by the Defense Ministry Council, and even by Solidarity.

REACTION TO TASS REPORT — Warsaw reacted to the 8 December TASS dispatch with radio and TV reports on conditions at the Iskra plant in Kielce, emphasizing that work was going on there "rhythmically and without difficulties" and even going "better and better." Although the Warsaw reports did not mention the TASS statement directly, a PAP news roundup on the 9th reported without comment the TASS statement that "counterrevolutionary groups are passing to open confrontation, striving for further destabilization" in Poland. There has so far been no monitored Moscow or Warsaw confirmation of a Paris radio report on the 9th that the Polish Foreign Ministry has made a formal protest over the TASS statement.

OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF CONCERN — Heightened concern over possible Soviet intervention has been a strong underlying theme of Polish comment since the 3d, when the Polish party's "appeal to the nation" stressed that the nation's future was at stake and that continuing disturbances were leading the country to the brink of "economic and moral devastation" and increasing danger of "counterrevolution." The same day, a brief statement by the military council of Poland's Defense Ministry, as carried by PAP, voiced "deep concern" over the situation, which it said, could negatively affect the country's "defense potential." The statement added ominously that the military council "had specified tasks facing the armed forces under the circumstances."

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Five days later, the military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI declared the army's opposition to "everything which weakens our alliances and credibility in the socialist community."

A remarkably candid acknowledgment of the threatened Warsaw Pact intervention was contained in a press conference held by the head of the party's press, radio, and television department, Josef Klasa, on 4 December. Klasa told Eastern and Western journalists that while the Poles could resolve the crisis "independently," the Polish communists would feel "entitled and obliged" to explore all possibilities to avert "a tragedy," including "turning for help to communists of other countries," if socialism were threatened in Poland. Klasa reportedly appealed to the nation to avoid putting Poland's allies in the difficult position of having no option but to intervene.

HARDER STANCE ON SOLIDARITY UNION The Polish authorities have also attempted to avert the need for intervention by demonstrating a tougher attitude toward the Solidarity union. Thus Klasa in his press conference on the 4th, while conceding that the union has a "healthy core," denounced its strikes, ultimatums, and other political activities, which he blamed on "some" Solidarity leaders and the union's sympathizers from the dissident Workers Defense Committee (KOR). ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 6th condemned Solidarity's "saber-rattling" and its "contemptuous, patronizing attitude" toward both the Polish Government and "other" countries. The army daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI added its voice to the tougher regime posture toward Solidarity in an article on the 9th warning that any trade union activity directed against the socialist state would not be tolerated. Echoing Kania's 1 December plenum speech, the paper voiced the hope that the overwhelming majority of Solidarity adherents were not involved in such activity.

For its part, the Solidarity union has combined restraint and defense in its latest statements on the crisis. As reported by the West German press agency DPA, the union's presidium on the 5th denied the regime's charges that the union was fomenting anarchy and chaos in the country and noted that there were no strikes at that time in all of Poland. The statement, which was not carried by Warsaw media, appeared the same day as a TRYBUNA LUDU article that leveled new charges of political maneuvering by Solidarity. In an earlier gesture of union restraint, the Szczecin regional radio on the 4th reported an agreement among four Solidarity union committees that they would not "undertake protest action until further notice." That statement, stressing concern "for the good of the country," warned against "irresponsible strikes" and served notice that the four committees might publicly dissociate themselves from any strike action that was not in accord with the Solidarity union statute.

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Finally, there have been signs that the Polish Government may be preparing to show some muscle in attempting to reimpose authority over Solidarity. One indication was the cancellation on the 8th of a film portraying the Gdansk strikes. The film had been denounced by Moscow radio four days earlier and was criticized in a film review in TRYBUNA LUDU on the 9th. The cancellation was denounced as a "provocation" by Walesa in a statement reported by ADN on the 9th. The possibility of even graver action against trade unionists was raised by a Warsaw radio report on the 9th that machinery at a Silesian coal mine had been sabotaged.

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U S S R - U. S.

SOVIET SPECIALISTS FORESEE PROBLEMS UNDER NEW ADMINISTRATION

Recent remarks by three prominent Soviet foreign affairs specialists suggest that Moscow may not be as optimistic about the outlook for U.S.-Soviet relations under the Reagan Administration as its official posture and media comment have implied. At the same time, the 5 December Warsaw summit meeting in Moscow reaffirmed the pledge made by President Brezhnev on 17 November to respond positively to any constructive steps taken by the new Administration.

Misgivings about the likely policies of the Reagan Administration were raised by IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin, speaking on a 7 December Soviet domestic radio program. Bovin appeared to refute a fellow participant's expression of "restrained optimism" by concluding that "a harder line in U.S. policy is at hand" under the new President. The USSR, Bovin suggested, should be making preparations for this eventuality. Speaking on the same program, Central Committee official Nikolay Shishlin contradicted the thrust of remarks by other commentators since the election by asserting explicitly that the hawkish sentiments heard during the campaign "were not empty talk, after all."

USA and Canada Institute director Georgiy Arbatov spoke to a similar purpose on a 29 November Soviet television program assessing the election results. Arbatov, while suggesting that the President-elect had moved toward the center during the campaign, pointed to negative trends in U.S. public opinion and cautioned that many "difficulties" stand in the way of normal relations.

Soviet media more generally continue to take a positive approach to President-elect Reagan. Moscow papers have refrained from criticizing the President-elect, reported his expressions of support for arms limitation negotiations, and played down any concerns that Soviet officials may harbor about foreign and defense policy trends under his Administration.

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USSR

The new Soviet five-year plan reveals some of the hard decisions the leadership is being forced to make in dealing with steadily declining growth rates and severe resource constraints. On the critical issue of industrial priorities, the Soviet Union has shifted from its historical emphasis on heavy industry development to giving a slightly higher priority to consumer goods in an apparent attempt to stimulate greater worker productivity. In addition, demographic pressures are prompting some geographic redistribution of resources, which is reflected in the plan's provision for a growth rate that is slower in most European parts of the Soviet Union than it is in the less industrialized Asian areas.

FIVE-YEAR PLAN DRAFT CHANGES PRIORITY GIVEN CONSUMER GOODS

In a notable shift in economic priorities, the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan, published in draft form on 2 December, sets the growth rate for light industry (Group B) slightly higher than that for heavy industry (Group A). Although the margin is so small--only 1 percent--that it is largely symbolic, it is nevertheless a reversal of the preferential rate accorded Group A in the 1976-80 plan and apparently marks the leadership's increased awareness of the need to provide more incentives for the workers to raise output. Articles by economists in recent months have argued repeatedly that investment in new technology (heavy industry) fails to bring the expected increase in productivity if workers are not provided incentives by the availability of sufficient consumer goods.

The draft plan specified that Group B is to rise 27-29 percent and A only 26-28 percent in the next five years. This contrasts with the 38-percent growth for A and the 32-percent growth for B in the last five-year plan. The present tilt toward consumer goods had been foreshadowed in the last two annual plans: After six years of priority for heavy industry, the 1980 plan called for exactly equal rates of growth for A and B, and the 1981 plan announced at the October 1980 Supreme Soviet session set B slightly ahead.

The draft thus indicates that heavy industry, rather than the consumer sector, will bear the brunt of cuts in allocations--a fact which can hardly please heavy industry supervisor Kirilenko,

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who five years ago successfully argued for an increase in development rates for machinebuilding in the 1976-80 Five-Year Plan. It is not yet clear how Brezhnev's favored sector of agriculture will fare. Unlike the first draft of the last five-year plan, the present one gives no figure for agricultural investment and only repeats the formula approved at the July 1978 plenum that agriculture should not receive a smaller proportion of the total investments than it did in the previous plan. On the basis of the present draft, it appears that the leaders presently are willing to settle for more balanced--and slower--growth in the next five years, rather than strive for all-out technological renovation.

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE In view of the slowdown in industrial growth and the increasing scarcity of investment funds, such cuts in economic development rather than in consumption can only be explained by economic necessity. The 1976-80 plan, which set heavy industry rates far ahead of consumer goods development, had sought to boost productivity through increased investment in new technology; but as the new draft plan acknowledges, labor productivity has failed to rise as fast as planned. Several economists recently have focused on this shortfall, arguing that workers are losing interest in working harder to achieve bonuses and pay raises because there are insufficient goods to purchase with their higher income.* Some, like B. Plyshevskiy in the May PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO (PLANNED ECONOMY), have maintained that for various reasons the old method of increasing growth by cutting consumption simply no longer works. Others, like Academy of Social Sciences rector V.A. Medvedev in a March KOMMUNIST, have directly disputed arguments that agriculture and machinebuilding must be developed more fully before investments in consumption can be raised and have insisted that improved consumption itself is a key source for increasing economic growth.

Leadership statements have also revealed increased appreciation of the crucial role of consumer goods in raising production. Premier Kosygin in the July 1979 PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO stated that more consumer goods were necessary to match the growing purchasing power of the public and to raise labor productivity. Gosplan Chairman Baybakov, in explaining the shift from heavy industry priority to equal growth rates in the 1980 plan, told the

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* Such an argument was made, for example, by T.I. Zaslavskaya in the March EKO and G. Popov in the 24 May PRAVDA. N.A. Shokin, writing in the May ECONOMIC SERIES of the Academy of Sciences, estimated that if workers had had more goods to buy with their increased income, labor productivity would have risen an additional 7 percent from 1960 to 1977.

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November 1979 Supreme Soviet session that this would help to cover more fully the growing demand for goods created by increased purchasing power. And, most recently, Brezhnev told the October 1980 plenum that higher output of consumer goods was necessary to "strengthen labor incentives"--an argument he had not used in his economic report the year before. Ironically, the leadership is recognizing the validity of these arguments even as leading consumer goods spokesman Kosygin leaves the scene and is being replaced as premier by longtime heavy industry spokesman Tikhonov.

REPUBLIC GROWTH RATES SCHEDULED FOR CUTBACK IN NEW PLAN

The slower rate of industrial growth projected in the draft plan will be felt much more heavily in some republics than in others. Although allocations have not been made exclusively along regional lines, growth appears to have been most sharply curtailed in European areas to provide additional funds for areas richer in natural and labor resources. In contrast, new measures to selectively influence demographic development on a regional basis appear designed to favor the European parts of the country.

The reduction in the growth rate for the European republics will be, without exception, considerably greater than the national average. Although allocations in the new plan appear to be linked in part to current performance, even Belorussia, the only European republic to have fulfilled its goal under the present plan, suffered a sharp cutback. Latvia and Estonia, which had the lowest growth rates in both the 9th and 10th five year plans, were again among the republics most sharply cut in the new plan. Growth in Lithuania and the Ukraine will also be below the national average. The somewhat higher rate of development for the RSFSR appears to reflect the investments scheduled for developing Siberia's natural resources.

The relative scarcity of resources, including manpower, in the European areas of the Soviet Union appears to have played a major role in the reduced rates of growth for these republics. The guidelines for the new plan specified that new production projects in European areas be restricted primarily to technical improvements not requiring additional workers. More significantly it prohibits the location of new, or the expansion of existing, energy- or water-intensive industries in European areas and requires that new industries be located where they can most effectively facilitate the development of resources from the eastern and northern regions of the country.

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Generally the reductions in the planned rates of industrial growth for the non-European republics were not as great. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, all of which will fulfill the current plan, will have among the highest rates of growth over the next five years. Uzbekistan, which has been lobbying for additional resources on the basis of its extremely high birthrate, received very favorable treatment in the plan guideline, despite its poor economic performance over the past five years. Some of the Asian republics, however, did suffer relatively sharp cuts in industrial growth. Kazakhstan, for example, which has had serious economic problems during the current plan, has suffered the largest cut in the rate of industrial growth. The proposed rates of industrial growth for the next five years appear in the following table:

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
(in percentages)

Regions	Planned Growth Goals 1981-85	Planned Growth Goals 1976-80	Proportion of Decrease (using average 1981-85 goal)
Uzbekistan	28-31	36	-18.1
Azerbaijan	29-32	39	-21.8
Georgia	30-33	41	-23.2
Turkmenistan	21-24	30	-25.0
USSR	26-28	36	-25.0
RSFSR	24-27	36	-29.2
Lithuania	21-24	32	-29.7
Moldavia	30-33	47	-33.0
Armenia	29-32	46	-33.7
Tajikistan	24-27	39	-34.6
Ukraine	20-23	33	-34.8
Belorussia	26-29	43	-36.0
Latvia	15-18	27	-38.9
Kirgizia	21-24	37	-39.2
Estonia	14-17	26	-40.4
Kazakhstan	22-25	40	-41.3

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DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES

In an apparent effort to redress one aspect of the shift of resources to the east, the new plan contains a number of measures that appear designed to encourage fertility in the European parts of the country. The previous plan barely touched upon demographic questions, but the current guidelines call for an "effective demographic policy" to be "implemented" during the next five years and for additional research on questions of demographic policy and the allocation of labor resources. Several specific measures were included in the plan to create the "best possible conditions for motherhood," and although these were not targeted to any particular region, they appeared to be aimed at the European republics. The measures include increased state aid to newlyweds and families with children, more flexible working conditions for mothers, additional state services for children, and better medical services for pregnant women.

Other demographic provisions in the plan also appear to be intended to selectively influence population growth. For example, partially paid maternity leave for one year is to be introduced "by region" beginning in 1981. Similarly, the plan called for a special emphasis on providing more daycare facilities in those areas having large numbers of working women. These measures are similar to those advocated earlier this year by a leading Soviet demographer, B. Ts. Urlanis, who called for the adoption of such regional demographic policies to "smooth out" the disparity in birthrate between the European and Central Asian regions of the country.*

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* See the TRENDS of 12 March 1980, pages 10-12.

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BRIEF

USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Military Aid Justified on Pact Anniversary

On the second anniversary of the Soviet-Afghan treaty, Moscow and Kabul have again pointed to the provisions of that document as the primary legal basis for Soviet military assistance to the Karmal regime. Comment on last year's anniversary--less than three weeks before the Soviet invasion--focused on the treaty's role in the economic and cultural development of Afghanistan. Unlike last year, no exchange of greetings between the Soviet and Afghan leaders has been reported, but the event was marked by a "friendship meeting" in Moscow and commemorative comment. Typifying much of the commentary, a Yuriy Tyssovskiy article in the 5 December SELSKAYA ZHIZN (RURAL LIFE) cited Brezhnev's characterization of the situation in Afghanistan as gradually returning to normal. Tyssovskiy maintained that the "hired bands" of "imperialism, Beijing, and reactionaries of all kinds" were encountering a "crushing rebuff." Other comment has been somewhat more defensive. K. Rashidov, for example, sounded much less assured in his anniversary piece in IZVESTIYA than he did in an article on the same occasion last year. In 1979 he confidently described the past, present, and future of Soviet-Afghan relations; this year most of his article was devoted to a refutation of Western reports that social conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated as a result of the fighting.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 1-7 DECEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,213 items)			Beijing (677 items)		
CPSU Draft 1980-90 Economic Guidelines	11%	(--)	Japanese Ministerial Delegation in PRC	12%	(--)
Polish Situation	8%	(--)	SRV-Kampuchean Dispute	4%	(1%)
Warsaw Pact Meeting, Moscow	4%	(--)	Ray Cline, Adviser to President-Elect Reagan, Asian Tour	4%	(--)
Kuznetsov in Syria for Friendship Treaty Ratification	4%	(--)	Trial of Gang of Four	4%	(5%)
Lao Founding Fifth Anniversary	3%	(--)	Iran-Iraq Conflict	3%	(3%)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Soviet restraint, discord on Poland

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17 DECEMBER 1980
FB TM 80-051

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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USSR-POLAND

Moscow's public attitude toward Poland in recent days suggests that the Kremlin is resolved to give the Kania regime more time to deal with the crisis without Warsaw Pact intervention. In the week following the 5 December extraordinary Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow, there were some mixed signals in Soviet media on this score, suggesting the possibility that some Soviet leaders were advocating a harder policy. But since Brezhnev's return from India on the 11th, Soviet statements have more faithfully reflected the Pact conference document's assertion that the Polish communists could overcome the country's problems. In the meantime, Warsaw has been showing signs of renewed confidence which no doubt will be reinforced by the peaceful observance of the Gdansk memorial ceremonies.

MOSCOW PROJECTS RENEWED RESTRAINT FOLLOWING BREZHNEV RETURN

Soviet reports on Poland in recent days have portrayed the situation as gradually returning to normal and the party's policies as enjoying widespread backing by the workers and the military. In glaring contrast to an 8 December TASS report, which described a state of near anarchy at a certain Polish plant and implied that such conditions were typical of the country as a whole, a dispatch carried by Moscow domestic radio on the 12th reported a "positive shift" in Poland's economy, in which "many enterprises are gradually beginning to function in their usual rhythm." PRAVDA the same day similarly reported on one Warsaw plant where work had never been interrupted and cited a worker as saying that "the absolute majority" of Poles are determined to preserve socialism. In similar vein, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article on the 16th portrayed the Polish army as being correctly indoctrinated and supporting the normalization efforts.

In some cases, PRAVDA seems to have gone out of its way to include favorable references to Poland. For instance, a 14 December PRAVDA account of an unusually hardline speech by SED Politburo member Guenter Mittag omitted his expressions of great concern about the Polish situation and attributed to him remarks, not carried in the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND version of his speech, expressing "confidence" in the Poles' ability to resolve their problems. And a 12 December PRAVDA report on a Polish article contained a rare favorable reference to the Solidarity trade union, citing it as one of the positive forces in Polish political life.

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Meanwhile, Soviet spokesmen have been busy discounting reports of Soviet aggressive intentions toward Poland. The most detailed disclaimer to this effect came in a 15 December DER SPIEGEL interview with Valentin Falin, first deputy chairman of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department. In the interview, Falin explicitly asserted that the socialist countries "do not intend to interfere in Poland's internal affairs" and provided other evidence suggesting that military intervention was unnecessary. He repeatedly refuted assertions by the interviewers to the effect that the Kania regime may be losing control and might require outside help and--as had been implied in the 12 December PRAVDA reference to Solidarity--expressed an unusually tolerant attitude toward the new trade unions. Falin's statements came on the heels of similar remarks by his counterpart in the Central Committee's International Department, Vadim Zagladin, in an interview reported by the Rome paper LA REPUBBLICA on 11 December. Zagladin also implied Moscow's readiness to give the Kania regime more time and to limit its help to "moral, political, and economic" aid.

EARLIER MIXED SIGNALS Moscow's strongly positive portrayal of the Polish situation since Brezhnev's return on the 11th contrasts with the mixed, sometimes contradictory, signals from Soviet media during his absence--a confusion which points to a possible lack of consensus and even conflict within the CPSU leadership over the handling of Poland. These signs seemed evident in the leadership's highly unusual treatment of the 5 December Warsaw Pact leaders' meeting, as well as in some other media anomalies.

Moscow's handling of the Warsaw Pact summit was highly unorthodox, suggesting possible resistance within the Politburo to giving an explicit endorsement to the meeting's stand on Poland. The official endorsement of the summit was limited to a one-sentence statement issued in the name of the Central Committee on 11 December. The issuance of the statement in the name of the Central Committee, and not of the Politburo, contrasts with standard Soviet practice as well as with the East European treatment of this meeting. The terseness of the declaration also contrasts with the lengthier and more substantive statements normally issued by Moscow on high-level meetings and with the lengthier endorsements of the Pact summit by the East Europeans. Also suggesting a reserved attitude toward the position on Poland, the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials on the summit, on 8 and 10 December respectively, did not even mention that Poland had been discussed--again in contrast to most of the East European reporting.

Moscow media's handling of a 10 December speech by Defense Minister Ustinov was unusual also, suggesting a switch in Soviet signals from a more hardline to a restrained stance following Brezhnev's

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return. The initial reports on the speech--carried by TASS on the 10th, PRAVDA on the 11th, and IZVESTIYA the following day--quoted Ustinov as having said that "the threat of war has increased," and that there is a need for "increased vigilance" with regard to imperialist threats to socialist countries, particularly to Poland. However, the Defense Ministry paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 11th, in a rare departure from normal practice, failed to carry a report of the Defense Minister's speech, promising instead that a "detailed report" of the speech would appear in the next edition. The report, when it appeared on the 12th, was much softer in tone than the PRAVDA version, omitting not only Ustinov's remarks on the threat of war and the need for vigilance, but also--paradoxically--the earlier version's fulsome praise of Brezhnev. Possibly the praise of Brezhnev had been included in the earlier version to lend it an appearance of authority and loyalty. The hard-to-soft shift on the speech was also followed by Moscow radio, which began to broadcast softer versions beginning late on the 11th.

Other media reports during Brezhnev's absence also lend themselves to the interpretation that they reflected hardline efforts to project an alarmist atmosphere concerning Poland. Some examples: The 8 December TASS report implying that Polish factories were bordering on anarchy, a 10 December LITERATURNAYA GAZETA article reporting for the first time alleged anti-Soviet demonstrations in Poland, and a favorable review of a Czechoslovak book in PRAVDA on the 11th stressing the continuing relevance of the 1968 events. Subsequently, there were a number of obvious efforts to contradict or play down these reports. For example, the TASS report did not appear in the Soviet press, was discounted by Falin in his DER SPIEGEL interview, and was implicitly contradicted by subsequent reports on the Polish situation following Brezhnev's return.* Falin also played down Soviet bloc press comparisons of Poland to Czechoslovakia in 1968 when he said that such reports were "just for information purposes." And the Brezhnev entourage in India seemed intent on counteracting the atmosphere of threat associated with these hardline reports. A TASS report on the 10th datelined New Delhi, citing a Soviet spokesman, issued a seemingly gratuitous denial that Soviet troops had crossed the Polish border.

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* Moscow's handling of the TASS report is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 December 1980, pages 1-2.

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WARSAW SHOWS MORE CONFIDENCE THAT INTERVENTION MAY BE AVERTED

Coinciding with Brezhnev's return to Moscow, the tension in Warsaw over possible intervention appeared to subside somewhat. Warsaw comment, citing the confidence of those meeting in Moscow that the Poles could work out their own problems, became bolder in openly dismissing the likelihood of an invasion. The harmonious observance in Gdansk of the potentially explosive 10th anniversary of the December 1970 uprising--an observance preceded by appeals for order from the regime, the church, and the Solidarity union itself--seems certain to help the Kania regime demonstrate its survivability to its bloc neighbors. At the same time, as a reminder that there is still muscle behind the regime's more relaxed stance, the Polish military press has maintained its visibility with articles calling for continued vigilance against the domestic antisocialist forces.

Polish statements have been notably less alarmist than they were during the first week in December, when they included desperate warnings by the party and army of impending danger. PZPR leader Kania, in his 13 December speech to the puppet United Peasant Party (ZSL), stressed his "conviction" that the country "will overcome the present difficulties" and that "no one is capable of pushing Poland from the socialist path of development," its alliance with the USSR, and its membership in the socialist community. Taking advantage of the more relaxed atmosphere, Warsaw has replayed recent expressions of confidence in Poland by its communist neighbors: Warsaw radio on the 12th quoted the GDR's Honecker--usually a hardline critic of the Polish developments--as predicting that the Polish party and people would be able to surmount the difficulties, and PAP the next day reported Hungary's Kadar as similarly stating that the Poles "have enough strength" to solve their problems.

A further indication of Warsaw's more confident mood had been its readiness to discuss the issue of intervention openly and in terms suggesting that such a course of action is unlikely. A Lulinski article in the 13-14 December TRYBUNA LUDU, for example, denounced "alarmist" bourgeois statements on this score and charged that "attributing allegedly 'interventionist' intentions to the USSR" is a hypocritical trick to divert attention from the West's current anti-Soviet campaign. Also, the trade union daily GLOS PRACY on the 11th dismissed Western media "speculations concerning the 'external danger' threatening Poland" by pointing out that the Polish de :gate at the current CSCE meeting in Madrid had spoken on behalf of the country's socialist allies in resubmitting Warsaw's proposal for a conference on military detente in Europe. And a Warsaw radio talk on the 15th, while not mentioning the intervention issue directly, ridiculed a U.S. magazine's portrayal of the Polish reforms as "a threat to Moscow," asserting derisively that "the renewal in Poland is no threat to Moscow, Ulaanbataar, Paris, or Brussels."

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GDANSK ANNIVERSARY OBSERVANCE The still threatening situation on Poland's borders and the unanimous public stance on the side of order by the regime, church, and Solidarity apparently had the effect of discouraging any disorders during the 16-17 December dedication in Gdansk and other coastal cities of monuments to those killed in the uprising 10 years ago. Solidarity leader Walesa in his speech at the Gdansk ceremonies coupled a demand that the regime never again resort to force, as it did in 1970, with repeated appeals for calm and order, including a citation of the Polish bishops' appeal on the 12th to avoid any "actions that could endanger our fatherland" and threaten its independence. Walesa called on the Poles to be "sensible and cautious" in everything connected with the country's well-being and to be "vigilant" in defending the country's security and sovereignty. Such appeals were echoed by the regime representative, PZPR Politburo candidate and Gdansk party leader Fiszbach, whose speech followed Walesa's. At the same time, while not mentioning the USSR directly, Fiszbach was more blunt than Walesa in calling attention to the external dangers, noting that Poland's "stabilization" was demanded by its "international position, linked by her alliances" to the outside world. Also, unlike Walesa, Fiszbach avoided ruling out the use of force in dealing with internal conflicts, demanding more generally that there be no repetition of "dramatic events which in the past have brought us so much pain and bitterness."

MILITARY PRESS WARNINGS Presumably to reinforce the regime's renewed appeals for discipline, a series of articles in the military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI have warned in effect that the antisocialists are still a real danger. An article in the issue of the 10th--replayed by Moscow and Prague--portrayed the "overwhelming majority" of Poles as saying yes to necessary reforms, including the Solidarity union, but no to political subversion, anarchy, and any attempt to push Poland off the socialist path. That article followed one the previous day warning Solidarity to refrain from any antistate activity. On the 11th, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI leveled a new attack on efforts to stir up popular emotions. And on the 15th, it denounced dissident leader Jacek Kuron's charge that the "despotic" system established in Poland under the pressure of Soviet tanks at the end of World War II had nothing in common with true socialism. Asserting that the presence of the Soviet Army had in fact been a deterrent to antisocialist forces, the paper stressed that the country's reform program can be implemented only under conditions of unflagging "ideological vigilance."

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U S S R - I N D I A - G U L F

BREZHNEV IN INDIA: PROPOSAL ON GULF, NO CHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN

Disagreement over Afghanistan clouded President Brezhnev's 8-11 December visit to India, but both sides were clearly intent on emphasizing their longstanding cooperation and friendship. Prime Minister Gandhi declared that India's agreements with the USSR outweighed any differences, but in a postsummit statement she questioned the Soviet stance on Afghanistan. And Delhi failed to endorse Brezhnev's "doctrine of peace and security" for the Persian Gulf, unveiled during the visit, just as it had shown reluctance in the past to subscribe to his formulations on Asian collective security.

Brezhnev's proposal capped a series of increasingly explicit and authoritative Soviet suggestions since early this year for negotiations on international security arrangements for the Gulf. Despite professed concern for the Gulf countries themselves, Moscow appears motivated primarily by a desire to gain recognition of its own interests in the region and to reduce Western influence and military presence there.

PERSIAN GULF Brezhnev's "peace and security" proposal, made in his 10 December address to the Indian parliament, is the culmination of a series of overtures in the past year for cooperation in assuring security of navigation in the Gulf. Moscow appears to be trying to contain Western influence in the region and to assert and legitimatize its own interests through some form of international talks. This effort represents a reversal of policy in past years, when Moscow disparaged any ideas for Gulf security systems as creatures of the United States or of conservative Arab regimes.* The shift to interest in some sort of security arrangement was clearly prompted by the growing instability in the region

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* In the early 1970's Moscow did raise Brezhnev's vague Asian collective security concept in connection with the Northern Tier states and the Gulf. See the TRENDS of 6 December 1972. Subsequent Soviet treatment of Gulf security ideas is reviewed in the TRENDS of 11 August 1976.

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and concern over the Western military buildup there. Brezhnev stressed that the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to what is taking place in the area, but he also declared, more emphatically than before, that the USSR "does not intend to encroach either on the Middle East oil or its supply route."

+ "Mutual Obligations." Brezhnev called on interested countries to agree to the following mutual obligations: not to establish foreign military bases in the area or to deploy nuclear weapons in the region; not to use or threaten to use force against countries of the region or to interfere in their internal affairs; to respect these states' nonaligned status; to recognize their sovereign right to control their own natural resources; and not to interfere with trade or use of sea lanes.

The five "obligations" incorporate standard themes of Soviet commentary for years. For instance, at a dinner for his visiting Kuwaiti counterpart in December 1975, Foreign Minister Gromyko called for liquidation of foreign bases in the Gulf, guarantees of freedom of shipping, and respect for the sovereign right of the peoples of the area to control their natural resources. The calls for renunciation of use of force and for noninterference in others' affairs were included in the Asian "collective security" principles advanced by Moscow in the early 1970's.

+ Big Power Versus Regional Concerns. Brezhnev's initiative seemed directed toward the major oil-consuming states and in effect relegated the regional countries to second-class status--despite his assertion only two months before that no one had the right to "appear in the role of guardian" of the Gulf states. After calling on the United States, other Western powers, China, Japan, and other interested states to agree on the mutual obligations, he tacked on a belated acknowledgment that "naturally" the states of the region would be parties to any accord.* Moscow may have had some second thoughts about how this approach would be received by the Gulf states and other nonaligned countries. A Soviet party-government statement on 12 December approving the results of Brezhnev's trip reversed the order and specifically inserted the Soviet Union as a party to the suggested accord. It referred to agreement "between the countries of that region, the Soviet Union, the United States," and so forth.

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* An earlier suggestion by Nikolay Portugalov, in a TASS commentary last February, had also downgraded the Gulf states by calling for an "all-European" conference that would submit agreed stands on security of shipping routes and commercial access to Gulf oil to the United Nations. Only then would the concurrence of the regional states be sought, according to his scenario. See the TRENDS of 8 March 1980, pages 1-4.

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Followup comment on the initiative has used Brezhnev's formulation but has pointed out, as PRAVDA's Korionov did on the 17th, that the "constructive program" is dictated by a "sincere concern" for the interests of the Gulf countries.

+ Forum for Discussion. The proposal did not go into the mechanics of the negotiations. Two possibilities had been broached previously--Portugalov's suggestion in February of an all-European conference of Helsinki signatories and the Warsaw Pact's more nebulous idea last May of addressing questions of freedom of navigation and lessened military presence in the world's oceans "within the UN framework." The Portugalov idea received virtually no backing from Soviet commentators. A more likely approach might be introduction of Gulf questions in UN discussions on the Indian Ocean. Brezhnev did not directly link his Gulf proposal and his endorsement of an Indian Ocean peace zone, but a TRUD article, reported by TASS on the 16th, lumped the two together and observed that the new Soviet initiative was "highly topical" since the UN General Assembly had just called for preparations for a conference on the Indian Ocean. A SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (SOVIET RUSSIA) article on the 11th sweepingly characterized the Brezhnev plan as a program for dealing with the "explosive situation in the Near East, South Asia, and Indian Ocean."

AFGHANISTAN Unbending on the Afghan situation, Brezhnev told the Indian parliament that only when Afghanistan's "southern neighbors" concluded a "goodneighborly accord" with the Afghan Government would conditions emerge for "complete political normalization" of the situation, "including" the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He cautiously maintained, much as he had done in June, that life in that country "is gradually becoming and will continue to become increasingly more normal and peaceful," and he reiterated Soviet support for the Afghan Government's proposal of last May for talks with its neighbors.

Moscow has defensively brushed aside any notion of Soviet-Indian differences over Afghanistan; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 11th dismissed alleged Western efforts to make the Afghan problem the "touchstone" of Soviet-Indian relations. But Soviet reporting has obscured India's position. Gandhi, in a statement to parliament on the visit, reported by Delhi radio on the 15th, said: "We expressed our opposition to all forms of outside interference in the internal affairs of other countries, either through the induction of regular troops or through infiltration." The TASS account of the speech merely noted that Gandhi had presented her government's views on the Afghan situation and had "declared for a political settlement" of the issue. The only relevant paragraph in the joint declaration on the visit was sufficiently vague to be applicable to both the Iranian-Iraqi conflict and Afghanistan.

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BILATERAL RELATIONS The atmospherics of the visit indicated both sides' interest in ensuring that their differences--and the restriction or cancellation of Brezhnev's public appearances because of security concerns--did not mar the image of firm Soviet-Indian relations. Brezhnev in effect welcomed Gandhi's return to power. Speaking at President Reddy's welcoming banquet on the 8th, he made a point of noting that "we have always had a particular liking" for her. For her part, Gandhi, at a "friendship" meeting at Vigyan Bhavan the next day, said that the talks had been marked by "candidness, warmth, and good will" and that the visit had demonstrated the "vitality" of the two countries' friendship.

The joint declaration listed agreements signed on economic, cultural, and other matters, but Moscow has been noticeably silent on the subject of increased oil deliveries. TASS, in reporting Gandhi's statement to parliament on the 15th, made no mention of her announcement that the Soviet Union had agreed to increase its supplies of crude oil from the current level of 1.5 million to 2.5 million tons annually. Nor is Moscow known to have reported Delhi's earlier announcement, at the time of Indian President Reddy's visit to Moscow at the beginning of October, that the USSR had agreed to make up oil deliveries disrupted by the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, honor its current export commitment, and "consider sympathetically" a request for additional supplies.

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NORTH KOREA

KIM CHONG-IL LAUDED SINCE RECEIVING HIGH POSTS AT CONGRESS

Kim Il-sung's son, Kim Chong-il, has been the focus of increased publicity in recent weeks as Pyongyang has stepped up its campaign to promote him as heir apparent to lead North Korea. Since the October Korean Workers Party (KWP) congress named Kim Chong-il to several high party positions, DPRK media have been portraying him as an outstanding leader, second only to his father. At the same time, he remains behind the veil of mystery that has always obscured his role: None of his activities have been reported, and original DPRK comment alludes to him only as the "party center," rather than by name.

Moscow has acknowledged Kim Chong-il's enhanced status and treated him favorably by linking him with the principle of improving Soviet-DPRK relations. Beijing media are not known to have mentioned him since reporting the new KWP appointments in October, but a Hong Kong journal that often takes positions associated with PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping has ridiculed the father-son succession idea.

Central DPRK media acknowledged Kim Chong-il's new status last month by citing foreign praise of him by name--treatment previously reserved only for Kim Il-song. While such reports have appeared only sporadically in the central media, numerous examples of foreign adulation for Kim Chong-il are being publicized regularly by the clandestine radio Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification (VRPR), which for years has been more open than the central media in dealing with the succession issue.

Since mid-November, VRPR has carried foreign congratulations to Kim Chong-il and foreign comment on him on almost a daily basis. The reports have baldly referred to Kim Chong-il as the "only successor," noted the father-son relationship, and, in terms reminiscent of those used to describe Kim Il-song, referred to Kim Chong-il as a "fatherly figure." In original comment, however, both DPRK central media and VRPR continue to praise Kim Chong-il only indirectly, through their use of the term "party center."

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The publicity for reports of foreign praise of Kim Chong-il has allowed Pyongyang to move his name into the public domain while maintaining its reserve on the succession question. At the same time, Pyongyang may be attempting to build an image of foreign respect for Kim Chong-il and, by extension, foreign approval of the succession plans. Evidence of such an effort on the North's part initially surfaced in October, during the congress, when Pyongyang for the first time began to cite foreign references to the "party center."

Publicly, Pyongyang continues to deal with the succession issue only indirectly, although even these oblique references to the question increasingly suggest that the issue has been settled. At the party congress the issue was addressed most directly in a 12 October speech by Hwang Chang-yop, who declared that Kim Il-song had "guaranteed" a unique method to ensure wise leadership "from generation to generation." Similarly, a 1 December NODONG SINMUN editorial, which emphasized the leading role of the "party center," asserted that the "basic question" of the future of the party and revolution had been "brilliantly solved." A 28 November NODONG SINMUN editorial article marking Engel's birthday pointedly focused on Engel's role as a successor to Marx. Echoing comment by VRPR earlier this year, the article asserted that the advancement of the revolutionary cause "can be realized only by a true successor faithful to the leader and his cause." DPRK comment on Engel's birthday anniversary in previous years did not raise the succession issue.

MOSCOW A Soviet reference to Kim Chong-il in the context of a discussion of Korean-Soviet relations, suggests that Moscow might view his succession as a plus for Soviet interests on the peninsula. Reporting on a USSR delegation's visit to North Korea in October, the weekly ZA RUBEZHOM (ABROAD) quoted the chairman of the North Korean trade union federation as telling his Russian visitors that Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il "constantly tell us that friendship with the Soviet Union and the Soviet people must be treasured."

BEIJING PRC media have not referred to Kim Chong-il since the Korean party congress; but the Hong Kong journal ZHENG MING, which frequently appears to reflect Deng Xiaoping's positions, carried an article last month which stated that "it is a foregone conclusion that Kim Chong-il is now the legal and undisputed successor to his father Kim Il-song." The article objected to the succession in principle, as a throwback to a feudal system that had proved unworkable and had been rejected by history.

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Comparing the father-son succession to Mao's efforts to practice a "feudalist patriarchal ruling system," the article said Kim Il-song was following the "feudalist monarchal system" and suggested that Korea was going to be stuck in a stage of "feudal socialism."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 8-14 DECEMBER 1980

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Soyuz T-3 Space Mission	4%	(--)	Trial of Gang of Four	4%	(4%)
Polish Situation	8%	(8%)	Brezhnev in India	3%	(--)
Warsaw Pact Meeting, Moscow	5%	(4%)	UNGA 20th Anniversary Granting Independence to Colonial Countries	3%	(--)
Brezhnev Greetings to Participants at UNGA 35th Anniversary Session	4%	(--)	Sino-Vietnamese Dispute	3%	(--)

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow, Warsaw restraint on Polish crisis
- High-level party meetings in Beijing

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24 DECEMBER 1980
FB TM 80-052

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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USSR-POLAND

MOSCOW, WARSAW MAINTAIN RESTRAINED PUBLIC ATTITUDE ON CRISIS

The Soviet Union and Poland continue to project restraint in their public attitudes on the Polish crisis, suggesting that neither anticipates any change in the status quo warranting the prior preparation of public opinion. Soviet reports on internal developments in Poland suggest that the Kania regime continues to enjoy a period of grace. The Soviet Union issued a sharp riposte--in the form of an authoritative Petrov article in PRAVDA--to the recent NATO warning against Soviet intervention in Poland, saying in effect that it was the West, not the Soviet Union, that needed to be warned against interference.

MOSCOW The Soviet Union has reported internal developments in Poland over the past week in largely positive terms, suggesting that the Kania regime continues to enjoy Soviet support in its efforts to cope with the crisis. For example, a 23 December PRAVDA report on a Kania speech to a party commission cited remarks by the Polish leader to the effect that the situation in Poland was "improving," that there had been "no strikes for a long time," that the 1970 Gdansk events had been marked in a "calm" atmosphere, and that Poland enjoyed the "confidence" of the other socialist countries. Similarly, a 19 December Moscow radio report on a speech by a Polish planning official cited his expression of "confidence" in the Polish miners' readiness to work and suggested the new economic targets reflected the regime's efforts to "overcome the difficulties." Such favorably slanted reports contrast with some earlier Soviet reportage, in particular the unusual TASS report on 8 December, during Brezhnev's absence in India, depicting a situation of growing anarchy.

The 18 December Petrov PRAVDA article, like other Soviet comment on the recent NATO session, seemed aimed at countering the Western effort to make the Polish crisis a subject of international concern. The article charged that certain leading NATO members were ready to "overstep the universally accepted norms of international relations" by shifting from ideological intervention in Poland to "intervention of another kind." And it cast aspersions on NATO's motives when it said that NATO members hoped the Polish situation would pass "out of the control of the government and the PZPR" and into "chaos and anarchy."

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While the Petrov article was sharply critical of the West, it was less threatening and ominous than some earlier Petrov articles on the Polish crisis. For example, its implicit claim that the Polish regime had the right to invite help from its Warsaw Pact allies was less blunt than the boast of a 27 September Petrov article that Poland's borders were "guarded by the united might of the Warsaw Pact." Likewise, its brief references to dissident elements in Poland were much less ominous than the claim of a 1 September Petrov article that "antisocialist forces" had successfully penetrated Polish plants, or the declaration of the article on the 27th that Poland had reached a "watershed" in the struggle between patriotic and other forces.

WARSAW The Poles have publicly aligned themselves with the theme of the Petrov article, displaying none of the hesitation apparent in their treatment of the September articles. While Warsaw did not mention any of the four Petrov articles in September, Polish media have publicized the most recent article. Moreover, Polish commentary, including speeches by Kania, has strongly echoed the anti-Western view of the Petrov article and has continued to manifest confidence that Soviet intervention is unlikely. In a speech at a Plock refinery on the 18th Kania enjoined Western nations: "Above all, do not do us harm." He continued his attack on the NATO session in his speech at PZPR headquarters in Warsaw on the 20th, citing it as a prime example of the West's "alarmist campaign of absurd insinuations about threats to Poland from our allies." The latter speech included a notably optimistic portrayal of an improving Polish domestic situation, an aspect which was publicized in Moscow's reportage of the speech.

Warsaw's currently more confident view of its security position was further exemplified in articles in TRYBUNA LUDU and ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on the 22d, both of which explicitly debunked the possibility of Soviet intervention. Polish-Soviet accord on this issue was displayed also in Warsaw radio's report on the 22d of invective by USSR Ambassador Aristov at a bilateral friendship meeting in the Polish capital. The ambassador charged that "the enemies of socialism are trying to drown in a murky wave of falsehood and insinuations" the truth about the two countries' relations "under the pretext of an alleged Soviet threat."

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EUROPEAN COMMUNISM

ITALIAN, FRENCH CP'S SPLIT OVER SOVIET POLICY IN POLAND

The contrasting foreign policy orientation of West Europe's two largest communist parties has again been highlighted by their sharply differing reactions to Western speculation about Warsaw Pact intentions in Poland. Since early December the Italian party (PCI) has embarked on a highly visible campaign of official statements and interparty contacts aimed at warning Moscow of the negative consequences intervention by the East would have on East-West relations and party-to-party ties. The French communists (PCF), on the other hand, have adopted a lower profile, showing greater circumspection regarding Soviet intentions and criticizing their Italian comrades for giving aid and comfort to anti-Soviet forces in the West. Differences between the two parties over Poland--evident since the beginning of the crisis last August--parallel the sharp divisions that emerged following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a year ago.

PCI CAMPAIGN The Italian communists have used private contacts with the East and public expressions of concern in their effort to counsel Moscow against any forcible intervention in Poland's internal crisis. In a two-week burst of activity reminiscent of their energetic upport for the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Italian communists hosted two delegations from the CPSU Central Committee International Department, dispatched a foreign affairs official to Warsaw for two days of talks with Polish authorities, and publicly revealed that an "official demarche" had been sent to Moscow and its Warsaw Pact partners arguing against any external interference in the reform process under way in Poland.

Reinforcing the private exchanges, Italian party leaders have publicly invoked the memory of 1968 in airing their apprehensions over the trend of Polish events. PCI Directorate members Napolitano and Bufalini addressed the prospect of intervention head on. "Nothing could be worse," Napolitano said in a Rome speech on the 2d, than the "growing trend among the Warsaw Pact nations toward military intervention in Poland," a development

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he said would have "irreparable consequences" for the PCI's relations with the Eastern parties. Bufalini seconded these sentiments in a 6 December statement to the party daily L'UNITA. We publicly confirm once again, he said, that military intervention is "entirely unacceptable" and that the Polish crisis must be resolved by the Polish people and party, "independently of any pressure or interference, even from other communist parties or socialist countries." We have expressed these stances publicly, Bufalini noted, and also "in the clearest and most specific way to the communist parties of the socialist countries concerned." Reporting the PCI's demarche on the 10th, L'UNITA asserted that Bufalini's remarks represented their "substance."

ZAGLADIN VISIT The PCI's efforts on the Polish issue reached a peak with the 9-10 December meeting in Rome between PCI leaders and Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department and a leading Soviet expert on Europe. Judging from the communique carried by L'UNITA on the 11th, the Italian and Soviet delegations had a "long and frank"--meaning acrimonious--exchange on Poland and failed to narrow the gap between their "respective positions." Soviet press and radio accounts of the meeting--and Zagladin himself in an interview given to Rome's LA REPUBBLICA during a break in the talks--attempted to gloss over the continuing disagreement between the two parties, but PCI International Department head Pajetta confirmed in the 11 December LA STAMPA that "each side refused to budge" during the talks. Pajetta, who had held talks with Zagladin's assistant Chernyayev on 29 November, participated in the discussions along with party Secretary General Berlinguer, Bufalini, and Foreign Section chief Rubbi, who had spent 4-5 December in Warsaw conferring with Polish party leaders. When pressed as to the likelihood of a break in the PCI's relations with Moscow over Poland, Pajetta suggested that Moscow was anxious to prevent any split. As for the PCI, he added, the question of a split depends on the question of intervention, and "our concern is to prevent one."

PCF STANCE In contrast to the PCI, the French communists have shown a marked reluctance to address the Polish issue directly. Party chief Marchais has said little in recent weeks to expand on the PCI's official position as outlined last summer. At that time Marchais expressed confidence that the Poles and the Polish party, "and they alone," could correct the "problems" that had arisen but did not counsel Moscow publicly on the crisis.

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Since early December, the French party's distance from its Italian counterpart has been further underscored by the PCF's rush to Moscow's defense. A 4 December L'HUMANITE editorial blamed the United States for spreading "distortions" of Soviet policy and asserted that "no measure . . . and no statement" by any Soviet leader suggested Moscow was contemplating military intervention. Marchais was characteristically blunt in acknowledging his displeasure with the PCI's approach. The 15 December L'HUMANITE cited Marchais on the 13th as saying the Italian party was "not taking Poland's real interests into account." By helping people to believe there is indeed an outside threat to Poland, he charged, the PCI is complicating the Polish party's task of implementing reforms by "encouraging those who do not want socialism to be strengthened in Poland." In a jibe at the PCI for its bilateral consultations with the CPSU, Marchais said that it was "out of the question" for the PCF to "discuss or publish communiques with any party" on the events in Poland. Marchais' criticism drew a prompt retort from L'UNITA on the 14th.

OTHER CP'S West Europe's other communist parties have maintained a low profile on the prospect of Soviet intervention. Public comment from the Spanish party--like the PCI an enthusiastic supporter of the Polish workers--has been sparse owing to the continued shutdown of their daily organ; but party theoretician Azcarate declared unambiguously in the 12 December Madrid EL PAIS that the PCE would "sever" relations with Moscow if it were to intervene. Azcarate said that armed Soviet intervention would be "crazy in terms of peace, European security, and the development of socialism itself." The British Communist Party daily MORNING STAR on the 16th wrote rather cautiously that "outside intervention" could "never solve problems arising within a society." In remarks to the Austrian Communist Party's 24th Congress on 6 December, party leader Muhri, a staunch Soviet ally, voiced concern about counterrevolution as well as support for the efforts of the Polish communists to "resolve their difficulties and problems themselves."

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USSR-CUBA-EL SALVADOR

In a commentary deploring the escalation of anti-leftist violence in El Salvador, Moscow for the first time has suggested that armed struggle may be the only course open to the left. The new evaluation of the situation, offered in a low-level broadcast, moves Moscow closer to Cuban prescriptions for change in Central America. In recent months, Havana has resumed trumpeting the use of armed struggle as the only viable path to regional revolutionary transformation. Both Moscow and Havana have expressed concern about the perceived Latin American policies of the incoming Reagan Administration, warning that Latin American countries would rebuff any U.S. attempt to negate revolutionary gains in the region.

MOSCOW SEES ARMED STRUGGLE AS ANSWER FOR EL SALVADOR

The view that armed struggle is the only option open to Salvadoran leftists, voiced in a Spanish-language broadcast on Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on 9 December, was linked to what the radio portrayed as a "U.S.-inspired campaign of genocide" directed against leftist militants belonging to the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR)--a grouping that includes the Communist Party of El Salvador. Recalling the 27 November assassination of six FDR leaders, the commentary stated that the "crimes" committed by the junta and rightist extremists "leave the people no other course of action than armed struggle." In the past Moscow has implicitly endorsed the use of armed struggle as an appropriate means for achieving power in Central America in pointing to the Sandinist victory in Nicaragua as a "correct" revolutionary model for other countries in the region. However, Soviet theoreticians continued to stress the long-held Soviet contention that armed struggle is only one method of struggle and that the best guarantee of a successful revolution in Latin America is to employ a combination of various methods of struggle, including political dialogue and economic demands.*

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* Soviet treatment of the Sandinist victory in Nicaragua as a revolutionary model is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 July 1980, pages 10-14.

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Moscow thus far has offered no comment on the restructuring of the Salvadoran military-civilian coalition government, announced on 13 December, which resulted in the naming of Christian Democratic leader Jose Napoleon Duarte as civilian president and the country's top military figure as vice president. However, a panelist on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program on the 14th viewed liberal-leaning Colonel Majano's removal from the government on 7 December as further evidence of the junta's "continuing drift to the right" and of a "widening split" within the Salvadoran armed forces.

Criticizing the U.S. role in El Salvador, the roundtable panelist scoffed at the suspension of U.S. military and economic aid to San Salvador following the killing, allegedly by Salvadoran security forces, of four American religious workers earlier this month, saying Washington had taken this action "merely to observe the rules of decency." Noting that the U.S. special mission investigating the murders had found no evidence to link them to the Salvadoran army, the panelist characterized the inquiry as a sham and asserted that the United States could be expected to resume aid to the junta "at any moment."

COMMENT ON REAGAN In its first public comment on Washington's Latin American policy under the incoming Republican Administration, Moscow has professed to see a link between the spiraling violence in El Salvador and the election of Governor Reagan. The paper LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, according to TASS on 17 December, warned that "if it is true" that the Reagan Administration intends to assign priority status to Latin America in its foreign policy, it would be "expedient" to heed criticism of U.S. actions there. The paper said it would be "regrettable" if this priority is "boiled down to a more open attempt to halt the pressing changes there" through military force. Such a priority, the paper concluded, "might lead the United States to creating by its side a situation more tragic than that of Iran."

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CASTRO HITS PRESIDENT-ELECT REAGAN ON LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES

President Fidel Castro used the occasion of his opening address to the recent congress of the Cuban Communist Party to paint a bleak picture of U.S.-Cuban relations under the incoming Reagan Administration. Castro, in his first public comment on the U.S. election results, predicted in his 17 December speech that President-elect Reagan will introduce an element of "uncertainty and danger" into U.S.-Cuban relations, and he vowed to respond "forcefully" to any U.S. military attack. Although Castro tempered his harsh criticism of the President-elect with the offer that Havana "would not reject an olive branch if extended," he went on to indicate that Cuba does not plan to deviate from its established foreign policy lines and that it would not initiate any concessions to further U.S.-Cuban relations.

CRITICISM OF REAGAN Castro's remarks contrast with the more restrained approach Havana adopted toward the President-elect in the first days after the election. At that time, Havana distinguished between what a U.S. presidential candidate says during the campaign and what he does when he takes office, ascribing the "dangerous and reactionary" image of President-elect Reagan to campaign rhetoric. While Castro conceded that it might have been "preferable" to withhold judgment on the new administration until it took office, he nevertheless termed it "our sacred duty" to be "realistic" and to prepare the Cuban people for "the struggle that may be coming."

Castro's comments brought into sharp focus his preoccupation with the possibility of U.S. military action against Cuba and intervention in Central America. Thus, the Cuban leader denounced as "disgusting and cynical" the suggestion--which he attributed to President-elect Reagan and his advisers--that the United States would set up a military blockade around Cuba "if the Soviet Union carried out an action in any other part of the world." He vowed that Cubans would fight against such an action "until the last drop of their blood is shed." Turning to Central America, Castro asserted that there had "even been talk of probable intervention" by the United States. With an apparent eye to Nicaragua, he maintained that any attempt to turn back the "irreversible" changes there would be met with "resolute struggle." Not only do the people of Latin America reject the "big stick," they also scorn the imperialist carrot," he added.

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ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-CUBAN TIES

Reviewing the present state of U.S.-Cuban relations, Castro acknowledged that the Carter Administration had made some positive gestures toward Cuba, citing the temporary suspension of aerial reconnaissance of Cuban territory, the authorization of visits by Cuban-Americans to Cuba, and the establishment of interest offices in Washington and Havana. Typically, however, he blamed the United States for "pending problems" in U.S.-Cuban relations, such as air hijackings and U.S. "encouragement" of illegal departures from Cuba. Castro raised the specter of future emigration of Cubans to the United States if these problems are not resolved. In a thinly veiled reference to Cuba's unilateral decision last May to allow some 120,000 Cuban refugees to depart from the post of Mariel for the United States, Castro cautioned that "the Mariel situation is not resolved; it is simply suspended."

Castro appeared to hold out little prospect for the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations under the Reagan Administration and reitereated that Cuba would not take "official steps" toward that goal unless the United States was prepared to eliminate the "blockade"--a reference to the U.S. trade embargo--discuss the "problem" of Guantanamo, and suspend its reconnaissance flights over Cuban territory. Pointing to what he termed "insurmountable and permanent" differences between the U.S. and Cuban political systems, Castro stressed that no one should expect Cuba to change its position, renounce its socialist principles, or relinquish its ties to the Soviet Union. And in an apparent allusion to Cuba's military presence in Ethiopia and Angola, as well as to its support for national liberation movements in the hemisphere, Castro stressed that Cuba's "internationalist principles are not negotiable."

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CHINA

EXTENDED LEADERSHIP MEETINGS DEBATE HUA'S FATE, PARTY REFORM

The Chinese leadership is apparently gathered in Beijing attempting to resolve controversial issues, fundamental to party reform, in preparation for the party congress early next year. The sensitive issues under discussion probably include a final reassessment of the party's history since 1949 and the political fate of party Chairman Hua Guofeng. Party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping will score a major victory if these questions are finally settled, but there is still evidence of active opposition to Deng and his policies.

As key Chinese provincial leaders dropped from public view in mid-December, it became evident that an extended central work conference or party plenum was under way in Beijing. The meeting was probably convened shortly after 13 December, the date of the last appearance of a provincial leader who is also a CCP Central Committee member--Tianjin CCP First Secretary Chen Weida's meeting with a foreign delegation. Central work conferences since the early 1960's have been forums for consolidating a broad leadership consensus on major issues. They often last for weeks and being Central Committee members together with representatives from departments and organizations involved with the problems under discussion. Beijing has normally not publicized the convocation of work conferences, but on occasion it has acknowledged them after the event.* The current meeting was apparently preceded by a smaller one discussing party reform and other key concerns.

HUA GUOFENG — Western news reports that ongoing leadership meetings in Beijing have been deliberating the eventual removal of Hua Guofeng as party chairman were implicitly confirmed in an 11 December commentary in the army paper JIEFANGJUN BAO. Belatedly broadcast by Beijing radio on the 19th, presumably

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* Since Mao's death, Beijing has acknowledged a central work conference in March 1977, which prepared the way for Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation at the 10th CCP Congress Third Plenum shortly thereafter; a conference in November-December 1978 preceding the 11th CCP Congress Third Plenum, a major turning point in China's recent political history, and a meeting in April 1979, preceding the inauguration of Beijing's economic readjustment program.

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as the central meetings were under way, the commentary recalled how Marx had declined the position as chairman of the First Internationale in 1864. With clear implications for Hua, the commentary observed that Marx had urged that the post be abolished and that the movement's work be supervised by its general secretary alone--a position in the CCP now held by Deng's associate Hu Yaobang.

Hua has not appeared in public since late November. It was apparent in early December that something was amiss when he failed to meet with a delegation of the Greek Communist Party (KKE/Interior), a courtesy Hua has extended to similar delegations in the past, and with a Japanese delegation in Beijing for inaugural ministerial-level consultations, an omission notable since Hua helped arrange the talks during his Tokyo visit last spring.

While Hua may yield the party chairmanship in a show of orderly party reform, there is evidence that the move has required application of severe political pressure. Oblique attacks on the legitimacy of Hua's succession to Mao have appeared in the Chinese press since last summer. The formal indictment of the Cultural Revolution radicals now on trial, released by XINHUA on 20 November, mentioned Hua only tangentially, while it prominently cited most other current leaders as Cultural Revolution victims, thus leaving open questions about Hua's politically ambiguous past. A long Contributing Commentator article in a December issue of the party theoretical journal HONGQI (RED FLAG) pressed an apparent case against Hua and may have served as the keynote for the central party meeting. The article, which was given unusually heavy publicity, asserted that the party continued to suffer from the "cult of personality" after Mao's death--an accusation that could apply either to attempts to build a cult around Hua or to efforts by Hua and others to maintain Mao's image after his death.

Hua has consistently been in the forefront of party leaders resisting efforts by Deng Xiaoping to promote reassessment of the party's past, to press party organizational reform, and to expand the purge of the party's ranks against cadres still committed to the Maoist policies of the Cultural Revolution years. If Hua's removal is presented as part of an orderly process of party reform, other leaders associated with Hua--such as Vice Chairman Ye Jianying--may be eased out in similar fashion. Beijing radio on 17 December carried a report that the Central Committee and State Council had "recently" decided that all levels of the party and state apparatus establish "advisory" positions from which veteran leaders could continue to contribute to party decisions without the burdens of active leadership--a post which might effectively curtail the immediate influence of a veteran leader like Ye without damaging his prestige.

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PARTY HISTORY RESOLUTION

Another related major topic on the current meeting's agenda is probably discussion of a draft resolution on Mao Zedong's leadership of the party since 1949. The approval of such a resolution at the 12th party congress next year would parallel the adoption of a resolution assessing Mao's struggles with Wang Ming--his archrival for leadership of the Chinese communist movement up to the Yanan period--at the party's seventh congress in 1945. Party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and other leaders associated with him have consistently attached great importance to such a historical reassessment as the ideological foundation of party reforms they have promoted, and press commentary associated with Deng has explicitly called for such a resolution since shortly after the Third Plenum in December 1978. The party's Fifth Plenum, in February 1980, had called for the opening of the 12th congress ahead of schedule to resolve "a number of important issues" and "important ideological and theoretical problems" crucial to the "stability and unity" of the party. Subsequently, Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, stated in interviews publicized by Beijing that the upcoming party congress would provide authoritative final judgment on sensitive historical issues.

Despite the success Deng has had in the past three years in pressing for a more critical evaluation of Mao and his leadership of the party after 1949, resistance to such a reassessment--particularly of the Cultural Revolution years--remains strong. The strength of this conservative opposition in the context of the ongoing central meeting in Beijing was apparent in the remarkable defensiveness of a major commentary in the party paper regarding the necessity of the ongoing criminal trials of Cultural Revolution leftists. An article in the 22 December RENMIN RIBAO by a Contributing Commentator--a press vehicle usually conveying a position which does not yet enjoy full leadership consensus--sounded strongly Dengist themes in stressing the need for the trials as a demonstration of the permanence of the regime's commitment to democratic and legal reform. The article implied that some significant portion of the party's leadership believes that some of the charges against the "gang of four" and surviving allies of Lin Biao are not crimes but "political errors." It acknowledged that differentiation of political "mistakes" from crimes in the context of the Cultural Revolution "has become a very important, outstanding question," and it labored at length to demonstrate the criminality of the radicals' behavior.

That doubts on this score existed within the party was apparent early in the trials. A XINHUA reporter's commentary on 4 December, for example, sharply rebutted views by "some people" who believe that the gang of four's efforts to discredit Zhou Enlai in Mao's

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eyes on the eve of the 1975 Fourth National People's Congress were something less than the criminal "frameup" and "conspiracy" portrayed in the trials. The authority of the 22 December Contributing Commentator article, the prominence given it on the party paper's front page, and its timing in the midst of an ongoing leadership meeting all suggest that controversy over the trials, as well as the historical questions associated with it, exists at the highest levels of the party leadership.

EARLIER MEETING The pattern of public appearances by central party leaders and of authoritative press commentary in late November and early December suggests that the current Central Committee-level meeting was preceded by an extended higher level meeting--possibly by an expanded Politburo conference. Reported public appearances by members of the Politburo Standing Committee have been unusually sparse since late November. Hua Guofeng has not appeared at all since 27 November, and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping has appeared only once over the same period.

While the earlier meeting undoubtedly debated the political issues on the agenda for the larger party meeting, it may also have discussed other important questions. RENMIN RIBAO editorials on the economy on 2 December and on party propaganda and rectification on 5 and 11 December may suggest the direction of leadership decisions made at the smaller, earlier conference.

The positions taken in the three RENMIN RIBAO editorials in early December do not completely coincide with the viewpoint of any single segment of the party leadership, and taken together, they suggest that while Deng Xiaoping may hold the initiative on several party issues, he does not have things going completely his way. The 2 December editorial on the economy, for example, contained a more pessimistic appraisal of the economy than that which emerged from the National People's Congress session last September, when Deng and others were pressing for fundamental economic reform. The call for economic retrenchment contained in the 2 December editorial's prescription for decelerated economic reform and its reassertion of centralized controls over local economic activity must therefore be seen as a serious setback, if not a political defeat, for rapid fundamental economic reform promoted by Premier Zhao Ziyang and backed by Deng:

+ Citing "unexpected new problems" in the economy--including a "serious and disastrous" harvest failure, severe energy shortages, and "continuing large deficits" in state revenue--the 2 December editorial announced that the effort to readjust imbalances in the economy will take longer than the three years originally projected.

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+ The editorial insisted that efforts to reform China's economic structure must be subordinated to efforts to readjust imbalances in the economy overall. While acknowledging the long-term validity of the reform measures, it stated that "readjustment is our cardinal task" and that "we should slow down or suspend those restructuring measures that are in conflict with the readjustment task, even if they are appropriate in the long run."

+ While the editorial renewed strong injunctions against "comrades" who continue to expand state investment in new construction from a "leftist deviationist trend" of economic thought, it also noted that one of the causes of the expansion of capital construction is the very success of the reform measures themselves and reasserted the need for centralized control over economic activity liberalized under the reform programs to stop it. "It is completely wrong to think that once enterprises have decisionmaking powers, there will be no need for planning guidance, that administrative interventions will be unacceptable, and that the reactivated economy will again become stagnant if such planning guidance and administrative interventions are imposed on it," the editorial stated.

The "unexpected" problems mentioned in the 2 December editorial, in fact, have been discussed in the Beijing press previously this year, and the editorial's statements on them fly in the face of more optimistic positions taken on these problems by the leadership's most ardent advocates of economic reform, including Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping. The problems with unconstrained capital investment by enterprises granted new decisionmaking powers under the economic reform policies were acknowledged by Zhao--then party chief in Sichuan Province--in a major, highly publicized speech last April, but Zhao then seemed optimistic that the problem would not hinder the continuation of the reform program. While declaring that the scope of reforms should remain limited during the readjustment period, for example, Zhao had nevertheless declared that "as far as reform is concerned, you are moving backward if you do not make progress."

Displacing Hua Guofeng as premier at the September National People's Congress session, Zhao was a symbol of enthusiastic commitment to a rapid fundamental restructuring of China's economy of the type Zhao had apparently implemented successfully in Sichuan. The session itself heard sanguine economic assessments by Zhao's associates and backers. State Planning Commission Chairman Yao Yilin, both in his economic report to the session and in other comments reported by XINHUA during the session, acknowledged the agricultural and deficit problems cited by the 2 December editorial but conveyed no pessimistic concern about them and instead called for efforts to "speed

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up" economic reform. According to a 5 September XINHUA report, Yao told a Japanese visitor during the session that Beijing "does not plan to extend the period for readjusting her national economy." Shortly after the National People's Congress session, according to XINHUA on 14 September, Deng Xiaoping told another Japanese guest that the results of China's readjustment efforts had been "better than expected" and that reform efforts would continue.

In the context of the more pessimistic appraisal of China's economic situation conveyed in the 2 December RENMIN RIBAO editorial, the subsequent editorials on party work contained politically mixed signals. Keyed to a recent CCP Propaganda Department meeting, the 5 December editorial, for example, observed that the party's efforts in "political and ideological" work had not kept pace with the rate of economic and political reform. In some areas where this failure has been serious, it noted, "the snowballing of some lingering problems has given rise to antagonistic contradictions" which have "adversely affected stability and unity"--an acknowledgment that efforts at political and economic reform have exacerbated existing political and social problems to the point of serious conflict and disorder. While sounding a solidly Dengist theme in calling for renewed efforts to indoctrinate the party rank and file in the "Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life" and to rectify party workstyle, the editorial at the same time endorsed themes closely associated with Hua Guofeng. Citing a statement by Mao that "ideological education is the key link" for uniting the party for "great political struggles," the editorial strongly underscored the necessity for ideological incentives alongside material ones to stimulate economic activity. "Everyone should gain certain material benefits, but must not work only for his own material good without regard for those of the state and other individuals," it stated, adding that "if everyone focuses his attention on money, it will be impossible to achieve socialist modernization." Hua Guofeng had appeared to embroil himself in political controversy last April, when he similarly expressed reservations about one-sided reliance on material incentives for stimulating economic work in a period when state resources are constrained.

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MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 15-21 DECEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,423 items)			Beijing (576 items)		
Cuban Communist Party Congress	11%	(--)	Polish Situation	10%	(10%)
Presentation to Brezhnev of Order of the October Revolution	4%	(--)	Brezhnev in India	5%	(3%)
Ponomarev in France	4%	(--)	Brezhnev Persian Gulf Peace Proposal	3%	(--)
Brezhnev in India	4%	(26%)			
Brezhnev Persian Gulf Peace Proposal	3%	(--)			
Polish Situation	4%	(8%)			

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- PRAVDA on communist trade unions
- Moscow on Tehran embassy demonstration

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31 DECEMBER 1980
FB TM 80-053

The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components. While the analyses are based on press, press agency, and radio output, statistics presented in the Appendix are compiled only from Moscow and Beijing broadcast commentary output.

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Analyses of Communist Media Now Available

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE OFFERS "TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA"

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which publishes eight different volumes of Daily Reports containing textual material from foreign media, will in the future make available the FBIS weekly analytical report titled TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA. This weekly periodical, which analyzes Chinese, Soviet, and other communist media discussions of key issues, is published under a Confidential classification but is now automatically declassified six months after date of issue. The declassified TRENDS, which averages some 20 to 30 pages, will be sent to you weekly, either as a paper publication or on microfiche.

TRENDS describes current Moscow, Peking and other communist media materials in the perspective of past media content and behavior. The periodical identifies new elements or departures from the standard line, and assesses the import of various themes. It reports and analyzes communist media reactions to major international events and U.S. policy moves. It covers in systematic fashion communist media treatment of such topics as Sino-Soviet, Sino-U.S., and Soviet-U.S. relations, nuclear issues and arms limitation, European security, energy, the Middle East, Indochina, East European developments, international communist alinements and Soviet and Chinese general foreign relations and domestic affairs, including leadership questions.

TRENDS from time to time also includes special "supplementary articles" on subjects of continuing, longer-range interest. Recent examples include articles on the continuing Soviet ideological debate between liberal and conservative figures, and the debate on Chinese leadership policies conducted through historical allegories.

NTIS can also provide immediately microform copies of declassified weekly and biweekly (discontinued) FBIS analyses of communist media, dating from April 1947. These volumes are available under the various titles listed below. The first six entries, dating from April 1947 through March 1967, are on microfilm. The last two entries are on microfiche.

+ SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS
  22 April 1947 - 19 June 1958

+ SURVEY OF FAR EAST BROADCASTS
  12 October 1950 - 26 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF MOSCOW BROADCASTS
  5 October 1950 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF PEKING BROADCASTS
  1 October 1952 - 18 June 1958

+ TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  25 June 1958 - 29 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS
  3 July 1958 - 20 March 1967

+ SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  13 April 1967 - 23 April 1970

+ TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
  5 April 1967 - six months prior to
  current date

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USSR-POLAND

Following its recent rejection of NATO warnings against Soviet intervention in Poland, Moscow has taken new diplomatic and propaganda steps to buttress its claim to be the dominant authority in the area. High-level Soviet-Polish talks have reaffirmed Soviet support for the Kania regime, while Moscow's public reports on Polish developments continue to depict a return to normality. In the meantime, a PRAVDA article has made a new effort at defining what may be the paramaters under which Moscow could accept the Solidarity independent trade union federation.

MOSCOW STRESSES SOLIDITY OF TIES FOLLOWING WESTERN WARNINGS

The visit by Polish Foreign Minister Czyrek to Moscow on 25-26 December has served as a new public demonstration of Soviet support for the Kania regime while signaling Moscow's intention to continue monitoring Polish developments closely. Meanwhile, Moscow comment has continued to balance reassurances to Warsaw with attacks on Western interference and hints of the need for vigilance against destabilizing forces.

The effort to project a renewed atmosphere of normality in Soviet-Polish relations was reflected both in the rank of the latest visitor--the foreign minister rather than a party official--and in the publicity surrounding the visit. As was appropriate for a foreign minister's visit, the final statement dealt largely with international issues, touching only fleetingly on the Polish domestic situation. Although the statement stressed the "inviolability" of the Soviet-Polish alliance and Poland's commitment to maintaining socialism, it did not explicitly discuss Western interference in Poland or raise any other issues that would suggest an abnormal situation. The statement implicitly reaffirmed confidence in the Polish regime by expressing support for the results of the 5 December extraordinary Warsaw Pact leaders' meeting in Moscow. Soviet leader Brezhnev gave a more explicit vote of confidence in the Polish communists' ability to weather the crisis in his meeting with Czyrek, reported by PRAVDA on 27 December. Also suggesting that bilateral relations are on an even keel, a Polish economic delegation arrived in Moscow on the 29th for apparently routine talks on plan coordination.

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Soviet comment on Poland in recent days has balanced a generally favorable assessment of the Polish domestic situation with continued sharp warnings of Western-inspired subversion. One of the most menacing articles, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) on 28 December, denounced as "dirty, provocative, and extremely dangerous" U.S. efforts to encourage countermeasures "in the event of Russian intervention in Poland." The article, like others on the recent NATO meeting, concluded that West European resistance had forced U.S. officials to "give up the idea of pushing through their plan." Another strident note was sounded by PRAVDA on the 28th. It warned that the Soviet bloc countries "will not allow anyone to undermine the socialist gains of their people" but went on to express confidence in the Poles' ability to manage the crisis.

In a more positive vein, Western speculation about Soviet military intervention was dismissed on the 28th by prominent commentator Valentin Zorin in a Moscow English-language radio broadcast and by ZA RUBEZHOM (ABROAD) deputy chief editor Georgiy Kuznetsov in a Budapest television roundtable. And a 25 December Moscow radio English-language commentary on Poland's domestic situation said that "trust" in the Polish party "is being restored" and that "commonsense, constructive attitudes, and realism are gradually gaining the upper hand."

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PRAVDA ACCEPTS IDEA OF DIFFERENTIATION AMONG COMMUNIST UNIONS

In what could be a move aimed at preparing the ground for Soviet acceptance of the Polish Solidarity independent trade union, a PRAVDA article has endorsed the principle that "each fraternal party" must determine the appropriate form for its own trade unions. In an extensive review of the role of trade unions in a communist society, the article sketched a theoretical framework clearly broad enough to accommodate practical compromises that communist regimes may be forced to make as a result of worker pressure stimulated by the Polish events. The only nonnegotiable requirement laid down in PRAVDA was that trade unions could not question the leading role of the party.

The 26 December PRAVDA article by trade union legal expert Marat Baglay was remarkable for its flexibility, practical focus, and nonideological style. From its opening sentence, which stated that the role of trade unions "is determined by the social conditions in which they operate and the tasks facing them," to the closing lines, which declared that socialist trade unions need not follow any "set model" or "mechanically copy" each other, the article seemed clearly calculated to open the door to compromise. In this respect, it introduced a new element of flexibility to the ideas presented in two earlier Soviet articles on the role of trade unions, one by G. Alekseyev in the 25 September PRAVDA and another by Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko in KOMMUNIST No. 17.

Like the earlier articles, the Baglay article stressed the restraint and limitations within which the trade unions' activities should take place. It insisted, for example, that the legitimate goals of trade union activity are the same as those pursued by any communist state. Thus it argued strongly against the idea of a trade union operating outside the framework of other state institutions. Similarly, it argued that the use of the strike weapon to defend workers' interests is inappropriate for a trade union in a communist society, since there is no divorce between the trade unions and the state in their dedication to the workers' interests. These arguments were made in a nondogmatic way, however, seemingly intended to point the way toward compromise.

Seen from the standpoint of its impact on the communist countries of Eastern Europe other than Poland, the article seems likely to impart an impulse for reform, or at least a warning against complacency.

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The article urged unions to "more actively" fulfill their obligations to their members, pointing out that many existing legal rights and responsibilities of the trade unions are not being exercised. It went so far as to point out that Soviet trade unions in 1979 successfully initiated over 6,000 administrative reprimands, including 146 dismissals of economic managers, in exercising these legitimate functions.

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AFGHANISTAN-USSR-IRAN

KARMAL RENEWS CALL FOR FORMATION OF NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT

On the first anniversary of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and his own installation in office, Afghan President Babrak Karmal acknowledged the problems still facing his regime and called for the creation of a National Fatherland Front (NFF). Nothing has come of similar proposals in the past. But in a 27 December speech to the Conference of National and Political Forces in Kabul--the latest and largest in a long line of public meetings designed to generate support for his government--Karmal argued that such an umbrella body would help the Afghan people to defeat the remaining "bandit groupings" and to construct a new society. Moscow commentary on the anniversary was generally affirmative but also pointed to continuing "difficulties."

MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES

In his speech to the representatives of various social and political organizations, many of which had been set up by his regime, Karmal bluntly admitted that the major purpose of the NFF would be to attract "fresh forces" to his hard-pressed government. He noted that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regarded the formation of the front as "the best form" of political organization of the masses and the surest guarantee against divisions and "discord" among the people, which could be exploited by reaction and imperialism. Karmal, as well as subsequent Kabul and Moscow commentary, made much of the size--1,500 people--and representative scope of the conference, but the list of people assigned to the NFF organizing committee suggests that the regime has not reached out very far beyond its usual cadre of supporters.

The notion of an Afghan NFF, which has a long history, grew out of Soviet efforts--such as the creation of committees for the defense of the revolution--to expand the PDPA's political base and to enhance the legitimacy of the Kabul regime. In July 1979 Moscow reported that the PDPA had decided to establish a "united national front" of all "progressive public and political forces." Following the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Moscow noted that Karmal had promised to create such a front. And in July 1980 Moscow reported that the PDPA Central Committee had resolved to form a "United National Fatherland Front." There is no indication, however, that the Afghans ever did anything to implement these announced decisions.

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SOVIET COMMENT In its treatment of the anniversary, Moscow offered the usual praise of the Karmal regime and attacks on alleged foreign backers of the Afghan opposition. Scant attention was given to the Soviet military presence. One observer suggested a sober Soviet evaluation of the events in Afghanistan. Speaking on Moscow television's "Studio Nine" on 27 December, Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Oriental Institute, argued that the stabilization process was the dominant motif of Afghan life and cited as evidence the consolidation of the party, the strengthening of the Afghan army, the establishment of contacts between the Kabul government and the tribes, and the return of refugees from Pakistan. At the same time, however, Primakov conceded that the entire process was "proceeding with difficulties."

MOSCOW, TEHRAN TRADE BARBS OVER EMBASSY EPISODE, AFGHANISTAN

The contentious issue of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan has again soured Moscow's uneasy relations with Tehran. The USSR officially protested an attack by Afghan demonstrators on the Soviet Embassy in Tehran on 27 December, the first anniversary of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Sensitive to repeated Iranian criticism of the Soviet role there, Moscow in its protest avoided acknowledging either the occasion of the demonstration or the identity of the "raging elements" involved in the incident. At the same time, Moscow has again objected to Tehran's equating of U.S. and Soviet policies in the region, contrasting U.S. "aggression and diktat" with Brezhnev's new "peace and security doctrine."

The Soviet protest--publicized in Persian-language broadcasts on the 28th and 29th--complained twice about the "glaring violation of the extraterritoriality" of the Soviet mission in Tehran and stated that the lives of embassy staff members had been threatened.*

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* The last significant expression of support for the principle of diplomatic privileges came in June, at the time of Iran's expulsion of the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy, in an IZVESTIYA article ostensibly addressed to the issue of the American hostages. The Soviet Embassy in Tehran subsequently issued a statement warning of possible "provocative actions" against the embassy. See the TRENDS of 2 and 7 July 1980.

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Holding Iran responsible, the Soviet note envisioned a claim for compensation for damage and asserted the USSR's right to consider appropriate measures "in connection with the hostile actions of the Iranian side" against the Soviet Embassy.

Moscow's Persian-language commentary, reflecting Soviet annoyance with Iranian criticism, has vaguely linked the embassy episode with the Soviet military role in Afghanistan. A talk broadcast in Persian on the 30th found it regrettable that some circles in Iran, in discussing the attack on the embassy, slandered the USSR's military aid to Afghanistan. A 25 December commentary added Iranian Minister of State Behzad Nabavi to the list of Iranian officials periodically chided in Persian broadcasts. Reproaching Nabavi for "negatively" assessing Brezhnev's 10 December "peace and security" proposal for the Persian Gulf, Moscow asserted that he was "one of those people" who cite "completely false facts" to allege that the "superpowers are uniting at the expense of Iran in order to secure their own interests."

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USSR

KOSYGIN DEATH BRINGS PERSONNEL SHAKEUPS, MINIMAL HONORS

The 18 December death of Aleksey Kosygin, head of the Soviet government for 16 years, was marked with correct but minimal honors, apparently reflecting the years of personal and political friction between him and Brezhnev. Kosygin experienced a foretaste of this official coolness some two months before his death, when he resigned as premier under circumstances suggesting that his action may not have been entirely voluntary. Efforts to remove Kosygin's influence quickly became evident in extensive dismissals of his longtime deputies and subordinates which began as soon as he had surrendered his office. The latest of such moves--the ouster of another deputy premier and four more ministers--were announced virtually coincidentally with the news of Kosygin's death.

MINIMAL PUBLIC OBSERVANCES

The most telling divergences from the norm in the Soviet handling of Kosygin's death were the long delay in announcing it and the limited publicity accorded messages of condolence and official tributes. Though his death occurred late on 18 December, it went unannounced until midday on 20 December. The silence on 19 December may have resulted from unwillingness to mar Brezhnev's birthday, which was given ceremonial fanfare and lavish press treatment unprecedented for a 74th birthday. The death was finally announced by TASS shortly after noon and by the Soviet radio at 1300 Moscow time on 20 December and did not make the newspapers until 21 December.

Messages of sympathy were also inexplicably delayed and tributes held to an absolute minimum. Messages of condolence, sent as early as 20 December, did not begin to appear in the central press until 26 December. This contrasts starkly with the practice followed for Kuusinen, Voroshilov, and Grechko, for whom pages of tribute began to appear immediately upon the announcement of their deaths.

In other respects, Kosygin was given correct but minimal treatment. His obituary on page two of the 21 December PRAVDA was similar to that of other deceased Politburo members in recent years--but less than the black border, page-one treatment accorded Kuusinen in 1964 and Voroshilov in 1969. Kosygin's body lay in state for only a minimal period, which gave relatively little opportunity for the

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public to pay homage to their longtime premier. The eight hours accorded him was the same as for Kozlov and Grechko but shorter than for Kuusinen, Voroshilov, or Kulakov. Like most prominent deceased Politburo members, Kosygin was cremated and his ashes placed in the Kremlin wall.

The downgrading of Kosygin implied by the handling of his death was foreshadowed by the curious manner in which his resignation on 23 October was handled. In announcing Kosygin's resignation, Brezhnev failed to utter any word of praise for Kosygin's many years of service. Although a one-sentence message of tribute was belatedly published on 25 October, it was hardly up to the praise accorded to other prominent figures in the past.

GOVERNMENT SHAKEUP Since Kosygin's resignation in October, a widespread purge of his former deputies and subordinates has been taking place. Over the past two months, two deputy premiers and seven ministers have been retired:

+ Deputy Premier M.A. Lesechko, 71, was retired on about 25 October.

+ Deputy Premier V.N. Novikov, 73, was retired on 19 December.

+ Minister of the Tractor and Agricultural Machinebuilding Industry I.F. Sinitsyn, 69, was removed on about 10 October.

+ K.I. Galanshin, 68, and N.V. Timofeyev, 67, disappeared after their ministries, the Timber and Wood-Processing Industry and Pulp and Paper Industry Ministries, were merged on about 30 October.

+ Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry Minister A.I. Kostousov, 74; Construction, Road, and Municipal Machinebuilding Minister Ye. S. Novoselov, 74; Health Minister B.V. Petrovskiy, 72, and Chairman of the State Committee for Material Reserves A.A. Kokarev, 71, were retired on 20 December.

That these replacements reflect a Brezhnev move to consolidate his hold on the government is demonstrated by the career ties of the replacements. The new premier, N.A. Tikhonov, and first deputy premier, I.V. Arkhipov, are old Brezhnev cronies from Dnepropetrovsk. Moscow Second Secretary V.N. Makeyev, named deputy premier on 23 October, was formerly first secretary of Brezhnev's election district and apparently won Brezhnev's trust by his effusive praise for him during election campaigns. Moldavian First Secretary I.I. Bodyul, named deputy premier on 19 December, began his career under Brezhnev when the latter was Moldavian first secretary in the

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early 1950's. Also added to the Council of Ministers were several party officials: L.I. Khitrun, deputy head of the Central Committee's Agriculture Section, became chairman of the State Committee for Technical Supply of Agriculture on 10 October; V.V. Listov, head of the Central Committee's Chemical Industry Section, became minister of the chemical industry on 5 November; and Orenburg First Secretary A.V. Kovalenko became chairman of the State Committee for Material Reserves on 20 December.

With Kosygin's departure, Brezhnev has achieved an objective he has long sought. In recent years, Brezhnev has repeatedly taken advantage of Kosygin's illnesses and incapacitations to undermine the latter's influence over the Council of Ministers. During Kosygin's first serious illness in August-September 1976, Brezhnev promoted his old crony Tikhonov to first deputy premier, and the latter began impinging on the territory of Kosygin's longtime first deputy and apparent ally, K.T. Mazurov. Inclusion of Tikhonov in Politburo photos hinted that he would soon join the Politburo, but with Kosygin's return to work in October 1976 advancement of Tikhonov ceased temporarily and Mazurov resumed his role. Kosygin again fell ill in 1979 and remained absent from mid-October to late February 1980. During his absence, Tikhonov was promoted to full Politburo member and began substituting for Kosygin. Also during Kosygin's absence, in January 1980, Deputy Premier V.A. Kirillin, Kosygin's deputy for science and technology since 1965, was unceremoniously retired.

ARMY PAPER HINTS AT NATIONALITY TENSIONS IN SOVIET MILITARY

A major article in the Soviet paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has suggested that the military leadership is concerned about nationality tensions in the Soviet armed forces. Specifically addressed to the question of the armed forces' policy toward national minorities, the 9 October article appeared aimed at countering discriminatory practices suffered by officers and men of minority origin. The article is the most impressive recent evidence that the growing proportion of Asian recruits in the armed forces--the long-predicted "yellowing" of the Soviet army--is exacerbating the frictions endemic in the multinational Soviet armed forces.

The article, by a frequent commentator on military theoretical subjects, Navy Captain N. Shumikhin, made the usual broad claims on behalf of the armed forces' policy toward national minorities,

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depicting it as a mirror of high standards in Soviet society as a whole. But he made it clear that realities do not always correlate with ideals. He complained that "national prejudices" in the military are "extremely tenacious" and acknowledged that frictions between various ethnic groups will not disappear "spontaneously." He recommended that more attention be paid to countering this divisive force, stating that "discrimination" on the basis of nationality has no place in the Soviet army. In an apparent reference to the growing Asian component of the armed forces, he noted that "demographic" factors are "now making themselves felt" in the armed forces and warned that the elimination of national tensions is a matter of "decisive importance" for the Soviet military.

The article suggested that the military leaders are concerned by resentments generated by unequal treatment of minorities. It implied, for example, that promotions of minority nationalities to command positions are often blocked by discriminatory practices. Assignment to command positions, the article asserted, has nothing to do with nationality but is determined on the basis of "ideological, political, and moral maturity." Similarly, the article suggested that minority personnel are unlikely to be assigned to services equipped with the "most modern and complex types of weapons"--for example to such elite services as the Navy or the Strategic Rocket Forces.

Some of the problems hinted at by Shumikhin had surfaced earlier in a 1978 article on the need for better Russian-language training in non-Russian areas. The article, in RUSSKIY YAZYK V NATSIONALNOY SHKOLE (THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL), No. 4, highlighted some of the disabilities suffered by recruits who were not fluent in Russian. Such recruits, the article indicated, are often assigned to service units rather than to more responsible tasks where their ability to communicate could be vital. This practice, it said, is having an adverse influence on the morale of servicemen, and leading in some cases to a "negative" attitude toward service and a feeling of being "suppressed."

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BRIEF

PRC-SOUTHEAST ASIA: Beijing Support for Democratic Kampuchea

Beijing marked the second anniversary of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea with an authoritative RENMIN RIBAO Observer article that reaffirmed support for Democratic Kampuchea (DK) as the focal point for anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea. The 27 December Observer article maintained that the DK Government is "the mainstay of anti-Vietnamese resistance" and that it is now enjoying increased popular support because of recent political reforms. The article asserted that other "patriotic anti-Vietnamese forces" are starting to cooperate with DK troops in fighting the Vietnamese, an apparent allusion to the joint DK - Khmer Serei military actions against the Vietnamese, which Beijing recently began to publicize. The Observer article suggests that Beijing has not abandoned its view that the DK remains the key to exerting pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Kampuchea. Following the UN General Assembly session last October, which endorsed the DK's UN seat and ASEAN's call for an international conference on Kampuchea, Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew visited Beijing and tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Chinese to support an alternative to the DK regime. In spite of Beijing's refusal to bow to ASEAN pressures on this issue, Chinese media continue to emphasize general areas of agreement with ASEAN. Consistent with this trend, the Observer article stated that ASEAN countries were "vigorously supporting the Kampuchean people's struggle" and demanding Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, BEIJING BROADCAST STATISTICS 22-28 DECEMBER 1980

These statistics are based on the number of commentary items monitored by FBIS from Moscow and Beijing domestic and international radio services. For counting purposes, a commentary item is defined as an official statement or leader's speech, a radio talk, or a press comment. Percentage figures in parentheses refer to the previous week's broadcasts.

Moscow (3,430 items)			Beijing (645 items)		
Polish Foreign Minister Czyrek in USSR	7%	(--)	Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi in PRC	10%	(--)
Afghan Situation	4%	(2%)	Afghan Situation	5%	(1%)
Award Ceremony for Soyuz T-3 Crew	4%	(--)	PRC Foreign Ministry Note on Nonresumption of Talks	4%	(--)
Norwegian Foreign Minister Frydenlund in USSR	3%	(--)	PRC Protest of Dutch Submarine Sales to Taiwan	3%	(1%)
Kosygin Death	2%	(--)	Kampuchea-Vietnam Dispute	3%	(1%)